

**COURSE
GUIDE**

**INR 482
RUSSIA IN WORLD POLITICS**

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INTRODUCTION

INR482, Russia in World Politics is a one semester course in the first year of B.A. (Hons) degree in International Studies. It is a two unit credit course designed to present you a foundational knowledge on vital issues relating to Russia engagement in world politics, it is a global perspectives. The course begins with a module on the background to the study of Russia in world politics, including the geography, economy, political structure; Russian revolutions; Soviet Union in the Cold War era; and Soviet disintegration. The second module will increase your understanding on Post-Soviet restructuring and foreign policy including the historical perspective of Soviet Union foreign policy; post-Soviet restructuring; Russia's foreign policy in post-Cold War era; and Russia's foreign policy in post-Soviet. The third module will help you to familiarize with Russia's contemporary international relations including Russia-European Union relations; Russia in Ukraine; Russia's Role in the Arab spring; and Russia-China relations. Interestingly, the last module will expose you to vital issues on Russia-Africa relations; Russia's foreign policy towards Africa; positive and negative factors in Russia-Africa relations; as well as Russia-Nigeria bilateral relations. However, the study units are structured into modules. Each module is structured into 4 units. A unit guide comprises of instructional material. It gives you a brief of the course content, course guidelines and suggestions and steps to take while studying. You can also find self-assessment exercises for your study.

COURSE AIMS

The primary aim of this course is to provide students of international relations with a comprehensive knowledge on Russia in world politics. The course specific objectives include enabling you:

COURSE OBJECTIVES

To achieve the aims set out above, the course sets overall objectives. In addition, each unit also has specific objectives. The unit objectives are always included at the beginning of a unit; you should read them before you start working through the unit. You may want to refer to them as you progress. You should always look at the unit objectives after completing a unit. In this way, you can be sure that you have done what was required of you by the unit. Set out below are the wider objectives of the course. By meeting these objectives, you should have achieved the aims of the course as a whole.

On successful completion of the course, you should be able to:

- discuss the geography, economy, political system of Russia
- explain Russian revolutions and the subsequent Soviet disintegration
- analyse the post-Soviet restructuring and foreign policy
- familiarise with the Russia's contemporary international relations with EU, Ukraine, Arab spring; and China
- enhance knowledge on Russia-Africa relations; and
- gain in-depth knowledge on Russia-Nigeria bilateral relations.

The specific objectives of each study unit can be found at the beginning and you can make references to it while studying. It is necessary and helpful for you to check at the end of the unit, if your progress is consistent with the stated objectives and if you can conveniently answer the self-assessment exercises. The overall objectives of the course will be achieved, if you diligently study and complete all the units in this course.

WORKING THROUGH THE COURSE

To complete the course, you are required to read the study units and other related materials. You will also need to undertake practical exercises for which you need a pen, a note-book, and other materials that will be listed in this guide. The exercises are to aid you in understanding the concepts being presented. At the end of each unit, you will be required to submit written assignment for assessment purposes.

At the end of the course, you will be expected to write a final examination.

COURSE MATERIALS

Major components of the course are:

1. Course Guide
2. Study Units
3. Textbooks
4. Assignment

STUDY UNITS

There are four modules in this course divided into 16 study units as follows:

Module 1

- Unit 1 Geography, Economy and Political System of Russia
- Unit 2 Russian Revolutions and the Aftermaths
- Unit 3 Soviet Union in the Cold War Era
- Unit 4 Soviet Disintegration

Module 2

- Unit 1 Historical Perspective of Soviet Union Foreign Policy
- Unit 2 Understanding Post-Soviet Restructuring
- Unit 3 Russia's Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era
- Unit 4 Russia's Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet

Module 3

- Unit 1 Russia-EU Relations
- Unit 2 Russia in Ukraine
- Unit 3 Russia's Role in the Arab Spring
- Unit 4 Russia-China Relations

Module 4

- Unit 1 Russia and Africa Interactions
- Unit 2 Russia's Foreign Policy towards Africa
- Unit 3 Positive and Negative Factors in Russia-Africa Relations
- Unit 4 Russia-Nigeria Bilateral Relations

As you can observe, the course begins with the basics and expands into a more elaborate, complex and detailed form. All you need to do is to follow the instructions as provided in each unit. In addition, some self-assessment exercises have been provided with which you can test your progress with the text and determine if your study is fulfilling the stated objectives. Tutor-marked assignments have also been provided to aid your study. All these will assist you to be able to fully grasp the spirit and letters of Russia's role and place in international politics.

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

At the end of each unit, you will find a list of relevant reference materials which you may yourself wish to consult as the need arises, even though I have made efforts to provide you with the most important

information you need to pass this course. However, I would encourage you, as a third year student to cultivate the habit of consulting as many relevant materials as you are able to within the time available to you. In particular, be sure to consult whatever material you are advised to consult before attempting any exercise.

ASSESSMENT

Two types of assessment are involved in the course: the Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs), and the Tutor-Marked Assessment (TMA) questions. Your answers to the SAEs are not meant to be submitted, but they are also important since they give you an opportunity to assess your own understanding of the course content. Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs) on the other hand are to be carefully answered and kept in your assignment file for submission and marking. This will count for 30% of your total score in the course.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

At the end of each unit, you will find tutor-marked assignments. There is an average of two tutor-marked assignments per unit. This will allow you to engage the course as robustly as possible. You need to submit at least four assignments of which the three with the highest marks will be recorded as part of your total course grade. This will account for 10 percent each, making a total of 30 percent. When you complete your assignments, send them including your form to your tutor for formal assessment on or before the deadline.

Self-assessment exercises are also provided in each unit. The exercises should help you to evaluate your understanding of the material so far.

These are not to be submitted. You will find all answers to these within the units they are intended for.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

There will be a final examination at the end of the course. The examination carries a total of 70 percent of the total course grade. The examination will reflect the contents of what you have learnt and the self-assessments and tutor-marked assignments. You therefore need to revise your course materials beforehand.

COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table sets out how the actual course marking is broken down.

ASSESSMENT	MARKS
Four assignments (the best four of all the assignments submitted for marking)	Four assignments, each marked out of 10%, but highest scoring three selected, thus totalling 30%
Final Examination	70% of overall course score
Total	100% of course score

COURSE OVERVIEW PRESENTATION SCHEME

Units	Title of Work	Week Activity	Assignment (End-of-Unit)
Course Guide			
Module 1	Background to the Study of Russia in World Politics		
Unit 1	Geography, Economy and Political System of Russia	Week 1	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Russian Revolutions and the Aftermaths	Week 1	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Soviet Union in the Cold War Era	Week 2	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Soviet Disintegration	Week 3	Assignment 1
Module 2	Post-Soviet Restructuring and Foreign Policy		
Unit 1	Historical Perspective of Soviet Union Foreign Policy	Week 4	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Understanding Post-Soviet Restructuring	Week 5	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Russia's Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era	Week 6	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Russia's Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet	Week 7	Assignment 1
Module 3	Russia's Contemporary International Relations		
Unit 1	Russia-EU relations	Week 8	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Russia in Ukraine	Week 9	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Russia's Role in the Arab Spring	Week 10	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Russia-China Relations	Week 11	Assignment 1

Module 4	Understanding Russia-Africa Relations		
Unit 1	Russia and Africa Interactions	Week 12	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Russia's Foreign Policy Towards Africa	Week 13	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Positive and Negative Factors in Russia-Africa Relations	Week 14	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Russia-Nigeria Bilateral Relations	Week 15	Assignment 1

WHAT YOU WILL NEED FOR THE COURSE

This course builds on what you have learnt in the 100 Levels. It will be helpful if you try to review what you studied earlier. Second, you may need to purchase one or two texts recommended as important for your mastery of the course content. You need quality time in a study friendly environment every week. If you are computer-literate (which ideally you should be), you should be prepared to visit recommended websites. You should also cultivate the habit of visiting reputable physical libraries accessible to you.

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of the course. You will be notified of the dates and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, and keep a close watch on your progress. Be sure to send in your tutor marked assignments promptly, and feel free to contact your tutor in case of any difficulty with your self-assessment exercise, tutor-marked assignment or the grading of an assignment. In any case, you are advised to attend the tutorials regularly and punctually. Always take a list of such prepared questions to the tutorials and participate actively in the discussions.

ASSESSMENT EXERCISES

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First is the Tutor-Marked Assignments; second is a written examination. In handling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The tutor-marked assignments are now being done online. Ensure that you register all your courses so that you can have easy access to the online assignments. Your score in the online assignments will account for 30 per cent of your total coursework. At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final

examination. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS

Usually, there are four online tutor-marked assignments in this course. Each assignment will be marked over ten percent. The best three (that is the highest three of the 10 marks) will be counted. This implies that the total mark for the best three assignments will constitute 30% of your total course work. You will be able to complete your online assignments successfully from the information and materials contained in your references, reading and study units.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for INR 482: Russia in World Politics will be of two hours duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of multiple choice and fill-in-the-gaps questions which will reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed. It is important that you use adequate time to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

There are 16 units in this course. You are to spend one week in each unit. In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suites you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do. The study units tell you when to read and which are your text materials or recommended books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you in a class exercise.

Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives.

If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chance of passing the course.

The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your reference or from a reading section.

The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre nearest to you. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

READ THIS COURSE GUIDE THOROUGHLY. IT IS YOUR FIRST ASSIGNMENT

Organise a study schedule – Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units.

Important information; e.g. details of your tutorials and the date of the first day of the semester is available at the study centre.

You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.

Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind in their coursework. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please let your tutor or course coordinator know before it is too late for help.

Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.

Assemble the study materials. You will need your references for the unit you are studying at any point in time.

As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information. Visit your study centre whenever you need up-to-date information.

Well before the relevant online TMA due dates, visit your study centre for relevant information and updates. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination.

Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to space your study so that you can keep yourself on schedule.

After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the course guide).

CONCLUSION

This is a theory course but you will get the best out of it if you cultivate the habit of relating it to political issues in domestic and international arenas.

SUMMARY

'Russia in world politics', introduces you to general understanding on Russia engagements in world politics. All the basic course materials that you need to successfully complete the course are provided. At the end, you will be able to:

- explain the geography, economy, political system of Russia;
- discuss Russian revolutions and the subsequent Soviet disintegration;
- analyse the post-Soviet restructuring and foreign policy;
- broadly discuss Russia's contemporary international relations with EU, Ukraine, Arab spring; and China;
- clearly explain Russia-Africa relationship; and
- appraise Russia-Nigeria bilateral relationship

List of Acronyms

APEC	-	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BJP	-	Bharatiya Janata Party
CAGR	-	Compounded Annual Growth Rate
CIS	-	Commonwealth of Independent State
CNPC	-	China National Petroleum Corporation
CoE	-	Council of Europe
COMECON	-	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPC	-	Communist Party of China
CPRF	-	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CPSU	-	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRCC	-	Chinese Railway Construction Corporation

ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EU	-	European Union
GCC	-	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
IRT	-	Industrialists' Round Table
ISTC	-	International Science and Technology Centre
LDPR	-	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
MER	-	Ministry of External Relations
MTCR	-	Missile Technology Control Regime
MOU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDDC	-	New Nigeria Development Company
NEP	-	New Economic Policy
NEPAD	-	New Partnership for African Development"
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Community Development
PCA	-	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PPC	-	Permanent Partnership Council
RCP	-	Russian Communist Party
RSDLP	-	Russian Social Democratic Labour Party
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
UK	-	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
UN	-	United Nations
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
USA	-	United States of America
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	-	World Trade Organisation
WWI	-	World War I
WWII	-	World War II

**MAIN
COURSE**

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MODULE 1

Unit 1	Geography, Economy and Political System of Russia
Unit 2	Russian Revolutions and the Aftermaths
Unit 3	Soviet Union in the Cold War Era
Unit 4	Soviet Disintegration

UNIT 1 GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMY AND POLITICAL SYSTEM OF RUSSIA**CONTENTS**

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
	3.1 Russia's Geography and Economic Potentials
	3.2 The Uniqueness of Russia's Independence
	3.3 Russia's Political System
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit is fundamental introductory knowledge including Russia's geographical compositions and economic potentials, the uniqueness of Russia's independence as well as the political system of Russia.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- briefly explain the geographical compositions and economic potentials of Russia
- review the uniqueness of Russia's independence; and
- describe the political system of Russia.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT**3.1 The Geography and Economic Potentials of Russia**

Geographically, Russian federation is located in northern part of Eurasia. Russia is the world's largest country covers a total area of 17,098,242 sq. km. and shares its land boundary with fourteen

neighboring countries. China, Mongolia, North Korea, Kazakhstan in the south, Georgia, Azerbaijan in the southwest, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in the northwest and Poland, Belarus and Ukraine in the west. It is surrounded by Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea in the north. Russia has 37,653 km long coastline. The latitudinal and longitudinal extent of Russia is 41° and 82°N and 19°E and 169°W respectively. Moscow, the capital city of Russia is also its largest city, it is a major political and economic center in Russia and in Eastern Europe. Russia has wide base of natural resources, in fact it has 40 UNESCO listed biosphere reserves. Topographically, Russia has plains in the west of Urals, mountainous regions in the south and tundra and coniferous forest in Siberia. Due to its vast size Russia experiences wide range of climates though humid continental climate is predominant in most part of the country barring Siberian region, which experience sub-arctic climate and tundra climate in polar north. The official language is Russian and ethnic groups' ranges among Tatars, Ukrainians, Bashkirs, Churash, Chechen and Armenians. The Current President is Dmitriy Anatolyevich Midvale and the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (Maps of World, 2016).

Fig. 1.1a: World Political Map showing the Location of Russian Federation



Source: <http://www.mapsofworld.com/images/world-political-map.jpg> retrieved June, 2016.

Fig.1.1b: World Map showing the Location of Russian Federation



Source: <http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-maps/world-map-with-latitude-and-longitude.html> retrieved June, 2016

Fig.1.1c: Russia physical map showing Moscow, the capital city, international boundaries between her neighboring countries and surrounding seas



Source: <http://www.mapsofworld.com/physical-map/maps/russia-physical-map.jpg> June, 2016.

Economically, Russia has a large reserve in the world's national resources. It is blessed with crude oil, natural gas, mineral resources and energy resources. Russia has the world's eighth largest economy by nominal GDP or the sixth largest by purchasing power parity with the eight largest nominal military budgets with the possession of world's largest stockpile of weapon of mass destruction. Russia possesses the world's eighth largest reserves of oil and is the world's second largest oil exporter (next to Saudi Arabia). It also possesses the world's largest natural gas reserves and is the largest exporter of natural gas. In addition, Russia has the second largest coal reserves. These natural resources, particularly oil, have been a major driving force of the Russian economy for a long time and a significant determinant of Russia's economic wealth (Cooper, 2009).

Russia, one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. However, Russia's reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices. The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during 1998-2008 as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia's commodity-based growth model. A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with the GDP falling by close to 4%. Most economists expect this downturn will continue through 2016. Government support for import substitution has increased recently in an effort to diversify the economy away from extractive industries. Although the Russian Ministry of Economic Development is forecasting a modest growth of 0.7% for 2016 as a whole, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is more pessimistic and expects the recovery to begin later in the year and a decline of 0.5% to 1.0% for the full year. Russia is heavily dependent on the movement of world commodity prices and the CBR estimates that if oil prices remain below \$40 per barrel beyond 2016, the resulting shock would cause GDP to fall by up to 5% (World-FactBook, 2016).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you briefly explain the geographical compositions and economic potentials of Russia?

3.2 The Uniqueness of Russia's Independence

Russia has been celebrating its independence day on June 12 since 1990. However, unlike most countries Russia's Independence Day doesn't observe end of colonial rule or imperialism; instead it observes the creation of the Russian Federation after the dissolution Soviet Union that comprised of 15 sub-national republics. On June 12, 1990, Russia

formally declared its secession from the Soviet Union; the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, which was then headed by Boris Yeltsin, adopted the Declaration of the State Sovereignty, giving birth to the Russian Federation as an independent state. This assembly also declared its autonomous power over matters within the borders of the Russian Federation to take precedence over Soviet rule. Consequently, a dual political system was born within Russia, which changed the political landscape of the nation. However, on the first anniversary of the Russian declaration of sovereignty, Boris Yeltsin was elected as first democratically elected president of the Russian Federation. The country adopted its new constitution, national flag, and anthem to reflect the new political dynamics. Its new name—the Russian Federation was adopted on December 25, 1991, and June 12, 1992, was proclaimed as the national holiday. Although, Russia did not achieve independence in the typical sense of the word, the Independence Day is reminder of the period of uncertainty, and the progression of Russian people towards a more open society. The celebrations that mark this day are full of festivities and events highlighting the rich heritage and culture. Since 2003, the country has been organising a grand military parade that recaptures the Soviet military parade of the Revolution Day. While bands play songs that have been a vital aspect of Russian legacy including those from the Soviet era, cavalymen are seen wearing traditional uniforms prior to Russian Revolution. Moreover, in some parts of the country people wear their traditional dresses, and indulge in their traditional dance and music.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the uniqueness of Russia's independence

3.3 Russia's Political System

Every country has its own political structure and composition, Russia is an exception. According to the constitution, which was adopted in 1993, following the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, Russia is a federation, which is fundamentally structured as representations of democracy, whose government is composed of three branches including *executive*, *legislative* and *Judiciary*. However, *Executive power* is exercised by the government (The President is the Commander in Chief of the Military); *Legislative power* is vested in two chambers of the federal assembly (State Duma and the Federation Council); *Judiciary* comprises the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Arbitration.

According Chapter 1 of the 1993 Constitution of Russian Federation, Russia is a democratic federal law-governed state with a republican form of government, comprising 83 federal subjects. The Federal Assembly is a two-chamber legislature: the lower house, the State

Duma, has 450 deputies elected by proportional representation; and the upper house, the Federation Council, has 178 nominated deputies, two from each of Russia's 83 republics and regions. The most important political parties currently represented in the Duma are: United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Fair Russia, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) (World Bank, 2011).

The government is regulated by a system of checks and balances defined by the constitution of Russian Federation. The President is elected by popular vote for a six-year term and eligible for a second term, but constitutionally barred from a third term. Election was last held in 2008. Ministers are composed of the premier and his deputies, and selected other individuals. The National Legislature is the Federal Assembly consisting of two chambers, 450 member state Duma and 176 member Federation Council. Leading political parties in Russia include United Russia, the Russian Communist Party (RCP), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Fair Russia.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you describe the political system of Russia?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have explained the geographical compositions and economic potentials of Russia; discussed the uniqueness of Russia's independence; and the political system of Russia.

5.0 SUMMARY

Summarily, Russia is very important in world politics because of her strategic geographical location, compositions and economic/technological potentials; her independence is unique and the political system of Russia satisfied a globally endorsed system of democratic representativeness.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Briefly explain the geographical compositions and economic potentials of Russia
2. Discuss the uniqueness of Russia's independence
3. Describe the political system of Russia

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Cooper, W. H. (2009). 'Russia's Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States.' Available from <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf>

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UNIT 2 RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS AND THE AFTERMATH**CONTENTS**

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 1905 Russian Revolution
 - 3.2 1917 Russian Revolution
 - 3.3 The creation of the Soviet Union
 - 3.4 The Policy of War Communism
 - 3.5 The New Economic Policy
 - 3.6 The Effect of the Communism on the Russian Society
 - 3.7 Industrialisation and Collectivization Policies
 - 3.8 The First Five-year Plan by Stalin in 1929
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit is significant as it will help you to understand some major historical events that took place before Russia became a sovereign or independent state, particularly the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions; the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 including the policy of war communism; the new economic policy; the effect of communism on the Russian society; industrialisation and collectivisation and the first five-year plan by Stalin in 1929.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the 1905 Russian Revolution
- discuss the 1917 Russian Revolution
- explain the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922
- review the policy of War Communism
- explicate the New Economic Policy
- explain the effect of the communism on the Russian society
- analyse the industrialisation and collectivisation; and
- discuss the first five-year plan by Stalin in 1929.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The 1905 Russian Revolution

The 1905 Russian Revolution was sparked off by a peaceful protest held on January 22nd. This protest was the turning point in the relationship between *Tsar Nicholas II* and his people. Led by a Russian orthodox priest, Father Gapon, 150,000 people took to the cold and snow covered streets of St Petersburg to protest about their lifestyle. The protest was not intent on calling for the overthrow of the government or royal family. The petition they carried clearly showed that they wanted Nicholas to help them. The petition they carried stated:

"Oh Sire, we working men and inhabitants of St. Petersburg, our wives, our children and our parents, helpless and aged women and men, have come to You our ruler, in search of justice and protection. We are beggars, we are oppressed and overburdened with work, we are insulted, we are not looked on as human beings but as slaves. The moment has come for us when death would be better than the prolongation of our intolerable sufferings. We are seeking here our last salvation. Do not refuse to help your people. Destroy the wall between yourself and your people (Trueman, 2016)."

None of this could be considered to be a call for a political overhaul, merely a plea for Nicholas to hear their call for help. As the huge crowd marched through St Petersburg to the Winter Palace, they were confronted by troops who were understandably nervous having to face such a large crowd. The evidence as to why the soldiers fired on the peaceful crowd is patchy – such as who gave the command (if one was ever given) – but after the firing had finished several hundred protestors lay dead. The tragedy was quickly called “Bloody Sunday”. *Revolutionary parties* inflated the number of deaths to thousands. Rumors were spread that there were so many deaths, that soldiers disposed of the bodies in the night to disguise the real number killed. The government figure was less than 100 deaths.

"The present ruler has lost absolutely the affection of the Russian people, and whatever the future may have in store for the dynasty, the present tsar will never again be safe in the midst of his people." (ibid, 2016).

News of what happened quickly spread throughout Russia. Strikes occurred throughout the country involving about 400,000 people; peasants attacked the homes of their landlords; the Grand Duke Sergei, the tsar's uncle, was assassinated in February; the transport system all but ground to a halt. Russia seemed to be on the point of imploding. Sailors on the battleship 'Potemkin' mutinied in June and to add more woes to the government, it became clear that on top of all of this, Russia had lost the *Russo-Japanese War* – a war that was meant to have bound the people in patriotic fervour to Nicholas.

In January the demonstrators in St Petersburg had merely wanted the tsar to help improve their living standards. By the summer, the demands had become far more political. Protestors called for freedom of speech to be guaranteed; they demanded an elected parliament (Duma) and they demanded the right to form political parties. The Finns and Poles demanded their right to national independence.

In October 1905, a general strike took place in Moscow and quickly spread to other cities. All manner of people took to the streets demanding change – students, factory workers, revolutionaries, doctors and teachers. On October 26th, the St Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed. This example of working class unity and strength quickly spread to other industrial cities.

Nicholas had two choices. He could use force to put down the rebellions but he had no guarantee that this would be successful as he could not fully trust the military or he could make a conciliatory offer. He did the latter by issuing the *October Manifesto* on October 30th.

By December, troops had arrived back in European Russia from the *Russo-Japanese War*. Nicholas used loyal troops to put down the St Petersburg Soviet and to crush those on strike in Moscow. Loyal troops were also sent into the countryside to restore law and order. While the October Manifesto had seemingly brought rewards to the protestors, the tsar's reaction in December showed where the government really stood.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the 1905 Russian Revolution?

3.2 The 1917 Russian Revolution

Displeased by the relatively few changes made by the Tsar after the Revolution of 1905, Russia became a hotbed of anarchism, socialism and other radical political systems. The dominant socialist party, the

Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), subscribed to Marxist ideology. Starting in 1903, a series of splits in the party between two main leaders was escalating: the Bolsheviks (meaning “majority”) led by Vladimir Lenin, and the Mensheviks (meaning “minority”) led by Julius Martov. Up until 1912, both groups continued to stay united under the name “RSDLP,” but significant and irreconcilable differences between Lenin and Martov led the party to eventually split. A struggle for political dominance subsequently began between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. Not only did these groups fight with each other, they also had common enemies, notably, those trying to bring the Tsar back to power. The Tsarist system was completely overthrown in February 1917. Rabinowitch (2004) argues:

The February 1917 revolution grew out of prewar political and economic instability, technological backwardness, and fundamental social divisions, coupled with gross mismanagement of the war effort, continuing military defeats, domestic economic dislocation, and outrageous scandals surrounding the monarchy.

In late February (3rd March, 1917 in the Gregorian Calendar), a strike occurred in a factory in the capital Petrograd (the new name for Saint Petersburg). On 23 February 8th March, 1917, thousands of women textile workers walked out of their factories protesting the lack of food and calling on other workers to join them. Within days, nearly all the workers in the city were idle, and street fighting broke out. The Tsar ordered the Duma to disband, ordered strikers to return to work, and ordered troops to shoot at demonstrators in the streets. His orders triggered the February Revolution, especially when soldiers openly sided with the strikers. The tsar and the aristocracy fell on 2nd March, as Nicholas II abdicated.

The Russian Revolution is the collective term for a pair of revolutions in Russia in 1917, which dismantled the Tsarist autocracy and led to the eventual rise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Empire collapsed with the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II, and the old regime was replaced by a provisional government during the first revolution of February 1917 (March in the Gregorian calendar; the older Julian calendar was in use in Russia at the time). In the second revolution that October, the Provisional Government was removed and replaced with a Bolshevik (Communist) government. The February Revolution (March 1917) was a revolution focused around Petrograd (now Saint Petersburg), then capital of Russia. In the chaos, members of the Imperial parliament or Duma assumed control of the country, forming the Russian Provisional

Government. The army leadership did not have the means to suppress the revolution, resulting in Nicholas' abdication. The Soviets (workers' councils), which were led by the more radical socialist factions, initially permitted the Provisional Government to rule, but insisted on a prerogative to influence the government and control various militias. The February Revolution took place in the context of heavy military setbacks during the First World War (1914–18), which left much of the Russian army in a state of mutiny. A period of dual power ensued, during which the Provisional Government held state power while the national network of Soviets, led by socialists, had the allegiance of the lower classes and the political left. During this chaotic period there were frequent mutinies, protests and many strikes. When the Provisional Government chose to continue fighting the war with Germany, the Bolsheviks and other socialist factions campaigned for stopping the conflict. The Bolsheviks turned workers militias under their control into the Red Guards (later the Red Army) over which they exerted substantial control. In the October Revolution (November in the Gregorian calendar), the Bolshevik party, led by Vladimir Lenin, and the workers' Soviets overthrew the Provisional Government in Petrograd and established the Russian SFSR, eventually shifting the capital to Moscow in 1918. The Bolsheviks appointed themselves as leaders of various government ministries and seized control of the countryside, establishing the Cheka to quash dissent. To end Russia's participation in the First World War, the Bolshevik leaders signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March 1918. Civil war erupted among the "Reds" (Bolsheviks), the "Whites" (anti-socialist factions), and non-Bolshevik socialists. It continued for several years, during which the Bolsheviks defeated both the Whites and all rival socialists. In this way, the Revolution paved the way for the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922.

Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia from exile in Switzerland with the help of Germany, which hoped that widespread strife would cause Russia to withdraw from the war. After many behind-the-scenes maneuvers, the Soviets seized control of the government in November 1917 and drove Kerensky and his moderate provisional government into exile, in the events that became known as the October Revolution. When the National Constituent Assembly (elected in December 1917) refused to become a rubber stamp of the Bolsheviks, it was dissolved by Lenin's troops and all vestiges of democracy were removed. With the handicapped moderate opposition removed, Lenin was able to free his regime from the war problem by the harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) with Germany in which Russia lost much of her western borderlands. However, when Germany was defeated the Soviet government repudiated the Treaty.

Following the February Revolution in 1917, the Mensheviks gained control of Russia and established a provisional government, but this lasted only until the Bolsheviks took power in the October Revolution (also called the Bolshevik Revolution) later in the year. To distinguish themselves from other socialist parties, the Bolshevik party was renamed the Russian Communist Party (RCP).

Under the control of the party, all politics and attitudes that were not strictly RCP were suppressed, under the premise that the RCP represented the proletariat and all activities contrary to the party's beliefs were "counterrevolutionary" or "anti-socialist." During the years between 1917 to 1923, the Soviet Union achieved peace with the Central Powers, their enemies in World War I, but also fought the Russian Civil War against the White Army and foreign armies from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, among others. This resulted in large territorial changes, albeit temporarily for some of these. Eventually crushing all opponents, the RCP spread Soviet style rule quickly and established itself through all of Russia. Following Lenin's death in 1924, Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the RCP, became Lenin's successor and continued as leader of the Soviet Union until the 1950s.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the 1917 Russian revolution?

3.3 The Creation of the Soviet Union in 1922

The history of Russia between 1922 and 1991 is essentially the history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or Soviet Union. This ideologically based union, established in December 1922 by the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, was roughly coterminous with Russia before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At that time, the new nation included four constituent republics: the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belarusian SSR, and the Trans Caucasian SFSR. The constitution, adopted in 1924, established a federal system of government based on a succession of soviets set up in villages, factories, and cities in larger regions.

This pyramid of soviets in each constituent republic culminated in the All-Union Congress of Soviets. However, while it appeared that the Congress exercised sovereign power, this body was actually governed by the Communist Party, which in turn was controlled by the Politburo from Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, just as it had been under the tsars before Peter the Great.

Early in its conception, the Soviet Union strived to achieve harmony among all peoples of all countries. The original ideology of the state was

primarily based on the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In its essence, Marx's theory stated that economic and political systems went through an inevitable evolution in form, by which the current capitalist system would be replaced by a socialist state before achieving international cooperation and peace in a "Workers' Paradise," creating a system directed by what Marx called "Pure Communism."

On December 29, 1922 a conference of plenipotentiary delegations from the Russian SFSR, the Trans caucasian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR approved the Treaty on the Creation of the USSR and the Declaration of the Creation of the USSR, forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These two documents were confirmed by the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR and signed by heads of delegations – Mikhail Kalinin, Mikhail Tskhakaya, Mikhail Frunze and Grigory Petrovsky, Alexander Chervyakov respectively on December 30, 1922.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Attempt an explanation of the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922.

3.4 The Policy of War Communism

During the Civil War (1917–21), the Bolsheviks adopted War Communism, which entailed the breakup of the landed estates and the forcible seizure of agricultural surpluses. The period from the consolidation of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to 1921 was known as the period of War Communism. Lands, all industries, and small businesses were nationalized, and the money economy was restricted. Strong opposition soon developed. The peasants wanted cash payments for their products and resented having to surrender their surplus grain to the government as a part of its civil war policies. In the cities there were intense food shortages and a breakdown in the money system (at the time many Bolsheviks argued that ending money's role as a transmitter of "value" was a sign of the rapidly approaching communist epoch). Many city dwellers fled to the countryside - often to tend the land that the Bolshevik breakup of the landed estates had transferred to the peasants. Even small scale "capitalist" production was suppressed.

The Kronstadt rebellion signaled the growing unpopularity of War Communism in the countryside: in March 1921, at the end of the civil war, disillusioned sailors, and peasants who initially had been stalwart supporters of the Bolsheviks under the provisional government, revolted against the new regime. Although the Red Army, commanded by Trotsky, crossed the ice over the frozen Baltic Sea to quickly crush the rebellion, this sign of growing discontent forced the party to foster a broad alliance of the working class and peasantry (80% of the population), despite left factions of the party which favored a regime

solely representative of the interests of the revolutionary proletariat. At the Tenth Party Congress, it was decided to end War Communism and institute the New Economic Policy (NEP), in which the state allowed a limited market to exist. Small private businesses were allowed and restrictions on political activity were somewhat eased. However, the key shift involved the status of agricultural surpluses.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the policy of war communism?

3.5 The New Economic Policy

Confronted with peasant opposition, Lenin began a strategic retreat from war communism known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). The peasants were freed from wholesale levies of grain and allowed to sell their surplus produce in the open market. Commerce was stimulated by permitting private retail trading. The state continued to be responsible for banking, transportation, heavy industry, and public utilities. Although the left opposition among the communists criticized the rich peasants, or kulaks, who benefited from the NEP, the program proved highly beneficial and the economy revived. The NEP later came under increasing opposition from within the party following Lenin's death in early 1924.

Rather than simply requisitioning agricultural surpluses in order to feed the urban population (the hallmark of War Communism), the NEP allowed peasants to sell their surplus yields on the open market. Meanwhile, the state still maintained state ownership of what Lenin deemed the "commanding heights" of the economy: heavy industry such as the coal, iron, and metallurgical sectors along with the banking and financial components of the economy. The "commanding heights" employed the majority of the workers in the urban areas. Under the NEP, such state industries would be largely free to make their own economic decisions.

In the cities and between the cities and the countryside, the NEP period saw a huge expansion of trade in the hands of full-time merchants - who were typically denounced as "speculators" by the leftists and also often resented by the public. The growth in trade, did generally coincide with rising living standards in both the city and the countryside (around 80% of Soviet citizens were in the countryside at this point). The Soviet NEP (1921–29) was essentially a period of "market socialism" similar to the economic reform in China in 1978, in that both foresaw a role for private entrepreneurs and limited markets based on trade and pricing rather than fully centralized planning. As an interesting aside, during the

first meeting in the early 1980s between Deng Xiaoping and Armand Hammer, a U.S. industrialist and prominent investor in Lenin's Soviet Union, Deng pressed Hammer for as much information on the NEP as possible. During the NEP period, agricultural yields not only recovered to the levels attained before the Bolshevik Revolution, but greatly improved. The break-up of the quasi-feudal landed estates of the Tsarist-era countryside gave peasants their greatest incentives ever to maximize production. Now able to sell their surpluses on the open market, peasants spending gave a boost to the manufacturing sectors in the urban areas. As a result of the NEP, and the break-up of the landed estates while the Communist Party was strengthening power between 1917–1921, the Soviet Union became the world's greatest producer of grain. Agriculture, however, recovered from civil war more rapidly than heavy industry. Factories, badly damaged by civil war and capital depreciation, were far less productive. In addition, the organisation of enterprises into trusts or syndicates representing one particular sector of the economy contribute to imbalances between supply and demand associated with monopolies. Due to the lack of incentives brought by market competition, and with little or no state controls on their internal policies, trusts sold their products at higher prices. The slow recovery of industry posed some problems for the peasantry, who accounted for 80% of the population. Since agriculture was relatively more productive, relative price indexes for industrial goods were higher than those of agricultural products. The outcome of this was what Trotsky deemed the "Scissors Crisis" because of the scissors-like shape of the graph representing shifts in relative price indexes. Simply put, peasants have to produce more grain to purchase consumer goods from the urban areas. As a result, some peasants withheld agricultural surpluses in anticipation of higher prices, thus contributing to mild shortages in the cities. This, of course, is speculative market behavior, which was frowned upon by many Communist Party cadres, who considered it to be exploitative of urban consumers. In the meantime, the party took constructive steps to offset the crisis, attempting to bring down prices for manufactured goods and stabilize inflation, by imposing price controls on essential industrial goods and breaking-up the trusts in order to increase economic efficiency.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the new economic policy?

3.6 The Effect of Communism on the Russian Society

While the Russian economy was being transformed, the social life of the people underwent equally drastic changes. From the beginning of the revolution, the government attempted to weaken patriarchal domination

of the family. Divorce no longer required court procedure, and to make women completely free of the responsibilities of childbearing, abortion was made legal as early as 1920. As a side effect, the emancipation of women increased the labor market. Girls were encouraged to secure an education and pursue a career in the factory or the office. Communal nurseries were set up for the care of small children, and efforts were made to shift the center of people's social life from the home to educational and recreational groups, the soviet clubs.

The regime abandoned the tsarist policy of discriminating against national minorities in favor of a policy of incorporating the more than two hundred minority groups into Soviet life. Another feature of the regime was the extension of medical services. Campaigns were carried out against typhus, cholera, and malaria; the number of doctors was increased as rapidly as facilities and training would permit; and infant mortality rates rapidly decreased while life expectancy increased.

In accordance with Marxist theory, the government also promoted atheism and materialism. It opposed organized religion, especially to break the power of the Russian Orthodox Church, a former pillar of the old tsarist regime and a major barrier to social change. Many religious leaders were sent to internal exile camps. Members of the party were forbidden to attend religious services, and the education system was separated from the Church. Religious teaching was prohibited except in the home, and atheist instruction was stressed in the schools.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the effect of the communism on the Russian society?

3.7 Industrialisation and Collectivisation

The years from 1929 to 1939 comprised a tumultuous decade in Soviet history - a period of massive industrialization and internal struggles as Joseph Stalin established near total control over Soviet society, wielding virtually unrestrained power. Following Lenin's death, Stalin wrestled to gain control of the Soviet Union with rival factions in the Politburo, especially Leon Trotsky's. By 1928, with the Trotskyists either exiled or rendered powerless, Stalin was ready to put a radical programme of industrialisation into action.

Following Lenin's third stroke, a troika made up of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev emerged to take day to day leadership of the party and the country and try to block Trotsky from taking power. Lenin, however, had become increasingly anxious about Stalin and, following his

December 1922 stroke, dictated a letter (known as Lenin's Testament) to the party criticising him and urging his removal as General Secretary, a position which was starting to become the most powerful in the party. Stalin was aware of Lenin's Testament and acted to keep Lenin in isolation for health reasons and increase his control over the party apparatus. Zinoviev and Bukharin became concerned about Stalin's increasing power and proposed that the Orgburo which Stalin headed be abolished and that Zinoviev and Trotsky be added to the party secretariat thus diminishing Stalin's role as general secretary. Stalin reacted furiously and the Orgburo was retained but Bukharin, Trotsky and Zinoviev were added to the body. Due to growing political differences with Trotsky and his Left Opposition in the fall of 1923, the troika of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev reunited. At the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, Trotsky failed to use Lenin's Testament as a tool against Stalin for fear of endangering the stability of the Party. Lenin died in January 1924 and in May his Testament was read aloud at the Central Committee but Zinoviev and Kamenev argued that Lenin's objections had proven groundless and that Stalin should remain General Secretary. The Central Committee decided not to publish the testament. Meanwhile, the campaign against Trotsky intensified and he was removed from the position of People's Commissar of War before the end of the year. In 1925, Trotsky was denounced for his essay *Lessons of October*, which criticized Zinoviev and Kamenev for initially opposing Lenin's plans for an insurrection in 1917. Trotsky was also denounced for his theory of permanent revolution which contradicted Stalin's position that socialism could be built in one country, Russia, without a worldwide revolution. As the prospects for a revolution in Europe, particularly Germany, became increasingly dim through the 1920s, Trotsky's theoretical position began to look increasingly pessimistic as far as the success of Russian socialism was concerned. With the resignation of Trotsky as War Commissar, the unity of the troika began to unravel. Zinoviev and Kamenev again began to fear Stalin's power and felt that their positions were threatened. Stalin moved to form an alliance with Bukharin and his allies on the right of the party who supported the New Economic Policy and encouraged a slowdown in industrialization efforts and a move towards encouraging the peasants to increase production via market incentives. Zinoviev and Kamenev criticized this policy as a return to capitalism. The conflict erupted at the Fourteenth Party Congress held in December 1925 with Zinoviev and Kamenev now protesting against the dictatorial policies of Stalin and trying to revive the issue of Lenin's Testament which they had previously buried. Stalin now used Trotsky's previous criticisms of Zinoviev and Kamenev to defeat and demote them and bring in allies like Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov and Mikhail Kalinin. Trotsky was dropped from the Politburo entirely in 1926. The Fourteenth Congress also saw the first developments of the Stalin's cult

of personality with him being referred to as “leader” for the first time and becoming the subject of effusive praise from delegates.

Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev formed a United Opposition against the policies of Stalin and Bukharin, but they had lost influence as a result of the inner party disputes and in October 1927, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were expelled from the Central Committee. In November, prior to the Fifteenth Party Congress, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Communist Party itself as Stalin sought to deny the Opposition any opportunity to make their struggle public. By the time, the Congress finally convened in December 1927, Zinoviev had capitulated to Stalin and denounced his previous adherence to the opposition as “anti-Leninist” and the few remaining members still loyal to the Opposition were subjected to insults and humiliations. By early 1928, Trotsky and other leading members of the Left Opposition had been sentenced to internal exile. Stalin now moved against Bukharin by appropriating Trotsky’s criticisms of his right wing policies and he promoted a new general line of the party favoring collectivization of the peasantry and rapid industrialization of industry, forcing Bukharin and his supporters into a Right Opposition.

At the Central Committee meeting held in July 1928, Bukharin and his supporters argued that Stalin’s new policies would cause a conflict with the peasantry. Bukharin also alluded to Lenin’s Testament. While he had support from the Party organization in Moscow and the leadership of several commissariats, Stalin’s control of the secretariat was decisive in that it allowed Stalin to manipulate elections to party posts throughout the country, giving him control over a large section of the Central Committee. The Right Opposition was defeated and Bukharin attempted to form an alliance with Kamenev and Zinoviev but it was too late.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you analyse the industrialisation and collectivisation policies?

3.8 The First Five-Year Plan by Stalin in 1929

Abolishing the NEP, it was the first of a number of plans aimed at swift accumulation of capital resources through the buildup of heavy industry, the collectivisation of agriculture, and the restricted manufacture of consumer goods. For the first time in history a government controlled all economic activity. As a part of the plan, the government took control of agriculture through the state and collective farms (kolkhozes). By a decree of February 1930, about one million individual peasants (kulaks) were forced off their land. Many peasants strongly opposed regimentation by the state, often slaughtering their herds when faced

with the loss of their land. In some sections they revolted, and countless peasants deemed “kulaks” by the authorities were executed. The combination of bad weather, deficiencies of the hastily established collective farms, and massive confiscation of grain precipitated a serious famine, and several million peasants died of starvation, mostly in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and parts of southwestern Russia. The deteriorating conditions in the countryside drove millions of desperate peasants to the rapidly growing cities, fueling industrialization, and vastly increasing Russia’s urban population in the space of just a few years.

The plans received remarkable results in areas aside from agriculture. Russia, in many measures the poorest nation in Europe at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, now industrialised at a phenomenal rate, far surpassing Germany’s pace of industrialisation in the 19th century and Japan’s earlier in the 20th century.

While the Five-Year Plans were forging ahead, Stalin was establishing his personal power. The NKVD gathered in tens of thousands of Soviet citizens to face arrest, deportation, or execution. The six original members of the 1920 Politburo who survived Lenin, were all purged by Stalin. Old Bolsheviks who had been loyal comrades of Lenin, high officers in the Red Army, and directors of industry were liquidated in the Great Purges. Purges in other Soviet republics also helped centralize control in the USSR. Stalin’s repressions led to the creation of a vast system of internal exile, of considerably greater dimensions than those set up in the past by the tsars. Draconian penalties were introduced and many citizens were prosecuted for fictitious crimes of sabotage and espionage. The labor provided by convicts working in the labor camps of the Gulag system became an important component of the industrialization effort, especially in Siberia. An estimated 18 million people passed through the Gulag system, and perhaps another 15 million experienced of some other form of forced labour.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the first five-year plan by Stalin in 1929?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, the 1905 and 1917 Russian Revolutions; the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 including the policy of War Communism; the New Economic Policy; the effect of the communism on the Russian society; industrialization and collectivization and the first five-year plan by Stalin in 1929 have been discussed respectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

Summarily, this unit is a review of some major historical issues particularly Russian revolutions and the subsequent creation of the Soviet Union as well as the various political and economic policies up till 1929 as they affected Russian society.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the 1905 Russian Revolution.
2. Discuss the 1917 Russian revolution.
3. Explain the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922.
4. Discuss the policy of War Communism.
5. Explain the New Economic Policy.
6. Explain the effect of communism on the Russian society.
7. Analyse the industrialisation and collectivisation in the Soviet Union.
8. Discuss the first five-year plan by Stalin.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 SOVIET UNION IN THE COLD WAR ERA

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 The Concept of Cold War
 - 3.2 The Early Cold War (1917 - 1939)
 - 3.3 The 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath
 - 3.4 The Soviet Union as one of the Major World Powers in the Cold War Period
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Soviet Union was one of the ideological driven States in the Cold War era of world politics. Therefore, This unit is significant as it will not only help you to have a good understanding on the concept of Cold War and bring to your limelight the Soviet involvement in the early Cold War from 1917 to 1939; the 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath as well as the Soviet Union as one of the two major world powers in the Cold War period.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- briefly describe the concept of the Cold War
- discuss the early Cold War period from 1917 to 1939
- discuss the reason for the 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath; and
- explain the how the Soviet Union became one of the major powers in the Cold War.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Concept of Cold War

Cold War is the term used to describe the post-World War II struggle between the United States and its allies and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies. During the Cold War period, which

began with the rise of communism in 1917 and the creation of Soviet Union in 1922, until the end of the 1980s, international politics were heavily shaped by the intense rivalry between these two great blocs of power and the political ideologies they represented: democracy and capitalism in the case of the United States and its allies, and communism in the case of the Soviet bloc. The principal allies of the United States during the Cold War included Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada. On the Soviet side were many of the countries of Eastern Europe - including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Romania - and, during parts of the Cold War, Cuba and China. Countries that had no formal commitment to either bloc were known as neutrals or, the Third World, as non-aligned nations - a self-proclaimed neutral bloc which arose with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) founded by Egypt, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. This faction rejected association with either the US-led West or the Soviet-led East. American journalist Walter Lippmann first popularized the term *Cold War* in a 1947 book by that name (Carnes and Helle, 2007). By using the term, Lippmann meant to suggest that "relations between the USSR and its World War II allies (primarily the United States, Britain, and France) had deteriorated to the point of war without the occurrence of actual warfare" (Legvold, 2006).

The emerging rivalry between these two camps hardened into a mutual and permanent preoccupation. It dominated the *foreign policy agendas* of both sides and led to the formation of two vast military alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), created by the Western powers in 1949; and the Soviet led Warsaw Pact, established in 1955. Although centered originally in Europe, the Cold War enmity eventually drew the United States and the USSR into local conflicts in almost every part of the globe. It also produced what became known as the *cold war arms race*, an intense competition between the two superpowers to accumulate advanced military weapons (*Ibid.* 2006).

The Soviet Union *adopted an aggressive posture of communist expansionism following the end of World War II*, with the United States and its strong navy quickly finding that it had to aggressively defend much of the world from the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Strategically, the United States maintained *a policy of limited first strike* throughout the Cold War. In the event of a Soviet attack on the Western Front, resulting in a breakthrough, the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons to stop the attack. Soviet Union responded by adopting a policy of *no first use*, involving massive retaliation resulting in mutual assured destruction. So, if the Warsaw Pact attacked using conventional weapons, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would use tactical nukes. The Soviet Union would respond with an all out nuclear attack, resulting in a similar attack from the United States, with all the

consequences the exchange would entail. This did not happen as the United States continues to maintain *a policy of limited first strike* until the end of 1980s(Sigmund, 1999).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you briefly describe the concept of Cold War?

3.2 Soviet in the Early Cold War (1917 - 1939)

Cold War is used as a proper name for the Soviet-American rivalry after the Second World War. But what about cold war as a generic title, meaning the bipolar, largely ideologically driven struggle between Soviet communism and western capitalism. When we say bipolar, it does not mean Soviet Russia vs. the United States. In 1918 the United States was only one of many enemies of the Soviet state, and not the most important either. Great Britain, France, Japan, for example, also wanted to down the Bolshies. In fact, during the inter-war years Great Britain and France were the main antagonists of the USSR; the United States had a secondary role. After the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, the Soviet government nationalized private property and land, and repudiated billions in foreign debts contracted by the tsars. The Bolsheviks withdrew from the Great War, condemning it as a bloody imperialist conflict in which the working classes were pawns and cannon fodder. This was a dangerous line to take during the fourth year of a seemingly endless and bloody conflict in which soldiers died by the hundred thousand.

The Allied powers were dismayed and appalled by the Bolshevik revolution, and for a brief period in early 1918, debated how to respond. It did not take long for them to make up their minds. One British general said that "if we let the land be handed over to the peasantry in Russia, they will be doing the same thing in England in two years" (General Sir Alfred Knox, August 1917). The American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, directed his ambassador in Russia not to have any formal, direct communications with the Soviet government. He thought, any sign of diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik regime would only encourage their sympathizers outside of Russia.

The British war cabinet hotly debated the issue. Bolshevism was a menace to civilisation. We should take care, said one Cabinet minister, because Bolshevism could be "catching" (Robert Cecil, February 1918). David Lloyd George, the Liberal prime minister, agreed but thought that maybe the British government should help the Bolsheviks to fight the Germans. Some soldiers in France - no less than Foch and Georges - considered the same idea. It made sense because the anti-Bolshevik factions were mostly weak, dissolute, and pro-German. On the other

hand, the Bolsheviks seemed to want to fight the Germans. Lloyd George was one of the first "realists" or pragmatists, who was ready to overlook Bolshevik revolutionary ideas in order to achieve important purposes of state. Incidentally, Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary of state in the British Foreign Office, coined the term "realist" in the 1930s, when he stood for Anglo-Soviet cooperation against Nazism. Lloyd George, was the most powerful early "realist". But even he could not overcome the anti-Bolshevik Ideologues, who wanted to snuff out Bolshevism before it could spread. "Any attempt of the Germans to interfere in Russia," said Lloyd George, "would be like an attempt to burgle a plague-house." This was a common western metaphor for Bolshevism, it was a contagious disease, a plague, a virus, a bacillus which threatened world socialist revolution and the laying low of capitalism and the abolition of property and individual freedom. That is why the Allied idea of helping the Bolsheviks to fight the Germans in the spring of 1918 did not go very far. Early forms of disinformation were used to accuse the Bolsheviks of being German agents. One American in Russia, Raymond Robins, said that if the Germans bought the Bolsheviks, they bought a lemon. In fact, he was talking about L. D. Trotskii, who became Soviet commissar for war in March 1918. He is "a four kind son of bitch", said Robins, but the "greatest Jew since [Jesus] Christ", and a potentially formidable adversary of Germany. Reasoning of this kind fell on barren ground. Trotsky was organizing an army for social revolution, and the Allies dared not help him. "This is out of the question," said Lansing, because Bolshevism was a greater danger to the United States than Germany (February 1918).

In the end, the Allies decided to burgle the plague house themselves. They intervened in Russia to overthrow Soviet authority, but they promoted it as re-establishing an Eastern Front in Russia to fight Germany. This was only good public relations. Not even Woodrow Wilson, the American president, believed it. But the P.R. would avoid arousing opposition on the Left.

The British government sent armed forces to the four corners of Russia to overthrow Soviet authority. From the Baltic Sea and northern Russia, to the Caucasus and Turkestan, to Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean, British army and naval units supported the enemies of the Soviet state. The British government eventually sent guns, stores, and munitions, costing £100 millions and sufficient to supply large anti-Bolshevik armies. The American government sent troops to northern Russia and to Siberia. Even the French, who had few troops to spare from the western front, sent small contingents to northern Russia and to Siberia. The Japanese sent the largest forces to Siberia. Allied troops were small in number, but then the Allies thought the Soviet was on the brink of collapse. A little nudge would send the Bolsheviks over the brink - and

into hell. It did not quite work out that way. Commissar for war, Trotskii, had succeeded in building up a Red Army, which went over to the offensive in August 1918, and began to drive back the enemy. Quite unexpectedly, the Soviet survived and was building up its strength, and this frightened the Allies all the more. Allied military efforts against the Soviet increased at the end of the World War. Anti-Bolshevik Paul Reveres went on rides in all the Allied states warning of the spread of red revolution. With the war won and the *Boches* out of the way, the Allies could finish off the Bolshies. The French and the British governments considered sending 20 French, British, and Roumanian divisions to southern Russia. Fear of social revolution spurred them on. Woodrow Wilson told his cabinet that he was worried about the spread of revolution. "The spirit of the Bolsheviki," he said, "is lurking everywhere" (October 1918). It is "the most hideous and monstrous thing that the human mind has ever conceived", a "monster which seeks to devour civilized society and reduces mankind to the state of beasts" (Robert Lansing, October 1918).

The French government said: "The Bolshevik problem has ceased to be purely a Russian question; it is now an international question." "All the civilized countries" should unite to oppose this "anarchic contagion which should be fought in the same way as an epidemic" (Stéphane Pichon, French foreign minister, November 1918). Snuff out the Bolshevik revolution before it spreads.

The mind was willing, but the body was not. The troops would not march. After more than four years of slaughter, the common soldier had had enough. Neither the British Tommy nor the French *poilu* wanted to go to Russia. "To Hell with this," they said. "What the devil have we got against the Bolsheviks!" Hey, if the tuffs in London and Paris want to fight the Bolsheviks, let them go themselves. But not us! We've had enough. "*Vive les Bolcheviks!*", said the French *poilu*. "Hands off Russia," said the British left (January-February 1919). The French government did not listen; it assumed that the *poilu*, like Napoleon's *grogards*, would fight anyway. But the French government was wrong. At the end of 1918 France sent armed forces to southern Russia, but they mutinied. In April 1919, French sailors raised the red flag on the battleships *France* and *Jean Bart* of the Black Sea fleet. This was enough for Paris, and the French hastily withdrew. One French general called it "the complete failure of a ridiculous adventure" (Philippe Henri d'Anselme, April 1919). But defeat in southern Russia did not induce the French to abandon their hostility to Soviet Russia. On the contrary, they devised a new policy which came to be known as the *cordon sanitaire*, a barricade of barbed wire and bayonets from the Baltic to the Black Seas. It was the first policy of containment, more than 25 years before the Americans thought up their own. Bolshevism was still

catching. A Red government had established itself in Hungary. There was unrest nearly everywhere in Europe, as soldiers came home grumbling about those who had put them through it, and expecting and demanding more out of life than the war's miseries and terror.

In March 1919, the Soviet government set up the Communist International, to spread the cause of world revolution. The Bolsheviks acted as much from self-defence, as out of principle. They were blockaded and surrounded on all sides in an increasingly bloody and ruthless civil war. Communist propaganda was the only way to take the war against the Allies outside the frontiers of Russia, and to hit them back. The propaganda was dangerous, and the *cordon sanitaire* was intended to stop its leaking into the west. Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia were to be built up to block any Red expansion to the west; and the revolution in Hungary was snuffed out with Rumanian bayonets.

The civil war in Russia, which the Allies had supported and encouraged, appeared to have been resolved by the end of 1919, when the Red Army emerged victorious. Anti-Bolshevik forces were routed and reduced to debris streaming towards exile. But it was not over yet. A Polish state had reemerged at the end of the war. The Polish government was dominated by visions of restoration to great power status in its 18th century frontiers, reaching far into the Russian borderlands to the city of Kiev in the Ukraine. In early 1920 the Poles sent secret envoys to Paris and hinted to the French minister in Warsaw that they wanted to launch a springtime offensive. The French minister thought the Poles had gone quite mad, and called them "megalomaniacs", but in Paris the dream of eradicating the red plague was still enticing. The French government acquiesced, sending powder and shell to Poland to support the offensive. They had already armed and supplied much of the Polish army. The French had to conceal their enthusiasm for the Polish offensive because in London, the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, thought it was folly. The Poles, he said, should take care they don't get their heads punched. The Poles would have been wise to listen to Lloyd George. Instead, they launched a major offensive in April 1920, and they seized Kiev in May.

The Red Army recovered and launched a counter-offensive which took it to the outskirts of Warsaw in August 1920. The triumph of revolution seemed near, but the Red Army's lines of supply and communication were over-extended. The Poles launched their own counter-offensive which came to be known as the "Miracle on the Vistula." "Miracle" is the right word: it reminds me of Wellington's comment about the battle of Waterloo. "It was the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life." The last faint hopes of the west in the extinction of Bolshevism guttered out in March 1921 with the defeat of the Kronstadt rebellion of dissident

Red soldiers and sailors. Against long odds, the Bolsheviks won the merciless, destructive civil war. The Bolsheviks had won... but really they had lost, for Russia was in ruins. The Russian economy barely functioned. War, Allied blockade, civil war had reduced industrial production to something like 10% of pre-war levels - and Russia in 1914 was still a largely agricultural economy. In a malicious twist of fate, the Bolsheviks had to turn to the capitalist west for trade, credits, and technical expertise to rebuild. Above all, the Soviet government needed to borrow. Soviet leader V. I. Lenin swallowed his pride and enjoined his comrades to do the same. Go west, he said, not as communists, but as merchants. It may surprise you, but the Bolsheviks were good businessmen, and "credit was Russia's God!" So said F. H. Nixon, Export Credits Guarantee Department, London, December 1931. The Bolsheviks quickly gained a reputation for driving a hard bargain, as any good merchant should do. The Soviet government enticed scoundrels first, and then progressively more respectable business people and companies to trade with the USSR. The Bolsheviks scrupulously respected their contracts, and they tempted the west with profitable business. They taunted those who held back, with sounds of jingling gold in competitors' pockets. This strategy divided the west between new merchants and old investors, and it divided the former Allies, all of whom wanted to trade in the potentially profitable Russian market. But western-Soviet trade was not easy. The Soviet government had annulled the Russian state debt and nationalized private property. Western industrialists and investors had, as I said, lost billions! When the Soviet said it wanted to trade and needed credit to do so; western bankers responded, "nothing doing, until you've paid up". Who could blame them? Western punishment against the Soviet was to deny it credit for foreign trade, or to make such credit expensive to acquire. Up to the end of the 1920s there was a tacit, if slightly leaky credit blockade against the USSR which the Soviet government worked tenaciously and cunningly to breakdown.

On the whole, Soviet foreign policy was skilful and multi-faceted, and it took place on two planes: political and economic. It was directed at Germany, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and virtually all independent states everywhere. Indeed, no country was too small to draw Soviet wooing and attention. Beyond trade, the Soviet government sought diplomatic recognition to enhance the terms and conditions of trade, but also to improve political relations with the west. The Soviet government feared - and not without reason - the formation of a western anti-communist bloc against it. Trade and better political relations would prevent this danger.

Soviet diplomacy ran into difficulties, although it succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with Great Britain, Italy, France, and

Japan, but not with the United States. The Communist International still pursued the objective of world revolution even though the chances of it had slipped away as Europe returned to normal after the war. And the Soviet government could not then control the Communist International as it did under the iron dictatorship of Stalin. So Bolshevik revolutionaries interfered with the work of Bolshevik businessmen. Historians have traditionally called this the dual policy. Naturally, western governments took a dim view of Communist International propaganda, and disbelieved claims from the commissariat for foreign affairs, the Narkomindel, that the Communist International was independent of Soviet government control. The Narkomindel and the commissariat for foreign trade were the bastions of Soviet *realpolitik*. Chicherin, foreign commissar, Litvinov, his deputy, and Krasin, commissar for foreign trade and itinerant Soviet diplomat, were the strongest proponents of business-like relations with the west. The West had a dual policy also, though one hears less about it. Anti-Bolshevik Ideologues, fearing communist propaganda and subversion, rejected any notion of accommodation with Soviet Russia, trade or otherwise. The Ideologues held the upper hand over Realists, who said that trade and national security should not be affected by judgments about Soviet communism. The debate between Realist and Ideologue continued throughout the inter-war years: in the 1920s it pivoted largely on the question of trade; in the 1930s, on the question of who was the paramount enemy of the west: Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia? Even in the 1920s French realists, for example, thought of Franco-Soviet relations in terms of future French security against Germany. But the Ideologues were stronger: they feared communist revolution, they brooded over the billions in "stolen" investments, and they chalked up a red bogey to down the left. It was the same in Great Britain where Tory "die-hards" used anti-communist slogans to defeat Labour - 25 years before Richard Nixon tried them out on American Democrats. The Anglo-French press was full of lurid, sensational stories about the perils of communism. One British Foreign Office official - with a trenchant sense of humour - commented that if the British press "called a truce in the long range bombardment of Moscow... Half their 'copy' need to go..."

Efforts at conciliation were not more successful in the United States. In the autumn of 1926 Krasin approached the American ambassador in London, but nothing came of it, since the American government was only interested in deflecting the Soviet initiative. Krasin was anxious to meet American officials to discuss recognition and trade, but he died at the end of November, preventing any awkwardness for the American government. More than money is involved, explained Frank B. Kellogg, the secretary of state, it is "a question of principle". "We cannot recognize a régime whose very foundation principle is ultimately to

bring about the overthrow of every foreign government by revolution..." At the end of the decade, the American position was unchanged. A State department official commented, "We have waited 10 years for the Soviets to be overturned in Russia."

In 1926-27, the British government railed against the Soviet for helping the nationalist and slightly communist revolution in China, which was ruining British trade. China was Red, thought the British Foreign Office in 1926 - 23 years before it actually was. When the revolution failed in 1927, and the Communists were routed and slaughtered, the Foreign Office said, "Our prayers have been answered beyond our wildest dreams". In the same year when the Soviet tried to conclude a political and economic arrangement with France, the French government refused it. What if the Soviet accepts all our demands? a French official asked rhetorically. No problem, he said, we'll put more obstacles in the way (Jean-Jacques Bizot, finance ministry, May 1927). It is an old diplomatic ruse: make unacceptable demands, and blame the other side for refusing them. In the autumn of 1927 the Soviet ambassador was driven out of Paris in a furious anti-communist press campaign, reportedly inspired by the French interior minister and financed by an anti-red oil baron. A few months earlier Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. The end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s saw a continuation of the smouldering conflict. The French were unrelenting, but in Great Britain a minority Labour government renewed diplomatic relations in 1929 and signed a trade agreement with the USSR in 1930. Tory die-hards then went on the offensive, and blocked any further improvement.

The rise of Nazism *temporarily* braked Anglo-French anti-communism. In 1931 French and Soviet negotiators initiated a non-aggression pact. But news of it leaked out, and the right wing press raised a hue and cry. The French government dropped the pact like a hot stone, and only signed it 18 months later. Communist International activities still interfered with Soviet-western relations. Litvinov, foreign commissar during the 1930s, said to the British ambassador in 1930 that the Communist International was "hopeless". "Why don't you take the thing? You are a free country. We do not want it here. Do arrange for it hold its sessions in London." "You can hang [all foreign communists]; or burn them alive if catch them," Litvinov sometimes said.

The red tsar, Stalin, got the Communist International under control, more or less; and French diplomats said it was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, no different than the Red Army. The Communist International was dangerous only to states hostile to the USSR. Realists wanted to strengthen relations with the USSR to create an anti-Nazi system of collective security, strongly pressed by commissar Litvinov.

Between 1932 and 1934 Franco-Soviet relations improved. But in October 1934 agents of the Croatian fascist *Ustashe* assassinated the Yugoslav king and the French foreign minister, who was a strong advocate of better relations with the USSR. He was succeeded by a future Nazi collaborator, Pierre Laval, who feared that good relations with the Soviet would bring to France "the International and the red flag". And a European war would lead to an "invasion" of Bolshevism. This was a common, both spoken and unspoken assumption of the Anglo-French right in the 1930s. Franco-Soviet relations cooled after 1934 even though a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance was signed in May 1935. It was never more than a scrap of paper though the Soviet pressed the French for military staff talks to make it something more. The French General Staff rejected Soviet initiatives for military talks and played hard to get. Its orders were: Do not offend the Soviet, but stall, stall, stall.

The British put pressure on the French not to become too close to the Soviet. But for a time Anglo-Soviet relations also improved between July 1934 and February 1936, but they failed for the same reasons as in France. An Anglo-Soviet rapprochement is "a fatal policy", said one important Foreign Office official: it "can... only lead to one ultimate result, namely a European war in which the Soviet Government, in their capacity as agents of the Third International, would probably be the only beneficiaries." The situation worsened as 1936 unfolded. 1936 was a bad year. In the spring the French elected a left-centre coalition government. The British thought France was going red, or at least half red. In September 1936 the British embassy in Paris sent a dispatch to London on "Sovietisation in France". Then in July 1936 the Spanish civil war began. Tory ideological dread was brought to a fine edge. The Spanish civil war could lead to a European conflict between ideological *blocs*; and war could provoke the spread of communist revolution or Soviet influence. It was better, a lot of Tories thought, to turn Germany eastward against the USSR. "Let gallant little Germany glut her fill of reds in the East..." suggested one Tory M.P. Even the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin was attracted by the idea. One Foreign Office official commented, "People... seem to lose all consideration for the interests of their country, as opposed to those of their church or of their class, when they deal with affairs in Spain...."

Stalin's purges began in earnest in the late summer of 1936. First it was just old Bolsheviks who were shot; old revolutionaries about whom, the French anyway, did not care a pin. It was only in 1937 when Stalin did away with his best generals that the Anglo-French showed concern. But these events occurred long after Anglo-Franco-Soviet relations worsened. The purges did not cause the decline in relations; they justified it after the fact.

The Anglo-French looked at the Soviet through a red prism. In 1938 and 1939, they still did. At Munich the Anglo-French ignored the USSR. In 1939 when an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance was mooted, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain shunned the Soviet even though public opinion strongly favored the alliance. The Soviet wants to drag us into a war, he said, in order to spread communism in Europe. The French had the same idea. In August 1939 the Soviet concluded a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. It's all Stalin's fault, said the Anglo-French. But was it? Litvinov had *for years* warned of a Soviet-German rapprochement if Anglo-Franco-Soviet relations failed. Western realists had done the same. But the Ideologues said that the Soviet was just bluffing and would never conclude with the Nazis. We don't need an alliance with the USSR. The Ideologues were wrong.

So why is it important to stress the strength of anti-communism after World War I; why should someone try to change the way we look at the *Cold War*? For one thing, it adds to the importance of the First World War as the most influential event of the 20th century. The First World War not only left unresolved the issue of German hegemony in Europe, but it set off an ideological conflict, a smouldering *Cold War*, between the Soviet and the west. This early cold war obsessed western governments and society, and it seriously impeded the defence of the west against Nazism in the 1930s. Thus, the *Cold War* began as the First World War ended, and that it contributed greatly to the origins of the Second World War.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the events of the early Cold War period from 1917 to 1939?

3.3 The 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath

The foreign minister of Nazi Germany, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov on August 23, 1939. The reason for signed a non-aggression pact, was to promising themselves not to interfere in case the other went to war. That public announcement was shocking enough: The two totalitarian states had been at loggerheads for many years. But they also signed a second, secret agreement that carved up eastern Europe between them. Those world-changing deals are the subject of "*Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact With Stalin, 1939-1941*," a book by historian Roger Moorhouse that's due out this fall. "In fact, the Nazi-Soviet Pact as the kick-off for World War II is probably the most surprising scenario that anyone could have imagined," The world was absolutely dumbstruck by this deal." Those twin agreements did in fact set the stage for the start of World War II. Within days of signing the pacts, now confident that the Soviets would not oppose him, Hitler invaded Poland. Britain and France declared war

on Germany, and the war was underway. A couple of weeks later, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east to grab its share of the spoils. In 1940 it followed up by occupying Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Romanian province of Bessarabia. Britain and France protested, but with their forces already taking on Germany, they couldn't afford to fight Stalin as well. For a time, the pact worked well - and showed how similar the two states really were (Carley, 1995).

In the areas of Eastern Europe that they did occupy, the Nazis and Soviets set up occupation zones. Moorhouse says they governed in remarkably similar ways, targeting remarkably similar groups of people. Army officers and officials of the old regimes, intellectuals, priests and community leaders were detained en masse. Thousands were executed or deported to gulags and concentration camps. The Nazis obviously also targeted Jews, but not many people know that many Jews fled Stalin's control as well - even seeking sanctuary in Nazi areas. In his book, Moorhouse writes about a moment in which two trainloads of refugees going opposite ways met at a border. They were equally astonished that anyone should want to head in the other direction. But indeed, both Moscow and Berlin indulged in massive population transfers, each trying to recreate Eastern Europe in their preferred image. Thousands of ethnic Germans were moved from the Soviet zones to the German ones, while thousands of Poles were deported from areas now designated "German." Still others were shipped off as slave laborers to Germany proper. Many people simply moved of their own accord to escape the new states where they were denied basic rights, and some of them eventually came to America. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union also cooperated closely economically during their alliance after 1939. Soviet raw materials allowed the Germans to mitigate the worst effects of the British naval blockade, while the Soviets benefitted from German tools and finished goods. But the Nazi-Soviet pact didn't last. In late 1939, the Soviets also tried to invade Finland. The Finns refused to roll over. Despite being tremendously outnumbered and outgunned, they improvised a defense and made the best of the terrain and the ferocious winter weather. One innovation of that campaign was the gasoline bomb, designed for use against the air intake ducts on Soviet tanks. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, had called the Russian invasion a "humanitarian" move; Soviet propaganda even claimed that bombs dropped by Soviet planes were food aid. In a sarcastic tribute, the Finns christened their homemade weapons "Molotov cocktails," joking that they should have drinks along with the Soviet-provided "meals." In the end, the Soviets suffered a brutal loss in the "Winter War" with the Finns. The Germans were astonished at how badly the Soviets performed in the Winter War, a performance that made them believe they could turn on Stalin before finishing off the stubborn Brits in the west. In June 1941, Hitler attacked. Moor house

and other historians say that Stalin was stunned by the invasion and refused to accept that the news was true, leading to disastrous losses by the Red Army in the early days of the war. Once the Soviet Union recovered and defeated the Nazis, Moscow re-wrote history. *The Nazi-Soviet Pact morphed from a delusion to a clever way to buy time, which allowed the Soviet Union to re-arm.* Britain and America also tended to airbrush the Nazi-Soviet pact out of mainstream history, afraid that it would damage the popular narrative of the "Grand Alliance" that beat the Nazis. And that's only the public half of the alliance: the existence of the secret protocol was officially denied by the Soviet Union until its dying days in 1989 (ibid, 1995).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the reason for the 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath.

3.4 Soviet Union as one of the Major World Powers in Cold War Era

According to Zubok (2007),

"For fifty years the Soviet Union stood in the eyes of the West as a terrifying enigma bent on imperial and ideological expansion. According to Washington, it was a threatening state that needed to be confronted and contained. From Berlin to Hanoi and Cairo to Havana, the United States and the Soviet Union clashed in an era known as the Cold War"

The Cold War was a lengthy struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in the aftermath of the surrender of Hitler's Germany. In 1941, Nazi aggression against the USSR turned the Soviet regime into an ally of the Western democracies. But in the post-war world, increasingly divergent viewpoints created rifts between those who had once been allies. The United States and the USSR gradually built up their own zones of influence, dividing the world into two opposing camps. The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a struggle between the US and the USSR but a global conflict that affected many countries, particularly the continent of Europe. Indeed, Europe, divided into two blocs, became one of the main theatres of the war. In Western Europe, the European integration process began with the support of the United States, while the countries of Eastern Europe became allies of the USSR. From 1947 onwards, the two adversaries, employing all the resources at their disposal for intimidation and subversion, clashed in a

lengthy strategic and ideological conflict punctuated by crises of varying intensity. Although the two Great Powers never fought directly, they pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war on several occasions. Nuclear deterrence was the only effective means of preventing a military confrontation. Ironically, this 'balance of terror' actually served as a stimulus for the arms race. Periods of tension alternated between moments of détente or improved relations between the two camps. Political expert Raymond Aron perfectly defined the Cold War system with a phrase that hits the nail on the head: 'impossible peace, improbable war'. The Cold War finally came to an end in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The two superpowers never engaged directly in full-scale armed combat, but they were heavily armed in preparation for a possible all-out nuclear world war. Each side had a nuclear deterrent that deterred an attack by the other side, on the basis that such an attack would lead to total destruction of the attacker: the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Aside from the development of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, and deployment of conventional military forces, the struggle for dominance was expressed via proxy wars around the globe, psychological warfare, massive propaganda campaigns and espionage, rivalry at sports events, and technological competitions such as the Space Race.

At the end of the World War II in 1945, the USSR consolidated its alliance with the states of the Eastern Bloc, while the United States began a *strategy of global containment* to challenge Soviet power, extending military and financial aid to the countries of Western Europe (for example, supporting the anti-communist side in the Greek Civil War) and creating the NATO alliance.

The Berlin Blockade (1948–49) was the first major crisis of the Cold War. With victory of the communist side in the Chinese Civil War and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–53), the conflict expanded. The USSR and USA competed for influence in Latin America, and the decolonizing states of Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was stopped by the Soviets. The expansion and escalation sparked more crises, such as the Suez Crisis (1956), the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Following the Cuban missile crisis, a new phase began that saw the Sino-Soviet split complicate relations within the communist sphere, while US allies, particularly France, demonstrated greater independence of action. The USSR crushed the 1968 Prague Spring liberalization program in Czechoslovakia, and the Vietnam War (1955–75) ended with a defeat of the US-backed Republic of South Vietnam,

prompting further adjustments. By the 1970s, both sides had become interested in accommodations to create a more stable and predictable international system, inaugurating a period of détente that saw Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the US opening relations with the People's Republic of China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union. Détente collapsed at the end of the decade with the Soviet war in Afghanistan beginning in 1979. The early 1980s were another period of elevated tension, with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (1983), and the "Able Archer" NATO military exercises (1983). The United States increased diplomatic, military, and economic pressures on the Soviet Union, at a time when the communist state was already suffering from economic stagnation.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain that the Soviet Union was one of the two major world powers in the Cold War era?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to describe the concept of Cold War and also brought to your limelight the events of the early Cold War from 1917 to 1939; The 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath as well as show the Soviet Union became one of the major world powers in the ideological struggle with the United States during the Cold War period.

5.0 SUMMARY

Summarily, Soviet Union was one of the two major ideological world powers in the Cold War era of global politics, which polarized the world into two vast military alliances and created international tension for many years.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Briefly describe the concept of the Cold War.
2. Discuss the role of the Soviet in the early Cold War period from 1917 to 1939.
3. Discuss the reason for the 1939 Stalin-Hitler Armistice or Pact and the Aftermath.
4. Explain how the Soviet Union became one of the two major ideological world powers in the Cold War era.

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UNIT 4 SOVIET DISINTEGRATION

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides you with discussion on foundational issues to help you understand the socio-economic problems, which led to the Soviet disintegration; the impact of the disintegration on African states; the policies of glasnost and perestroika; as well as the various political and economic reforms that followed.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss socio-economic problems that led to the Soviet disintegration
- briefly explain why Eastern Europe broke away
- highlight the impact of Soviet disintegration on African States
- review Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika; and
- examine Gorbachev's political and economic reforms.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Socio-Economic Problems and Soviet Disintegration

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a process of systematic disintegration, which occurred in the economy, social and political structure. It resulted in the abolition of the Soviet Federal Government (“the Union Center”) and independence of the USSR’s republics on 25 December 1991. The process was caused by a weakening of the Soviet government, which led to disintegration and took place between 19

January 1990 and 31 December 1991. Andrei Grachev, the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department of the Central Committee, summed up the cause of the downfall quite succinctly: Gorbachev actually put the sort of final blow to the resistance of the Soviet Union by killing the fear of the people. This country was governed and kept together, as a government structure, by the fear from Stalinist times.

By the time the comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985; the Soviet economy faced a sharp fall in foreign currency earnings as a result of the downward slide in oil prices in the 1980s. These issues prompted Gorbachev to employ measures to revive the ailing state. An ineffectual start led to the conclusion that deeper structural changes were necessary and in June 1987 Gorbachev announced an agenda of economic reform called perestroika, or restructuring. Perestroika relaxed the production quota system, allowed private ownership of businesses and paved the way for foreign investment.

These measures were intended to redirect the country's resources from the costly Cold War military commitments to more productive areas in the civilian sector. Despite initial skepticism in the West, the new Soviet leader proved to be committed to reversing the Soviet Union's deteriorating *economic condition* instead of continuing the arms race with the West. Partly as a way to fight off internal opposition from party cliques to his reforms, Gorbachev simultaneously introduced glasnost, or openness, which increased freedom of the press and the transparency of state institutions. Glasnost was intended to reduce the corruption at the top of the Communist Party and moderate the abuse of power in the Central Committee. Glasnost also enabled increased contact between Soviet Union and the western world, particularly with the United States, contributing to the accelerating détente between the two nations.

However, Gorbachev's *social reforms* led to unintended consequences. Because of his policy of glasnost, which facilitated public access to information after decades of government repression, *social problems* received wider *public attention*, undermining the Communist Party's authority. In the revolutions of 1989 the USSR lost its allies in Eastern Europe. Glasnost allowed ethnic and nationalist disaffection to reach the surface. Many constituent republics, especially the Baltic republics, Georgian SSR and Moldavian SSR, sought greater autonomy, which Moscow was unwilling to provide. Gorbachev's attempts at economic reform were not sufficient, and the Soviet government left intact most of the fundamental elements of communist economy. Suffering from the low pricing of petroleum and natural gas, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, outdated industry and pervasive corruption, the Soviet *planned economy* proved to be *ineffective*, and by 1990 the Soviet

government had lost control over economic conditions. Due to price control, there were shortages of almost all products, reaching their peak in the end of 1991, when people had to stand in long lines to buy even the essentials. Control over the constituent republics was also relaxed, and they began to assert their national sovereignty from Moscow.

The tension between Soviet Union and Russian SFSR authorities came to be personified in the bitter power struggle between Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Squeezed out of Union politics by Gorbachev in 1987, Yeltsin, who represented himself as a committed democrat, presented a significant opposition to Gorbachev's authority. In a remarkable reversal of fortunes, he gained election as chairman of the Russian Republic's new Supreme Soviet in May 1990. The following month, he secured legislation giving Russian laws priority over Soviet laws and withholding two-thirds of the budget. In the first Russian presidential election in 1991, Yeltsin became president of the Russian SFSR. At last Gorbachev attempted to restructure the Soviet Union into a less centralized state. However, on 19 August 1991, a *coup* against Gorbachev, conspired by senior Soviet officials, was attempted. The coup faced wide *popular opposition* and collapsed in three days, but *disintegration* of the Union became imminent. The Russian government took over most of the Soviet Union government institutions on its territory. Because of the dominant position of Russians in the Soviet Union, most gave little thought to any distinction between Russia and the Soviet Union before the late 1980s. In the Soviet Union, only Russian SFSR lacked even the paltry instruments of statehood that the other republics possessed, such as its own republic-level Communist Party branch, trade union councils, Academy of Sciences, and the like. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned in Russia in 1991–1992. However, as the Soviet government was still opposed to market reforms, the economic situation continued to deteriorate. By December 1991, the shortages had resulted in the introduction of food rationing in Moscow and Saint Petersburg for the first time since World War II. Russia received humanitarian food aid from abroad. After the Belavezha Accords, the Supreme Soviet of Russia withdrew Russia from the Soviet Union on 12 December. The Soviet Union officially ended on 25 December 1991, and the Russian Federation (formerly the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) took power on 26 December. The Russian government lifted price control on January 1992. Prices rose dramatically, but shortages disappeared.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss socio-economic problems that led to the Soviet disintegration?

3.2 East Europe Breaks Away

By 1989, the Soviet alliance system was on the brink of collapse. Deprived of Soviet military support, the communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were losing power. Grassroots organizations, such as Poland's Solidarity Movement, rapidly gained ground with strong popular bases. In 1989, the communist governments in Poland and Hungary became the first to embrace competitive elections. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, mass protests unseated entrenched communist leaders. The communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania also crumbled, in the latter case as the result of a violent uprising. Attitudes had changed enough that the then US Secretary of State, James Baker suggested that the American government would not be opposed to Soviet intervention in Romania, on behalf of the opposition, to prevent bloodshed. The tidal wave of change culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which symbolized the collapse of European communist governments and graphically ended the "Iron Curtain" divide of Europe. The 1989 revolutionary wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe peacefully overthrew all the Soviet-style communist states: East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, Romania was the only Eastern-bloc country to topple its communist regime violently and execute its Head of State. Economy of the Soviet Union and Baltic way in the USSR itself, glasnost weakened the bonds that held the Soviet Union together and by February 1990, with the dissolution of the USSR looming, the Communist Party was forced to surrender its 73-year-old monopoly on state power. At the same time freedom of press and dissent allowed by glasnost and the festering "nationalities question" increasingly led the Union's component republics to declare their autonomy from Moscow, with the Baltic States withdrawing from the Union entirely.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Briefly explain why the East Europe broke away

3.3 The Impact of Soviet Disintegration on African States

Reforms in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc did not only affect Europe but it also saw dramatic changes to Communist and Socialist states outside of Europe. Here we will only highlight those that took place in some African countries.

Angola: The ruling MPLA government abandoned Marxism-Leninism in 1991 and agreed to the Bicesse Accords in the same year, however the Angolan Civil War between the

MPLA and the conservative UNITA continued for another decade.

Benin: Mathieu Kérékou's regime was pressured to abandon Marxism-Leninism in 1990.

Congo-

Brazzaville: Denis Sassou Nguesso's regime was pressured to abandon Marxism-Leninism in 1991. The nation had elections in 1992.

Ethiopia: A new constitution was implemented in 1987 and, following the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban assistance, the Communist military junta Derg led by Mengistu Haile Mariam was defeated by the rebel EPRDF in the Ethiopian Civil War and fled in 1991.

Madagascar: Socialist President Didier Ratsiraka was ousted.

Mali: Moussa Traoré was ousted, Mali adopted a new constitution and held multi-party elections.

Mozambique: The Mozambican Civil War between the socialist FRELIMO and the RENAMO conservatives was ended via treaty in 1992. FRELIMO subsequently abandoned socialism and with the support of the U.N., held multiparty elections.

Somalia: Rebellious Somalis overthrew Siad Barre's Communist military junta during the Somali Revolution. Somalia has been in a constant state of civil war ever since.

Tanzania: The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party cut down its Socialist ideology and foreign donors pressured the government to allow multiparty elections in 1995.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Assess the impact of Soviet disintegration on African States.

3.4 Gorbachev's Policies of Glasnost and Perestroika

Mikhail Gorbachev, the Russian leader that took over from Brezhnev, promoted the notions of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) in the Soviet Union, aimed at rehabilitating the faltering Soviet economy, but also suggesting significant domestic political and

foreign policy reforms as well. In his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, he stated that the conflict between communism and capitalism should not be regarded as inevitable; rather, there should be room for cautious cooperation in an "interrelated, interdependent world." In his book entitled *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, he achieved an unprecedented public relations coup by addressing a world-wide audience with what has been widely interpreted as unusual candor.

On 7 July 1989 President Mikhail Gorbachev implicitly renounced the use of force against other Soviet-bloc nations. Speaking to members of the 23-nation Council of Europe, Mr. Gorbachev made no direct reference to the so-called *Brezhnev Doctrine*, under which Moscow has asserted the right to use force to prevent a Warsaw Pact member from leaving the Communist fold, but stated 'Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states - friends, allies or any others - are inadmissible'.

Gorbachev's Five-Point Plan: The key pieces to Gorbachev's plan for the survival of the Soviet Union were a series of reforms which include:

- glasnost (openness) – greater freedom of expression;
- perestroika (restructuring) – decentralisation of the Soviet economy with gradual market reforms;
- renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine (armed intervention where socialism was threatened) and the pursuit of arms control agreements;
- reform of the KGB (secret service); and
- reform of the Communist Party

The objective of Gorbachev was survival. He knew that the Soviet Union would have to change if it was to survive. The old order which was central planning in a modern industrial economy brought much inefficiency; the factory management system provided little incentive to make technological improvements; the socialist farm system was inefficient. The Soviet State could no longer afford the high defense spending that accompanied the Cold War.

Gorbachev believed that his reforms were necessary and used his leadership and power to attempt to implement them. The *policy of glasnost (openness)* made it possible for people to more freely criticise the government's policies. When people realized it was safe to speak out, the calls for change became more insistent. The gradual market reforms and decentralisation of the economy (perestroika) were too slow and failed to keep pace with the people's demands. The Soviet Union

was suffering a deterioration of economic and social conditions and a fall in the GNP.

The renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine (armed intervention in support of socialism) which was articulated in 1968 when the Soviet army occupied Czechoslovakia to end the Prague Spring, an attempt by Alexander Dubcek to build "socialism with a human face." released the Eastern European states from Soviet domination.

Gorbachev's attempts to reform the Communist Party were a failure. Change was too slow to keep pace with events and he was continually hampered by his need to give in to the hard-liners in order to retain power.

Gorbachev won the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. He brought a peaceful end to the Cold War, and dramatic change to his country's economy, though not in the way he intended.

Understanding the Policy of Glasnosts and Its Effects

The literary meaning of glasnost is publicity. A policy that called for increased openness and transparency in government institutions and activities in the Soviet Union. Introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s, Glasnost is often paired with Perestroika (literally: Restructuring), another reform instituted by Gorbachev at the same time. The word "glasnost" has been used in Russia at least since the end of the 18th century. The word was frequently used by Gorbachev to specify the policies he believed might help reduce the corruption at the top of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and moderate the abuse of administrative power in the Central Committee. Russian human rights activist and dissident Lyudmila Alexeyeva explained glasnost as a word that "had been in the Russian language for centuries. It has been in the dictionaries and law books as long as there had been dictionaries and law books. It was an ordinary, hardworking, nondescript word that was used to refer to a process, any process of justice of governance, being conducted in the open.
[./AJA/Documents/BackupDoc/Documents/Aja_12/Ogkuka_New/Glasnost - wikipedia, thr free encyclopedia.htm - cited note](#) - "Glasnost can also refer to the specific period in the history of the USSR during the 1980s when there was less censorship and greater freedom of information. Gorbachev's policy interpretation of "glasnost" can best be summarized, translated, and explained in English with one word: "openness." While "glasnost" is associated with freedom of speech, the main goal of this policy was to make the country's management transparent and open to debate, thus circumventing the narrow circle of apparatchiks who previously exercised complete control of the

economy. Through reviewing the past or by opening up the censored literature in the libraries and a greater freedom of speech: a radical change, as control of speech and suppression of government criticism had previously been a central part of the Soviet system. There was also a greater degree of freedom within the media. However, in the late 1980s, the Soviet government came under increased criticism, as did Leninist ideology (which Gorbachev had attempted to preserve as the foundation for reform), and members of the Soviet population were more outspoken in their view that the Soviet government had become a failure. Glasnost did indeed provide freedom of expression, far beyond what Gorbachev had intended, and changed citizens' views towards the government, which played a key role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Effects of the Glasnost: Greater transparency: Relaxation of censorship resulted in the Communist Party losing its grip on the media. Before long, much to the embarrassment of the authorities, the media began to expose severe social and economic problems which the Soviet government had long denied and covered up. Long-denied problems such as poor housing, food shortages, alcoholism, widespread pollution, creeping mortality rates and the second-rate position of women were now receiving increased attention, as well as the history of Soviet state crimes against the population. In addition to serious explorations of the Soviet past and present situation relaxation of censorship resulted in an explosion of popular culture including popular Western literature and films and books on astrology, religion, and flying saucers, in short, anything official Soviet publishers had not deemed worth publishing.

Moreover, under glasnost, the people were able to learn significantly more about the doings of the administration of Joseph Stalin, including the purges and other previously classified activities. Although Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin's personality cult, information about the true proportions of his atrocities was still suppressed. In all, the very positive view of Soviet life which had long been presented to the public by the official media was being rapidly dismantled, and the negative aspects of life in the Soviet Union were brought into the spotlight. This began to undermine the faith of the public in the Soviet system.

Revelations about Soviet history had a devastating effect on those who had faith in state communism and who had never been exposed to this information. There was a sense of betrayal and hopelessness as the driving vision of society was demonstrated to have been built on a foundation of falsehood and crimes against humanity.

Understanding the Policies of Perestroika

The literary meaning of Perestroika is restructuring. It was a political movement for reformation within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the 1980s (1986), widely associated with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his glasnost (meaning "openness") policy reform. The literal meaning of perestroika is "restructuring", referring to the restructuring of the Soviet political and economic system.

Perestroika allowed more independent actions from various ministries and introduced some market-like reforms. The goal of the perestroika, however, was not to end the command economy but rather to make socialism work more efficiently to better meet the needs of Soviet consumers. The process of implementing perestroika arguably exacerbated already existing political, social and economic tensions within the Soviet Union and no doubt helped to further nationalism in the constituent republics. Perestroika and resistance to it are often cited as major catalysts leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev changed the meaning of freedom for the people of the USSR. Previously, freedom had meant recognition of the Marxist–Leninist regime. Now, however, freedom meant escaping all constraints. He also ceased the persecution of religion under perestroika and allowed the publishing of previously banned books, such as *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *Animal Farm*, and *Doctor Zhivago*. Although Gorbachev's attempts at Perestroika ultimately failed, he drastically changed the perceptions of the outside world towards Russia.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you review Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika?

3.5 Gorbachev's Political and Economic Reforms

Political Reforms

After Mikhail Gorbachev took the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he began a series of political reforms that were resisted by many established members of the Communist Party. However, Gorbachev appealed over the heads of the party to the people and called for demokratizatsiya (democratisation). For Gorbachev, demokratizatsiya originally meant the introduction of multi-candidate (but not multiparty) elections for local Communist Party (CPSU) positions and Soviets. In this way, he hoped to rejuvenate the party with progressive personnel who would

carry out his institutional and policy reforms. The CPSU would retain sole custody of the ballot box.

In May 1987, the unauthorized landing of German amateur aviator Mathias Rust next to the Kremlin enabled Gorbachev to remove many hardline opponents of his reforms, including Defense Minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov, from their positions in the military, and to consolidate his authority. [./AJA/Documents/BackupDoc/Documents/Aja_12/Ogkuka_New/Perestroika- wikipedia, thr free encyclopedia.htm - cited note -6](#)

Gorbachev increasingly found himself caught between criticism by conservatives who wanted to stop reform and liberals who wanted to accelerate it. Meanwhile, despite his intention to maintain a one-party system, the elements of a multiparty system were already crystallizing.

Despite some setbacks, he continued his policy of demokratizatsiya, and he enjoyed his worldwide perception as a reformer. In June 1988, at the CPSU's Nineteenth Party Conference, the first held since 1941, Gorbachev and his supporters launched radical reforms meant to reduce party control of the government apparatus. He again called for multi-candidate elections for regional and local legislatures and party first secretaries and insisted on the separation of the government apparatus from party bodies at the regional level, as well. He managed, in the face of an overwhelming majority of conservatives (i.e., higher authorities), to force through acceptance of his reform proposals. The conference was a successful step in promoting party-directed change from above.

At an unprecedented emergency Central Committee plenum called by Gorbachev in September 1988, three stalwart old-guard members left the Politburo or lost positions of power. Andrey Gromyko retired from the Politburo, Yegor Ligachyev was relieved of the ideology portfolio within the Politburo's Secretariat, and Boris Pugo replaced Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev as chairman of the powerful CPSU Party Control Committee. The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union then elected Gorbachev chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, giving Gorbachev the attributes of power that previously Leonid Brezhnev had. These changes meant that the Secretariat, until that time solely responsible for the development and implementation of state policies, had lost much of its power.

Meaningful changes also occurred in governmental structures. In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet approved formation of a Congress of People's Deputies, which constitutional amendments had established as the Soviet Union's new legislative body. The Supreme Soviet then dissolved itself. The amendments called for a smaller working body of

542 members, also called the Supreme Soviet, to be elected from the 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies. To ensure a communist majority in the new parliament, Gorbachev reserved one-third of the seats for the CPSU and other public organizations.

The March 1989, election of the Congress of People's Deputies marked the first time that voters of the Soviet Union ever chose the membership of a national legislative body. The results of the election stunned the ruling elite. Throughout the country, voters crossed off the ballot unopposed communist candidates, many of them prominent party officials, taking advantage of the nominal privilege of withholding approval of the listed candidates. However, the Congress of People's Deputies that emerged still contained 87 percent CPSU members because of the previous seat-packing (one-third reserved for Communists). Genuine reformists won only some 300 seats.

In May, the initial session of the Congress of People's Deputies electrified the country. For two weeks on live television, deputies from around the country railed against every scandal and shortcoming of the Soviet system that could be identified. Speakers spared neither Gorbachev, the KGB, nor the military. Nevertheless, a conservative majority maintained control of the congress. Gorbachev was elected without opposition to the chairmanship of the new Supreme Soviet; then the Congress of People's Deputies elected a large majority of old-style party apparatchiks to fill the membership of its new legislative body. Outspoken opposition leader Yeltsin obtained a seat in the Supreme Soviet only when another deputy relinquished his position. The first Congress of People's Deputies was the last moment of real control for Gorbachev over the political life of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1989, the first opposition bloc in the Congress of People's Deputies was formed under the name of the Interregional Group of Deputies. The members of this body included almost all of the liberal and Russian nationalist members of the opposition led by Boris Yeltsin.

A primary issue for the opposition was the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution, which prescribed the supremacy of the CPSU over all the institutions in society. Faced with opposition pressure for the repeal of Article 6 and needing allies against hard-liners in the CPSU, Gorbachev obtained the repeal of Article 6 by the February, 1990 Central Committee plenum. Later that month, before the Supreme Soviet, he proposed the creation of a new office of President of the Soviet Union, for himself to be elected by the Congress of People's Deputies rather than the popular elections. Accordingly, in March 1990 Gorbachev was elected for the third time in eighteen months to a position of Soviet head of state. Former first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Luk'yanov became chairman of the Supreme Soviet, but for the first

time in the history of the USSR this position was stripped of powers of the head of state. The Supreme Soviet became similar to Western parliaments. Its debates were televised daily.

By the time of the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress in July 1990, the CPSU was regarded by liberals and nationalists of the constituent republics as anachronistic and unable to lead the country. The CPSU branches in many of the fifteen Soviet republics began to split into large pro-sovereignty and pro-union factions, further weakening central party control.

In a series of humiliations, the CPSU had been separated from the government and stripped of its leading role in society and its function in overseeing the national economy. However, the majority of its apparatchiks were successful in obtaining leading positions in the newly formed democratic institutions. For seventy years, the CPSU had been the cohesive force that kept the union together; without the authority of the party in the Soviet center, the nationalities of the constituent republics pulled harder than ever to break away from the union.

Economic Reforms

In May 1985, Gorbachev gave a speech in Leningrad in which he admitted the slowing down of the economic development and inadequate living standards. This was the first time in Soviet history that a Soviet leader had done so. The program was furthered at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in Gorbachev's report to the congress, in which he spoke about "perestroika", "uskorenive", "human factor", "glasnost", and "expansion of the khozraschyot" (commercialization).

During the initial period (1985–87) of Mikhail Gorbachev's time in power, he talked about modifying central planning, but did not make any truly fundamental changes (uskorenive, acceleration). Gorbachev and his team of economic advisers then introduced more fundamental reforms, which became known as perestroika (economic restructuring).

At the June 1987 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Gorbachev presented his "basic theses," which laid the political foundation of economic reform for the remainder of the existence of the Soviet Union.

In July 1987, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed the Law on State Enterprise. The law stipulated that state enterprises were free to determine output levels based on demand from consumers and other enterprises. Enterprises had to fulfill state orders, but they could dispose of the remaining output as they saw fit. However, at the same time the

state still held control over the means of production for these enterprises, thus limiting their ability to enact full-cost accountability. Enterprises bought input from suppliers at negotiated contract prices. Under the law, enterprises became self-financing; that is, they had to cover expenses (wages, taxes, supplies, and debt service) through revenues. No longer was the government to rescue unprofitable enterprises that could face bankruptcy. Finally, the law shifted control over the enterprise operations from ministries to elected workers' collectives.

Gosplan's (Russian State Committee for Planning) responsibilities were to supply general guidelines and national investment priorities, not to formulate detailed production plans.

The Law on Cooperatives, enacted in May 1988, was perhaps the most radical of the economic reforms during the early part of the Gorbachev era. For the first time since Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy, the law permitted private ownership of businesses in the services, manufacturing, and foreign-trade sectors. The law initially imposed high taxes and employment restrictions, but it later revised these to avoid discouraging private-sector activity. Under this provision, cooperative restaurants, shops, and manufacturers became part of the Soviet scene.

Gorbachev brought perestroika to the Soviet Union's foreign economic sector with measures that Soviet economists considered bold at that time. His program virtually eliminated the monopoly that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had once held on most trade operations. It permitted the ministries of the various industrial and agricultural branches to conduct foreign trade in sectors under their responsibility rather than having to operate indirectly through the bureaucracy of trade ministry organizations. In addition, regional and local organizations and individual state enterprises were permitted to conduct foreign trade. This change was an attempt to redress a major imperfection in the Soviet foreign trade regime: the lack of contact between Soviet end users and suppliers and their foreign partners.

The most significant of Gorbachev's reforms in the foreign economic sector allowed foreigners to invest in the Soviet Union in the form of joint ventures with Soviet ministries, state enterprises, and cooperatives. The original version of the Soviet Joint Venture Law, which went into effect in June 1987, limited foreign shares of a Soviet venture to 49 percent and required that Soviet citizens occupy the positions of chairman and general manager. After potential Western partners complained, the government revised the regulations to allow majority foreign ownership and control. Under the terms of the Joint Venture Law, the Soviet partner supplied labor, infrastructure, and a potentially large domestic market. The foreign partner supplied capital, technology,

entrepreneurial expertise, and, in many cases, products and services of world competitive quality.

Gorbachev's economic changes did not do much to restart the country's sluggish economy in the late 1980s. The reforms decentralized things to some extent, although price controls remained, as did the ruble's inconvertibility and most government controls over the means of production.

By 1990 the government had virtually lost control over economic conditions. Government spending increased sharply as an increasing number of unprofitable enterprises required state support and consumer price subsidies continued. Tax revenues declined because republic and local governments withheld tax revenues from the central government under the growing spirit of regional autonomy. The elimination of central control over production decisions, especially in the consumer goods sector, led to the breakdown in traditional supply-demand relationships without contributing to the formation of new ones. Thus, instead of streamlining the system, Gorbachev's decentralization caused new production bottlenecks.

Glasnost inadvertently released the long-suppressed national sentiments of all peoples within the borders of the multinational Soviet state. These nationalist movements were further strengthened by the rapid deterioration of the Soviet economy, whose ramshackle foundations were exposed with the removal of Communist discipline. Gorbachev's reforms had failed to improve the economy, with the old Soviet command structure completely breaking down. One by one, the constituent republics created their own economic systems and voted to subordinate Soviet laws to local laws.

In an attempt to halt the rapid changes to the system, a group of Soviet hard-liners represented by Vice-President Gennadi Yanayev launched a coup attempting to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991. Boris Yeltsin, then president of the Russian SFSR, rallied the people and much of the army against the coup and the effort collapsed. Although restored to power, Gorbachev's authority had been irreparably undermined. In September, the Baltic States were granted independence. Later that month, Gorbachev resigned as leader of the Communist Party, and the Supreme Soviet indefinitely suspended all party activities on Soviet soil.

Within an interval period of three months, one republic after another declared independence, mostly out of fear of another coup. Also during this time, Russia began taking over what remained of the Soviet government, including the Kremlin. The penultimate step came on 1 December, when voters in the second most powerful republic, Ukraine,

overwhelmingly voted to secede from the Soviet Union in a referendum. This ended any realistic chance of keeping the Soviet Union together. On 8 December, Yeltsin met with his counterparts from Ukraine and Belarus and signed the Belavezha Accords, declaring that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Gorbachev denounced this as illegal, but he had long since lost any ability to influence events outside of Moscow.

Two weeks later, 11 of the remaining 12 republics - all except Georgia - signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, which confirmed the Soviet Union had been effectively dissolved and replaced by a new voluntary association, the Commonwealth of Independent States. Bowing to the inevitable, Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president on 25 December, and the Supreme Soviet dissolved itself the next day. By the end of 1991, the few Soviet institutions that had not been taken over by Russia had dissolved. The Soviet Union was officially disbanded, breaking up into fifteen constituent parts, thereby ending the world's largest and most influential Communist state, and leaving China to that position. A constitutional crisis devolved into violence in Moscow as the Russian Army was called in to reestablish order.

The freedoms generated under glasnost enabled increased contact between Soviet citizens and the Western world, particularly with the United States. Restrictions on travel were loosened, allowing increased business and cultural contact. For example, one key meeting location was in the US at the Dakin Building, then owned by American philanthropist Henry Dakin, who had extensive Russian contacts:

During the late 1980s, as glasnost and perestroika led to the liquidation of the Soviet empire, the Dakin building was the location for a series of groups facilitating United States-Russian contacts. They included the Center for US-USSR Initiatives, which helped more than 1000 Americans visit the Soviet Union and more than 100 then-Soviet citizens visit the US while thousands of political prisoners and many dissidents were released in the spirit of glasnost, Gorbachev's original goal of using glasnost and perestroika to reform the Soviet Union was not achieved. In 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved following a failed coup by conservative elements who were opposed to Gorbachev's reforms.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Gorbachev's political and economic reforms?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to discuss socio-economic problems that led to the Soviet disintegration; explain the breakaway of East Europe;

highlight the impact of Soviet disintegration on African States; review Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost, perestroika as well as examine the political and economic reforms.

5.0 SUMMARY

Summarily, this unit unfolds the socio-economic problems that led to the Soviet disintegration; the East Europe break away; the impact of Soviet disintegration on African States; Gorbachev's policies of glasnost, perestroika, political and economic reforms, which are significant foundational issues.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain socio-economic problems that led to Soviet disintegration.
2. Briefly explain why the East Europe breaks away.
3. Highlight the impact of Soviet disintegration on African States.
4. Review Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika.
5. Discuss Gorbachev's political and economic reforms.

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MODULE 2

Unit 1	Historical Perspective of Soviet Union Foreign Policy
Unit 2	Understanding Post-Soviet Restructuring
Unit 3	Russia's Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era
Unit 4	Russia's Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet

UNIT 1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY**CONTENTS**

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
3.1	Fundamental Goals of Soviet Foreign Policy
3.2	Soviet Foreign Policy 1918 to 1939
3.3	Soviet Foreign Policy after World War II
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides the discussion of the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy; the Soviet as well as the Soviet foreign policy after World War II.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy
- explain the Soviet foreign policy orientation; and
- discuss Soviet Union foreign policy after World War II.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT**3.3 Fundamental Goals of Soviet Union's Foreign Policy**

Geopolitics has always been a fundamental element in Russian political thought. Historically, Soviet Union's core area was the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, Russia's history was one of invasion and dominance by outsiders. Russia has never had secured borders, there is no great river

or desert, no huge mountain ranges to mark where Russia ends. Because of this, Russia has a history of expanding, and any territory was absorbed, became not a borderland but part of Russia, and Russia felt the need to expand more to protect it. This cycle went on for about three centuries as Russia expanded to fill the void left by the collapse of the Mongol Hordes. Another perennial Russian concern was the lack of a warm water port. All her ports froze over in winter preventing trade and military excursions. Because of this need, Russia traditionally expanded to find a port that did not freeze. Both these historic concerns played a factor in the Soviet Union's expansion into Eastern Europe after WWII.

The Great October Revolution of 1917 created a new type of state - the Soviet socialist state - and thereby initiated Soviet foreign policy, which is fundamentally different from the foreign policy of other states. Guided by the principles of Soviet foreign policy established by V. I. Lenin, the Communist Party took into account specific international circumstances and established, primarily at its congresses, the basic outlines of foreign policy. The foreign policy of the workers' state sets as its goal the establishment of favourable, peaceful conditions for socialist and communist construction. As head of the Soviet state, Lenin was the first to apply, in unusually difficult international circumstances, the basic propositions of Soviet foreign policy. After the October revolution, the confrontation between the socialist and capitalist systems was the main determinant of the international situation. The Soviet people were interested in maintaining peace throughout the world; a peaceful Soviet policy, which is inherent in the socialist system, ruled out aggression of any sort, the seizure of foreign territory, or the enslavement of peoples. The distinguishing features of Soviet foreign policy include genuine democracy; recognition of the equality of all states, large or small, and of all races and nationalities; recognition of the rights of peoples to form independent states; and determination to struggle resolutely for peace, progress, and the freedom of peoples. Soviet foreign policy is also distinguished by a commitment to honesty and truth and an unequivocal rejection of secret diplomacy. After the October Revolution, the principle of internationalism meant the solidarity of the Soviet working people with the working people of other countries in the mutual struggle to end the imperialist war, achieve a just, democratic peace, and preserve and strengthen the achievements of the socialist revolution.

After World War II and the formation of the world socialist system, the principle of internationalism became the foundation for relations between the countries of the socialist community, as well as for relations with the working people of the capitalist countries and with the peoples of newly independent developing states that were struggling against imperialism and colonial oppression. 107 Soviet Union's desire to

develop mutually beneficial relations with the capitalist countries derived from the Leninist theory of socialist revolution (worked out before 1917), which held that the victory of socialism could take place initially in a few countries or even just one country; such a view presupposes a long historical period during which the coexistence of the two different socio-political systems is inevitable. Lenin noted that peaceful coexistence means not only the absence of war but also the possibility of cooperation. Peaceful coexistence is founded on renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, which must be settled through negotiation; on equality, mutual understanding, and trust between states, as well as recognition of their respective interests; on noninterference in internal affairs, recognition of the right of every people to resolve independently all questions pertaining to its country, and strict observance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; and on the development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit. Cooperation between countries with different social systems does not mean ideological peace; on the contrary, it creates favourable conditions in the international arena for the struggle of the proletariat and all working people against capitalist oppression and for the national liberation movement of the peoples of the developing countries. The contradiction between socialism and capitalism is the primary contradiction of many decades. One of major preoccupations for Russian diplomacy – is to create a zone of good neighbourly relations around itself, to maintain universal stability and security. The foreign policy is to secure national interests of the Russians and develop optimally favourable external conditions for its consolidation. This is not an easy question in the conditions of increasing problems and challenges, facing the world community under the pressures of globalization. Distinctive feature of the Russian foreign policy is its balanced character. This is determined by the geopolitical location of Russia as the largest Euro-Asian power, requiring an optimum correlation of efforts in all directions. Such approach predetermines the responsibility of Russia for maintenance of security in the world both on global, and regional level, presupposes development and complementation of foreign-policy activity bilaterally and multilaterally.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you examine the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy?

3.1 Soviet Foreign Policy

Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks, once in power, believed their October Revolution would ignite the world's socialists and lead to a "world revolution." Lenin set up the Communist International

(Comintern) to *export revolution* to the rest of Europe and Asia. Indeed, Lenin set out to "liberate" all of Asia from imperialist and capitalist control. Lenin and the Bolsheviks advocated *world revolution* through workers' internal revolutions" within their own nations, but they had never advocated its spread by intra-national warfare, such as invasion by Red Army troops from a neighboring socialist nation into a capitalist one. Indeed, short of such "internal revolutions" by workers themselves, Lenin had talked about "peaceful cohabitation" with capitalist countries. The first priority for Soviet foreign policy was Europe and Lenin was most disappointed when, following the October Revolution, a similar revolution did not break out in Germany as he had expected and hoped for, forcing him to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 to take Russia out of the First World War. Afterwards, a new policy emerged of both seeking pragmatic cooperation with the Western powers when it suited Soviet interests while at the same time trying to promote a communist revolution whenever possible. As Europe's revolutions were crushed and revolutionary zeal dwindled, the Bolsheviks *shifted their ideological focus* from the world revolution and *building socialism* around the globe to building socialism inside the Soviet Union, while keeping some of the rhetoric and operations of the Comintern continuing. In the mid-1920s, a *policy of peaceful co-existence* began to emerge, with Soviet diplomats attempting to end the country's isolation, and concluding bi-lateral arrangements with 'capitalist' governments. Agreement was reached with German; Europe's other 'pariah' of the day, in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.

There were, however, still those in the Soviet government, most notably Leon Trotsky, who argued for the continuation of the revolutionary process, in terms of his theory of permanent revolution. After Lenin's death in 1924 Trotsky and the internationalists were opposed by Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Bukharin, who developed the notion of socialism in one country. The foreign policy counterpart of socialism in one country was that of the United Front, with foreign Communists urged to enter into alliances with reformist left-wing parties and national liberation movements of all kinds. The high point of this strategy was the partnership between the Chinese Communist Party and the nationalist Kuomintang, a policy favoured by Stalin in particular, and a source of bitter dispute between him and Trotsky. The Popular Front policy in China effectively crashed to ruin in 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek massacred the native Communists and expelled all of his Soviet advisors, notably Mikhail Borodin. Hand-in-hand with the promotion of Popular Fronts, *Maxim Litvinov*, and Commissar for Foreign Affairs between 1930 and 1939, aimed at closer alliances with western governments, and placed ever greater emphasis on *collective security*. The new policy led to the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations in 1934, and the subsequent conclusion of alliances with France and

Czechoslovakia. In the League, the Soviets were active in demanding action against imperialist aggression, a particular danger to them after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which eventually resulted in the Soviet-Japanese Battle of Khalkhin Gol. But against the rise of militant fascism the League was unlikely to accomplish very much. Litvinov and others in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs continued to conduct quiet diplomatic initiatives with Germany, even as the USSR took a stand in trying to preserve the Second Spanish Republic, and its Popular Front government, from the *Fascist rebellion* of 1936. The Munich Agreement of 1938, the first stage in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, gave rise to Soviet fears that they were likely to be abandoned in a possible war with Germany. In the face of continually dragging and seemingly hopeless negotiations with Great Britain and France, a new cynicism and hardness entered Soviet foreign relations when Litvinov was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov in May 1939. The Soviets no longer sought collective but individual security, and the Pact with Hitler was signed, giving Soviets protection from the most aggressive European power and increasing Soviet sphere of influence.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain Soviet Foreign Policy?

3.2 Soviet Foreign Policy after World War 11

The basic character of Soviet foreign policy was set forth in Vladimir Lenin's Decree on Peace, adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets in November 1917. It set forth the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy, which encompasses both proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. On the one hand, proletarian internationalism refers to the common cause of the working classes of all countries in struggling to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to establish communist regimes. Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, refers to measures to ensure relatively peaceful government-to-government relations with capitalist states. The Soviet commitment in practice to proletarian internationalism declined since the founding of the Soviet state, although this component of ideology still had some effect on later formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy. Although pragmatic *raison d'état* undoubtedly accounted for much of more recent Soviet foreign policy, the ideology of class struggle still played a role in providing a worldview and certain loose guidelines for action in the 1980s. Marxist-Leninist ideology reinforced other characteristics of political culture that create an attitude of competition and conflict with other states.

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II as one of the two major world powers, a position maintained for four decades through its hegemony in Eastern Europe, military strength, aid to developing

countries and scientific research especially into space technology and weaponry. The Union's effort to extend its influence or control over many states and peoples resulted in the formation of a world socialist system of states. Established in 1949 as an economic bloc of communist countries led by Moscow, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) served as a framework for cooperation among the planned economies of the Soviet Union, its allies in Eastern Europe and, later, Soviet allies in the Third World. The military counterpart to the COMECON was the Warsaw Pact. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States, and surpassed it by the end of that decade with the deployment of the SS-18 missile. It perceived its own involvement as essential to the solution of any major international problem.

The Cold War gave way to *Détente* and a more complicated pattern of international relations in which the world was no longer clearly split into two clearly opposed blocs. Less powerful countries had more room to assert their independence, and the two superpowers were partially able to recognize their common interest in trying to check the further spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The final round of the Soviet Union's collapse took place following the Ukrainian popular referendum on December 1, 1991, wherein 90% of voters opted for independence. The leaders of the three principal Slavic republics (the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs) agreed to meet for a discussion of possible forms of relationship, alternative to Gorbachev's struggle for a union. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian Republics met in Belavezhszkaya Pushcha and signed the Belavezha Accords declaring the Soviet Union dissolved and replacing it with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The Ministry of External Relations (MER) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was one of the most important government offices in the Soviet Union. The Ministry was led by a Commissar prior to 1946, a Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to 1991, and a Minister of External Relations in 1991. Every leader of the Ministry was nominated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and was a member of the Council of Ministers. The Ministry of External Relations negotiated diplomatic treaties, handled Soviet foreign affairs with the International Department of the Central Committee and led the creation of communism and "anti-imperialism", which were strong themes of Soviet policy. Before Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, the organisational structure of the MER mostly stayed the same. As many other Soviet agencies, the MER had an inner-policy group known as the Collegium, made up of the minister, the two first deputy ministers and nine deputy ministers, among others. Each deputy minister usually headed his own

department. The primary duty of the foreign ministry was directing the general line of Soviet foreign policy. The MER represented the country abroad and 105 participated in talks with foreign delegations on behalf of the Soviet government. It also appointed diplomatic officers, with the exception of Soviet ambassadors, who were appointed by the Council of Ministers. The MER was responsible for taking care of the USSR's economic and political interests abroad, although economic interests were also the joint responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The State Committee of the Council of Ministers on Cultural Links with Foreign Nations and the Ministry of Culture worked jointly with the MER in regards to the protection of Soviet citizens abroad, the exercise of overall Soviet consular relations abroad and the promotion of Soviet culture abroad. The dominant decision-making body has been the Politburo. Although the general secretary is only one of several members of the Politburo, his positions as head of the Secretariat and the Defense Council give him pre-eminence in the Politburo. Other members of the Politburo also have had major foreign policy-making responsibilities, most notably the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, the chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB), and the chief of the CPSU's International Department. The minister of defense and the minister of foreign affairs had been full or candidate members of the Politburo intermittently since 1917. The chairman of the KGB became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1967 and has generally been a full member since then. The Chief of the International Department became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1972 but from 1986 to 1988 held only Secretariat membership. Since late 1988, he has been a candidate, then full member of the Central Committee. Even when foreign policy organizations were not directly represented on the Politburo, they were nonetheless supervised by Politburo members. The centralization of foreign policy decision making in the Politburo and the longevity of its members (a major factor in the Politburo's lengthy institutional memory) both have contributed to the Soviet Union's ability to plan foreign policy and guide its long-term implementation with a relative singleness of purpose lacking in pluralistic political systems. Ideology was a key component of Soviet foreign policy. While Soviet diplomacy was built on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, even Vladimir Lenin believed that compromise was an important element in foreign diplomacy, claiming that compromise should only be used when "the new is not yet strong enough to overthrow the old". This policy was an important element in times of weakness, and therefore "certain agreements with the imperialist countries in the interest of socialism" could sometime be reached. The relationship between policy and ideology remained an active issue until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Soviet Union foreign policy after World War II.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have been able to examine the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy; explain the Soviet foreign policy relations; and discuss Soviet foreign policy after World War II.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit is a review of the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy; Soviet foreign policy relation up to 1930 as well as Soviet foreign policy after World War II.

6.0 UTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the Soviet Union's foreign policy from 1918 to 1939.
2. Discuss Soviet foreign policy after World War II.
3. Examine the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 UNDERSTANDING POST-SOVIET RESTRUCTURING

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Post-Soviet Restructuring
 - 3.2 Why Russians regretted the Collapse of Soviet Union
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit is build on the previous submission and is important as it provides you with discussion of the Post-Soviet restructuring; and the reasons why some Russians regretted the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the Post-Soviet restructuring; and
- briefly explain why some Russians regretted the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Post-Soviet Restructuring

The history of Russia from 1991 to the present began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991, and the establishment of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation was the largest of the fifteen republics that made up the Soviet Union, accounting for over 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and over 50% of the Soviet population. Russians also dominated the Soviet military and the Communist Party (CPSU). Thus, the Russian Federation was widely accepted as the Soviet Union's successor state in diplomatic affairs and it assumed the USSR's permanent membership and veto in the UN Security Council. Despite this acceptance, the Russian Federation lacked the military and political power of the former Soviet Union. Russia managed to make the other former Soviet

republics voluntarily disarm themselves of nuclear weapons and concentrated them under the command of the still effective rocket and space forces, but for the most part, the Russian army and fleet were in near disarray by 1992. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin had been elected President of Russia June 1991 in the first direct presidential election. In October 1991, as the USSR was on the verge of collapse, Yeltsin announced that Russia would proceed with radical market-oriented reform along the lines of Poland's "big bang", also known as "shock therapy".

To restructure the Soviet administrative command system and implement a transition to a market economy, Yeltsin's shock program was employed within days of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The subsidies to money losing farms and industries were cut, price controls abolished, and the ruble moved towards convertibility. New opportunities for Yeltsin's circle and other entrepreneurs to seize former state property were created, thus restructuring the old state-owned economy within a few months. After obtaining power, the vast majority of "idealistic" reformers gained huge possessions of state property using their positions in the government and became business oligarchs in a manner that appeared antithetical to an emerging democracy. Existing institutions were conspicuously abandoned prior to the establishment of new legal structures of the market economy such as those governing private property, overseeing financial markets, and enforcing taxation. Market economists believed that the dismantling of the administrative command system in Russia would raise GDP and living standards by allocating resources more efficiently. They also thought the collapse would create new production possibilities by eliminating central planning, substituting a decentralized market system, eliminating huge macroeconomic and structural distortions through liberalization, and providing incentives through privatization. Since the USSR's collapse, Russia faced many *problems* that free market proponents in 1992 did not expect. Among other things, 25% of the population lived below the *poverty* line, life expectancy had fallen, birthrates were low, and the GDP was halved. These problems led to a series of *crises* in the 1990s, which nearly led to the election of Yeltsin's Communist challenger, Gennady Zyuganov, in the 1996 presidential election. In recent years, the economy of Russia has begun to *improve* greatly, due to major *investments* and *business development* and also due to *high prices of natural resources*.

Although Yeltsin came to power on a wave of optimism, he never recovered his popularity after endorsing Yegor Gaidar's "*shock therapy*" of ending Soviet-era price controls, drastic cuts in state spending, and an open foreign trade regime in early 1992. The reforms immediately devastated the living standards of much of the population. In the 1990s Russia suffered an *economic downturn* that was, in some ways, more

severe than the United States or Germany had undergone six decades earlier in the Great Depression. Hyperinflation hit the ruble, due to monetary overhang from the days of the planned economy.

Meanwhile, the profusion of small parties and their aversion to coherent alliances left the legislature chaotic. During 1993, Yeltsin's rift with the parliamentary leadership led to the September–October 1993 constitutional crisis. The crisis climaxed on 3 October, when Yeltsin chose a radical solution to settle his dispute with parliament: he called up tanks to shell the Russian White House, blasting out his opponents. As Yeltsin was taking the *unconstitutional step* of dissolving the legislature, Russia came close to a *serious civil conflict*. Yeltsin was then free to impose the current Russian constitution with strong presidential powers, which was approved by referendum in December 1993. The cohesion of the Russian Federation was also threatened when the republic of Chechnya attempted to break away, leading to the First and Second Chechen Wars.

Economic reforms also consolidated a semi-criminal oligarchy with roots in the old Soviet system. Advised by Western governments, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, Russia embarked on the largest and fastest privatization that the world had ever seen in order to reform the fully nationalized Soviet economy. By mid-decade, retail trade services, and small industry was in private hands. Most big enterprises were acquired by their old managers, engendering a new rich (Russian tycoons) in league with criminal mafias or Western investors. That being said, there were corporate raiders such as Andrei Volgin engaged in hostile takeovers of corrupt corporations by the mid-1990s. By the mid-1990s Russia had a system of multiparty electoral politics. But it was harder to establish a representative government because of two structural problems - the struggle between president and parliament and the anarchic party system.

Meanwhile, the central government had lost control of the localities, bureaucracy, and economic fiefdoms; tax revenues had collapsed. Still in deep depression by the mid-1990s, Russia's economy was hit further by the financial crash of 1998. After the 1998 financial crisis, Yeltsin was at the end of his political career. Just hours before the first day of 2000, Yeltsin made a surprise announcement of his resignation, leaving the government in the hands of the little-known Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, a former KGB official and head of the FSB, the KGB's post-Soviet successor agency. In 2000, the new acting president defeated his opponents in the presidential election on 26 March, and won a landslide 4 years later. International observers were alarmed by late 2004 moves to further tighten the presidency's control over parliament, civil society, and regional officeholders. In 2008 Dmitri Medvedev, a former

Gazprom chairman and Putin's head of staff, was elected new President of Russia. In 2012, Putin was once again elected as President.

In August 2000, the Russian submarine K-141 Kursk suffered an explosion, causing the submarine to sink in the shallow area of the Barents Sea. Russia organised a vigorous but hectic attempt to save the crew, and the entire futile effort was surrounded by unexplained secrecy. This, as well as the slow initial reaction to the event and especially to the offers of foreign aid in saving the crew, brought much criticism on the government and personally on President Putin. On October 23, 2002, Chechen separatists took over a Moscow theater. Over 700 people inside were taken hostage in what has been called the Moscow theater hostage crisis. The separatists demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya and threatened to blow up the building if authorities attempted to enter. Three days later, Russian commandos stormed the building after the hostages had been subdued with a sleeping gas, shooting the unconscious militants, and killing over 100 civilian hostages with the sleeping gas in the process. In the aftermath of the theater siege, Putin began renewed efforts to eliminate the Chechen insurrection. The government canceled scheduled troop withdrawals, surrounded Chechen refugee camps with soldiers, and increased the frequency of assaults on separatist positions. Chechen militants responded in kind, stepping up guerrilla operations and rocket attacks on federal helicopters.

Several high-profile attacks have taken place. In May 2004, Chechen separatists assassinated Akhmad Kadyrov, the pro-Russia Chechen leader who became the president of Chechnya 8 months earlier after an election conducted by Russian authorities. On August 24, 2004, two Russian aircraft were bombed. This was followed by the Beslan school hostage crisis in which Chechen separatists took 1,300 hostages. The initially high public support for the war in Chechnya declined.

Putin has confronted several very influential oligarchs (Vladimir Gusinsky, Boris Berezovsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in particular) who attained large stakes of state assets, allegedly through illegal schemes, during the privatization process. Gusinsky and Berezovsky had been forced to leave Russia and give up parts of their assets. Khodorkovsky was jailed in Russia and lost his YUKOS company, formerly the largest oil producer in Russia. Putin's stand against oligarchs is generally popular with the Russian people, even though the jailing of Khodorkovsky is mainly seen as part of a takeover operation by government officials, according to another Levada-Center poll.

These confrontations also led to Putin establishing control over Russian media outlets previously owned by the oligarchs. In 2001 and 2002, TV

channels NTV (previously owned by Gusinsky), TV6 and TVS (owned by Berezovsky) were all taken over by media groups loyal to Putin. Similar takeovers also occurred with print media. Putin's popularity, which stems from his reputation as a strong leader, stands in contrast to the unpopularity of his predecessor, but it hinges on a continuation of economic recovery. Putin came into office at an ideal time: after the devaluation of the ruble in 1998, which boosted demand for domestic goods, and while world oil prices were rising. Indeed, during the seven years of his presidency, real GDP grew on average 6.7% a year, average income increased 11% annually in real terms, and a consistently positive balance of the federal budget enabled the government to cut 70% of the external debt (according to the Institute for Complex Strategic Studies). Thus, many credit him with the recovery, but his ability to withstand a sudden economic downturn has been untested. Putin won the Russian presidential election in 2004 without any significant opposition.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Attempt a critical evaluation of Post-Soviet restructuring?

3.2 Why Russians Regretted the Collapse of Soviet Union

Some researchers assert that most Russians today have come to regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. On repeated occasions, even Vladimir Putin-Boris Yeltsin's handpicked successor - stated that the fall of Soviet rule had led to few gains and many problems for most Russian citizens. In a campaign speech in February 2004, for example, Putin called the dismantlement of the Soviet Union a "national tragedy on an enormous scale," from which "only the elites and nationalists of the republics gained." He added, "I think that ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet space gained nothing from this. On the contrary, people have faced a huge number of problems." Putin's international prestige suffered a major blow in the West during the disputed 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. Putin had twice visited Ukraine before the election to show his support for the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich against opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western liberal economist. He congratulated Yanukovich, followed shortly afterwards by Belorussian president Alexander Lukashenko, on his victory before election results were even made official and made statements opposing the rerun of the disputed second round of elections, won by Yanukovich, amid allegations of large-scale voting fraud. The second round was ultimately rerun; Yushchenko won the round and was eventually declared the winner on January 10, 2005. In the West, the reaction to Russia's handling of, or perhaps interference in, the Ukrainian election evoked echoes of the Cold War, but relations with the U.S. have remained stable.

In 2005, the Russian government replaced the broad in kind Soviet-era benefits, such as free transportation and subsidies for heating and other utilities for socially vulnerable groups by cash payments. The reform, known as monetization, was unpopular and caused a wave of demonstrations in various Russian cities, with thousands of retirees protesting against the loss of their benefits. This was the first time, such wave of protests took place during the Putin administration. The reform hurt the popularity of the Russian government, but Putin personally was still popular, with a 77% approval rating. In 2008, Kosovo's declaration of independence saw a marked deterioration in Russia's relationship with the West. It also saw South Ossetia war against Georgia, that followed the Georgia's attempt to take over the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Russian troops entered South Ossetia and forced Georgian troops back, establishing their control on this territory. In the fall of 2008, Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Briefly explain why Russians regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have discussed the Post-Soviet restructuring; and explained why Russians regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit shows the restructuring activities in the Post-Soviet period and the challenges that made Russians regret the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss the Post-Soviet restructuring.
2. Explain why Russians regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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UNIT 3 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN POST COLD WAR ERA

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Russia's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War order
 - 3.2 Russia's Foreign Policy determinants in the Post-Cold War Era
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides you with discussions of Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War order; as well as Russia's foreign policy determinants in the post-Cold War era.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine the Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War order; and
- discuss Russia's foreign policy determinants in the post-Cold War era.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Russia's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Order

The process of search by Russia for its place and role in international affairs, in the relations with external world was complex and difficult. The illusions and errors of the early 1990s, probably, were unavoidable. Great geopolitical, social and economic changes have been taking place inside Russia and around. The world and its perception were changing very rapidly indeed, and not only Russia needed hard efforts to correctly understand the main and latent trends of developing events. The *paramount priority of Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union was the protection of interests of individual, society and state*. Thus the main efforts are directed to maintenance of reliable security of the country, preservation and strengthening of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,

strong and respectful positions in world community, which optimally respond to the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, and one of the contemporary world influential centres. Russia aspires to achieve formation of *a multi-polar system* of the international relations, realistically reflecting *multi-diversity* of the modern world, having such a variety of its interests. The *world order in the 21st century, for Russia*, should be based on mechanisms of *collective key problems decision-making*, on priority of law and on a broad democratization of international relations. Russia is striving to play an active role in such democratisation of international relations, to develop partnership and search for mutually acceptable solutions, even for the most complex problems.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War order.

3.2 Russia's Foreign Policy Determinants in the Post-Cold War Era

One of major preoccupations of *Russian diplomacy* – is to create a zone of good neighbourly relations, to maintain universal *stability* and *security*. The foreign policy is called to secure national interests of the Russians and develop optimally favourable external conditions for expansion and consolidation. This is not an easy question in the conditions of increasing problems and challenges, facing the world community under the pressures of globalization. The *national interests of Russia* are defined as a set of the balanced interests of personality, society and state in economic, internal policy, social, international, information, military, border-guard, ecological and other spheres. They are of a long-term character and determine the basic purposes, strategic and current problems of internal and external state policy. The *interests of multinational Russia* are directly connected to such tendencies, as globalization of world economy, increasing role of international institutes and mechanisms in global economics and politics. Comprehensive and equal participation in development of main principles of operation of world financial and economic system under contemporary situation fully corresponds to the interests of Russia. Besides the development of regional and sub-regional integration in Europe, Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Latin America becomes an important factor too. Russia cannot ignore *political-military rivalry* of the regional powers, growth of separatism, ethno-national and religious extremism. Vladimir Putin became Russia's President in December 1991. He has pursued a *policy* by which Russia became strong and independent. He frequently *criticized* US dominance and hegemony. He has described the US dominance as characterized by unrestrained *use of*

force. He has also *proposed a fair and democratic world* where every nation is *secure and prosperous*. Under Putin, Russia has been at the same time pursuing *positive and constructive* relations with the US and Europe. Russia became a full-fledged *member* of the G8. Russia has also sought to increase its *influence in ex-Soviet client states* like Cuba and Syria. Foreign policy in the post-Soviet era is being increasingly split into a Western and a Central Asian policy, which are quite separate and, therefore, more realistic. There is the *restoration of lost positions* in traditional zones of influence (Vietnam, the Middle East, India, and China) and development of ties with new partners (Latin American countries).

In the 1990s, Russia's foreign policy *lost its global reach*. Partner relations established in the Soviet era were broken and foreign trade shrank, while *pro-market reforms* in Russia put *trade* in the hands of *private business*, for the first time in decades. The Russian authorities in the 1990s did not have a clearly defined view of economic and political goals in different parts of the world. The situation changed under Putin, with state-controlled and private businesses establishing ties in nearly all countries, supported by a special policy of promoting their interests.

President Medvedev has argued that Russia's current foreign policy should seek to promote modernization by opening the country to foreign capital, technology, and ideas. Success should be judged on "whether *foreign policy facilitates* the improvement of *living standards* in our country." The emphasis on foreign policy as a tool for development has been increasingly pronounced during the crisis, as the elite has largely come to acknowledge that it cannot for the moment afford an ideologically driven, overtly confrontational foreign policy. This perception appears based in part on the recognition that the crisis had undermined some of the principal levers Russia has used to exert influence abroad in recent years: energy, the military, and financial assistance to neighbours.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain Russia's foreign policy determinants in the post-cold war era.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have examined Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War order as well as discussed Russia's foreign policy determinants in the post-Cold War era.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit focuses on Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War order and Russia's foreign policy determinants in the post-Cold War era.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Examine Russia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War order.
2. Discuss Russia's foreign policy determinants in the post-Cold War era.

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UNIT 4 **RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN POST SOVIET ERA**

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Russia's Post-Soviet Foreign Policy
 - 3.2 Russia's Foreign Policy Thrust in the Post-Soviet
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides you with discussions on Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy; highlighted Russia's foreign policy thrust in the post-Soviet as well as Russia's relations with her European neighbours.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy
- explain Russia's foreign policy thrust in the post-Soviet
- analyse Russia's relations with her European neighbours in the post-Soviet.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Russia's Post-Soviet Foreign Policy

During the early years of the construction of the Russian federation, Foreign Affairs Minister A. Kozirev pursued a strategy of maintaining close relations with the West in order to resolve international conflicts. A 1993 document contained a list of the *ten* most important regions for Russian interests in their order of significance. First on the list were the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The US was fourth, Europe was fifth, and China was sixth. Africa was the ninth, followed only by Latin America, the tenth and the final region on the list ("Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept" 1993: 6-20). During the 2000s, *disagreements* with the *West* on a number of international *issues* led Russia to *change its foreign policy* mentality. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept document was more pragmatic than its predecessor

(1993). However, there was still a top ten list, but the order of countries had changed. The CIS countries still constituted the first item, but Europe had become the second highest priority. The US was the third, and China had risen to the fourth. Africa was still ahead of Latin America and merited a separate paragraph explaining how Russia wished to see Africa's regional conflicts end as soon as possible. The document stated that Russia wanted to develop political relations with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other regional organisations, and that it was necessary for Russia to participate in *multilateral projects* by means of using the opportunities provided by such organisations (Ivanov, 2002: 210-230).

After the shaky years of the first Yeltsin period, the then-Foreign Minister Y. M. Primakov attempted to enforce economic reforms and adopt a *multidimensional foreign policy* line with a special reference to the former Soviet republics and the Middle East. It was during the firm and dedicated years of the Putin period after 2000 that the *economy became more stable*, increasing oil prices led to a *budget surplus*, the gross domestic product experienced an upsurge, and *foreign debt declined*. Encouraged by such developments, Russia started giving indications that it would not recognise or embrace the unipolar world system in the post-Soviet period. Russia's growing economic and political power led to a *change in its approach* toward Africa, with which it used to have closer relations. To Russia, Africa's role in the contemporary system of international politics was important and multidimensional. Africa's significance in world politics would increase even further if the continent's bloodshed and violent conflicts could be stopped. Because many countries were already aware of this, they were strengthening and expanding their efforts on the African continent. It was imperative that Russia avoid engaging too late and falling behind them (Gavrilov 2004: 505).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy.

3.2 Russia's Foreign Policy Thrust in the Post-Soviet Period

Russia's *policy* is no longer driven by ideological interests. The leaders are pragmatic, and this creates more opportunities. It has opened the way to establishing links with many countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which would have been unthinkable during the Soviet Union era because the Soviet policy was framed by a *bipolar view* as the key foreign policy aim was to undermine US influence, and all other considerations were subordinated to this. Russia's interests may not necessarily coincide with those of the US, but *contemporary* Russia does not seek to harm American interests per se.

The second priority is based on geopolitical calculations, which, as with the US, play a significant role in Russia's foreign policy thinking. The third driver of Russia's policy is business interests, particularly oil and gas. At least since Soviet times, Russian leaders have been keen on outlining long-term plans and doctrines in which the aims and means of their policy are explained to the people and the surrounding world. Just like Putin in 2000, President Medvedev after his accession to power launched a new Foreign Policy Concept in 2008, a new National Security Strategy in 2009 and a new Defence Doctrine in 2010. The first-mentioned Concept, which is the most relevant to foreign policy and presents priorities in terms of aims and means, according to Ingmar (2010) enumerated the following *basic objectives*:

- safeguarding the security of the country, maintaining and strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, its strong and authoritative positions, as one of the influential centres in the world;
- creating good external conditions for Russia's modernisation through raising the population's living standard, consolidating society, strengthening the foundations of the constitutional system, rule of law state and democratic institutions, realizing human rights and freedoms, and thus secure the competitiveness of the country in a globalizing world;
- influencing global processes in order to establish a just and democratic world order based on collective principles, and the supremacy of international law, in particular the principles of the UN Charter;
- creation of good-neighbourly relations with adjacent states and assistance in eliminating existing and preventing the emergence of new hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the adjoining regions of the Russian Federation and other parts of the world;
- seeking consensus and coinciding positions with other states and international organisations in the process of solving tasks defined by Russia's national interests;
- comprehensive defence of the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad;
- contributing to an objective perception of Russia in the world as a democratic state with a socially oriented market economy and an independent foreign policy;
- promoting and popularizing the Russian language and the cultures of the peoples of Russia abroad.

The Concept further describes Russian foreign policy as balanced and '*multi-vector*' as a result of Russia being a vast Eurasian country. It claims Russia bears a responsibility for *upholding security both on a global and regional level and is ready for common action*. Throughout,

priority is given to the adjoining region of post-Soviet states (excluding the Baltics). Further NATO enlargement to this region is seen as a serious threat to Russian security. Thus Russia claims a greater say in world politics at US expense and wants its own zone of influence, an ambition which reminds of the US Monroe doctrine for the Americas.

The Concept obviously is primarily concerned with Russia's state interests and its position in the world. The call for a '*democratic*' world order, or '*multi-polarity*', is evidently directed against the dominating position of the United States. External security is placed before economic development, which is largely seen as a means to the end. The points about Russians abroad can be seen as aiming to satisfy nationalist sentiments among the population. There is a clear risk of *conflict* between promoting the primary goal of strengthening Russia's position as one of the strong centres in the world and defending the Russians abroad on the one hand, and territorial integrity and the seeking of consensus with other states on the other. Further, there is little place in the Concept for democracy and human rights in the Western sense.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain Russia's foreign policy thrust in the post-Soviet?

3.3 Russia and Her European Neighbours

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian officials have attempted to exert influence on their immediate neighbors by withholding or threatening to withhold vital oil and gas shipments. This occurred as early as 1990 and most recently took place with the well-publicised gas cutoff to Ukraine in 2009. A variety of Central European countries have been targeted as a result of Moscow's ire, including the three Baltic States, Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Georgia. Much of Europe, however, only saw this as a threat to its own interests when in early 2009 Western Europe and the Balkans were directly hit by the disruption in gas shipment to Ukraine. Even with Russian oil production flattening and gas exports in temporary decline, Moscow has continued to use its energy revenues to buy downstream energy facilities in Europe. At the same time, Gazprom representatives have strengthened their influence with political leaders in key transit and consuming countries. The Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipeline projects, opposed by many of the United States' closest friends in Europe, is gaining momentum, thanks in part to Moscow's ability to recruit and pay substantial salaries to at least two former European leaders. Additionally, in some European countries, officials reportedly benefit

from their financial ties to Russia's Gazprom, thereby furthering European acceptance of Moscow's pipeline projects.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Briefly explain Russia's relations with her European neighbours in the post-Soviet.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we have discussed Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy; explained Russia's foreign policy thrust in the post-Soviet as well as briefly examined Russia's relations with her European neighbours in the post-Soviet period.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit focused on Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy; Russia's foreign policy thrust in the post-Soviet and Russia's relationship with her European neighbours in the post-Soviet era.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Describe Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy.
2. Explain Russia's foreign policy thrust in the post-Soviet period.
3. Briefly explain Russia's relationship with her European neighbours in the post-Soviet era.

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MODULE 3

Unit 1	Russia-EU Relations
Unit 2	Russia in Ukraine
Unit 3	Russia's Role in the Arab Spring
Unit 4	Russia-China Relations

UNIT 1 RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS**CONTENTS**

1.0	Introduction
2.0	Objectives
3.0	Main Content
	3.1 Legal/Institutional Framework of Russia-EU Relations
	3.2 Trade and Economic Cooperation
	3.3 Russia-EU Cooperation on Security Issues
4.0	Conclusion
5.0	Summary
6.0	Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0	References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides you important discussion on the legal/institutional framework of Russia-EU relations; trade and economic cooperation as well as cooperation on security issues.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- highlight the legal/institutional framework of Russia-EU relations
- explain the trade and economic cooperation between Russia and EU; and
- discuss Russia-EU cooperation on security issues.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT**3.1 Legal/Institutional Framework of Russia-EU Relations**

The legal basis for Russia-EU relations is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into force on 1st December, 1997 for an initial duration of 10 years, which will be automatically extended beyond 2007 on an annual basis - unless either side withdraws

from the agreement. It sets the principal common objectives, establishes the institutional framework for bilateral contacts, and calls for activities and dialogue in a number of areas. The PCA, is based upon the following principles and objectives: the promotion of international peace and security; support for democratic norms as well as for political and economic freedoms. It is based on the idea of mutual partnership - one aimed at strengthening political, commercial, economic, and cultural ties. The *provisions* of the PCA cover a wide range of *policy areas* including political dialogue; trade in goods and services; business and investment; financial and legislative cooperation; science and technology; education and training; energy, cooperation in nuclear and space technology; environment, transport; culture; and on the prevention of illegal activities. The PCA establishes an *institutional framework* for regular consultations between the European Union and the Russian Federation as follows:

- At Summits of Heads of State/Heads of Government, which take place twice a year and define the strategic direction for the development of EU-Russia relations.
- At Ministerial level in the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), to allow Ministers responsible for various policy areas to meet as often as necessary and to discuss specific issues. PPCs have so far been held with the participation of Foreign Ministers, Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Energy, Transport and Environment Ministers.
- At Senior Officials and expert level.
- Political dialogue takes place at regular Foreign Ministers meetings, meetings of senior EU officials with their Russian counterparts, monthly meetings of the Russian Ambassador to the EU with the troika of the Political and Security Committee and at expert level on a wide range of topical international issues.
- Since 2005, regular consultations on human rights matters (see Human Rights section) are held.
- Between the European Parliament and the Russian Parliament (State Duma and Federation Council) in the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. Members from both Parliaments meet on a regular basis and exchange views on current issues. To complement the provisions of the PCA, a number of sectoral and international agreements exist, as well as other mechanisms for cooperation (see section below). Steel and textiles are the main sectors covered by bilateral trade agreements. The latest Steel Agreement covers the years 2007 to 2008. The agreement will end on the day Russia becomes a member of the WTO.
- In November 2002, recognising the great efforts that Russia has made in its transition to a fully-fledged market economy, the EU

granted “market economy status” to Russian exporters. It should be noted that anti-dumping is not a major aspect in EU-Russia trade at present, as only 10 anti-dumping measures are currently in force, representing less than 0.5 % of EU imports from Russia.

- Bilateral EU-Russia negotiations for Russia’s accession to the WTO were concluded 2004 and negotiations at multilateral level are still ongoing. The EU is currently working with Russia on a new agreement for post-2007 to replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).

Both the EU and Russia have experienced many political, economic and social changes since the entry into force of the PCA in 1997, thus the new agreement must reflect these changes.

In the period 1994–2006 an EU-Russia Cooperation Programme was funded through a programme of Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). Russia has been the biggest beneficiary of support to the countries in the post-Soviet region receiving about half of all funding. Since 1991, when the Programme was launched, €2.7 billion has been granted to Russia and has been used in 1,500 projects in 58 regions.

At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their co-operation by creating four ‘common spaces’:

- The Common Economic Space, covering economic issues and the environment;
- The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice;
- The Common Space of External Security, including crisis management and non-proliferation; and
- The Common Space of Research and Education, including cultural aspects. Negotiations on a new EU-Russia Agreement were launched at the 2008 Khanty Mansiysk summit, with the objective to: provide a more comprehensive framework for EU-Russia relations, reflecting the growth in co-operation since the early 1990s; include substantive, legally binding commitments in all areas of the partnership, including political dialogue, freedom, security and justice, economic co-operation, research, education and culture, trade, investment and energy.

At the 2010 Rostov Summit, the EU and Russia also launched the Partnership for Modernisation, which was conceived as a focal point for mutual co-operation and to reinforce dialogue started under the common spaces. The Partnership for modernisation deals with all aspects of modernisation - economic, technical (including standards and regulations), rule of law and functioning of the judiciary. Following a

statement on 6th March, 2014 by the EU Heads of State or Government, negotiations on a new EU-Russia Agreement were suspended. Meetings at the highest political level (summits) have also been suspended. The last meeting took place on 28th January, 2014 in Brussels.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Briefly highlight the legal/institutional framework of Russia-EU relations.

3.2 Trade and Economic Cooperation

Between 2000 and 2006, EU exports of goods to Russia more than tripled in value, from 22.7 billion Euro to 72.4bn, while EU imports from Russia more than doubled, from 63.8bn to 140.6 bn. The share of Russia in the EU's total external trade in goods has nearly doubled between 2000 and 2006. In 2006, Russia accounted for just over 6% of EU exports and 10% of EU imports, and was the EU's third most important trading partner, after the USA and China. In 2006, the EU25 exported 13.1bn Euro of services to Russia, while imports of services from Russia amounted to 9.9bn, meaning that the EU25 had a surplus of 3.2bn in trade services with Russia. The EU and Russia agreed at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003 to create in the long-term a 'Common Economic Space'. A road map agreed in 2005 sets out objectives and areas for cooperation for the short and medium term. Fourteen dialogues between the EU and Russia covering most economic sectors have so far been established. They include a number of regulatory dialogues which aim at promoting the gradual approximation of legislation. Three meetings of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Councils at ministerial level have been held on environment, transport and energy in 2006. This framework is complemented by sectoral agreements between both sides (Eurostat Press Releases, 2007).

The overall *aim* of the Common Economic Space is the creation of an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. The *objectives* include to put in place conditions which will:

- increase opportunities for economic operators,
- promote trade and investment,
- facilitate the establishment and operation of companies on a reciprocal basis,
- strengthen cooperation in many sectors such as energy, transport, information and communication technologies, agriculture, space, aeronautics, research and development, macroeconomic policy, financial services, intellectual property rights, procurement, investment, standards and environment,

- reinforce overall economic cooperation and reforms,
- enhance the competitiveness of the EU and the Russian Federation.

It also aims at reinforcing the EU and Russian economies, based on the principles of nondiscrimination, transparency and good governance, taking into account the business dialogue conducted within the EU-Russia Industrialists' Round Table (IRT). For more information on the IRT, (see the web link at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/business_dialogues/Russia/russiaoverview.htm.)

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the trade and economic cooperation between Russia and EU?

3.3 Russia-EU Cooperation on Security Issues

The EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their cooperation in the area of external security as they both have a particular responsibility for security and stability on the European continent and beyond. There are 5 priority areas for enhancing EU-Russia cooperation:

- Strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the international scene;
- The fight against terrorism;
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening export control regimes and disarmament;
- Cooperation in crisis management;
- Cooperation in the field of civil protection EU Strategy;

The EU and Russia work to strengthen the roles of the United Nations, OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE) in building an international order based on effective multilateralism. An extensive and ever more operational political dialogue characterises EU-Russia relations. The EU has a strong interest in engaging Russia in strengthening stability on the European continent, notably in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders – common neighborhood. The regional conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria) and the South Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) are regularly discussed. The EU also stresses the importance of promoting democracy in Belarus. These discussions simultaneously grant both partners the opportunity to voice a frank exchange of views regarding the situation in the common neighborhood and a platform to seek common solutions. The EU and Russia seek to strengthen their cooperation in all relevant international and regional

fora in the fight against terrorism, notably by promoting and developing the relevant conventions and instruments in the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe. The EU in particular seeks an early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism.

In the area of non-proliferation, export controls and disarmament, a major objective of the EU and Russia is to promote the universal adherence to and greater effectiveness of the relevant international instruments. A particular EU concern at present is to seek Russian support for the accession of all EU Member States to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russia is seeking to join the Australia Group (Biological and Chemical Weapons Control).

A major part of EU funding has supported the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow for the redeployment of weapons experts to work on peaceful projects. Since 1994, some 60,000 experts have benefited from about 2100 projects worth a total of \$635 million. Out of this figure the EU has contributed €150 million to the ISTC redeployment efforts.

The EU contributes also to the G8 Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. At the G8 Summit in December 2003, a former Commission President Prodi committed €1 billion over ten years as a contribution to the Partnership. Currently, the EU is well on its way to meeting its pledge with around € 800 million committed and more than €400 million spent. The EU commitment refers to the four areas of cooperation that have been identified: non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety.

At the Seville European Council in 2002, the EU defined the arrangements for Russian participation in EU crisis management operations. Russia has however not accepted to participate in EU operations under these conditions. Nevertheless a policy dialogue is developing in the field of crisis management and European Security and Defence Policy, notably through the regular meetings of the Russian Ambassador in Brussels and the Political and Security Committee Troika. There are also regular meetings between the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee as well as expert-level contacts.

In the field of Civil Protection, the aim is to strengthen dialogue and cooperation to respond to disasters and emergencies. Cooperation primarily takes place between the EU's Civil Emergency Monitoring and Information Centre based in the Directorate General for Environment of the Commission and the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations. An arrangement for practical cooperation was established in 2004 providing for exchanges of information, contact

details for 24-hour communication and exchanges of staff between the operational centres.

The early promise of warmer EU-Russia relations, which was evident after Russia's emergence from the Soviet Union, has disappeared. This has happened despite the deep economic relations and energy dependence between EU member states and Russia. Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union, saw the crisis in Ukraine not as the cause of the decline in relations but rather as exposing existing problems. Dr Lilia Shevtsova, Senior Associate, Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program, Moscow Centre, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted that the "warm season" in relations, around 2001 and 2002, had declined to the point where, by the end of 2013, both sides felt "mutual frustration, disappointment and even disgust regarding each other."

Dr Alexander Yakovenko, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the UK, noted that "Russia-EU co-operation was grinding to a halt even before the current crisis in Ukraine", and highlighted the lack of progress on the energy dialogue and the new EU-Russia Agreement. The early post-Cold War years were marked by significant political, economic and social change within Russia itself, as the country instituted a multi-party electoral system, privatised and liberalised its economy, and began to recover from Soviet-era economic stagnation. Throughout this initial period, the EU played an important role - underpinned by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and other agreements - in supporting institutional and market reform, infrastructural investment, civil society development and other aspects of Russia's transformation. More than ever before, Russian and European individuals, businesses, goods and culture travelled in both directions. Simultaneously, the EU-alongside other regional institutions, including NATO- developed closer relationships with other states emerging from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, several of which took the decision to become NATO and EU members. Thus, as Russia was changing internally and regaining its economic footing, the geopolitical context around it was also changing.

According to Mr. Ian Bond CVO, Director of Foreign Policy, Centre for European Reform, what began in 1994 with the EU-Russia PCA "at a high point, a moment of great optimism when things seemed to be moving forward and reform was progressing very rapidly", had by the announcement of the 2010 Partnership for Modernisation descended into "full self deception mode" on the part of the EU. This, he and other witnesses argued, resulted from a long process marked by divergent political and economic agendas, and incompatible interpretations of geopolitical realities.

In the past ten years, the Kremlin's approach to the EU has changed fundamentally. It no longer regards Europe as a mentor or even a model. Russia no longer seeks a relationship in which the two partners would have, in Romano Prodi's memorable phrase, "everything in common except the institutions." The four common areas agreed upon in 2005 as fields of integration—economic; freedom, security, and justice; external security; and research, education, and culture—are by now history. Instead, the relationship is becoming more transactional, symbolized more by adding new pipelines and bickering over visas than by the profession of common values, not to speak of their implementation. Indeed, Moscow has not only accepted the values gap between itself and the EU but has begun to proudly advertise its own more conservative values, such as national sovereignty, religious faith, and traditional family. These priorities stand in contrast to Europe's unchecked freedoms which, in the Kremlin's view, erode society and will eventually doom it.

Russia's 2012 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has not led to an intensification of EU-Russian economic relations. To the contrary, Europeans are bringing up complaints about Russian actions. But the eighteen-year-long WTO negotiation process must have indicated to the EU that Russia was more interested in protecting what it had than in using the accession as a "big bang" to liberalize and modernize its economy, as others, including China, have done. Moreover, some sectors of the Russian economy will need time to adjust to the new, more competitive environment of life in the WTO. As a result, moving forward on free trade with the EU may not be easy or quick.

In the field of energy, mutual dependence between the EU and Russia will persist even as the recent shale gas revolution in the United States and the changes in the international gas trade have caused Russia's share of the EU energy market to diminish. The energy dialogue has been unproductive, with each side ignoring the other's unilateral bids. Russia appears monopolistic and heavy-handed to the EU, and the EU seems overly bureaucratic and unyielding to Russians. Moscow has preferred to counter the EU's internal regulations with its own ultimatums.

The Kremlin continues to be obsessed with building pipelines, driven by the strategic decision to put an end to problems with gas transit across Ukraine. This strategy has a high price: there is a significant amount of pipeline redundancy, with half the capacity going unused.

In the post-Cold War period Europe has proved to be incapable of reading Moscow's signals correctly. Its inability to appreciate the intensity of Russia's resentment about the European order is rooted in

the European Union's proclivity to think of Russian-European relations after the Cold War as a win-win game and to see the Union itself as a benevolent power that no reasonable actor could view as a threat. Until the annexation of Crimea, the West assumed that Russia could only lose by challenging the international order and especially by questioning the inviolability of internationally recognised borders on which control of its own vulnerable south-eastern flank seemingly depends. European leaders persuaded themselves that, behind closed doors, what Russia really feared were China and the spread of radical Islam, and that Russia's endless complaints about NATO's enlargement or America's anti-missile defence system in Europe were simply a form of popular entertainment aimed at a domestic audience for television news. The problem is, these Western assumptions were wrong. European leaders and European publics fell victim of their cartoon vision of the nature and capacity of President Vladimir Putin's clique.

The stories of pervasive corruption and cynicism coming from Russia made them believe that the Russian elite was interested only in money and it would do nothing that could threaten its business interests. Russian leaders were crooks, but profit-minded crooks. This vision of Putin's Russia as "Russia Inc." has turned out to be wrong. Russian elites are greedy and corrupt but they also dream about Greater Russia and they want Russia's triumphant return on the global stage. "Putin is a Soviet person," wrote Putin's former advisor Gleb Pavlovsky, "who set himself the task of revanche, not in a stupid, military sense, but in a historical sense" (Pavlovsky, 2014:57; Riccardo, 2015).

Conclusively, Europeans need to approach the Russians on European terms while remaining fully aware that Russians have their own interests, values, and terms of reference. The issue for the EU is not what the Europeans want Russia to be or to become-which is different from the EU's approach to Turkey and Ukraine, which are seeking EU membership. Instead, Europeans should think about what they want or need from Russia and work on those issues. Ensuring peace and stability on the continent of Europe, where the EU and Russia are the biggest players, is one such priority for Europeans. Another is expanding and deepening trade while avoiding overdependence on Russian energy supplies. The EU could seek to exploit investment opportunities in Russia as they present themselves and as the Russian investment climate warms up. It could also focus on broadening and deepening humanitarian contacts between EU and Russian citizens. As Russia becomes more integrated into the global system, for example by joining the WTO and acceding to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the future, Brussels and Moscow can work toward achieving greater harmony of their values, norms, and principles.

Isolationist trends in the Kremlin's policies can be effectively countered by opening Europe even more completely to ordinary Russian citizens. Moscow even advocates the goal of a visa-free regime between the Schengen zone and Russia.

The EU should also avoid a situation in which Russia sees a relationship with the entire EU as laden with restrictions but views bilateral relationships with individual EU member states as offering opportunities.

Europe should not succumb to the new stereotype of Russia's increasing irrelevance in the twenty-first-century world and simply lose interest. Globalization has not entirely abolished geography. And if Moscow finds a way to emerge as a more important player, which is more likely, Brussels will have missed key opportunities for collaboration.

As Russia becomes more integrated into the global system, Brussels and Moscow can work toward achieving greater harmony of values, norms, and principles. (Lipman and Malashenko, 2013).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Russia-EU cooperation on security issues?

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have been able to highlight on the legal/institutional framework of Russia-EU relations; explain the trade and economic cooperation between Russia and EU; and discuss Russia-EU cooperation on security issues.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit is an examination of the legal/institutional framework of Russia-EU relations; trade and economic cooperation as well as their cooperation on security issues.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Briefly highlight the legal/institutional framework of Russia-EU relations.
2. Explain the trade and economic cooperation between Russia and EU.
3. Discuss Russia-EU cooperation on security issues.

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UNIT 2 RUSSIA-UKRAINE INTERACTIONS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 The Beginnings of Russian–Ukrainian Relations
 - 3.2 Russian-Ukrainian Treaty
 - 3.3 Russian-Ukrainian Economic Relations
 - 3.4 Russia Policy toward Ukraine
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- 4.0 Conclusion
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- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation is one of the most important partners of the European Union (EU). Russia is the largest neighbour of the EU, brought even closer by the Union's 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The 2003 EU Security Strategy highlights Russia as a key player in geopolitical and security terms at both the global and regional level. Russia is also a major supplier of energy products to the EU. Among all of the countries that border Ukraine, the Russian Federation is its most important partner. Ukraine's relations with Moscow are the key issue of its foreign policy to such an extent that each option of the Ukrainian foreign policy is first and foremost a choice as to the shape of its relations with Russia. This is mainly a consequence of Ukraine's geographic and geopolitical situation, the legacy of many centuries of political, economic and cultural bonds between these two countries, as well as Russia's inevitably dominant position in their mutual relations. During the final period of USSR's existence the authorities of Ukraine and Russia co-operated in their efforts against the union-oriented centre. However, the day after the signature of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formation treaty on December 8, 1991 *conflicts of interests* emerged and co-operation gave way to rivalry. One of the basic *causes of controversy* was the fact that the two countries had different ideas of the Commonwealth. For Ukraine, it was to be a kind of Commission for the Liquidation of the USSR, while Russia saw it as an instrument to preserve the maximum possible degree of post-Soviet countries' integration and to carry out their future reintegration.

A major factor that affected the development of independent Ukraine and its relations with Russia is often overlooked. This is the fact that Ukraine's independence was a product of the Soviet political classes' division into republican "formations". It was Ukraine's Soviet ruling class that decided to form a state of its own, and therefore this state has been a continuation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both in terms of the international law and in terms of its political system, economy and culture.

Manifold bonds existed between the emerging Ukrainian political classes (with the exception of the very limited dissident circles) and the Russian political classes. From the very beginning this has been a major factor which made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Kiev to adopt a policy of definite separation from Moscow, as independence-oriented right wing Ukrainian groups wanted. Thus, in the first years of Ukraine's independence it was mainly the Russian Federation's confrontational policy that pushed Ukraine towards the West.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss what happened in the beginning of Russian–Ukrainian relations
- explain the reason for the Russian-Ukrainian 1995 Treaty
- analyse Russian-Ukrainian economic relations
- assess Russia's policy toward Ukraine
- examine the implications of the Ukraine crisis
- discuss why Russia has to turn East
- explain the relationship between Russia and Turkey; and
- briefly discuss the relationship between Russia's and neighbours in the Arctic.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Beginning of Russian–Ukrainian Relations

The beginning of Russian–Ukrainian relations was very difficult. Ukraine was experiencing an independence induced happiness which bred excessive expectations regarding the West. At the same time the Russian Federation was in a state of shock caused by the loss of lands that were considered to be historically part of Russia and were largely inhabited by Russians. For some time Moscow continued to articulate threats of border revision and to promote the idea of Ukraine's inevitable division into a western and an eastern part. On the other hand,

the attitude adopted by Kiev towards Russia in the first years of independence was strict and in many respects unrealistic. Moscow welcomed this attitude, as it slowed down the process of recognising, Ukraine as a responsible member of the international community entitled to full rights. For the Russian Federation it was significant that along with its territory, Ukraine took almost all of the Black Sea Fleet bases, as well as the groups of strategic bombers and rockets armed with over 1700 nuclear warheads. Also taken were two stations of the nuclear attack early warning system, these being the most important for Russia, as without them its anti-rocket defence system lost sight of the south-west. Nevertheless, the two countries soon reached an agreement on this: Ukraine leased both these facilities to the Russian Federation and their operation continued uninterrupted. Similarly, Ukraine never questioned the presence of Russian armed forces in Sevastopol. Ukraine did not accede to the CIS Collective Security Treaty (the Tashkent Treaty), nor did it join the treaty on collective defence of borders and many other CIS agreements, which Ukraine considered disadvantageous. Also, Kiev consistently and effectively opposed the transformation of the CIS into a super-state structure, and from 1994 Ukraine developed a tendency to sabotage forms of multilateral co-operation and to prefer bilateral co-operation (including with the Russian Federation). This policy, supported by some of the other CIS countries, ultimately led to the failure of Moscow's policies and to the decline of the CIS.

The policy of Ukraine's first president Leonid Kravchuk was fairly impressive and rather ineffectual. It was basically a policy of gestures, both in relation to the West and to Russia. It led to the recognition of Ukraine as an equal member of the community of nations, but failed to solve any of the country's major problems. Especially in the relations with Russia Leonid Kravchuk proved to be unable to develop workable compromises. However Russian expectations were also exaggerated. In 1992–1994 the main points of debate could have been resolved in a manner that would be much more favourable for Russia than the compromise reached ultimately in 1997. The attitude of Ukraine's second president Leonid Kuchma was radically different. Elected promising closer relations with Russia, he pursued a definitely patriotic yet simultaneously pragmatic policy towards it from the start. This policy proved quite effective.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss what happened in the beginnings of Russian–Ukrainian Relations?

3.2 Russian-Ukrainian Treaty

In February 1995 the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership was signed. It did not include the provisions on dual citizenship and the Black Sea Fleet that Russia had proposed (both these issues were excluded to be settled in a separate agreement), and its provisions on the recognition of borders were absolutely univocal. Nevertheless, Moscow's agreement to sign the Treaty depended on the signature of the accords on the final division of the Black Sea Fleet and the terms and conditions of Russian navy's stationing in Crimea. The absence of any progress on this matter resulted in repeated cancellations of the Russian president Boris Yeltsin's visits to Kiev. It was, however, a success on the part of Ukraine's diplomacy to convince international opinion that Moscow was responsible for the impasse in the negotiations and that the conditions it wanted to impose would call into question Ukraine's sovereign rule over a portion of Crimea. The Ukrainian constitution passed in June 1996 ruled out the fulfilment of one of Russia's demands, namely the introduction of dual citizenship (and of equal status of Russian as an official language, which has been persistently, if unofficially, urged by the Russian and some groups within the Ukrainian political classes). The constitution did, however, allow the existence of a Russian military base in Ukraine. This opened the way to the final resolution of the Sevastopol issue.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the reason for the Russian-Ukrainian 1995 Treaty?

3.3 Russian-Ukrainian Economic Relations

The supply and transit of natural gas is the key element in Russian-Ukrainian economic relations. Ukraine cannot survive without the supplies of natural gas from Russia (or from other sources through the territory of Russia), while for the Russian Federation the proceeds from natural gas exports are of crucial importance for the stability of its public finances. Russia exports its natural gas almost exclusively through the territory of Ukraine, and the launch of the first branch of the Yamal pipeline has changed this situation by only a small extent. Ukraine is also one of the major consumers of Russian gas, a consumer that Gazprom could not do without in the early years (this changed around 1999 when Gazprom decided to maximise its exports outside the CIS).

In the early 90s, the import of natural gas was probably the most criminally-affected sector of Ukraine's economy: all (or nearly all) of

Ukrainian oligarchical fortunes (and some of those in Russia) were built on corrupt practices in the gas sector. These practices caused losses for Gazprom, too, but in spite of the Ukrainian partners' growing debt, its supplies of gas to Ukraine must have remained profitable, either for the concern or for its management, whose private interests were often in conflict with the interests of the company. Following the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine assumed control over the system of transit pipelines running across its territory. At that time the management of Gazprom disregarded this fact, probably because it did not take the ultimate break-up of the common state seriously. This is why they later attempted to reclaim this infrastructure (without success yet, even though it has made several such attempts).

In the early 90s, Ukraine's consumption of natural gas reached 115 billion cubic metres per year, dropping gradually over subsequent years and reaching 68.6 billion cubic metres in 2000. At the same time, Ukraine's domestic production decreased from 28.1 billion cubic metres in 1990 to 18.0 billion cubic metres in 2000. Nevertheless, the proportion of domestic production in the energy balance increased. From the start (probably even before 1991), a portion of the gas supplied to Ukraine originated from Turkmenistan. In 1996 this country provided 18.3 billion cubic metres of gas, while Russia provided 52.9 billion cubic metres (in 1997, 11.9 and 49.3 billion cubic metres, respectively). However, in 1997 Turkmenistan discontinued its supplies because the Ukrainians failed to meet their obligations. Unlike Russia, Turkmenistan was not dependent on Ukraine for transit of gas exports and so could afford to cut off supplies (Olszafski 2001).

The management of Gazprom took advantage of this situation and increased supplies to Ukraine so as to make up for the shortage caused by the discontinuance of Turkmen imports. At the same time Gazprom attempted to force the transformation of the Ukrainian gas importers' debt into Ukrainian state debt. Given all this, the 1998 agreement on the supplies of natural gas to Ukraine seriously worsened the Ukrainian side's situation. The arrangements that accompanied it secured a quasi-monopoly position in Ukraine's internal market for ITERA-Ukraine (who also acts as the provider of Turkmen gas). The debt relating to

current supplies ceased to accrue and the old debts were restructured, but there was the growing problem of gas theft from transit pipelines. Moscow would use this as an argument in bilateral negotiations and on the international scene to discredit Ukraine, while the management of Gazprom did nothing to stop the theft. It seems that the main reason for this was the fact that theft of gas and its subsequent resale to the West was a source of profit not only for the top management of Ukraine's Ukrhazprom, but also for the top managers of Gazprom. In February 1998 Ukraine and Turkmenistan signed a long-term agreement for the supply of natural gas, but the supplies under this agreement were also soon discontinued. In 1998 Ukraine received no Turkmen gas, while in 1999 the volume of supplies reached approx. 8 billion cubic metres. Thus, Russia continued to supply a major portion of the natural gas consumed by Ukraine. Gazprom went on to take advantage of this situation, attempting to assume control over Ukrainian transit gas pipelines (unsuccessful) and over Ukraine's metallurgic and chemical enterprises that were of interest to it (quite successful).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Attempt an analysis of Russian-Ukrainian economic relations.

3.4 Russia Policy toward Ukraine

The new President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, gave up his predecessor's inconsistent policy towards Ukraine, which was coloured with a certain post-soviet nostalgia and the hopes of the still more and more mythical "re-integration of the CIS' countries". Moscow has understood and accepted the fact that Ukraine's independence is irreversible and that it would be in Russia's interest to respect this, not only making its policy towards Kiev easier, but also improving the Russian Federation's global image. The change contributed to improvement in bilateral relations in the years 2000-2001. During the presidential campaign of 1999 in Ukraine, Russia remained restrained. Relatively late in the campaign it opted for Leonid Kuchma as the least inconvenient of the important candidates. His main rival, a communist Petro Symonenko, was dangerous to Moscow as he is an ally of Gennady Zyuganov. Kuchma however, was already known and was also liked and valued by Boris Yeltsin. If the change of leaders in the Kremlin had happened earlier, Russia might have decided to support Oleksandr Moroz, the only candidate who in those elections constituted a real political alternative to Kuchma.

Since 2000 Russia's politics have become more pragmatic and predictable, and Russia itself ruled much more consistently, and therefore stronger. Putin's Russia has given up treating the CIS as a tool

in re-integration of the “post-USSR space” and with determination has backed bilateral relations with the member countries of the CIS. The Kremlin has decided that treating Ukraine as a partner and an ally, and not as a “transient country”, would make it easier to achieve the important political aims connected with this much weaker country. It has turned out to be a good decision. The new political direction has removed the main psychological impediment in the way of tightening the Ukraine-Russia relationships, enabling Kiev to make some concessions to its northern neighbour.

As the chief for the Council of Foreign Affairs and Security of the Russian Federation Sergei Karaganov said at the beginning of 2001: Russia is interested in a stable Ukraine; Russia needs a friendly Ukraine. Russia cannot afford the luxury of supporting Ukraine financially. Moreover, according to Karaganov: A downfall of Ukraine’s economy means a catastrophe for Russia. Boris Tarasyuk, Ukraine’s previous minister of foreign affairs, similarly assesses the situation: Since Vladimir Putin’s victory in elections we have clearly experienced a new approach of the Russian Federation. It is characterised by firmer relations and I would even say, pressure on Ukraine. Nowadays, there is less sentiment in the relationship of the leaders and more pragmatism, which is positive in itself. But if you are the weaker party, such pragmatism turns into the partner’s pressure. Nevertheless, contrary to Tarasyuk’s beliefs, it is difficult to see any increase in Russia’s pressure on Ukraine. It was especially noticeable during gas negotiations at the end of 2000, which gave Kiev some unexpected benefits. As a Russian political commentator has accurately remarked, Yuschenko’s pro-Western policy was favourable to Russia as the new Ukrainian government honestly addressed the issue of debts and gave Russian businessmen wide access to legal privatization in Ukraine. The dismissal of Ihor Bakai, the director of Ukrhazprom, who was a patron of the mafia-like relations of Russia and Ukraine (responsible for stealing of Russian gas) was also convenient to Russia (as it weakened Rem Vyakhiryev whom Putin wanted to remove). A certain hardening of Russia’s standpoint in economic matters did not take place until 2001.

These dramatic developments were most traumatic for Moscow. From a Russian perspective, Ukraine had for two decades been a weak, fragile, and often unreliable state, chronically creating problems for Russian energy giant Gazprom’s transit to Europe. However, to most Russians, the country was anything but foreign. Now, Ukraine was suddenly turning into a country led by a coalition of pro-Western elites in Kiev and anti-Russian western Ukrainian nationalists. This shift, in the Kremlin’s eyes, carried a dual danger of Kiev clamping down on the Russian language, culture, and identity inside Ukraine and of the country itself joining NATO in short order. Putin reacted immediately

by apparently putting in motion contingency plans that Moscow had drafted for the eventuality of Kiev seeking membership in the Atlantic alliance. Russia's Ukraine policy, which until then had been publicly low-key and heavily focused on top-level interaction with the Ukrainian president, immediately went into high gear. Defense and maneuvering stopped, to be replaced by a counteroffensive. The main goal became to keep Ukraine from joining NATO and, ideally, to win back the country for the Eurasian integration project, whose core element is the reunification of what Moscow sees as the "Russian world." In pursuing its new, proactive approach, Russia had two main objectives. The first was to make Crimea off limits to the new post-Yanukovich authorities in Kiev. This was executed by means of Russian Special Forces physically insulating the peninsula from mainland Ukraine, neutralizing the Ukrainian garrison in Crimea, and helping Crimea's pro-Russian elements take control of the local government, parliament, and law enforcement agencies. Russia also encouraged those elements to hold a referendum on Crimea's status and pursued an all-out campaign in favor of Crimea's reunification with Russia. The vote, held on March 16, 2014, overwhelmingly endorsed such a union. Two days later, a treaty was signed in Moscow to incorporate Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into Russia.

Moscow's second objective was to achieve a new federal settlement in Ukraine, which would forestall complete domination of the country by Kiev and western Ukraine and thus make any move toward NATO structurally impossible. On March 1, 2014, Putin had already sought and received powers from the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, to use Russian armed forces inside Ukraine. Russian forces began exercising along the Ukrainian border, appearing ready to invade, but no cross border invasion happened. The Kremlin was putting pressure on the new authorities in Kiev, making them nervous and indecisive; deterring Washington and Brussels from intervening by dramatically raising the stakes; and encouraging Moscow's political friends in the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine. Indeed, in the largely Russophone eastern and southern Ukraine, mass rallies began to demand regional autonomy, including rights for the Russian language. These rallies were later followed by reasonably well-organized militant groups seizing government buildings, arming themselves, and taking over towns. In the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, the militants held regional referendum in early May and proclaimed their own "republics" independent from Kiev. Moscow did not hide its sympathy and support for these separatists, but it refrained from either recognizing them or sending the Russian forces to protect them.

However, Russia failed in rousing resistance to Kiev across the entire southeast of Ukraine. The hope that predominantly Russian-speaking Novorossia, “New Russia” encompassing Ukraine’s entire south-east, would break away from the new revolutionary authorities and form a federation, did not materialize. Only Donetsk and Luhansk held referendums in support of regional sovereignty. The key cities of Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhia, however, remained under the central government’s control. Moreover, the interim government launched an “antiterrorist operation” in Donetsk and Luhansk, which led to numerous casualties on both sides, and provoked a humanitarian crisis. Moscow gave the militants there moral, political, and material support but stopped short of recognizing their “people’s republics” and outright military intervention. Moscow refused to recognize the Maidan-backed government as legitimate, even though it dealt with its officials. It also branded the revolutionary regime in Kiev as ultranationalist, even “fascist,” with reference to the role the Ukrainian radicals had played in the ouster of Yanukovich. The United States, by contrast, gave well-publicized political support to Kiev, as evidenced by the visits there by Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan, and a number of other U.S. officials. Russian media claimed that Washington was directing the Ukrainian authorities’ actions. Russia attempted a number of diplomatic steps to manage the crisis next door and achieve its goals. However, telephone diplomacy between Presidents Putin and Obama produced no solution, and the channel between Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary Kerry yielded little. The Geneva statement of April 17, 2014, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s road map of May 8 were stillborn. Moscow got far more attention by sending forces to the Ukrainian border for military drills, which looked like a preparation for invasion. The idea was to deter Kiev from going too hard against its opponents in eastern Ukraine and to raise the stakes in Washington by demonstrating Russia’s resolve to defend its vital interests. On May 25, 2014, Ukraine successfully held early presidential elections that led to the clear victory of Petro Poroshenko, an oligarch and the principal sponsor of the Maidan. The radicals received little support, just like Yanukovich’s former party. Putin decided he could not ignore the choice of many millions of Ukrainians and agreed to resume top-level contacts with Kiev. With the move, the Kremlin, which knew Poroshenko well, was likely getting ready to reengage with the Ukrainian elite, albeit under new circumstances.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you assess Russia's policy toward Ukraine?

3.5 The Implications of the Ukraine Crisis

The Ukraine crisis has led Russia to openly challenge the post-Cold War, post-Soviet settlement in Europe, which Putin has now openly come to reject. Moscow has already changed Russia's borders by adding part of a neighboring state after a referendum, to be sure - to the Russian Federation. Putin has publicly adopted the thesis of a divided Russian people, which sends a signal to countries with significant ethnic Russian or Russophone populations. Russia has become drawn into the domestic Ukrainian conflict, backing certain elements within Ukraine, insisting on constitutional reform there, and refusing for months to recognize the interim authorities in Kiev. As a result, the post-Cold War status quo in Eastern Europe and, to a degree, in Europe as a whole is a thing of the past. Russia is focused on post-Soviet integration in Eurasia and is increasingly shifting its attention farther eastward, with implications for rising China and other states in Asia. Against the background of mounting tensions in the East and South China Seas and between Beijing and Washington, as well as the arrival of more nationalist leaders in Tokyo and New Delhi, a revisionist, resurgent Russia may not be an outlier, but part of an emerging trend of great-power competition succeeding the post-Cold War period of U.S.-dominated world order. Post-Soviet Regions With Crimea back in its hands, Russia has made a big step toward restoring its dominance in the Black Sea area. Rather than just a small stretch of the sea's eastern shoreline, Russia now occupies the strategically strongest position in the area. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, with Sevastopol as its main base, will now grow and modernize faster, which will enhance Moscow's capability to project power, including to the Eastern Mediterranean. By contrast, the Turkish Navy, which became the strongest force in the Black Sea after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has lost its primacy.

As the domestic Ukrainian conflict intensifies, Russian involvement in Ukraine also increases. However, Russia has been very careful to operate below the West's radar screen, leaving few, if any, fingerprints. Rather than sending military units or groups of agents and operatives, it relies on local militants in eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as genuine volunteers and activists from around Russia, including ethnic Ukrainians, who vow to prevent Ukraine from being "hijacked" from its natural prominent place in the "Russian world" and turned into a Western-dominated backyard of the EU and NATO. Ukraine is likely to be unstable for a relatively long time. Violence, currently at the level of a regional insurgency, can still potentially expand into a multiparty civil war and provoke a conventional military conflict, complete with guerrilla warfare. Even if that extreme scenario is forestalled, social upheavals and political infighting will be difficult to avoid. That may lead to one of the following potential outcomes: first, a unified country

(minus Crimea, which will stay with Russia) heavily supported by and leaning toward the West; second, a loose federal state with a neutral status between the West and Russia; third, a partition of the country into two or several units, each of which will lean toward the EU or Russia. The first outcome is favored by the West, the second one by Russia, and the third one by neither because it would probably mean a full-scale civil war, yet it should not be ruled out. Each of these outcomes would significantly change the geopolitical balance in Eastern Europe. Amid this discussion of eventualities, one thing is clear, however. Post-Soviet Ukraine is history.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you examine the implications of the Ukraine crisis?

3.6 Russia Turned East Asia

Faced with an increasingly hostile West, Russia visibly turned east. This geopolitical rebalancing of the country had been under way since 2012, but it accelerated in early 2014. Putin's most important visit since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis was in May 2014 to Shanghai, where Gazprom signed a thirty-year gas contract worth \$400 billion. The deal's importance can be compared with a similar accord concluded in the 1960s that brought Russian gas to West Germany for the first time. Moscow and Beijing vow to more than double their bilateral trade to \$200 billion by 2020, that is, roughly half of their current turnover with the EU. And Moscow is expected to reinvigorate ties with India and Japan, particularly in the defense technology sphere, under the leadership of newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Putin publicly praised both India and China for their "restraint" during the Ukraine crisis. In fact, China abstained during the UN General Assembly vote on Crimea. Beijing is certainly not in favor of changing borders, including in Europe.

However, China is most vehemently opposed to regime change and interference in other countries' internal affairs. Beijing abhors Maidan-style revolutions, which remind its leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and is suspicious of U.S.-supported democracy programs. In June 2014, it issued statements reasserting Beijing's sovereignty and overall control over Hong Kong and Macau. China's abstention was thus coupled with a fair amount of sympathy for Russia. A fundamental deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations carries a series of challenges for China. In particular, Beijing will need to be careful not to lean too much toward either of the rivals and provoke the anger of the other. Yet, China has much more to gain than to lose from recent developments. China will seek to exploit Russia's alienation from the United States and its estrangement from the EU to gain a better deal in

its energy relations with Russia. As a result, Gazprom has probably settled for a lower price for its future gas exports to China. The rise in the cost of Western credit for Russia would allow China to offer Russia cash on terms that would pave the way to China's direct participation in energy projects in Siberia and the Arctic. In May 2014, China and Russia engaged in joint naval exercises in the East China Sea - the site of territorial disputes between China and Japan - which allowed Beijing to send a message to Tokyo. The Russians, watching Japan's siding with the United States on the issue of economic sanctions against Russia, have not objected to a tougher Chinese stance in the region. The Chinese People's Liberation Army, however, will continue to press Russia to provide more technologically advanced weapons, such as its S-400 air defense system or Su-35 aircraft.

Although, Moscow's consent is not given, and the Russia China relationship is not about to evolve into a military alliance, the alignment between the two powers is becoming closer. The Western economic sanctions against Russia leave China as the one major economy unaffected by the new measures. China is already Russia's biggest trading partner. Trade between the countries was worth over \$88 billion in 2013 and it is likely to grow as Russia's trade with EU countries, worth about \$410 billion in 2013. The shift in Russia's trade pattern from West to East would lead to a reconfiguring of Moscow's Eurasian Economic Union project. Rather than being an element in Putin's original idea of a Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, the Eurasian union may add on to, or even an extension of, China's Silk Road project. If so, "Eurasia" would morph into something that some Russians, a hundred years ago, facetiously called *Asiopa*, making Russia an extension of Asia. The closer the relationship between Moscow and Beijing, the more Russia will need to take China's interests into account. This situation, in which Russia will depend significantly more on China than vice versa, will give China access to Russia's natural and military-technological resources, a perfectly safe strategic rear, and a position of *de facto* hegemony in eastern, northern, and central Eurasia. That is something unseen since the days of thirteenth-century Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan and his early successors. The attainment of such a commanding position could lead to a qualitative change in China's foreign policy. The hope of constructing a strategic relationship between Russia and Japan, and of finally solving their territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands in the process, was rekindled after Shinzo Abe became Japan's prime minister in 2012. But after Ukraine, that hope faces a tough test. Japan is still interested in a relationship with Russia to partially offset the geopolitical pressure from China, but there is little that can actually be done now, under the circumstances. In its stand-off with Beijing, Tokyo has had to rely increasingly on the United States and, as a trade-off, follow its guidance on anti-Russian sanctions.

Moscow cannot ignore this, even as it is itself becoming more dependent on China. The outlook for Russia-Japan final reconciliation is not yet completely hopeless, but it has definitely worsened since early 2014.

Apart from Japan, Russia is interested in maintaining links with other advanced Asian economies, such as South Korea and Singapore. However, both countries are heavily dependent on the United States for their security and will follow Washington on sanctions. To raise the stakes in Seoul, Moscow is expanding political and economic contacts with Pyongyang, hoping for its cooperation on gas and rail links between Russia and South Korea across North Korean territory. In Southeast Asia, Russia's gateway to the region remains Vietnam, but the main target is Indonesia. India faces a number of challenges in its region that are not dissimilar from Russia's in its own neighborhood. Yet it is not fully clear how the new Indian government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), will approach relations with Russia within its revised foreign policy concept for India. In the 1970s, Indo-Russian relations already survived one shift from a Congress-led government to one headed by the BJP, and Moscow sees no need for change in its attitude toward New Delhi now. There has never been any aversion or reservation toward Modi in the Kremlin of the sort that have been laid out in Western media. The dispatch to New Delhi in June 2014 of Dmitri Rogozin, a deputy prime minister in charge of the military-industrial complex, demonstrates the continuity of Russian priorities vis-à-vis India.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss why Russia turn to the East.

3.7 Russia and Turkey

Turkey finds itself in an ambivalent position vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Crimea is home to about 300,000 Tatars, who have the support of a million strong diaspora in Turkey. The Russian authorities' outreach to the Crimean Tatars before and after the peninsula's independence referendum has not done away with the historic wariness, even hostility, toward Russia among the diaspora. Turkey is also a U.S. ally within NATO, and it picked a different side from Russia's in the Syrian conflict. Yet, Turkey's neo-Ottoman ambitions of a regional power set it apart from the United States and the EU. Turkey also values its economic, particularly energy, relations with Russia. Armenia's accession to the Eurasian union has not been ignored by Ankara, but it came with an offer to structure an economic relationship between the union and Turkey.

Finally, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while the subject of strong criticism in the West, particularly in Europe, is portrayed in Russia as a strong leader and enjoys a working relationship with Putin. The in the Arctic, all of Russia's neighbors are NATO member states. The Ukraine crisis has thus added a northern flank to the western theater of renewed confrontation. In the middle of the Crimea episode, Russian forces exercised in the Arctic Ocean. Of Russia's Arctic neighbors, Canada, with a larger and powerful Ukrainian diaspora and already deeply suspicious of Moscow's policies in the region, has gone furthest, after the United States, in condemning and sanctioning Russia. A slowdown and even a breakdown in Arctic cooperation, which began so auspiciously in 2008, cannot be ruled out in these circumstances. Elements of militarization of the area, particularly on the Russian side, are already evident. At the same time, Moscow uses legal arguments in international forums to promote its claims to an enlarged economic zone in the Arctic.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the relationship between Russia and Turkey?

3.8 Russia's Neighbour in the Arctic

In the Arctic, all of Russia's neighbors are NATO member states. The Ukraine crisis has thus added a northern flank to the western theater of renewed confrontation. In the middle of the Crimea episode, Russian forces exercised in the Arctic Ocean. Of Russia's Arctic neighbors, Canada, with a larger and powerful Ukrainian diaspora and already deeply suspicious of Moscow's policies in the region, has gone furthest, after the United States, in condemning and sanctioning Russia. A slowdown and even a breakdown in Arctic cooperation, which began so auspiciously in 2008, cannot be ruled out in these circumstances. Elements of militarization of the area, particularly on the Russian side, are already evident. At the same time, Moscow uses legal arguments in international forums to promote its claims to an enlarged economic zone in the Arctic.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you briefly discuss relationship Russia's with neighbours in the Arctic?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Russia is openly challenging the U.S.-dominated order, having seen its own vital security interests challenged by U.S.-friendly forces in Ukraine. Moscow will not back off on issues of principle, and Washington cannot be expected to recognize Russia's sphere of

influence in Ukraine and elsewhere in Eurasia. The United States will also refuse to treat Russia as an equal. Most importantly, the elements of trust that existed in U.S.-Russian relations in the 1990s and that reemerged briefly in the 2000s have been fundamentally shattered. The relationship has become essentially adversarial, as in the days of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War or, more to the point, the Russo-British Great Game. Unlike in 2008 in the South Caucasus, the current conflict will not be a bump in the road that will soon lead to a new reset. Russian President Vladimir Putin has scored a huge success domestically by returning Crimea to Russia, simultaneously creating a major obstacle to future accommodation not only with Ukraine but primarily with the United States and Europe. No lasting settlement will be possible without resolving the Crimea issue. Bracketing off Crimea from consideration in the relations between Russia and the West - unlike the successful bracketing off of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the 2009 reset of U.S.-Russian relations - is unlikely. The eventual Crimea settlement, like German settlement at the end of the Cold War, will be the result of the long competition whose outcome is unknowable at this point. The Ukrainian situation, despite the country's May 2014 presidential elections, is far from stable and has a potential for social unrest, political upheaval, and territorial fragmentation. It will be years before Ukraine acquires a modicum of stability. Russia's tactics with regard to the country will change, but the goal will remain: at minimum, to keep Ukraine as neutral ground, a buffer, between Russia to the east and the EU and NATO to the west. Such neutrality, however, may have an insufficient number of supporters in Ukraine itself and may be hard to maintain. Ideally, Russia would want Ukraine, which it sees as belonging to the same Orthodox Christian/Eastern Slavic civilization, to join its Eurasian union. This runs counter to the policies aimed at associating Ukraine ever closer with the European Union and the United States. More conflicts in Ukraine will stoke U.S.-Russian confrontation.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit is a review of what happened in the beginnings of Russian-Ukrainian relationship; reason for the Russian-Ukrainian 1995 Treaty; Russian-Ukrainian economic relations; Russia's policy toward Ukraine; implications of the Ukraine crisis; why Russia had to turn East; the relationship between Russia and Turkey; as well as the relationship of Russia's with neighbours in the Arctic.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss what happened in the Beginnings of Russian-Ukrainian Relations.
2. Explain the reason for the Russian-Ukrainian 1995 Treaty.

3. Analyse Russian-Ukrainian economic relations.
4. Assess Russia's policy toward Ukraine.
5. Examine the implications of the Ukraine crisis.
6. Discuss why Russia turn to the East.
7. Explain the relationship between Russia and Turkey.
8. Briefly discuss relationship Russia's with neighbours in the Arctic.

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UNIT 3 RUSSIA'S IN THE ARAB SPRING

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Russia's Relationship with the Arab World
 - 3.2 Russia in Libya
 - 3.3 Russia in Syria
 - 3.4 Effects of Russia's Syria Policy
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit takes you further in the discussion of Russia's relations with countries of the world, particularly in Russia's engagement in the Arab World including in Libya, in Syria and the effects of Russia's Syria policy.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss Russia's relationship with the Arab world
- briefly explain Russia's engagement in Libya
- appraise Russia's engagement in Syria; and
- discuss the effects of Russia's Syria policy.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Russia's Relationship with the Arab World

Russia's relationship with the Arab world has gone through several distinct phases. Pre-Soviet Russia, or the Russian Empire, did not have any major aims and ambitions in the Arab Middle East, save for protecting the Orthodox Church's interests in Palestine. Its strategy focused instead on other regions - the Mediterranean Straits, Persia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China. The Middle East itself lay at the periphery of Russian Empire's interests, all the more so as the region was dominated by Turkey and the European powers. There was no fundamental change in this situation after the 1917 revolution that overthrew Russia's czarist regime and established the Soviet state. The

Middle East held little strategic interest for the ruling Bolsheviks, who decided Moscow now had to concentrate not on trying to preserve what it inherited from the Soviet Union but on developing new strategy and tactics to define Russia's place in the post-Arab Spring Middle East.

Russia has another reason for attempting to establish an active presence in the Middle East - the Kremlin wants to show Russia's own Muslim citizens that it is willing to cooperate with their fellow Muslims abroad. Russia has a significant Muslim population, especially in the North Caucasus and the Volga Region, and Moscow is anxious to demonstrate that it is involved in the Islamic world's affairs and ready to defend Muslims' interests if need be. Putin's attempts to shore up Russian influence in the Middle East were motivated by a combination of nostalgia for the legacy of Soviet influence and strategic national interests. The Kremlin does not have a clearly defined historical position with regard to Islam or to working with Islamist regimes. Russian politicians have repeatedly declared their willingness to work with whichever government a people elect, reflecting a pragmatic position. Moscow is engaged in dialogue with Iran's leadership and has tried to build relations with the Hamas Islamic resistance movement. After Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, Russia even offered its services to help settle the differences between the movement and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. Russia has also been trying to develop tolerable relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which has played a prominent role in the country since the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak. Moscow's attitude toward Islamists depends on the positions they take on issues of importance to Russia. The Kremlin shows respect for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, but considers its Syrian counterpart - which is currently participating in a civil war to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a Russian ally - a terrorist organization. Moscow also clashed with the Islamists in Libya who took part in overthrowing Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, another Kremlin ally, in 2011. In addition, Moscow categorically opposes Islamist extremists linked to al-Qaeda, which has contributed to violent insurgencies in Russia's restive North Caucasus region. Islamists and the architects of Russia's state ideology share one common feature: an identity built on a base of anti-Western sentiment. Islamists and the Russian Orthodox Church both stress that they each have their own understanding of democracy and human rights that is different from the Western interpretation. Islamist radicals, especially the Salafis, reject the principles of democracy and can be compared to Orthodox fundamentalists, who call for a return to an idealized communal spirit and want to revive "Orthodox Russia" as a state matrix. Here, there are unexpected similarities to the idea of an Islamic state. But these similarities are unlikely to ever result in Russia and the Islamists joining forces. Indeed, Russia rejects the Salafis, many of whom constitute a leading force of Islamic opposition in the

Caucasus. But mutual respect and understanding between them are perfectly possible. A number of books suggesting the idea of a merger between Russia and the Muslim world and Russia's Islamisation have already been published in Russia.

The Arab revolutions have drastically changed the situation not just in the Middle East but also globally. The world's leading powers are directly or indirectly being drawn into the developments unfolding in the region. The revolutions have helped fuel contradictions between Russia and the West, which took opposing stands in the Libyan conflict and even more so in the Syrian conflict. The Arab Spring has also given Islamism a seal of legitimacy as a permanent factor in politics in the Muslim world, a development that has ramifications for Russia's domestic stability. As Russian Middle East analyst Georgy Mirsky said, the "Arab world is radical political Islam's testing ground." The changes in the Middle East in general are forcing the Kremlin to reflect on Russia's prospects in the Arab world and on how to go about building relations with the new elites coming to power in several Arab states. Moscow now has to concentrate not on trying to preserve what it inherited from the Soviet Union but on developing a new strategy and tactics to define Russia's place in the post- Arab Spring Middle East.

The revolutionary changes in the Arab world – massive protest movements, uprisings and civil wars – have transformed Arab societies as well as shifted the regional balance of power, having elevated the region's significance in the eyes of regional and global players, including Russia. Russia wants a peaceful and prosperous Middle East, free of wars and foreign interference – a region where all nations are able to choose their own path. But it is clear that the painful turmoil in the region has not yet ended and that the process of transformation will continue, drawing many countries both inside and outside the region into the process.

The following causes of the mass protests can be identified: stagnating authoritarian regimes; lack of civil liberties (which had become increasingly clear to the more modernized public in the light of globalization); growing income inequality between the elite and the rest of the people; systemic corruption; poverty; weak social policy; ineffective economic models; the poor development of society's productive forces and dependence on unstable but relatively accessible foreign sources of revenue which was used to pursue statist policies and maintain the inefficient public sector, thereby impeding the growth.

The powerful scope of the protest movements was determined by a whole set of domestic factors, the accumulation of which demanded a transformation of ossified conservative societies and systems. But as

events unfolded in the Arab countries, foreign interference began to play a larger role far from stabilizing. The large-scale military confrontation between the opposition and the regimes in Libya and Syria focused public attention on the potentials, limits and legitimacy of foreign interference, including its justification by the humanitarian goal of protecting civilians. Thus, a question posed by Moscow posed arises: Will the fundamental norms of international law, such as sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, continue to be valid after Kosovo, Iraq and Libya or are the rules of conduct among states changing *de facto*? The events in Libya showed Russia that the military force is moving to the fore and that the West still leans towards interventionism.

Actions to establish a no-fly zone in Libya, based on a broad interpretation of the UN Security Council resolution 1973, evolved into a NATO military operation to overthrow the government of a member of the international community. It was an open interference in a domestic conflict on behalf of one of the sides, so as to ensure the victory of the opposition forces. The events that followed Muammar Gaddafi's downfall showed that the victory of the opposition did not help stabilize Libya, much less realize its democratic slogans. To the contrary, the seizure of power by the new forces resulted in large scale reprisals, the exacerbation of tribal tensions and the rise of separatism. Libya's territorial integrity was called into question.

And, finally, the brutal murder of Gaddafi by a group of rebels with the tacit consent if not the complicity of European troops in no way corresponded to the opposition's declared ideals of democracy, freedom and justice. The overthrow of the regime with the help of outside powers led to the proliferation of weapons in neighbouring states, increased terrorist activity in the Sahel countries, and provoked a riot among Islamists and Tuareg tribes in Mali.

The decision to enforce a no-fly zone was formally a legitimate action based on a UN Security Council's resolution and precedent, in particular with respect to Iraq. But resolution 1973 contained very loose definitions, allowing for broad interpretation. This is how a legal case for regime change by force with UN participation was made, and the UN, with its considerable peacekeeping experience, was driven into legitimizing something quite different – democracy by force.

The Libyan crisis largely determined Russia's tough stance during the discussion and voting on a resolution on Syria. Some UN members clearly wanted to essentially replicate the Libyan playbook: declare the ruling "dictatorial" regime illegal; recognize the opposition as the nation's legal government; secure a UN mandate to intervene under the

pretext of ending violence perpetrated by the state authorities; and establish military bridgeheads in the form of “buffer zones” or “humanitarian corridors.” The issue of legally depriving governments of their international legitimacy was put on a practical plane. It was enough for some states to find them objectionable. These internationally recognized governments were accused of suppressing civil freedoms, using disproportionate force against the rebels attempting to overthrow them, and violating human rights or standards of humanitarian law. But was it legal to take such steps against them? All these important and not purely legal questions moved to the fore under the impact of the crises in Libya and Syria. As a result of the Arab Spring, states in the region have become much more active. In the new conditions of weaker control over global processes, some countries in the Middle East and regional organizations (the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) opted for a more independent policy to meet their own interests, which do not always coincide with those of outside actors. The GCC has turned into a military-political bloc directed against Iran, on the one hand, and designed to protect the Gulf monarchies against real and potential domestic threats, on the other. Having overcome the shock of the Arab Spring, the key countries of the bloc – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – helped to suppress the Shia uprising in Bahrain and enthusiastically supported the Sunni opposition to the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria. The Gulf countries also exerted decisive influence on the Arab League, leading the organization to support regime change in a member country for the first time in history. The media is strongly encouraging moves to intervene by manipulating information or even distorting it in the interests of some groups of states. Reports that favor the opposition are being published almost exclusively by the Western electronic media and press, including the Internet and social networks. Unlike in the past, almost all events in the region instantly become public knowledge. Even during this initial stage of the turbulent changes, it is clear that we are witnessing not just the free embrace of democracy by the Arab countries but also attempts by Russia’s Western partners to reorder the entire Arab world. Events in Syria force us to consider all the above mentioned factors in this complicated political landscape, including the Sunni-Shia component. The objective position of Russia and China, with the focus on mediation and national dialogue, gave the regime a chance to implement reforms, freezing out those who demanded its immediate overthrow under the threat of armed intervention. Moscow’s support for UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s peace plan showed that it approached the issue without bias, proceeding from the principle of respect for sovereignty and a desire to prevent a domestic armed conflict from escalating into a full regional war with a sectarian dimension. In effect, Russia secured the adoption of a balanced new resolution on Annan’s plan that did not demand Al-Assad’s resignation. Regrettably, an external interference in

the domestic conflict in Syria had already been taking place: commandos were sent into Syria from abroad; the opposition received help with training militia units, primarily the Free Syrian Army; and these units were supplied with arms and ammunition. In such conditions, hostilities are bound to spread, with heavy losses and destruction on both sides. The development of situation in Syria took a very negative turn. The Ba'ath Party, which had held a monopoly on power in a country where 40% of people are minorities, started losing ground. Exhausted by long-term hostilities and high tensions in cities, the army and security forces failed to restore order quickly enough. As a result, the country has reached a stalemate; the regime is not strong enough to suppress the opposition, which has fairly significant level of foreign support, but without direct foreign intervention the opposition would have been unable to seize power.

A number of Arab experts did not support the Russian-backed concept of a national dialogue between the Syrian authorities and the opposition, which is possible if the latter disassociates itself from radicals and terrorists. Some of them even believe that there is no more chance for a peaceful resolution. This negative attitude, combined with the demand of Al-Assad's resignation as a precondition for a negotiated settlement, has promoted criticism from many Russian and foreign experts. They cite numerous acts of violence carried out by the opposition, its disunity, continued support for Al-Assad among large segments of society, including minorities, and the absence of a plan of action by the opposition.

What the Syrian opposition will do if it comes to power remains an open question. None of its various groups has explained what it intends to do with all those who served the regime, with the minorities and the large number of government employees, the bulk of which belong to the ruling party. Moreover, the opposition is not united (even territorially), and includes not only moderate secular forces but also radicals from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and even Al-Qaeda, according to some experts. One of the major problems is that the Syrian opposition does not have a strategy of national reconciliation or a recovery program for their weakened country. Huge funds are needed to pay salaries and support infrastructure. Secular opposition members believe that a transitional government will have to make peace with Israel, even if it comes to negotiating over the Golan Heights, in order to focus on domestic issues. However, nobody can predict what the religious forces will do – they are hoping to come to power if the Al-Assad regime is defeated.

For the time being, the regime is still strong enough to resist the pressure. Its overthrow is fraught with even worse bloodshed and a civil

war that could spill over into neighboring countries and turn into an extremely dangerous and protracted Sunni-Shia conflict.

Despite the efforts made, trade and economic relations with the Arab world in the early 21st century have remained relatively minor and unstable. Annual trade has averaged 6.5-7 billion dollars. There continues to be a demand in Arab countries for Russian-produced arms and armaments, which are traditionally known for being more durable than Chinese products and cheaper than similar Western makes. According to the Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, recent figures show that Arab countries remain significant arms buyers – accounting for 14% of Russia's arms exports. The Arab Spring has made it much more difficult for some Russian companies to continue to fulfill their contracts and previous agreements. Russian businesses have had problems in Libya, for example. At the same time, Russia has concluded an agreement with the new Egyptian leaders for arms deliveries worth 4 billion dollars. Arms deliveries to Libya may also be restored, although at a lower level (Zvyagelskaya, 2014).

For President Putin, policy in the region has always been more than just a regional policy. He aims at a world order in which Russia's role as a permanent member of the Security Council and Russian interests are recognised and respected. In this context, Russia insists on being treated by the West as an indispensable partner in the search for peace in Syria and a compromise on the Iranian nuclear programme. According to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, "Two decades after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to be a major international player as a permanent member of the Security Council. Moscow espouses a distinct worldview that increasingly diverges from that of the West, and it is not shy about offering alternative solutions to a range of international issues." One might add that, as an international player, Russia has been striving to keep the world order (probably not an ideal one) from falling into havoc; it has opposed the toppling of regimes as a result of intervention, and its Middle East policy works in the service of this image of Russia (*ibid*, (2014).

The acceptance of the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (following the referendum) into the Russian Federation has led to the most severe crisis in Russia's relations with the US and the EU since the end of the Cold War. Vitaly Naumkin, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, points out that the closing of Syria's diplomatic missions in the United States "is interpreted as a signal that the American administration is pursuing a tougher policy with respect to Damascus, and that Washington is very likely to move away from cooperation with Moscow in resolving the Syrian crisis." Negative reactions by the EU and the US to Russian policy and the imposition of sanctions could make cooperation in the

region much more complicated or even impossible. That said, one might doubt the wisdom of such an approach. Joint efforts to stabilise the situation in Syria or to ensure that the military aspects of Iran's nuclear programme will never be revived are mutually beneficial, not to mention joint efforts in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Cooperation in Middle East issues could have prevented bilateral relations from sliding even further down the slope when other areas of mutual concern and interaction have been closed. Under the present circumstances, it seems that Middle East policy may become even more instrumental to Russia than before. The developments in the region in 2013-2014 have proved that the general approaches of the various global actors to events there (as different as they still are) have been getting closer. It is more obvious now that the Islamic extremists fighting in Syria pose a serious threat not only to corrupt and inadequate regimes but also to modern international relations (ibid, 2014).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Russia's relationship with the Arab world?

3.2 Russia in Libya

As popular protests swept Libya in 2011, Moscow found itself caught between the desire to keep Qaddafi, a Russian ally, in power and Western pressure to allow international support to the rebels. The Kremlin tried to prevent European intervention in the Libyan internal conflict, blocking a number of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions that would have permitted intervention by using its veto. Eventually, however, Moscow gave in to growing international pressure to support the forces opposing Qaddafi. On February 26, 2011, Russia joined the embargo on arms exports to Libya, and it abstained in a March 2011 UN Security Council vote that imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, giving other countries the right to take necessary measures to protect the civilian population. This allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to carry out a military operation at the end of March. In June 2011, Moscow attempted to persuade Qaddafi to step down, but it was already too late. Qaddafi's opponents no longer needed any compromise or voluntary resignation on the part of the Libyan leader. With U.S. and European backing, they pushed onward to victory through the force of arms.

Having lost to the West in the diplomatic intrigues over Libya, Russia was only the 73rd country to officially recognize the authority of the opposition National Transition Council, which had gained the upper hand in the fight against Qaddafi. Such belated recognition of the new government inevitably affected Moscow's relations with Libya.

The new Libyan regime quickly started showing signs that it was not happy with the Kremlin. In 2012, the Tripoli Military Tribunal sentenced Russian citizen Alexander Shadrov to life imprisonment for “abetting” Muammar Qaddafi. There is no longer any force in Libya that looks to Russia for support, and there is no sense of gratitude toward Moscow for forgiving Libya’s \$4.5 billion debt to Russia in April 2008. The view in Tripoli is that this act of debt forgiveness was directed not at Libya itself but at Qaddafi specifically. The new Libyan government did not honour the \$10 billion worth of contracts that Russia had concluded with Qaddafi and instead declared that these agreements would undergo a revision. Tatneft and Gazprom, two major Russian energy companies, ended up having to abandon their Libyan contracts. Alexei Kokin, an analyst from the leading Russian financial corporation Uralsib, said that “Russia has been left empty-handed; the Libyan oil market is going to Italy’s [multinational oil and gas company] ENI.” American and European companies have also stepped in to take the Russian companies’ place.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you briefly explain Russia's engagement in Libya?

3.3 Russia in Syria

With Qaddafi gone and the new Libyan government displeased with the Kremlin, Moscow has only one remaining friend in the Middle East—Syria’s Assad. Many in Moscow see Syria as a chance—perhaps a final chance—for Russia to reclaim the influence of its Soviet past. But the Kremlin’s policy of supporting Assad has earned it international criticism and further eroded its influence in the Arab world.

Russia wants to prevent Assad’s fall for a number of reasons, including geopolitical and economic ones. Russian gas exports, for example, are one consideration. So long as Syria remains unstable, neither Qatar nor Iran can pursue plans they have in the works to build gas pipelines through Syria, giving Russia extra time to develop its own gas projects, Nord Stream and South Stream. Some experts contend that “it is entirely possible that these considerations could explain why Moscow’s assistance for its last remaining ally in the Middle East is limited to taking a categorical line in the UN Security Council and preventing the West from beginning legal intervention.” But that is only part of the story. As Carnegie’s Dmitri Trenin has noted, “in a deeper analysis, Russia’s stance on Syria is based, above all, on its leader’s largely traditional view of the global order.” Keeping Assad in power is Moscow’s way of ensuring that it maintains some influence in the Middle East.

Russia's desire to maintain an image of a global power can be seen in its attempts to restore its military presence in the Mediterranean, which the Defense Ministry plans to do by 2015. Moscow has an interest in maintaining a military base in the region, and Tartus in Syria is rumored to be the preferred site. The move is likely to be more symbolic than functional. According to military expert Oleg Shvedkov, Moscow would be capable of sending a maximum of ten ships and two or three submarines. This force is not designed for military confrontation with a serious adversary. Its main task is political; it is there to demonstrate Russia's presence in the region. These considerations have led Moscow to throw its support behind the ruling Syrian regime. Early in the conflict, this stance was not entirely unpopular, even in the West, as Assad seemed to be ready to engage in dialogue. Many in the United States shared the view that Assad was potentially willing and able to carry out reforms and even partially liberalize the regime. In March 2011, when the level of tension in Syria was still comparatively low, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that "Bashar Assad is a reformer" and gave this as the reason why "the United States has no interest in intervening in Syria."

But with the start of civil war in Syria, the United States and Europe became disappointed in Assad. He rejected dialogue and tried to rely on military force to settle the conflict, and his regional alliance with Iran made any dialogue between Damascus and outside actors extremely difficult. As the conflict began to have effects on Syria's neighbours - Lebanon and Turkey - it took on an increasingly regional dimension.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you appraise Russia's engagement in Syria?

3.4 Effects of Russia's Syria Policy

As the situation deteriorated, Russia tried to assume the role of mediator, attempting to maintain its influence in the Middle East and the Arab world by insisting on the importance of its mediation efforts in settling the Syrian crisis. It offered to mediate in both the internal confrontation and the international intrigue surrounding Syria. To this end, it hosted the first Russian-Arab Forum in February 2013, during which Moscow and the Arab League held talks on the situation in Syria. Those invited to the forum included then Egyptian foreign minister Mohamed Amr; Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari; and members of the Arab League Council from Kuwait, Lebanon, and Libya. Secretary General of the Arab League Nabil al-Arabi said that Russia and the Arab League seek peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict and expressed the hope that Moscow "will be able to convince the Syrian government on this." In September 2013, Russia began an effort to broker a deal in which

Assad would surrender his regime's chemical weapons stockpile. Russia proposed the deal after U.S. President Barack Obama announced that Washington was considering launching a military strike against the Assad regime, which had reportedly used chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. This effort was an attempt by Moscow to accomplish what it failed to do in Libya - prevent the armed intervention of Western actors in the conflict and keep the regime of its ally intact.

Syrian opposition forces and their allies abroad have perceived Russia's continued mediation as support for Assad's regime. Russia's position on Syria has made its relations with the Arab world even cooler. The Arab Middle East is firmly allied against the ruling Syrian regime. When the Arab League voted in 2012 to expel Damascus from its ranks, only Algeria and Syria itself voted against the decision, and Arab leaders vocally criticized Russia's support of the Syrian regime. When then Prime Minister of Qatar Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani added his voice to the criticism, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's envoy to the UN, retorted, "If you speak to me in that kind of tone again, the place we call Qatar won't be on the map any longer tomorrow."

The Arab world sees the Syrian conflict as not only a purely internal Syrian affair but also a confrontation between outside actors, above all the United States and its allies versus Russia and China. Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Business Administration at the Lebanese University Camille H. Habib said that "the struggle for Syria is a struggle for Eurasia with different characters." Syria, following this logic, is where global confrontations meet.

This understanding also indicates that the Arab world still has an interest, albeit not widely publicized, in retaining in the Middle East a Russian presence to partially balance the West's activeness. This leaves Russia the chance to position itself as a restraining force standing in the way of foreign military intervention. It is also clear that Russia does not itself want to become directly involved in any military conflicts. "There are no indications currently that the Russians are sending troops to help the regime's armed forces. There are also no signs that the Americans and concerned Europeans would get involved in Syria in a similar way to their involvement in Libya"(Habib, 2013).

The Islamic community has joined Western and Arab actors in criticizing Russia's support for Assad. One of the Muslim world's most prominent theologians, Yusef al-Qaradawi, said Russia "has become enemy No. 1 for Islam and Muslims because it supports the Syrian regime." He also declared that "the Arab and Muslim world must rise up against Russia. We should boycott Russia and count it amongst our main enemies" (Maltsev, 2012). The fourth conference of the Group of

Friends of the Syrian People, held in Marrakech in December 2012, ended with the 70 member countries voting to recognize the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, an umbrella group for organizations opposed to Assad, as the sole legal representative of Syria's people. This development undermined the chances that Russia, which still recognized the legitimacy of the Syrian president, could successfully act as a mediator in the conflict.

The conflict in Syria - and Russia's role in it - is further complicated by sectarian concerns. As Sergei Lavrov said in March 2012, "Syria could become the start of very serious events. . . . Unfortunately, it is here that the growing crisis within the Islamic world between Sunnis and Shiites could burst into the open." Analysts noted the possibility of this turn of events right from the start of the Syrian crisis. French analyst Hosham Dawod predicted in 2011 the possible emergence of two "hostile crescents"; the first made up of Shia in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and the second composed of radical Sunnis from Egypt, Syria, and Palestine. In reality, both crescents reach far wider and not only include radicals but also extend to the mostly moderate Muslims in the Arab countries. Western actors, who see the increased Iranian influence that would accompany a triumphant Shia crescent as a threat, "back the Sunni side" by supporting the Syrian opposition (Rubin, 2012).

Russia, by contrast, does not seek to play the card of Shia-Sunni differences. Its position is complicated by the fact that it shows solidarity with Iran on the Syrian question, but on issues such as the Iranian nuclear program, it stands with the Arab countries - that is to say, it takes the side of Iran's opponents. Moscow is tied to Tehran not only by the closeness in their policies on the Syrian issue but also by the perception of interference by a common Western enemy. As one scholar notes, "People in both Tehran and Moscow interpret the protest movements through the light of conspiracy theories and see the West's hand in them" (Fayard, 2013).

The solidarity in their views has led some Western media to talk of a new "axis of evil" comprising Russia, Iran, and Assad's Syria. This was the expression used, for example, by Fox News commentator Kathleen McFarland. The result of this Western criticism has been to further isolate Russia on the Syrian issue.

Assad, who does not always listen to Russia's advice, has also created big problems for Moscow. His reluctance to make concessions to the opposition has put the Kremlin in a difficult position. Russian diplomats have made numerous declarations that Assad is willing to soften his stance, only to have him fail to keep his word. In October 2012, for example, Assad declared his willingness to accept a ceasefire for the

duration of the Eid al-Adha holiday but then refused to honor the agreement. Meanwhile, Western countries and their allies in the Persian Gulf continued supplying arms to the opposition.

Now, Moscow has grown tired of Assad and the way he has been compromising Russia's peacemaking efforts. Seeing that the Syrian president has been unable to suppress the opposition, some Russian officials have come to believe that Assad will not hold on to power much longer and should perhaps be making arrangements for a transition (International Herald Tribune, 2012). Russia has cut back its military assistance to Assad as a sign of its disappointment in his regime and its fears of ending up completely isolated. Anatoly Isaykin, the head of Russian arms exporter Rosoboron export, said that "there is no question of delivering fighter planes and helicopters, including repaired ones, to Syria, Rosoboron export have a contract to deliver Yak-130 training fighter planes, but not a single aircraft has been delivered yet". Moscow's latest mediation effort indicates that it still sees an opportunity to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis. So far, however, Russia's support for Assad has cast it as an enemy of virtually all other Arab nations. More broadly, it has made Moscow the enemy of many Sunni Muslims, drawn Russia further into an uneasy alliance with Iran, and pitted against the West (Malashenko, A. 2013).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the effects of Russia's Syria policy.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit we have been able to discuss Russia's relationship with the Arab World; explain Russia's engagement in Libya; appraise Russia's engagement in Syria as well as discuss the effects of Russia's Syria policy.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit is an assessment of the Russia's relationships and engagements in the Arab World including, in Libya, in Syria and the effects of Russia's Syria policy.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss Russia's relationship with the Arab world.
2. Briefly explain Russia's engagement in Libya.
3. Appraise Russia's engagement in Syria.
4. Discuss the effects of Russia's Syria policy.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4 RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provide you an in-depth discussion important issues including the history of Russia-China relations; the Sino-Soviet split; Russia-China relations after the Ukrainian crisis; challenges to the Russian-Chinese relations; Russian-Chinese trade cooperation; Political and Economic interactions.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- trace the history of Russia-China relations
- discuss the Sino-Soviet split
- explain the Russia-China relations after Ukrainian crisis
- identify and explain the challenges to Russian-Chinese relations
- discuss Russian-Chinese trade cooperation; and
- clearly explain the political and economic interactions between Russia and China.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 History of Russia-China Relations

Relations between China and Russia date back to the early 17th century, when Russia took possession of Eastern Siberia. The first official Russian ambassador reached Beijing in 1655, but was soon expelled

from China due to his unwillingness to comply with the etiquette of Chinese diplomacy. This first failed encounter set the tone for the coming 300 years, throughout which bilateral contacts remained tenuous and often adversarial, characterised by a persistent lack of mutual cultural understanding. Russian attempts in the second half of the 17th century to take possession of the Chinese-administered territories in the Amur River basin were forcibly repelled by China's Manchu rulers. Although both states began to share a common border that stretched for thousands of kilometres and established commercial relations, diplomatic contact remained extremely sparse. Bilateral trade slowly grew, but overall bilateral relations saw few developments until the mid-19th century, when Russian settlement recommenced in the Chinese administered Amur region.

In 1858 and 1860, Russia forced a weakened Qing 40 Dynasty to cede the tributary territories north and east of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, more than one million square kilometres in total. This was followed by Russian encroachments on Manchuria around the turn of the century. Bilateral relations remained poor until the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 and the Soviet Union in 1917. Both countries established formal diplomatic ties in 1924, while bilateral tensions (for instance over the status of Mongolia) persisted. Nevertheless, from then on the Sino-Russian relationship grew consistently closer, and the Soviet Union exerted a key influence on political developments in the young Republic of China. From the early 1920s onwards, the Moscow-based Comintern helped both the Chinese Nationalist party Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC) to organise and consolidate themselves. During the 1930s, when the CPC was pushed to the periphery in China, it was mostly ignored by the Soviets. Mao Zedong, who gradually emerged as the leader of the CPC, in his turn ignored several key Comintern directives regarding the conduct of the ongoing war against Japan. The CPC's ideological line at the time became more and more autonomous and independent from Moscow, although Mao adopted the personality cult and purge tactics from Joseph Stalin's USSR. After the Japanese defeat in August 1945, Soviet troops entered Manchuria. To the dismay of Mao and the CPC, the Soviets negotiated a treaty with the Kuomintang and formally recognised its leader Jiang Jieshi, allowing him to cement his power in China. As U.S. policy in 1945 became increasingly anti-Communist, the Chinese Communists all the more looked towards the Soviet Union for support. During the Civil War, some aid from the Soviet Union kept arriving in Mao's camps (in some areas this help indeed was critical), but Stalin gave no indication that he expected or even intended this to help the CPC attain victory. He resorted to dealing with both sides in the conflict, aiming primarily to secure the Soviet Union against Western influence in its borderlands. Not even when the CPC was on the road to victory did Stalin make any

substantial investment into it. When the war was eventually won, Moscow offered Mao broad bilateral cooperation, but mutual ties were slow to develop. The Chinese and Russian leaders did not meet each other in person until December 1949 (the first of only two personal encounters between them). On that occasion, both sides concluded a formal alliance and agreed on the provision of comprehensive military and economic assistance to China, but significant disagreements remained: The Soviets rebuffed Mao's objective of annexing Mongolia, and Stalin asked whether Moscow from then on should sign separate trade agreements with Xinjiang and Manchuria, raising the spectre of Soviet encroachment on the Chinese periphery. The tensions in bilateral relations continued with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Soviets supplied substantial military assistance to China, with considerable cost to their own production, but Stalin demanded that Beijing acquired its supplies on credit. Stalin eventually considered it advantageous for the Korean War to continue as long as possible, also when, by late 1952, the Chinese, who were bearing the brunt of the war, had become eager for a settlement of the conflict. Although the bilateral relationship was thus beset with countless problems, formal cooperation and Soviet assistance to China grew steadily. Soviet economic and political support became vital for the consolidation of Mao's nascent regime. Mao continued to keep in close touch with Moscow on all important strategic matters, and nearly all of his political initiatives from the period were inspired and sanctioned by the Soviet leadership. As soon as Nikita Khrushchev assumed power in Moscow after Stalin's death in 1953, many of the bilateral disagreements disappeared. Under Khrushchev, practical economic and defence cooperation with China made real and substantial progress. Unlike under Stalin, the Kremlin was now willing to provide the Chinese with what they wanted, including state-of-the-art technology, and to this end Moscow was willing to make a significant economic sacrifice equal to ca. seven percent of the Soviet annual national income in the late 1950s. The number of Russian experts and advisers in China soared, and military cooperation between the two sides also flourished from 1954 onwards. The Soviets even helped China start up its nuclear research programme, and in October 1957 Moscow went so far as to promise China outright supply with a prototype nuclear weapon.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Account for the history of Russia-China relations.

3.2 The Sino-Soviet Split

For a number of reasons the partnership began to unravel after 1957. Practical cooperation between the two sides continued, and in some areas, such as military and nuclear cooperation, it even intensified.

During the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, a cause of significant disagreements between Beijing and Moscow, Khrushchev – to Mao's satisfaction – still gave full public security guarantees to China, and in 1958 Mao still repeatedly assured Moscow of his intentions to follow the Soviet lead. But Mao's rejection of a large-scale military cooperation programme in June 1958 set off alarm bells in Moscow. The Soviet leadership began to review its aid programme and to worry how China would eventually use the transferred technologies. Khrushchev then decided to slow down the transfer of nuclear technology. In June 1959, he informed the Chinese that the USSR was unilaterally scrapping the remaining parts of the nuclear cooperation programme. Eventually, in an impulsive decision, Khrushchev ordered all Soviet technicians working in China back to the Soviet Union, an act that came as a genuine shock to many in the Chinese leadership. Even after the withdrawal of all Soviet specialists, Mao was eager not to discontinue all cooperation, at least in the defence sector, and there was a lull in the bilateral dispute lasting for almost one and a half years. But China and Russia eventually descended to a state in which all bilateral ties and communications were abrogated and the two sides began to perceive each other as their greatest international nemeses – a situation, that was to last for nearly three decades. That Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated so swiftly and remained unabatedly hostile until shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely due to a growth of mutual suspicions and a persistent lack of mutual understanding, exacerbated in no small part by the scarcity of contacts and exchanges between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships. One particular problem that plagued the relationship from the beginning was the persistence of cultural barriers and stereotypes that complicated day-to-day cooperation between both countries. Even at the height of mutual cooperation in the 1950s, cultural interchange between Chinese and Russians was partially offset by the fact that both governments remained opposed to close contacts between the Soviet specialists and their Chinese counterparts. Even minor disagreements and perceived slights led the Chinese leaders, especially Mao, to suspect that, like the Tsars, the Soviets aspired to win dominance over China. The Soviets, in turn, sustained a paternalistic image of their alliance with China as that of an industrially advanced state 'educating' a backward nation. A more crucial dimension of disagreement between Beijing and Moscow was ideology. Differences in this regard already began to open up under Stalin, who, opposing much of Mao's activism immediately after the foundation of the PRC, advocated Chinese moderation towards the United States and Taiwan. With Beijing and Moscow unable to agree on a joint revolutionary strategy for East Asia, Mao's respect for Stalin and for Soviet socialism diminished significantly over time. Following Stalin's death and Khrushchev's ascent to power, the personal aversions between the two leaders initially notably lessened. Nonetheless, a gradual disenchantment with Soviet communism set in

among the Chinese, especially after Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalinism at the XX Communist Party Congress in 1956. Besides shattering the myth that the CPSU had always been correct, Khrushchev's volte-face was seen by Mao as possibly endangering his own Stalinist rule in China, and he feared that the Soviets' behaviour could weaken international socialism. Moscow's 'revisionism' increasingly led Mao to challenge the Soviet Union's leadership of the world Socialist movement. Mao came to regard Soviet advisers, Chinese studying in the USSR, and others who had worked together with the Soviets as potential critics of the CPC's own disastrous development policies. He began to stress a policy of self-reliance and criticised excessive dependence on Moscow. Mao argued for a reinvigoration of socialist transformation and mobilisation of the masses in all socialist countries, and he believed that the Soviets should confront the U.S. without fearing war. Khrushchev, who was striving for a reduction of tensions with the United States, became increasingly anxious about Mao's determination to speed up the development of socialism through direct confrontation with the capitalist world. The renewed Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958 and China's escalating tensions with India – a country with which the Soviets had built up a close relationship – led Khrushchev to accuse Beijing of attempting to torpedo global relaxation. Out of all of Mao's deviations from Soviet communist thinking, what shocked and worried Moscow most were his comments on nuclear war, including his professed belief that socialism could be built after World War III, or that it was acceptable if half of humanity was to perish in a nuclear conflict. Mao's seemingly erratic and provocative foreign policy conduct and the lack of strategic consultations with Moscow led the Soviets to begin questioning his mental stability. Once China had developed its own atomic bomb in 1964, the Soviet leaders therefore began to consider whether nuclear deterrence alone could prevent China from launching an attack against the Soviet Far East: They did rely on it against the U.S., but given Mao's previous comments they were left with lingering doubts as to whether strategic superiority was enough to deter a Chinese attack. The Emerging Security Dilemma: As the Sino-Soviet split began to cement itself, one of the main reasons why it persisted so long was the increasing suspicions on either side about the other's military intentions. The development of a seemingly intractable security dilemma between Beijing and Moscow allowed bilateral relations to deteriorate from a mere disruption of cooperation to a state in which each side perceived the other as a mortal enemy. This security dilemma would have been significantly less pronounced if ideological differences and misperceptions had not led key policy-makers on either side to constantly overestimate the military threat posed by the other. Although the Soviets had never trusted their Chinese allies fully and, unbeknownst to the Chinese, had deliberately held back some of their offensive missile technology, they had generally provided Beijing with

extremely broad strategic assistance throughout the 1950s. Once the doubts about each other's motives grew, however, mutual threat perceptions increasingly became a hindrance to further bilateral cooperation. When Khrushchev proposed active bilateral military integration in 1958, Mao's suspicions about Moscow's intentions reached their apex.

With the ideological disputes growing, the common border emerged as a focal point of the rising tensions between Beijing and Moscow. The issue of border demarcation had been a latent problem already in the early 1950s and was raised again by Zhou Enlai in 1957, but Khrushchev then refused to discuss it. From 1963, the Chinese insinuated that they 'had not yet accounted' for the vast amounts of Chinese territory acquired by Tsarist Russia in the 19th century. In 1964, a round of bilateral talks on the demarcation of the border led to an agreement on most border sections, but the matter remained inconclusive. One month before his ouster, Khrushchev issued a veiled nuclear threat in response to Chinese claims of the illegitimacy of the border. Shortly thereafter, China tested its first nuclear bomb. By the mid-1960s, a genuine paranoia had developed both in Beijing and in Moscow regarding each other's strategic goals. The Chinese government from 1964 feared that the Soviets might attack China jointly with the U.S.A. Indeed, as the Khrushchev years ended, Soviet representatives were secretly discussing plans with the Americans for joint preventive military action against Chinese nuclear facilities. The new Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev grew increasingly concerned over the security of the Soviet Union's Far East. In 1965 the Soviet Union began a vast military build-up in the border region, deploying ca. 370,000 men, including large detachments of its nuclear forces. Despite a great gap in military capacities, the image of 'Chinese multitudes' sweeping across Siberia was widespread in the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Both sides engaged in a frantic building of defence works along the border, China even relocated some of its vital industries further inland, and Mao initiated campaigns to build tunnels in case of a Soviet attack. Constant mutual harassment between Chinese and Soviet border guards throughout the 1960s briefly erupted into open fighting along the Ussuri River in March 1969, bringing both sides to the brink of an all-out war. In mid-October 1969, a full military alert was triggered in China, and senior Soviet personnel at the time apparently had concrete intentions for a nuclear strike against China. The moderates in the Chinese leadership then strove to improve relations with Washington (since they had come to regard the Soviet Union as the more dangerous enemy), and to use this in order to deter potential Soviet military action against China. Military incidents along the border continued after 1969. When the Chinese leadership was finally wishing to re-engage in political dialogue with Moscow in September 1979, this was again forestalled for

several years by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which China fervently opposed, as well as Moscow's support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The Soviet leadership likewise intermittently advocated a normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations: One attempt at mutual rapprochement was made when Alexei Kosygin met Zhou Enlai in September 1969, after the Ussuri Crisis. This promising step, which initially served to diffuse the military confrontation along the border, was obviated by domestic power struggles in Moscow, as Brezhnev used the reconciliation attempts made by his internal rival Kosygin to discredit him. After Mao's death in 1976, Brezhnev himself briefly expressed a greater interest in improving relations with China, but this was thwarted by the entrenched opposition to such a move in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the CPSU Central Committee. By that time, a 'containment coalition' had established itself in the Moscow Politburo that developed a lasting consensus on the need for sustained political and military containment of China. With no effective dialogue mechanisms in place between Beijing and Moscow, a number of conservative Soviet officials in charge of China policy who acted as the sole 'gatekeepers' of bilateral relations, remained persistently obstructive towards any attempts at a de-escalation of tensions and irresponsive to changes in Chinese policymaking, contributing to the Soviet leadership's failure to discern developments within China away from staunch Maoism since the mid-1970s. The Path to Bilateral Rapprochement: Reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing therefore proved protracted and difficult. Since no learning process about each other's motives set in (in part because appropriate forums for an exchange between officials on both sides were lacking), it was ultimately only leadership turnover that enabled lasting changes in bilateral relations. After Brezhnev's death, Yury Andropov took a more pragmatic approach to China, but mutual containment continued unabated. Among the factors promoting the eventual resumption of bilateral relations was increasing pressure from regional officials to open some cross-border trade. A further incentive for normalisation was China's initiation of a programme of domestic economic reform and modernisation, which led it to drop its charges of 'revisionism' against Moscow. Mikhail Gorbachev's launch of a reform programme in the Soviet Union a few years later led to a gradual narrowing of differences in the Soviet and Chinese domestic strategies. Only when the two domestic systems thus began to converge in the 1980s did both sides initiate a true rapprochement. For Gorbachev, improving ties with China became an important foreign policy goal. In 1986, Moscow began to take steps to remove what the Chinese had identified as the 'three obstacles' to bilateral reconciliation: Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of troop levels at the Sino-Soviet border, as well as a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan, and he pressured the Soviet ally Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia. This enabled Gorbachev to meet

the Chinese leadership in Beijing in May 1989. During his stay, bilateral relations were officially normalised, and both sides agreed on mutual force reductions and a resumption of negotiations on the course of the border. A border agreement was signed in 1991. Further rapprochement was initially obstructed by the gradual breakdown of the socialist bloc, for which the Chinese leadership blamed Gorbachev personally. Nonetheless, progress was made on reducing the troop levels on the border, and military linkages between the two sides were resumed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Moscow and Beijing briefly stalled. The Chinese leadership openly sympathised with the attempted coup d'etat against Gorbachev by orthodox CPSU members in 1991, and it disapproved of Gorbachev's successor Boris Yeltsin. Nonetheless, personal disagreements between Yeltsin and the Chinese leadership were eventually overcome, and by 1992 both sides signed an initial intergovernmental trade agreement and convoked a Sino-Russian trade commission. The border negotiations, now including the Central Asian republics, resumed in late 1992. Yeltsin visited China in December 1992 and several agreements were signed on this occasion, although most of them, especially in the economic sphere, eventually remained unrealised.

In the mid-1990s, further rapprochement was hampered again, as resistance in the Russian Far East grew against the border agreements of 1991. Popular fears of Chinese immigration led the Kremlin to impose harsh visa regulations in January 1994, which caused a precipitous drop in bilateral trade. Although relations with China were rhetorically promoted to a 'constructive partnership' in 1994, bilateral cooperation progressed slowly until April 1996, when both states signed a joint communiqué announcing their commitment to develop a 'strategic partnership' and inaugurated a large number of functional bilateral institutions.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the Sino-Soviet split?

3.3 Russia-China Relations after the Ukrainian Crisis

It is important to note here that after the Ukraine crisis began, the Russian government immediately started to assess the economic implications. In a series of study sessions in the Kremlin and in the government building on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment in the spring of 2014, experts went through the sanctions regimes applied by the West in recent years, including Iran and North Korea, and immediately spotted Russia's three weakest points: critical dependence on the European energy market, critical dependence on Western capital

markets, and critical dependence on important technologies including offshore drilling, LNG plants, or telecommunications (discussions on telecoms equipment had started a year earlier, after the Edward Snowden revelations, but nothing had been done). They concluded that if the West imposed sanctions, Russia would have no other choice than to be more and more accommodating to China – even if it turned Moscow into the junior partner in the relationship. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group held a series of seminars, some of them headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The Chinese foreign policy elite concluded that though the crisis in Ukraine may have some negative implications for Chinese interests (Crimean annexation and Russian rhetoric on national self-determination were seen as particular threats for complicated situations such as Taiwan and Xinjiang), the opportunities outweighed the risks. As Russia would be looking to diversify from the West, the only major partner in Asia for them would be China. In geopolitical terms, the crisis was also seen as beneficial because it would distract the US, which would pay less attention to Chinese moves in Asia-Pacific, particularly the South China Sea. “This conflict will give us an additional 10 years of breathing space”, as one of the Chinese experts involved in framing Beijing’s response puts it. The formation of the new type of relationship proceeded fast. In May 2014, Putin visited Shanghai to attend the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia and signed 46 documents. In October, Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited Moscow and signed 38 agreements. In November, Putin attended the APEC summit in Beijing and signed an additional 17 agreements. Though the agenda for these summits was put together in a rush and was meant to impress the outside world – Russian and Chinese officials admit that some documents were so unprepared that in normal circumstances they wouldn’t reach the leaders’ desktops – they were very important. Russian and Chinese interlocutors point to three strategic spheres: energy, finance, and infrastructure and technology.

Energy Aspects

Long before the Ukraine crisis, energy was a crucial part of the Russia–China relationship. Earnings from selling hydrocarbons on international markets accounted for 70 percent of budget incomes in Russia. At the same time, since becoming a net importer of oil in 1994, China has been busy securing access to new sources of supply needed for economic growth. Recent developments include the first purchase of a stake in the Russian oilfield Vankor by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (a deal with Rosneft was signed in November 2014); plans for the Chinese companies Sanxia, the Yangtze power group, and State Grid Corporation to build electricity-producing plants in Eastern Siberia and the Far East; and joint plans to increase coal deliveries to China. But

none of these projects is as important as the new mode of cooperation in the gas sphere.

Although the Ukrainian crisis has prompted Moscow to start diversifying its gas exports and entering the Asian gas market, the major challenge it faces is that, with sanctions and low oil prices, it is forced to choose land-based pipeline options that link Russian gas to one customer without flexibility. The danger for Russia is that, in the future, China may change the conditions of agreements with it. A precedent was set in 2011 when CNPC refused to pay the full price for oil delivered via the Skovorodino-Mohe pipeline and demanded a discount of \$15 a barrel. The Russian side was fortunate that, given the turmoil caused by the Arab Awakening, China decided not to disrupt its relationship with one of the suppliers and agreed to just a \$1.5 per barrel discount. It should also be noted that China cannot replace European energy markets in the short or even medium term. Currently, Gazprom sells about 150 bcm annually to Europe, compared to just 1 bcm to China. If all the planned projects are built, Gazprom could sell 76 bcm per year to China but at a lower price. At the same time, Russia's lack of other options presents a great opportunity for China. Though supply from Russia is not critical in terms of volume, it is important to China in terms of security and as a bargaining factor in talks with other oil and gas suppliers. Access to Russian gas may also speed up the transfer to more environmentally-friendly power generation, with more extensive use of gas in big cities. This is important for domestic stability as pollution is becoming a more important political issue.

Finance Aspects

Whereas the energy partnership with China is a long-term project, financing is a more pressing issue for Russian companies. The introduction of sectoral sanctions in July 2014 restricted access to Western capital markets for some key Russian state-owned financial institutions, which led Western financial institutions to re-evaluate the country risk for Russian borrowers and deny further credits for all Russia-registered entities. As a result, Russian companies were isolated from the financial centres in London and New York, which used to be destinations of choice. Thus tapping alternative sources of capital became a necessity. In May 2014, a high-level Russian official delegation including First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov visited China to discuss the possible replacement of Western credits by Chinese financial institutions. The Chinese negotiation team, headed by Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, promised Beijing's support and talked about increasing the role of national currencies in bilateral trade in order to decrease dependency on the euro and the dollar, increasing loans from Chinese state-owned banks to Russian companies, listing Russian debt

and equity in Hong Kong, and opening the Shanghai Stock Exchange to foreign companies. Since this visit, several important developments have shown the potential for financial cooperation between Moscow and Beijing – but also its limits. The most important issue was the possible use of national currencies in bilateral transactions between China and Russia. During Li Keqiang’s visit to Moscow in October 2014, the Central Bank of Russia and the People’s Bank of China signed a three-year currency swap agreement for RMB 150 billion (about \$24.5 billion) – the twentieth agreement of its kind for China, which uses currency swaps with major trade partners to promote the renminbi globally, and the first of its kind with Russia. In September, Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Moiseev stated that China and Russia aim to transfer up to 50 percent of their trade to national currencies.³ The logic is not only political. Deals in national currencies can lead to benefits of up to 5–7 percent for buyers of Chinese products by avoiding currency conversion and hedging against foreign exchange risk. However, the non-convertibility of the renminbi is a major barrier. In 2013, ruble-renminbi settlement accounted for just 2 percent of bilateral trade. It is also significant that Russian companies that transferred part of their cash from dollars and euros after rumours that their accounts in Western currencies could be blocked as part of next sanctions package bought convertible Hong Kong dollars (pegged to the US dollar) rather than renminbi. It would be a game changer if Beijing and Russia started to trade major items such as oil and gas in their national currencies. In an interview in November, Putin hinted that this was already being discussed. According to him, China wanted to buy oil from the Vankor field in renminbi, which Rosneft could later use for buying Chinese drilling equipment. One of the remaining issues, according to Russian interlocutors, is the exchange rate the Chinese side will use: will it be the “onshore” rate or the “offshore” rate used for trade settlement through Hong Kong. Once these issues are sorted out, one may expect a dramatic increase in the use of national currencies in China–Russia trade. For Moscow, this will help to lower the risk of being overly exposed to the euro and the dollar. For Beijing, it will be just another major step in promoting its currency before turning to full convertibility. Although China has made some progress in diversifying away from dollars and euros during the last six months, it has proven more difficult to replace London and New York with Hong Kong and Shanghai. Foreign companies are still unable to list their shares or issue bonds in Shanghai. In May, China hinted that once the stock exchange was open for foreigners, Russian companies might get some “preferential treatment” and that Chinese state-owned bank and funds would invest in Russian paper. But this move, even if it happens, is some way off. HKEx has long been open to foreign companies and has hosted some Russian listings, including the landmark initial public offering in 2010 of Rusal. Although the announcement by Russian state-owned banks

VEB and Sberbank that they planned to buy up to 70 percent of the issue led to concerns about hosting a “political IPO” of a troubled company, the listing proceeded. But many funds that invested in Rusal have lost money and private investors in Hong Kong are now sceptical about investing in Russian companies. Following pressure by the US Treasury, Hong Kong banks have stopped opening bank accounts for Russian firms and individuals.

As for the possible loans from Chinese state-owned banks, three things need to be taken into account. First, Chinese banks are arms of Beijing – so their natural habit is to provide loans to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), not to foreign companies. If banks like CDB give foreign companies access to credit, a project with Chinese interests is always implied. Second, after Xi launched his anti-corruption campaigns in 2013, many top managers of Chinese financial institutions were imprisoned. This resulted in the reluctance of the new managers to sign any new loans for foreign companies. Third, banks have become more conservative in their transactions since the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Third Plenum in November 2013, which required Chinese SOEs, including banks, to be more efficient in their use of capital. Thus, in the short term, China cannot become a real alternative for Russia to replace the West as a source of capital. But in the medium term, and especially in the long term, if European and American sanctions remain in place, Russian companies may increasingly tap into opportunities provided by China. For Beijing, Russia’s decoupling from Western financial markets provides a chance to strike deals on Chinese terms and also to turn Russia into a testing-ground for some financial experiments needed for opening up its own financial system.

Infrastructure and Technology Aspects

The last area of the Russia–China relationship where major shifts have occurred since the Ukraine crisis is cooperation in infrastructure and technology. For the last 15 years there was an informal ban on Chinese participation in bids on large infrastructure projects in Russia. Moscow’s concerns included increased competition for local companies (some with good ties to the Kremlin) and a possible influx of Chinese migrant workers. In May 2014, this ban was lifted. The Chinese Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) has expressed interest in constructing new stations for the Moscow subway system (the city government signed a memorandum of understanding with CRCC, though it may not be fulfilled due to ruble devaluation). CRCC may also participate in constructing a high-speed railway line – Russia’s first – from Moscow to Kazan. With limitations put on technology transfer from the EU and the US (and Western companies considering Russia to be risky), Russia may increasingly turn to China for technology. It cannot hope to

substitute many critical technologies (most notably in offshore drilling), but some are available in China for a reasonable price. The area in which the Russians show most interest is telecommunications equipment.

Discussions on shifting Russian networks used by government bodies from US-produced to Chinese-produced equipment intensified in 2013 after Edward Snowden's disclosures about surveillance by the US National Security Agency. In May 2014, a task force was established under the Russian telecommunications ministry to study possible replacement. "We may be replacing American bugs with Chinese bugs", says an official involved in the study. "But at least the Chinese are our partners." In November 2014, Sberbank was the first major non-telecoms company to sign an agreement with Huawei to install Chinese equipment. Technological cooperation is particularly sensitive in the military sector. For the last 10 years, there was an informal ban on selling the Chinese the most advanced technologies. Moscow's concern was in part that the weapons could one day be used against Russia in a border conflict, but also in part that the Chinese could produce copies of Russian equipment and compete with them in markets such as Myanmar or Egypt. For example, while China wanted to buy only a limited number of Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, Moscow wanted China to buy a large number as advanced compensation for future copying. However, some in Moscow now want unlimited cooperation with China in the military-industrial area. According to a Russian expert with close ties to the military, Russia would even now be quickly defeated in a conventional border conflict with China, so it will in any case have to rely on its nuclear deterrent. Chinese experts see cooperation with Russia as crucial to military modernisation. "We can afford to buy large parties of weapons to accommodate Russian concerns", a Chinese military expert says.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain Russia-China relations after Ukrainian crisis?

3.4 Challenges to the Russian-Chinese Relations

Mutual Distrust

Aside from the above analyzed factors contributing to the Russian-Chinese rapprochement, there are quite a number of challenges to the evolving Russian-Chinese relations that might impede their positive development. Historical legacy here plays a substantial role, since it creates stereotypes among the involved parties. For example, the aggression from Czarist Russia towards China and more recently the

Soviet-Chinese conflict in 1960s and 1970s left an imprint in the historical memory of the Chinese.

Such historical moments bring in the contemporary Russian-Chinese relations elements of mutual distrust. Even now in Russia and China there are still negative images of one another, inherited from the legacy of the Soviet-Chinese relations, to overcome which needs time and efforts. To establishing trust on a grass root level, to enhance mutual understanding and respect, both the Russian and Chinese leadership have been undertaking different measures, such as for instance the launching of a Year of Russia in China for 2006 and a Year of China in Russia for 2007, which encompassed some 600 events in the political, military, economic, trade, research, and cultural spheres. Since this initiative proved to be very successful, in order further consolidate cultural ties the two countries decided to hold the Year of Russian language in China in 2009 and the Year of Chinese language in Russia in 2010. Thus, such statements as for example, those of Trenin (Trenin 1999: 39) that the Russians did not show any active interest in China, or those of Donaldsons (Donaldson 2003: 722) that there is no significant tourism between the two countries, are at present absolutely irrelevant and outdated.

Illegal Chinese Migration to Russia

Another challenge to the Russian-Chinese rapprochement is the still unsolved problem of illegal migration of Chinese citizens to Russia, primarily to the Russian Far East. Related to this issue there have appeared expressions as “the Chinese threat” or “yellow peril”, predicting that in the Far East Russians would be reduced to a minority compared to the number of Chinese that will populate this region. This alarming prognosis was especially popular in the 1990s, when Russia’s regional media, largely controlled by governors who tried to get additional votes in their favor, have exacerbated the concerns on illegal migration of Chinese citizens to the Russian Far East. Russian leading experts in Russian-Chinese relations, especially those affiliated with the Institute of Far Eastern Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), argue that there is no “Chinese threat” in terms of Chinese illegal migration to the Russian Far East. Though there is such a problem as Chinese illegal migration, it is politicised above measure. Moreover, Russian extreme nationalist forces use it for the purpose of creating a negative image of China to achieve their specific political goals. Going into the details of this issue, there are several points necessary to be noted. First, a population imbalance in favor of the Chinese in the Russian- Chinese border area has always been a case throughout the history of Russian-Chinese relations, and till now nothing bad has happened. Second, Chinese illegal migration did not have strategic implications (i.e., Beijing did not encourage Chinese

immigration across its border with Russia), as alleged by some Russian politicians and by some in Russian media. The Chinese migration flows are not directed to Russia, and the Russia Far East is not the main destination of Chinese migration flows. Mostly they are oriented to South-East Asia and to the U.S., Canada and Australia (Portyakov, 2006: 12). The root of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East is a matter of demography, not Chinese state policy to colonize the Russian Far East (Wilson, 2004: 127). Third, disparity between the Russians and the Chinese in the Russian-Chinese border area increased in the 1990s due to internal migration, but not solely as a result of the influx of Chinese citizens. After the collapse of the Soviet Union social and economic living conditions of people in the Russian Far East has changed for the worse, which resulted in their migration to the more economically attractive Western regions of Russia. According to the Russia's population census of 2002, population in the Russian Far East dropped from 8 million in 1990 to 6.7 million in 2002 (Portyakov, 2004: 44). Thus, the imbalance of the Russian and Chinese population in the common border area is a domestic political issue of Russia, which became one of the topics on the agenda of Russian-Chinese talks and a source of frictions between the two parties due to media exacerbations of the scale of Chinese illegal migration to Russia and the rhetoric of some anti-Chinese Russian politicians.

Bobo Lo considers that the best way of neutralizing the "Chinese threat" is to tie Beijing more closely into trans-Asian energy and infrastructural projects, transformed into a commercially lucrative region, where the two countries will have a stake, the Russian Far East will attract the Russians and investments into a sparsely populated region (Lo, 2004:305). The Russian government should conduct social and economic policies aimed at attracting the Russians to the Far East or at least at preventing migration outflow from this region. For this purpose a Russian Far East development strategy is badly needed. As for Chinese illegal migration, the main reason of this process is a lack of solid juridical basis of migration policy of Russia and the incompetence of the law-enforcement authorities created to regulate migration movements in the Russian Far East and Siberia. Consequently, the issue's resolution depends on the Russian government's skillful ability to take control over migration flows (both within Russia and cross border migration) and over the labor migrant's activities. Considering illegal Chinese migration to Russia as a challenge to the Russian-Chinese relations, it should be noted that official Moscow -in order not to harm Russian-Chinese relations- avoids putting special emphasis on this problem, although during high level meetings Russian senior officials have rendered their concerns over illegal Chinese migration to Russia (Portyakov, 2004: 46).

Russian Arms sales to China

During last two decades the role of Russian arms sales to China changed to a great extent. In the end of 1980s and during 1990s arms sales was the second factor in promoting Russian-Chinese relations. In 2003 Robert and John Donaldsons wrote that Russian arms sales to China were so prominent that they represented the main link between the two countries, and it motivated and formed the basis of their deepening relations (Donaldson 2003: 716). At that time both countries were highly interested in cooperation in the field of arms sales. As for Beijing, since the U.S. and European countries banned arms sales to China after the 1989 Tiananmen incident, the Chinese had lost American and European suppliers of weaponry and were looking for new sources of military equipment. Russia, in turn, making efforts to stop the collapse of military industrial complex that was crucial to its economy and searching for economic profits, was ready and willing to fill this vacuum by selling weaponry to China. By doing so, Russia started to restore a very significant old market of weaponry - until the break in relations in 1960 China was a major recipient of Soviet military assistance. In the 1990s Chinese military acquisitions from Russia increased steadily and by 2000 China already replaced India as the major recipient of Russia's weaponry. In the five-year period 2000-2004, China was Russia's most important market, accounting for 41 per cent of Russia's exports, and Russia has annually accounted for over 90 per cent of China's imports of major weapons (SIPRI, 2005: 422). During the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s China managed to buy a wide range of weapon systems, such as for example, Kilo Class submarines, SU-27, SU-30MMK2/MKK3 combat aircrafts, Sovremenny destroyers, T-72 and T-80 tanks, Il-76 transport aircrafts, Klub-S (SS-N-27) anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, the Moskit (SS-N-22) anti-ship missiles (Transfers). However, there are indications that China's role as a major Russian recipient is likely to change in the nearest future. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) estimates that the volume of arms delivered to China in 2007 and 2008 was at the lowest levels since 1999 and accounted for about one third of the 2005 and 2006 levels (SIPRI, 2009: 308). Even more, SIPRI's experts have doubts that Russian arms exports are likely to rise again (SIPRI, 2009: 304).

Indeed, during the last couple of years the arms sales issue in Russian-Chinese relations transformed from a factor promoting this relationship to a factor introducing an element of chill in bilateral ties. There are a number of reasons for frictions between the two sides. Recently China is growing frustrated with the fact that Russia sells more state-of-the-art weaponry to India than it does to China. Besides, China is more

interested in purchasing production technologies, which enhance the national capacity to produce equipment.

Another issue to be mentioned in this context is that China is reportedly illegally copying and reverse-engineering imported Russian weapons systems and technologies in order to establish a Chinese indigenous arms industry and to achieve self-sufficiency in arms acquisition. According to SIPRI sources, China has a long tradition of copying or using technology from weapons acquired from abroad (SIPRI 2005: 424). Chinese copying of Russian technology or complete systems has clearly angered Russia (SIPRI, 2009: 309). The most prominent of these illegal practices include the SU-27 fighter aircraft and advanced electronic systems such as radar and data-link systems for the Sovremenny destroyer and Fregat, and Mineral-ME radar systems. Shenyang, China's newest fighter aircraft, is apparently a reverse engineering Su-27 (East Asia and Australasia, 2009: 364). Although under an agreement on intellectual property rights for the arms trade, signed by Russia and China in December 2008, Russia's military technology is legally protected from being copied, according to SIPRI's experts' prognosis China will probably continue the illegal practice of copying Russian military technology (SIPRI, 2009: 309).

The determination of the Chinese leadership to develop their own domestic arms industry has long-lasting implications for the Russian-Chinese military cooperation, mostly negative ones. As mentioned above, China has become more and more interested in purchasing production military technologies.

As early as 2003 the Russian share of the technology transfers to China was around 30 percent. And what is more important, Beijing is seeking to increase the level of technology transfers to 70 percent, and to spend only the remaining 30 percent on equipment acquisitions (Ivanov, 2003). On the one hand, it means that China will buy less weaponry from Russia, and the volume of Russian arms sales to China is likely to reduce considerably. On the other hand, China will probably become a competitor for weaponry exports on the world market.

Above that, since the beginning of 2000s the lifting the arms embargo on China by the EU appeared on the political agenda of the EU-China talks. The abolishment of the arms embargo on China became a hot issue within the EU in 2004, when there emerged a debate between several EU member states, namely France and Germany, advocating lifting the embargo, and a number of EU member states, notably the UK, the Netherlands and Finland, arguing that since China still violated human rights it wasn't right time to abolish it. But the adoption of the anti-secession law by China's National People's Congress on March 14,

2005 stopped this process for the time being. Yet, it's pretty obvious that sooner or later the EU will remove its embargo, and once it happens, there will be more competition for the Chinese market from EU member states. When the EU's arms embargo on China is lifted, Russia will be the first to suffer.

All discussed above set-backs cast a shadow on the prospects of the Russia-Chinese arms trade. Once contributing to the Russia-Chinese rapprochement, at present the arms sales issue impedes the development of bilateral relations.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you identify and explain the challenges to Russian-Chinese relations;

3.5 Russian-Chinese Trade Cooperation

Another factor that might be considered as negative is the limited trade ties between Russia and China. The current trade relations between the two countries are insignificant in comparison with the more extensive trade relations with the U.S., Europe or Japan than with one another. For example, in 2008 the Russian-Chinese bilateral trade turnover reached \$ 56.8 billion (Bulleteden', 2009), while U.S.-China trade hit \$409 billion (Morris, 2009: 1).

But, with continuous efforts from both sides, Russian-Chinese trade expanded considerably in recent years - from 1994 to 1999 trade turnover was fairly stable and varied between \$5.1 billion and \$ 6.8 billion, in 2001 it reached \$ 10.7 billion, in 2005 – \$ 29.1 billion, in 2007 – \$ 48.1 billion (Rossiisko-kitaiskiie, 2002; Bulleteden', 2009). But while trade has strengthened steadily, the structure of bilateral trade has changed remarkably little. Russian exports to China are dominated by raw materials: in 2008 hydrocarbons represented about 50.1 per cent of Russian exports to China, timber was around 12.5 per cent, the other major groups were fertilizers, chemicals, non-ferrous and ferrous metals, fish, pulp, and machinery (Bulleteden', 2009). Russian imports from China are primarily Russian-machinery (36.7 per cent in 2008), chemicals, consumer goods such as apparel and textiles, leather goods, footwear, furniture, toys, ceramics and foods (Bulleteden, 2009). Though for Russia such a structure of bilateral trade is not favorable, at the same time it shows the complementarity of the Russian and Chinese economies. To provide positive implications for the Russian-Chinese relations it is necessary to bring the scale of economic interaction between the two countries into conformity with the level of bilateral political relations.

- 1) The most fundamental reservation of the Chinese leadership concerns the depth of Russian commitment to the strategic partnership, that is the extent to which China can rely upon Russia over the long term. The restoration of the double-headed eagle as the symbol of the Russian state ironically symbolises the problem: the fact that whenever it seems to be looking one way, it can very quickly look in the opposite direction. This nurtures misgivings. A Chinese professor well disposed towards Russia, Zhou Li, has commented on the general unpredictability of Russian foreign policy over the decades. He remarks that Russian culture lacks a sense of the “golden mean”, and its foreign policy is instead prey to sudden changes of course.⁷ To give an example, the Chinese leadership were profoundly shocked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they were also seriously shocked by the way that President Yeltsin (a former communist) then contemplated membership of NATO as well as the EU. Given the previous warming of relations under Gorbachev and the isolation of China at that time so soon after the Tiananmen massacres, the prospect of NATO stretching to Vladivostok was profoundly disturbing. The fact that only four years later President Yeltsin could propose a strategic partnership with China was at one level much more reassuring. So too was the personal chemistry between Presidents Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin. However, the Chinese worried that this might have simply been done as a way of pressuring the West into being more accommodating and that, if this succeeded, relations with China would be sacrificed again. Even though the Russian leadership maintained its commitment through the change of president and indeed found in President Putin someone who was later more combative in his treatment of the West, they also remembered that Putin had initially attempted to win increased cooperation with the US and had raised “hypothetically” the possibility of Russian membership of NATO. Now in President Medvedev they have a leader who has encouraged greater economic liberalisation and who seems more inclined to look westwards again. Even though he told a meeting of Russian ambassadors in 2010 that Asia was now the second foreign policy priority after Europe, which would still make relations with China dependent upon the success of Russia’s diplomacy towards Europe. Admittedly the financial difficulties of first the US and later the EU have enhanced the economic attraction of Asia, especially China, which should strengthen Russia’s commitment. Nevertheless, even though the new Russia has now demonstrated a sustained commitment to its relations with China, there remains the worry that smart Western diplomacy could lead Russia to look predominantly westwards again. Of course, part of the problem is China’s own antipathy towards alliances. Since China is unwilling

to make a formal commitment to Russia beyond a “strategic partnership”, it is not surprising that other states would want to keep their options open as well. So the problem partly of China’s own making. China would like monogamy from Russia, but polygamy for itself. This is not realistic.

- 2) The next concern follows from this: how comfortable is Russia with a rising China? As a former superpower, how ready is Russia to cede its position to China? This is not just a matter of diplomacy. It also affects military relations. Whilst Russia has supplied China with many more advanced weapons than the Chinese could at that time produce themselves, the Chinese military are only too aware of the fact that Russia has not allowed the transfer of many of the most advanced forms of equipment. Some Russians do not disguise the fact that the main reason for this is the fear that they might at some point be directed back at them. Worse, Russian officials have stated publicly that they would have no problem in transferring more advanced equipment to India – one of China’s biggest Asian rivals. Russian commentators have even suggested that Russia would be happy to develop stealth air and naval technology with India, but not with China. All of this keeps Chinese officials disgruntled. Of course, the Russians are not only concerned about power rankings in general. Many in Moscow, and even more in the Far East, are concerned about the long-term viability of Russian rule over Siberia. Even though the Russian and Chinese governments have signed agreements recognising the current frontiers in perpetuity, many Russians do not have faith in their permanence. They fear that at some point in the future, when China is much stronger and Russia weaker, the Chinese government will revive their earlier claims to territory over which they had some authority before 1689 and the Treaty of Nerchinsk. As is reiterated in Russia – and noted by China – even the demographic imbalance between the populations to the north and the south of the frontier is destabilizing, not to mention the possibility of renewed military conflict. It is this fear that keeps Russia from supplying China with the most advanced weapons. But at the same time, given all the reassurances that China has offered, it is not clear what more they could do. If they offer to invest in Siberia, they are suspected of preparing for a takeover. So Chinese officials are entitled to feel a certain exasperation.
- 3) Linked to this is the Chinese government’s specific concern about the Russian government’s treatment of Chinese citizens living in Russia. Russian internal security forces are noted for their harsh treatment of ethnic minorities and foreigners living in Russia. In the case of the Chinese there, the problem is compounded by the

wide discrepancies in estimates of the numbers of Chinese living in Russia. This can range from a few hundred thousand to several millions. Officials in different agencies, local as well as national, assert wildly varying figures. It contributes to popular paranoia about a Chinese “fifth column” that is allegedly just waiting for the opportunity to take control of large swathes of the country. Serious attempts to come up with an authoritative, more moderate figure have failed to dispel popular prejudice, in part because corrupt Russian officials are known to take bribes, so ordinary Russians are sceptical about official figures. Chinese officials are entitled to feel exasperated by this problem. Despite the fact that Chinese migration to Russia is now regulated by visas, unlike in the early 1990s, there seems no way to take the heat out of the issue. For China the worry is that this prejudice against Chinese living in Russia might lead to violence against them, in which case China would feel that it would have to take steps to protect them, which would damage relations with the Russian government.

- 4) In terms of business and economics, China’s main concern is over energy supplies. One of China’s biggest expectations of Russia was that it would seriously help to close their own energy gap. Yet agreements with Russia have taken much longer to achieve than the Chinese expected, and even afterwards have not always been implemented on time. For example, when the possibility of an oil pipeline to China was initially mooted, the Chinese made it clear that they would be willing to take all the oil that Russia could offer. An agreement was signed with the Yukos oil company in 2002 for completion in 2005 costing Russia US \$1.7 billion and supplying 20–30 million tonnes of oil per year. China would have only been responsible for the cost of the pipeline inside China – much less than that of Russia. Yet almost immediately the deal became embroiled in the break-up of Yukos after the arrest of its boss Khodorkovsky the following year, and in 2003 Japan also suddenly offered Russia a much larger sum for a pipeline to the Pacific. In the end the Russian government decided to build the longer pipeline to supply China in part, but also Japan and South Korea. It changed the route, citing environmental reasons for one, so as to avoid the risk of spillage from the original route in an earthquake zone around Lake Baikal, but which the previous nearly 10 years of feasibility studies had apparently failed to identify. It was only at the end of 2010 that the pipeline to China was opened. Whilst this was earlier than the longer pipeline to the Pacific which has still not been completed, it was also years later than originally agreed. It only supplies 15 million tonnes per year instead of 20–30 million, while China’s demand has escalated in the interim, and it eventually cost \$25 billion, of which China paid \$15 billion in

loans. China suspected that Russian companies procrastinated in the hope that China would have to pay more for the oil as world prices increased. China has also resented being charged European prices by Russia for the supply of energy, especially gas. Given China's growing energy needs, the experience of attracting Russian supplies – and the disputes over Russia's oil and gas shipments to Europe – have not encouraged confidence in Russia as a totally reliable long-term supplier. In turn, China has responded by signing agreements with Central Asian suppliers, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The Central Asians have appreciated the possibility of negotiating directly with China and thus reducing their own dependence on Russian cooperation for exporting their energy products. But these states cannot satisfy all of China's needs.

- 5) Also in terms of economics, China has been disappointed by the relatively leisurely growth in trade. To some extent this is not a crucial problem for either side, given that they both enjoy significant foreign trade surpluses. Nevertheless it shows that Russia has little to offer China by way of advanced technology, apart from the areas of defence, space equipment and nuclear power. Opportunities for joint projects between Chinese and Russian companies are likely to remain limited. There is a mismatch of economic interests between them. On the other hand, the Russian government seems unenthusiastic about increasing imports of Chinese consumer goods, even if it helps China pay for high-priced energy imports. Russia is allegedly more concerned with using its energy exports to enhance its strategic position in Pacific Asia.
- 6) One problem that both sets of leaders recognised in the middle of the last decade is the relatively thin nature of political and personal ties between them. Even if personal relations are again very good at the very top, there are no longer many middle-level officials who have any direct experience of working with counterparts in the other country. Despite the long years of the Sino-Soviet dispute, there were still many Chinese leaders in the 1990s such as Li Peng and Jiang Zemin who had trained as engineers in the USSR in the 1950s and who could still relate to Russians on a personal level. Their retirement left a big gap, however, and ignorance among their successors exacerbated distrust. Presidents Putin and Hu initiated programmes of mutual familiarisation, most notably with the "Year of Russia in China" in 2006 and the "Year of China in Russia" in 2007. This was intended to spread cultural as well as business awareness, in addition to familiarising middle-level officials at the national and provincial levels with opportunities for

mutual cooperation. It has had some effect. However, the numbers of students from both countries going to study in each other's country, for example, are still dwarfed by those going to study in the West, whether in the US or Europe. And provincial officials in the Russian Far East have tended to be less supportive of close ties with China – and more ready to mistreat Chinese citizens – than those in Moscow, so there is no doubt about the need for a change in their mindset if the relationship is to grow.

- 7) China is anxious about Russia's bouts of robust assertiveness against the West. Both have reasons to feel defensive vis-à-vis the West, but this comes out in different ways, reflecting the differing trajectories of their international power. Russia is or has recently been a declining power and it wants to remind others of its past glory so that it can deter them from taking advantage. It relies upon a harder concept of power. Russia's leaders are nostalgic for hegemony over the "near abroad", namely the war with Georgia, and they are certainly confronted by serious security challenges, both internally and externally. But sometimes the outbursts of Russian China have formally committed themselves. It was striking that China – and the rest of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well – refused to endorse Russia's leaders, such as Putin's blistering attack on US international behaviour at the 2007 Munich meeting, seem too provocative. Moreover Russian attempts to reassert hegemony over the "near abroad" sometimes seem to contradict the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states to which both Russia and recognition of Abkhazia as a separate state after the conflict with Georgia. China by contrast may have been a great power before the 19th century but not in recent memory. Now it is a rising power and its political leaders are anxious to avoid any provocation that might give other powers, above all the US, a pretext for action to prevent China from developing its full potential (though there are senior Chinese military figures who would be more inclined to stand up to the USA). According to Galenovich, Chinese officials and experts seemed to want Russia to take the lead in challenging the US, for example over Iraq. Their chief red line concerns Taiwan, and the SCO has already expressed support for a one-China policy.
- 8) Finally, from a constructivist view of international relations, the basic problem is that there is only a limited sense of shared values between Russia and China – namely the modest success of the Year of Russia in China and the Year of China in Russia. It is true that the mantra of the current Russian leadership is that it is a Eurasian state and so must share common values with both Europe and Asia. But in practice the Russian leadership presents itself as

partly Asian when it is talking to the West, as a way of brushing off excessive Western demands for liberalisation and democratisation. When Russian officials, especially those in the Far East, are talking to counterparts in China or Asia, they easily lapse into thinking of themselves as the last outposts of Western civilisation facing the Tartar hordes.

The fundamentals of the Sino-Russian relationship remain unaltered. Moscow and Beijing continue to attach high priority to their 'strategic partnership'; the economic relationship is expanding; and both sides oppose Western conceptions of global governance and seek to constrain American power. At the same time, they have different visions of a 'multipolar' world order. Whereas Russia sees itself as an 'independent' center of global power, China sees Russia as a prickly neighbour with an inflated sense of strategic self-worth, and which has failed to adapt to 21st century challenges, such as modernisation.

Strategic trust remains elusive. Their partnership is an axis of convenience, driven by a pragmatic appreciation of the benefits of cooperation rather than a deeper like-mindedness. Moscow worries about China's growing assertiveness in East Asia, the displacement of Russian influence from Central Asia, and the emergence of a China-centered or G-2 world in which Russia would play a subordinate role. It is also anxious about the growing asymmetry of the bilateral relationship, and the extent to which Russia now depends on China, both within Asia and in the international system more generally. Beijing has noted Putin's increasingly confrontational approach towards the West. Although it is concerned about the potential for destabilization of the international system, it recognizes that China may benefit as a result of Putin's excesses over Ukraine. Against the background of sharply deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, the Kremlin is more likely to comply with Chinese objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, Central Asia, and energy cooperation.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Russian-Chinese trade cooperation?

3.6 Political interaction

On the face of things, the political relationship has never been better. Since Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao at the 18th Party Congress, the tempo of relations has picked up. Xi and Putin have met frequently and cordially, most recently at the Sochi Olympics held from February 7 to February 23, 2014 and there are several more meetings planned over the next few months – at the G-20, BRICS, and APEC summits, as well as Putin's official visit to China in May. Moscow and Beijing continue to

work closely and effectively in the UN Security Council, and they share broadly similar views on many international issues, including the conflict in Syria, opposition to grassroots democratic movements and Western humanitarian intervention, and a strong attachment to so-called 'informational security' (involving tighter controls on new as well as traditional media). Additionally, the Snowden affair highlighted an unusual degree of collusion between security and intelligence agencies, even if this has been somewhat overblown. (Russia-West cooperation on such matters is considerably more advanced.) The nature of Sino-Russian interaction also suits both sides. In playing the lead role on larger international issues Putin is able to showcase Russia as an 'indispensable' player on the global stage. Conversely, China's more discreet approach has allowed it to minimize awkward entanglements and limit reputational damage.

However, the sustainability of this arrangement is in question. Until now, the assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy has been directed at regional priorities in East Asia. There have been moves to extend China's global reach, but outside the economic sphere these have been halfhearted. It has played no active role over Syria; it has resisted attempts to draw it into the strategic disarmament process; and it approaches economic rebalancing and global trade issues from a narrowly self-interested rather than global governance perspective.

Under Xi, there are signs of China wanting to play a more active international role. If this happens, it could change the whole dynamic of Sino-Russian accommodation. A more independent Chinese line on Syria and Iran would raise concerns in Moscow. More seriously still, Beijing's vision of a 'new pattern of Great Power relations' with Washington raises the specter of a 'G2-plus' arrangement whereby Russia is relegated to a secondary position. For the time being, this vision remains somewhat speculative. Moscow remains confident that Beijing is committed to the 'strategic partnership', especially given its confrontation with Tokyo and anxieties about US 'rebalancing' toward Asia. But it would be unwise to underestimate the potential for rising tensions, as Putin retreats ever further into a siege mentality, and Xi becomes increasingly confident – and assertive – about China's chances in the world.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you briefly explain the political interaction between Russia and China?

3.7 Economic Interaction

Economic ties are flourishing. China now comprises about 10 percent (USD 87 billion in 2012) of Russia's total overseas trade, and this percentage is set to rise following the Rosneft-CNPC oil supply agreement. This 25-year agreement envisages doubling the volume of Russian oil exports to China, reaching 31 million tonnes a year by 2018. If fully implemented, it will increase Russia's share of Chinese oil imports (9 percent in 2013). More significant still may be the decision to invite the Chinese into joint enterprises in the Arctic and the Russian Far East. This represents an important shift, suggesting that Moscow has become less paranoid about large-scale Chinese participation in 'strategic' industries such as energy. But the picture is not all rosy. Putin and other senior Russian figures are sensitive to the increasingly 'unbalanced' character of economic cooperation, which resembles China's ties with developing countries in Africa and Latin America. Even in the relatively successful area of energy, there are major problems, notably the impasse between Gazprom and CNPC over a long-term supply agreement. The main problem continues to be price. But there are other issues as well. Gazprom is unwilling, at this stage at least, to allow the Chinese to acquire equity in upstream development. In adhering to this inflexible – and unrealistic – stance, its approach differs not only from that of Rosneft, but also the private gas company Novatek, which recently sold CNPC a 20 percent stake in its Yamal LNG project. Ordinary logic would suggest that it is only a matter of time before the two sides finalize a deal. Over the past decade, Moscow and Beijing have concluded seven framework agreements and Memorandums of Understanding. Meanwhile, the window of opportunity is closing fast. Russia has already lost ground to the Central Asians (Turkmenistan, in particular), while the Chinese are building more LNG terminals, developing their own shale gas reserves (estimated to be the largest in the world), and building up renewables, especially hydroelectric power.

There is speculation that a final agreement could be signed during Putin's May visit to Beijing or shortly after. But there have been many false alarms in the past, and it would be unwise to assume anything. That said, two factors improve the chances of an agreement. The first is that Moscow has overcome (in part) an important psychological hurdle by allowing the Chinese into major energy projects elsewhere. The second is that the crisis in Russia's relations with the West will make Putin more anxious to conclude a deal in order to leverage (and 'punish') Ukraine and the EU, and reassert Russia's 'independence' and defiance of Western sanctions. Military cooperation after a lengthy hiatus, Russia and China appear to be closing on a major arms deal, involving the sale of 24 Su-35s and 4 Lada-class submarines. Rosoboron

export has suggested that the agreement could be concluded some time in 2014, although it is unclear whether this will happen. The arguments for and against Russian arms sales to China have not changed. On the one hand, arms sales would reinforce the 'strategic partnership', support the Russian military industrial complex, and finance the provision of modern equipment for Russia's armed forces. The PLA is also keen to buy, given its weaknesses in key areas such as avionics, and lack of alternative suppliers (as a result of the EU and US arms embargo). On the other hand, for Moscow, arms sales to China remain a sensitive issue. There are continuing concerns about Chinese reverse-engineering and intellectual property theft, as well as competition in third-country markets. The Russian military is wary about the build-up and modernization of the PLA. And the Kremlin wishes to maximize Russia's commercial and geopolitical options in Asia by selling to countries such as India (its largest customer), Vietnam and Malaysia. The picture on military-to-military cooperation is mixed. There have been important joint exercises over the past 18 months, such as Joint Sea 2013 and Peace Mission 2013. The former involved the largest deployment of Chinese naval forces in any exercise outside China. Peace Mission 2013, which took place within the SCO framework, was the most substantial exercise in that series. However, military cooperation continues to be constrained by mistrust, especially on the Russian side. Its forces have been engaged in exercises where the Chinese have been effectively excluded, namely, RIMPAC 2012. More significantly, in July 2013 the Ministry of Defense initiated the largest exercise in post-Soviet history, involving 160,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks, 130 aircraft, and 70 vessels. The location of this exercise in the Eastern Military District indicates that Russia continues to see China as a potential long-term military threat. Another important issue is Moscow's tough stance on strategic disarmament. It has indicated that it will not entertain any further reductions unless negotiations are 'multilateralised' to include China and other nuclear weapons states (UK, France). The 'China factor' is also highly influential in determining the Russian government's position on tactical, 'battlefield' nukes.

Although Moscow has left open the possibility of parlaying these for (improbable) US concessions on missile defense, such weapons are regarded as critical to the effective defense of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. Geopolitical balancing Russia strives to be the 'swing power' between the United States and China at the global level, and between China and Japan in East Asia. In pursuing this vision, the Kremlin operates on a number of assumptions:

- a good relationship with Beijing is not only vital to national security, but also integral to a multipolar world order (or 'polycentric system of international relations') on Russian terms;

- China is the only plausible counterweight to US primacy in the international system. At the same time, an excessively strong China is bad for Russia. Moscow has no interest in one hegemon being replaced by another;
- Russia should maximize its influence by playing on the uncertainties and anxieties of other major players. That said, it is more important to constrain the United States globally than to counter Chinese power in Asia. The Ukrainian revolution has reinforced the view that the United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe, pose a 'clear and present danger' to Russian geopolitical interests;
- Moscow cannot rely on Chinese good intentions in the Asia-Pacific, and must look to develop other regional partnerships. However, it needs to avoid any suggestion of conspiring in a policy of anti-Chinese containment. Other Asian countries (Japan, India, Vietnam, South Korea) may dilute Chinese power, but they will never be able to counterbalance it entirely;
- in the event of Sino-American (or Sino-Japanese) open confrontation, Russia should adhere to neutral position and stay well away from trouble. Beijing regards Russia less as a counterweight to the United States than as a neighbour with whom it is important to keep on good terms. Its priorities are:
 - to secure its 'strategic rear' so that it can concentrate on domestic modernization and on more pressing foreign policy concerns, such as its relationship with the United States, its increasingly difficult interaction with Japan; and broader geopolitical shifts in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Obama 'pivot';
 - to achieve a degree of geopolitical comfort at a time of escalating tensions and uncertainties about the security environment in the Asia-Pacific. A good relationship with Russia also gives China the space to promote its economic and, over time, political and security interests in Central Asia;
 - to avoid over-committing strategically to Moscow. Notwithstanding the expansion of Sino-Russian partnership, this is dwarfed by China's all-encompassing interaction with the United States, its one truly indispensable partner. Economically, too, it is more important to engage productively with the EU (its largest trading partner) and Asian countries than to expand energy ties with Russia, for whom there are always alternatives.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the economic interactions between Russia and China?

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have been able to discuss the history of Russia-China relations; the Sino-Soviet split; explain Russia-China relations after the Ukrainian crisis; identify and explain the challenges to the Russian-Chinese relations; discuss Russian-Chinese trade cooperation; briefly explain the political and economic interaction between Russia and China respectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit provide is an assessment of the history of Russia-China relations; the Sino-Soviet split; Russia-China relations after the Ukrainian crisis; challenges to the Russian-Chinese relations; Russian-Chinese trade cooperation as well as the political and economic interactions between the two countries.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Trace the history of Russia-China relations.
2. Discuss the Sino-Soviet split.
3. Explain Russia-China relations after the Ukrainian crisis.
4. identify and explain the challenges to the Russian-Chinese relations.
5. Discuss Russian-Chinese trade cooperation.
6. Briefly explain the political interaction between Russia and China.
7. Discuss the economic interactions between Russia and China.

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MODULE 4

- Unit 1 Russia and Africa Interactions
- Unit 2 Russia's Foreign Policy towards Africa
- Unit 3 Positive and Negative Factors in Russia-Africa Relations
- Unit 4 Russia-Nigeria Bilateral Relations

UNIT 1 RUSSIA AND AFRICAN INTERACTIONS**CONTENTS**

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Socialist Penetration in Africa
 - 3.2 Soviet Foreign Policy towards Africa during the Cold War
 - 3.3 Russia Post-Soviet Policy towards Africa
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The decade of the 2000s witnessed a revival of Russia's interest in Africa. This revival emerged within the framework of Russia's new foreign policy, which began developing in the late 1990s and consolidated recently. After experiencing a golden age during the USSR period, particularly the 1960s, Russia-Africa relations regressed considerably with the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the Russian Federation (the Soviet Union's successor) has never withdrawn from the continent, its involvement in Africa declined during its initial years. The early 1990s were years in which Russia attempted to develop relations with the West while moving away from Africa. Failing to achieve a desired momentum in its relations with the West, Russia began developing a larger-scale, multi-dimensional policy encompassing the former Soviet geography and the Middle East initially, and China, Africa and Latin America afterwards. Y.M. Primakov's attempts to develop this type of multidimensional foreign policy during his time as foreign minister failed to fulfill its objectives due to economic problems and the Chechnya crisis. This process, which gained a new momentum during the period of former President V. Putin during the 2000s, has developed radically with the rise of oil prices and the effect of an accommodating international structure. Russia's geopolitical priorities and agenda have expanded to develop a concurrent geo-economical

profundity as a result of its growing economy, foreign trade and investments in this new era. These changes in Russian foreign policy were felt in several domains. Russia was accepted as the eighth member of the G-7 club. Negotiations were established with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Russia achieved observer country status. Relations with the Far East were kept intact by maintaining close relations with China, the predicted super-power of the 21st Century. Friendly relations with Syria, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Hamas indicated that Russia would return to the Middle East as well. Closeness with Venezuela showed that Russian foreign policy-makers considered relations with Latin America important (Lopatov, 2007).

In this context, it would therefore be unthinkable for the African continent to remain out of Russia's expanding area of interest. In the old days, the Soviet Union had close relations with the nations of Africa especially in African states attempts to free themselves from the shackles of colonialism. In this stage, therefore, Africa has emerged as a domain in which the Russian Federation can obtain economic revenue and demonstrate its effectiveness on a global scale. Russia's relations with Africa, first regressing, and then stagnating, have taken a new turn in the last decades of the 21st Century. It is no longer base on using ideological orientation to draw African states closer to her. This time around, the relations between Russia and African states most tied to economic and military strategic issues (ibid, 2007)..

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss Socialist penetration in Africa
- examine Soviet foreign policy towards Africa during the Cold War; and
- explain Russia post-Soviet policy towards Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Socialist Penetration in Africa

In Soviet foreign policy, there is the interplay between the forces of ideology and economy defined as national interest. Russian interest in Africa could be traced to 1674 during the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov. Motivated by security concern, Romanov sought an alliance with Ethiopia and Western Europe in order to forestall Turkish aggression. It was only during the reign of Peter the Great that Russia was able in 1723 achieved a measure of success when he sent Admiral Golovin to Ethiopia to establish trade relations and also

extend an invitation to the Emperor of Ethiopia to visit Russia. Unlike the other European nations that busied themselves with the arbitrary partition of African states into their spheres of influence, Russia's interest was centred on Ethiopia for security, economic, religious and political considerations. Although Russia under the Tsars concentrated her activities in Africa mainly in Ethiopia, her interest was also in other African countries such as Egypt and South Africa. Also while the Tsarist Russia employed methods such as gifts, lavish receptions and appeal to similarities in religion and government, the Soviet Union on the other hand, stressed similarities in economic conditions and common goals, world peace based on the policy of peaceful co-existence and industrialisation

Although, socialism made little impact in pre-1958 Africa due to misplaced and misapplied ideological efforts, by 1960 Soviet policy had become impressively effective with the adoption of new tactics occasioned mainly by the establishment of diplomatic, economic and cultural missions in Africa. The Soviet policy towards Africa can be viewed from two perspectives, viz: attempts to export and foster socialism in Africa and efforts to promote her influence as a great power.

The Sino-Soviet conflict in the Sixties heavily impacted on the review of the Soviet African policy when the Chinese accused the Soviet of neo-colonialist tendencies in the continent, and advised Africa to team up with them to carry out the proletarian revolution in contrast to the Soviet's policy of peaceful co-existence. The Soviet viewed Africa as a continent whose peoples were heavily subjected to oppression because of the imperialist desire for continued exploitation of its natural resources.

Cowan (1966) noted that: "the determinant of foreign policies of the developing nations are much more closely associated with the immediate interval goals and aspirations of the regime than with a long-range assessment of the national interest in foreign affairs". That is, foreign policy has been turned into an instrument to suppress opposition and a cover-up on the part of the failure of the leaders to execute popular domestic programme by purporting to adopt critical stance against our common enemies abroad.

The external determinants of the foreign policies of African states are shaped by the events in the international system, their relationship with each other within the continent and the ideological blocs at the international arena. The global system is significantly dominated by the East-West power blocs on one hand and the ideological or economic

conflicts between the new nations and the developed countries of the West regarded as oppressors and exploiters in Moscow.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Socialist penetration in Africa?

3.2 Soviet Foreign Policy towards Africa during the Cold War

Marxist-Leninist doctrine re-emphasizes a vision of a peaceful world ruled by communist parties with both the state apparatus and means of production firmly under the control of the working class. In the opinion of the socialist analysts, Marx and Engel were the first to place international relations on scientific basis and to view it as a crucial weapon in the war against capitalism. The capitalist objectives, according to Marx and Engels are to maximise bourgeois interests at the international arena through the use of foreign policy. They also argued that international relations was not only an arena between two ideologically opposed nations but also a battle ground of class struggle to which both global and domestic politics were inevitably tied (Danjo, 2003:19-20). The domestic origin of foreign policy was made the more glaring by Lenin when he declared that “no idea could be more erroneous or harmful than to separate foreign from home or domestic policy”.

During the Cold War, Russian interest in Nigeria was an attempt to transplant the communist idea into Nigeria and then use Nigeria as a spring board to penetrate other African nations due to the fact that Nigeria was very vocal on issues that concern the continuous domination and incarceration of other African states by Western imperialist nations. For Marx and Engels not only preached that the working class should conduct its own foreign policy, but maintained that the growth and consolidation of its positions within each capitalist state implied the consolidation of its international positions. This is because the interests of the toiling masses in global politics are identical and indivisible regardless of the nationality or state it belongs to.

Deriving from the above argument, Engels declared that:

since the fundamental relations between labour and capital are the same everywhere and since the political domination of the propertied classes over the exploited classes exist everywhere, the principles and goals of the proletarian policy will be the same everywhere.

This declaration by Engels was used by Lenin and his successors as a basis for the internationalization or the exportation of the socialist ideology aimed at freeing the working or toiling masses the world over. Therein lies the reason for Russian interest in Nigeria during the Cold War era.

Just like Danjo (2003:22) argued, one of the basic elements of the Soviet foreign policy is Lenin's Thesis that imperialism is objectively a logical development of capitalism at its highest or last stage. The Marxist-Leninist socialist theory viewed the problems of both international relations and foreign policy from the perspective of class struggle. It is only recently that the Russian Federation which inherited most of the Soviet Union debt and progress changed its foreign policy and international relations from that of socialist ideology to that of economic determinism under the guise of state capitalism as being pursued currently by Putin.

The pillars of the Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War era were hinged on proletarian internationalism and peaceful co-existence. The principle of proletarian internationalism deals with class trend of the socialist foreign policy. This principle was seen as a viable instrument with which to realize socio-economic and political interest of the working class and also a deadly weapon against imperialism and should be made available to the national liberation movements the world over (Danjo, 2003:22-23).

One of the major stands of this principle was its anti-war stance, which in the soviet view will assist the working class and the national liberation movements to win the support of the various strata of modern society. this is in accordance with Marx's declaration that; "the alliance of the working classes of all countries will intimately kill war". Another stand of this principle is its inseparability from the legitimate right of self-determination. This made the Soviet Union to unflinchingly support the decolonization struggles in the Third World countries.

The principle of peaceful co-existence seeks to regulate relations between states with different social systems. For the Soviet, peaceful co-existence of states with different socio-economic and political systems will facilitate the consolidation of socialism and weakening of capitalism. This principle recognized the contradictions between the two systems; but adds that they should be amicably resolved and not allowed to generate a third world war. In this context, the Soviet's position is that socialism alone has offered the world an alternative to a Third World War.

In summary, and from whatever angle one may decide to view the point at stake, in the formulation of the Soviet foreign policy, ideology and real politik play crucial roles and as such cannot be divorced. It is also pertinent to note that the global issues such as the “Cold War”, Sino-Soviet dispute, the nationalist struggles in the Third World nations, especially in colonial Africa were quite fundamental in both the formulation and execution of the Soviet foreign policy.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you examine Soviet foreign policy towards Africa during the Cold War?

3.3 Russia Post-Soviet Policy towards Africa

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and transition to a market economy brought major economic and political problems and changes for Russia.

Russian diplomacy faced major difficulties during the early 1990s. Moscow’s more proximate, domestic problems were so exhausting that Moscow had neither the time nor the opportunity to deal with Africa. After the dissolution of the communist system, Russia inherited a lot of responsibilities from the old Soviet Union, including technical-economic assistance for 37 African countries and trade agreements with 42 countries. The issue of technical economic cooperation was de facto out of the agenda, and several joint projects were left incomplete (Deich and Polikanov 2003a: 52). The Soviet Union-Africa trade volume was \$1.3 billion on the eve of the Soviet dissolution. This volume declined to as low as \$740 million by 1994. Cultural and scientific relations with Africa had been quite active during the Soviet period, but experienced a serious weakening in the post-Cold War period (Deich and Polikanov 2003b: 106).

B. N. Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation at the end of 1991, declared that Russia’s policy of foreign aid would be halted and that Russia would ask African countries to repay their debts as soon as possible.

In response, African countries demanded that Russia either erase or reduce the debts they owed the Soviet Union (Deich 2007: 28). All this damaged Russia’s image in the African continent. The model that Russia had previously developed in its relations with African countries lost validity, and there was no new model at hand (Emelyanov 2000: 314). The African continent disappeared from the Russian radar screen. Africa left the orbit of Russian foreign policy (Deich and Polikanov 2003b: 121). During the 1990s, the African press and discourse referred to Russia as “the land that turned its back on the continent” (Solodovnikov 2000: 6).

Meanwhile, the US, Europe, and Asia were competing for influence on the African continent. Unresponsive to this competition, Russia desperately missed the old days. For instance, during the 1990s, although Russia and China both had interests in the African continent, it was China that achieved great progress while Russian influence was declining (Solodovnikov 2000: 6). By 1992, nine Russian embassies and three Russian consulates in Africa had been shut down, and the number of personnel in the remaining ones had been decreased. The number of representative agencies and trade attachés on the African continent were restricted and Russian cultural centres were closed. In the same way, African countries also reduced the number of their representatives in Russia (Deich and Polikanov 2003a: 50). Russia African relations were then in a stage of breakdown, so there was an urgent need for extensive and decisive policies. The relationships that were established during the Soviet era had to be protected, developed, and adapted in accordance with the new international system.

Russia-Africa relations began to become livelier towards the end of the 1990s. Reciprocal visits by the highest ranking officials were initiated. According to the International Relations Committee of the Russian Federation Council, Russia was coming back to Africa by returning to the traces the Soviet Union left on the continent during the Cold War period. A. Elua, the Madagascar Republic's ambassador in Moscow, summarised the situation with these words: "We had lost one another for a short while after the dissolution of the Soviet Union." High-ranking Russian officials started to refer to Africa's importance for Russia's foreign policy in their speeches. The speeches of Yeltsin, as well as prime ministers V. Chernomyrdin and Y. M. Primakov, also showed similar signals and explanations. In the programme of "Dni Afriki" (African Days) organised in Moscow on May 24, 1999, former Foreign Affairs Minister I. S. Ivanov specifically mentioned that Russia perceived Africa as "a years-long tested and reliable ally, which has been actively making its existence better known on world issues." In his formal visit to Washington in 1999, deputy minister of Russian foreign affairs G. Karasin explained that Russia had not left Africa.

The Russian perception of Africa had begun to change in accordance with the framework of new values and national priorities at the beginning of the 21st Century. Russia started to establish close relations with Angola, its former ally. Deputy Foreign Minister V. Sredin said that Russia-Angola relations were "stepping up to the stage of strategic partnership." From 2001 to 2005, Russian interest in Africa began growing, and Russia-Africa relations gained positive dynamism. In 2001, the Presidents of Algeria, Gabon, Guinea, Egypt, Nigeria, and Prime Minister of Ethiopia visited Moscow. In his meeting with the

president of Gabon, O. Bongo, in April 2001, Putin mentioned that Russia wanted to establish friendly relations with all countries of the world, and Africa was no less important than any other region (Deich and Polikanov 2003a: 53). Russia participated in the African Action Plan, which was accepted by the G-8 countries at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit in Canada. It also participated in the application of the “New Partnership for African Development” (NEPAD) programme (Korendiasov 2003: 97-105).

The “Russia-Africa Business Council” was founded in 2002, with the participation of 60 businessmen who were active in the oil, gas, finance, and tourism sectors of Africa. Organized on October 24-25, 2006, the Russia-South Africa Business Forum took part as one of the organizers of “Expo-Russia.” Although it fell short of having a serious presence until 2008, this council is reconstructing itself, and G.G. Petrov, Russian Federation Commerce and Industry Chamber Vice-President, pointed to it as an umbrella institution for serving bilateral business relations. Russia’s ambassador to Ethiopia was accredited to the African Union commission in October 2005. Relations were launched with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), where the Republic of South Africa plays a central role, as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), where Nigeria plays a central role.

Growing interest in Africa among Russian political and economic circles was easily observable in 2006 and 2007. Putin visited the Republic of South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco in September 2006. These visits were the first of their kind, as Putin was reported to be the first Russian leader who went to the south of the Equator. Putin’s visits to Africa, including South Africa and Morocco, were in fact an open message to the world announcing that Russia is coming back to the region where it traditionally had geopolitical interests, and Russia is doing this in a qualitatively new way. In symbolic terms, because South Africa and Morocco were located on opposite extremes of the African continent, Putin was sending the message that the entire African continent was important to Russia (Shedrin, 2006). The Republic of South Africa turned out to be an important pilot region for Russia’s expansion into Africa and its relations with the continent. Russian business circles selected this country as a base for African expansion. The Russian Federation’s Foreign Ministers visited some African countries. Former Prime Minister Fradkov visited Angola, Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa in March 2007. There were also inter-parliamentary visits between Russia and African countries. In the July 2007 summit of G-8 countries in Heiligendamm, Germany, Putin mentioned that the solution to Africa’s energy problem would pave the way for the continent’s development.

Putin sent a message to African presidents and governments on “Africans’ Day” celebrations in May 2007. An international exhibition named “Mir Afriki” (African World) and a forum named “Afrika Sevodnya” (Today’s Africa) were planned for 2007. However, neither took place. The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity and Cooperation Society signed a cooperation memorandum on May 19, 2008.

The Russian Foreign Ministry published a document entitled “A Comprehensive Look at Russian Federation Foreign Policy” on March 27, 2007. The document mentioned that the “policy of developing traditional friendly relations with Africa and cooperation on mutual interests provided the opportunity to use the African factor in such a way as to make progress on our international interests and reach our economic goals.” The document advocated actively participating to resolve conflicts in the African continent, easing the debts of African countries, contributing to the development of trained human capital, and continuing humanitarian assistance to the continent. Political relations were said to be supplemented by better commercial-economic relations. In sum, this document provided a clear answer to the question: “Is Africa still necessary for Russia?”

The 2007 activity report of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Ministry stated that “a new dynamism started to appear in the development of Russia-Africa traditional friendly relations.” The report said that 230 Russian soldiers and police participated in UN-supported peace-keeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Western Sahara, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sudan. More than 500 students from 16 African countries received practical training in military education centres that were institutionally connected to the Russian Defence Ministry. Seventy-eight persons from the security forces of 17 African countries received peacekeeping training at the Russian Ministry of the Interior. One hundred fifty African experts were educated in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Volgograd academies, all of which were connected to the interior ministry. Bilateral mixed economic commissions and business councils were formed for the purpose of raising commercial-economic relations to the level of diplomatic relations. The Russian Federation’s Foreign Ministry continued to provide political-diplomatic support to Russian firms operating on the continent.

According to 2007 figures, Russian investment in sub-Saharan Africa was as high as \$1.5 billion. Russia’s trade volume with these countries grew by 20 percent, surpassing \$1.3 billion. By the year 2007, 4,500 African students were being educated in Russia, and 50 percent of them

were funded by Russia from the federal budget. Eight hundred state-funded fellowships were reserved for African students in the 2007-2008 budget. Assistance was allocated for fighting AIDS and malaria on the continent. Humanitarian and financial aid was provided to Kenya, Sudan, Guinea, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and other countries.

The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept stated that: “Russia will enhance its multi-pronged interaction with African States at the multilateral and bilateral levels, including through dialogue and cooperation within the G8, and contribute to a prompt resolution of regional conflicts and crisis situations in Africa. We will develop political dialogue with the African Union and sub-regional organizations, taking advantage of their capabilities to involve Russia in economic projects implemented on the continent.” Africa was again the ninth, followed only by Latin America, on the list of the ten most important regions for Russian interests in the 2008 document. All these developments pointed to Russia’s acknowledgement of Africa’s growing role in the contemporary world as well as Russia’s desire to participate in the resolution of international problems on the continent in order to create a multi-polar world system. Russia was coming back to Africa slowly, but changing conditions invalidated past methods of engagement. Russia now had to draw a brand new road map in Africa.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss explain Russia post-Soviet policy towards Africa?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit we have discussed the Socialist penetration in Africa; examine Soviet foreign policy towards Africa during the Cold War; as well as explain Russia's post-Soviet policy towards Africa.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, the Socialist penetration in Africa; Soviet foreign policy towards Africa during the Cold War; as well as Russia post-Soviet policy towards Africa have been appraised.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss the Socialist penetration in Africa.
2. Examine the Soviet foreign policy towards Africa during the Cold War.
3. Explain Russia post-Soviet policy towards Africa.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 **RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA**

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 From Ideology to Economic
 - 3.2 Prospect of Russia in Africa
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit is significant as it take you further in understanding the Russia's foreign policy towards Africa, which springs from ideology to economic; as well as the prospect of Russia's in Africa.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss Russia foreign policy towards Africa springing from ideology to economic; and
- explain the prospect of Russia involvement in Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 From Ideology to Economic

Looking retrospectively at Russia-Africa relations that began developing at the beginning of the 21st Century, one can discern from how geo-political priorities are increasingly combined with geo-economic concerns in the relations with Africa. Former Foreign Minister I. S. Ivanov affirmed this situation in a 2001 speech:

Please see how a ruthless struggle has started among strong states for strengthening their existence in the African continent. The majority of interests there are in the economic domain. In this situation, why should Russia remain outside of multilateral economic projects in Africa and of mutually beneficial bilateral commercial-

economic relations? Our country played the vanguard role in the decolonisation of the continent, and helped several African countries' independence struggle. They remember that very well (Ivanov, 2004).

One of Russia's primary instruments for its conduct of relations with Africa is the policy of debt relief. The "Foreign Policy Concept" document of 1993 advocated putting diplomatic pressure on debtor countries to pay their debts. However, this firm strategy changed during the Putin years. Former Russian Prime Minister M. Fradkov mentions that Russia's policy of contextualising its relations with Africa on the basis of economics started off with this debt relief policy. In 1999, Russia cancelled the debts of poor countries (the majority being from the African continent), totalling \$904 million. The amount of debt relief by Russia reached \$572 million by 2000 (Ivanov, 2004: 379). In his visit to Algeria on March 11, 2006, as mentioned, Putin declared that he would erase Algeria's \$4.7 billion debt to Russia. In 2008, Russia announced debt relief worth \$20 billion on behalf of African countries.

The most significant factor behind bringing geo-economically based relations alongside geopolitical prerogatives is a foreign policy attitude that relies on the control of economic and energy resources. Engaging in cooperation with African countries in the oil, gas, platinum-group metal, and diamond markets, Russia is attempting to be the world leader in production and market development. Russia's prominent energy companies (such as Lukoil, Gazprom, Sintezneftegaz and Rosneft) actively work in African countries like Angola, Namibia, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya. This subject also has a nuclear face. Uranium extracted from Africa is quite a significant raw material for Rosatom, which wants to compete for global nuclear leadership. Considering that energy resources have recently moved towards the gas and nuclear sectors, Russia Africa cooperation further increases Russia's chance of becoming an energy super-power (Maslov 2005: 59-66, Maslov 2006: 61-75). Russia is one of the few countries of the world capable of realising a nuclear based transformation. It can produce uranium and utilise spent nuclear fuel.

Russia signed treaties with some African countries on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The only active nuclear energy power plant in Africa is the Koeberg plant in the Republic of South Africa, which has periodically had to halt its activities because of technical problems. Russia offered to establish a nuclear power plant in South Africa (currently experiencing an energy shortage) with Russian technology and to cooperate with the country on uranium production. Sergei Krienko, the president of Rosatom, announced on February 26, 2007

that three Russian companies, “Techsnabeksport”, “Renova” and “Vneshtogbank”, had decided to establish a joint firm for the purpose of extracting uranium in Namibia. On this issue, Yuriy Trutnev, the Russian Minister of Natural Resources, stated that Russia would be willing to help construct a nuclear power plant in Namibia. Nevertheless, negotiations on the construction of nuclear power plant are still in the preliminary stage. Irina Esipova, the representative of Russia’s nuclear power construction company “Atomstroyeksport”, mentioned that countries that are willing to order the construction of nuclear power plants should arrange the legal infrastructure and cooperate with international institutions for this purpose. North African countries also announced that they were ready for nuclear energy cooperation with Russia (Deich 2007: 90-91).

Independent of its being an instrument of foreign policy and a matter of economic interest, the uranium issue is a sensitive one for Russia. The country’s nuclear plants are currently operating off of raw materials that were stored up during the Soviet Union period. In addition to its domestic consumption, Russia also supplies fuel for about 30 countries with which it has nuclear agreements. The processing and production of uranium are quite expensive in Russia because of low-quality uranium reserves in the country. To maintain its status as a large and reliable provider of nuclear fuel in the world market, Russia has to find uranium resources outside its territory (Deich 2007: 91). Africa, being a continent filled with natural resources (uranium inclusive) is now seen more as an economic partner than a partner that is recruited to share the same socialist ideology.

An essential component of Russia-Africa relations is the domain of military technical relations. These relations, established during the Soviet Union years, have always been given priority due to the purchase of military equipment and weapons. The militaries of several African countries, including Algeria, Angola, and Ethiopia, are 90 percent equipped with Soviet weaponry and military instruments. According to data provided by the London Strategic Research Centre, by the early 1990s 70 percent of tanks, 40 percent of combat planes, and 35 percent of helicopters in the African continent were Soviet-made (Emelyanov 2000: 326). These weapons and technical supplies require modernisation and spare parts. Because African militaries are accustomed to Soviet weapons and technology, Russia is the only country that can satisfy their need for new weapons purchases and the technical staff and military experts for providing instruction in their use.

The total cost of Russia’s weapons delivery to African countries from 1999- 2006 is \$1.4 billion. Russia erased Algeria’s total debt of \$4.7 billion during Putin’s formal visit to the country in March 2006. During

this visit, Algeria declared that it would purchase weapons from Russia costing a total of \$7.5 billion; the package was to include military planes, tanks, land and air defense missiles, weaponry modernization, and military ship repairs (Bakucharsky 2007: 118). African countries are willing to purchase more modern and advanced weapons from Russia and to convince Russia to help with the modernisation of their arms technology. In return, they propose alternative payback methods such as transferring the shares of their own companies to Russian firms or authorising them for administering their national, modern, valuable mine reserves. This is the reason why military-technical relations with African countries are a driver for Russia's business affairs in the continent.

Russia's annual commercial-economic relations with the entire continent of Africa were on the level of \$4.45 billion in 2007. Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco exemplify the North African countries with which Russia has traditionally had better relations. Among sub-Saharan countries, Russia's priority economic and political partners are Angola, Namibia, Congo, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and most recently, the Republic of South Africa (Bakucharsky 2007: 118).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Russia foreign policy towards Africa from ideology to economic?

3.2 Prospect of Russia in Africa

Reengagement with Africa Russia's involvement in Africa is not new; it heightened during the Cold War period, largely driven by the Kremlin's search for geostrategic advantage. After the Cold War, leading up to the 1990s, Russian foreign policy resulted in withdrawal from Africa and other developing countries. As Russia began to return to African countries in the early 2000s, its pursuit of Africa's high concentrations of strategic minerals and significant deposits of petroleum and uranium emerged as a key driver of its increasing commercial engagement with the continent.

Russia's geopolitical goal to extend Europe's dependence on the import of its energy also inspired its quest for Africa's natural resources. Although self-sufficient in fuels and power generation, Russia's energy dependence (primary source of hard currency and revenues) and the plummeting reserves of oil and gas could negatively affect its recent economic growth and drive to become a world-leading energy producer. Under the Soviet system, Russian energy pricing and consumption policies called for subsidized prices far below world market prices and higher output volumes without conservation measures, which resulted in

excessive consumption of energy, increased exports of natural gas and oil, and, more recently, in plummeting energy reserves. With the current proven oil reserves of 60 billion barrels, Russia will have to rely on new discoveries of oil in order to meet the growing global demand for energy. Similarly, Europe's increasing consumption of energy and dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia puts pressure on the Kremlin to seek alternative sources of energy.

Africa, with its rich endowment of crude oil reserves, natural gas deposits, and other minerals, is exerting a strong attraction for Russian energy companies. The African continent currently accounts for about 9.7 percent of the world proven oil reserves of 1.2 trillion barrels and its oil reserves are growing at an annual rate of 3.2 percent. With regard to natural gas, Africa's share of the global gas deposits of 181.46 trillion cubic meters is estimated at 7.8 percent. As Africa's comparative advantage in the scope and frequency of new discoveries is being courted by global energy consumption countries such as Russia, precautionary measures should be put in place to ensure that sustainable economic and social benefits accrue from natural resources exploitation. Increasing Russian investments in Africa could have both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, while such investments might represent significant economic opportunities for resource-rich African countries, there is a risk that, coupled with limited domestic policies, they might generate negative social and environmental outcomes for Africa. On the other hand, Russia's well-established expertise in extracting energy resources and advanced nuclear know-how presents a value-added opportunity for Africa. It is worth noting that Russia is participating in tenders for the construction of the first nuclear power plants in Egypt and Nigeria, which have significant uranium reserves.

Also, Russia's own experience with the problems that plagued its energy sector during the 1990s and its ability and knowledge to restructure the sector for improved management and higher productivity, could provide a salutary lesson to be learned by African countries.

Furthermore, Russia's membership in the G8 and its development commitments, offer African countries additional economic opportunities through opening its market, writing off African debt, and advocating for more debt reduction, especially for resource-rich African countries. To date, Russia has written off over US\$ 20 billion of Africa debt, and, like other G8 members, has pledged to double its ODA to African countries. In addition to negotiating debt reliefs, Russia could contribute to promoting African regional cooperation by making debt reliefs conditional upon African nations' demonstrated commitment to regional energy sector cooperation (i.e. policy harmonisation, trans-border

projects, free trade agreements, and integrated pipeline and transmission networks on the continent).


Resource-based firms in both developed and emerging countries have been playing a central role in generating revenues for the national economies of oil- and resource-rich countries in Africa. However, those revenues do not always translate into long-term sustainable growth, nor do the revenues generated from natural resources production always contribute to human capital and social infrastructure development in African countries. Foreign investment companies should be called upon to create incentives or adopt measures to generate sustainable and shared benefits for resource producing countries in Africa. For instance, Russian resource-based firms should negotiate exploration and extraction agreements with the provision that a percentage of the investment should be earmarked for socioeconomic development, i.e. a trust fund to be set up to support agro-business, education, health, and other forms of social welfare.

Russian firms seeking greater access to African natural resource fields are playing a key role in renewing and expanding Russia's sphere of influence in Africa.


While Russia's search for alternative sources of energy provided the impulse for its new engagement with Africa, the Kremlin's goal of remaining the world's largest energy exporter propelled Russian corporations into the continent.

Russia's pursuit of strategic natural resources will benefit African countries; not only from a revenue-generating point of view, but also because of the catalytic role the increased investments will have on socioeconomic growth and development.

Russia's expertise in energy exploration and production, and its membership in the G8 present an opportunity for African governments to work jointly with Russian companies and international organizations such as the African Development Bank in order to ensure a strong and constructive linkage between Russia's energy interests and sustained economic growth in the continent.



Source: UN COMTRADE, AfDB



Source: UN COMTRADE, AfDB

Major Investments of Russian Companies in Africa

Russian Investor	Host Country/ Company	Industry	Type of Investment	Value	Year
Norilsk Nickel	South Africa <i>Gold Fields</i>	Gold mining and processing	M&A (acquired 30% of Gold Fields)	US\$1.16 billion	2004
Norilsk Nickel	Botswana <i>Tati Nickel</i>	Nickel mining and processing	M&A (acquisition of Canada Lion Ore Mining gave it 85% stake in Tati Nickel)	US\$2.5 billion	2007
Sintez	South Africa, Namibia, Angola	Oil, gas, diamonds and copper exploration	'Greenfield' Investment	US\$10-50 million	2006
Lukoil	Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana	Oil exploration	M&A (acquired interest in 10,500 km ² deep water blocks)	US\$900 million	2010
Rusal	Nigeria <i>ALSCON</i>	Aluminum refining	M&A (acquired majority stake in Aluminum Smelter Company - ALSCON of Nigeria)	US\$250 million	
Severstal	Liberia	Iron ore	M&A (acquired control of iron ore deposit in Putu Range area of Liberia)	US\$40 million	2008
Gazprom	Algeria <i>Sonatrach</i>	Natural gas exploration	Joint exploration and development projects by debt write-off agreement and ams deal	US\$4.7 billion and US\$7.5 billion	2006
Alrosa	Angola, Namibia, DRC	Diamond mining, and hydro-electricity	Greenfield Investment	US\$300-400 million	1992
Rosatom	Egypt	Nuclear power	Ongoing negotiations to build Egypt's first nuclear power plant	US\$1.8 billion	2010

Sources: various media sources; Russian company websites.

Depletion Timeline of Russia's Mineral Reserves

Year	Economically Viable Reserves	All Reserves
2011	Zinc	
2013	Chromium Ores; Diamonds; Quartz	Quartz
2015	Tin; Uranium; Gold; Oil	
2016	Copper; Nickel; Tungsten	
2018	Platinum; Graphite	
Beyond 2025	Coal; Phosphate; Potash; Bauxite; Iron Ores; Natural Gas; Vanadium; Fluorspar; Salt	Zinc; Chromium Ores; Diamond; Tin; Uranium; Gold; Oil; Copper; Nickel; Tungsten; Platinum; Graphite; Coal; Phosphate; Potash; Bauxite; Iron Ores; Natural Gas; Vanadium; Fluorspar; Salt

Source: Russian Federation; US Geological Survey (USGS)

Russian foreign policy-makers imply that they will pursue equality in relations with African countries, refrain from intervening in domestic politics, maintain mutual respect for independence and territorial integrity, and recognise the UN's role in the continent. Russia is willing to develop its commercial-economic relations by means of Russian firms that operate on the continent, have economic cooperation with the relatively developed countries of Africa, and expand these attempts to countries that once fell out of the Soviet Union's scope. Russia shapes these strategies in accordance with the direct and indirect effects of Africa on world politics. In brief, Russia wants to contextualise its relations with Africa in an entirely pragmatic framework and bring this framework in line with its national interests.

Russia needs Africa as much as Africa needs Russia. According to A. M. Vasilyev, Russia's need for Africa is even greater than Africa's need for Russia.

In political terms, as Deputy Director of S. N. Kryukov pointed out, African countries can be regarded as Russia's foreign policy reserve. African countries are the first to support Russia in cases when Russia insists on its own stance in the international arena or resists pressure from the West. Africa is necessary for Russia's trade as well. Russian products, machines, equipment, and weapons are familiar and easily repairable in Africa. Furthermore, Russia of late has been selling these goods not on credit but for real money.

Africa is also important to Russia because of its rich natural resources. Africa's resource wealth provides potential new areas of expansion and opportunity for Russia. Several Russian firms currently work in the aluminium, manganese, and diamond industries. Africa is important as it is the supplier of several goods that Russia needs such as rubber, sea

products, fish, cocoa, coffee and tea. Big Russian firms operate in several areas and domains on the continent. For instance, Gazprom is willing to establish a \$10 billion gas pipeline between Nigeria and Algeria. Alrosa extracts diamond in South Africa, Sierra Leone, Namibia, and Angola, and controls 60 percent of diamonds extracted in Angola. Other big companies that operate in Africa are Norilskiy Nikel, Rusal Boksit, Lukoil, Tehnopromeksport, Stroytransgaz, Silovie Mashini, Tyajpromeksport, Russkiy Aluminiy and Renova. Lukoil works in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast; Rusal Boksit operates in Guinea. Russkiy Aluminiy produces aluminium in Guinea. Renova administers manganese reserves in South Africa. Russia's aluminium industry is partially run by raw materials from Africa (Lopatov, 2007).

Despite Russia's vast territory and its under- and above-ground resources, Russia experiences a shortage of raw materials such as manganese, chrome, mercury, titanium, and aluminium. Imports fill the gap. Russian aluminium processing companies supply approximately 80 percent of their needs with imported raw materials. Russian facilities that process metals like copper, nickel, zinc, tin, and antimony will probably experience difficulties due to shrinkage of the national reserves. Uranium reserves, which provide the essential component of the nuclear sector, are about to be used up. This means that Russia may soon become a uranium-importer. The Russian Federation Ministry of Natural Resources reports that the country will soon be unable to supply its need of manganese, chrome, bauxite, high-quality kaolin, bentonite, and similar metals from its own reserves (Lopatov, 2003: 91).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain the prospect of Russia in Africa?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit we have been able to discuss the Russian foreign policy towards Africa, from ideology to economic; and explain the prospect of Russia's in Africa.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit is an appraisal of Russia's foreign policy towards Africa, from ideology to economic; as well as her prospect in Africa.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss Russia foreign policy towards Africa from ideology to economic.
2. Explain the prospect of Russia in Africa.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FACTORS IN RUSSIA- AFRICA RELATIONS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Positives Factors
 - 3.2 Negative Factors
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides you with explanation on the positive and negative factors in Russia-Africa relationship.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain on the positive factors in Russia-Africa relations; and
- discuss the negative factors in Russia-Africa relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Positives Factors

Russia also has advantages, especially compared to other interested countries on the continent. First and foremost is the fact that Russia has never supported the colonisation of Africa or the slave trade. On the contrary, the former Soviet Union contributed politically and materially to the colonised African people's struggles for independence. It was the defender and supporter of Africa at international fora. In this regard, an important Russian advantage is the 100,000 Africans who received education or practical training at Russian universities and military schools. These students constitute an elite group of politicians and businesspeople in Africa. Furthermore, several Russian experts have produced geological maps that picture the under- and above-ground resources of a large portion of the continent, as well as its economic potential. This provides a significant advantage to Russia, especially relative to the US, China, India, Brazil and other countries that work actively on the continent.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you explain briefly the positive factors in Russia-Africa relations?

3.2 Negative Factors

One of the primary negatives is on legal grounds. The international bilateral agreements for arranging relations between Russia and Africa have not yet been signed with the majority of the countries in Africa (Rubinstein 1997: 224). Furthermore, as of yet there is no "Russia-Africa" forum where high-ranking diplomatic bodies and representative agencies can meet. In contrast, Africa has such platforms and institutions currently operating with other countries, such as "US-Africa," "France-Africa," "China-Africa," "Japan-Africa" and "South Korea-Africa" councils or forums.

Russia also has an image problem in Africa. The new post-Cold War generation in Africa (those who grew up and were socialised in the aftermath of the Soviet Union) do not know much about Africa's formerly close relations with the Soviets. While other countries have filled African markets with investment and consumer goods, thus promoting positive images of themselves, Russia has not. Furthermore, racially motivated attacks by Russian ultra-nationalist groups against African students and workers have damaged the image of Russia in Africa. Mutual denunciations by the media doubly damage the images of both sides (Deich, 2007: 21-44).

Racist violence continues to seriously damage Russia's image among the African countries and their intelligentsia. In response to the rise in violent attacks against their citizens, almost all African ambassadors in Moscow demanded meetings with the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister on May 18, 2002, urging strong measures against such attacks. Despite such protests, diplomatic notes and the efforts of the Russian security forces, racist attacks still continue. From January 2004 to January 2009, attacks against African and the Middle Easterners in Russia resulted in 16 people murdered and 248 beaten and wounded. In 2007, Russia maintained diplomatic relations with 53 African countries but lacked diplomatic presence in 13. Some Russian embassies in Africa have been attempting to make up for this deficiency by being accredited in a number of countries. Similarly, 14 African countries lack diplomatic representation in Moscow. Embassies in seven of them are accredited jointly with other countries.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the negative factors in Russia-Africa relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit we have been able to explain the positive factors in Russia-Africa relations; as well as discuss the negative factors in Russia-Africa relations.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit is an examination of the positive and negative factors in Russia-Africa relations.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain on the positive factors in Russia-Africa relations.
2. Discuss the negative factors in Russia-Africa relations.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Deich, T. L. (2007). 'Politics as a Factor in Russia's Image in Africa'. *Russia-Africa Relations and Russia's Image in Africa*. Collection of Articles. Moscow: RAN Institute for African Studies.

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UNIT 4 RUSSIA-NIGERIA BILATERAL RELATIONS

CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
 - 3.1 Russia-Nigeria Relations during the Civil War Period
 - 3.2 Russia-Nigeria Relations after the Civil War
 - 3.3 The Prospects of Russia-Nigeria Relations
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit provides you important discussions on Russia-Nigeria relations in period of the Civil War in the country; Russia-Nigeria relations after the Civil War and the prospects of Russia-Nigeria relations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss Russia-Nigeria relations during the period of the Civil War
- indentify and explain Russia-Nigeria relations after the Civil War; and
- discuss the prospects of Russia-Nigeria relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Russia-Nigerian Relations during the Civil War Period

The civil war (1967-1970) marks a significant era in the relationship between USSR (Russia) and Nigeria. When Britain, the major source of Nigeria's arms supply refused to supply offensive weapons to Nigeria on the pretext of humanitarian grounds, and Nigerian found herself in a difficult position or circumstances. Britain, France, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and the United States also followed Britain unwillingness example Dauda (2006). However, according to Orumade (2016), Nweke maintains that throughout the cold war, the United States and Russia were interested in Nigeria because of its size, population, economic and military potential, and especially for the United States, its oil. From 1967 to 1977, Nigeria was very cold toward the United States.

The two countries took opposing positions over southern African liberation. Nigerians were angered by pro-Biafra propaganda in the United States and by America's refusal to sell arms to the federation during the civil war. Whereas, white dominated African countries had supported Biafra, the AU sided with the federation by voting for unity. The AU stance proved helpful for Nigerian diplomacy. Nigeria turned to the then Soviet Union (now Russia) for support after the west refused arms to the federation. Ofoegbu (1980) citing from John de St. Jorre's book titled '*The Nigerian Civil War*' and stresses that the most significant facts and how the war created a diplomatic opportunity and the Soviet Union cleverly exploited to the embarrassment and vexation of the Western powers and acted in favour of the Federal government of Nigeria. Ofoegbu observes that as both Nigeria and Biafra were pressed to get arms sells to them, Britain maintained neutrality but continued its traditional (small arms, armoured cars, etc) and purely defensive (anti-aircraft guns) supplies to Nigeria. It resisted federal pressure to sell aircraft, bombs tanks and heavy field guns. The US government was confident that Britain would hold the Western line against Soviet Union penetration in Nigeria, hence it declared a formal arms embargo against both sides. Because of this sad experience, Nigeria looked for an unsentimental nation or power ready to do business by selling weapons and receiving cash. Nigerian Missions went to Moscow (capital of Russia), negotiated arms and cultural agreements and by August 1968, broke with tradition as two Czech Delpin L-29 jet fighters with Nigerian air force insignia painted on their tail refueled in Accra on their way to Nigeria. Four more followed later; Kano airport was abruptly closed to civilian traffic; and Soviet Antonov freighters roared in with twenty crated MIG-15 fighter-trainers on board. Two hundred Soviet technicians poured into Nigeria to assemble and test the aircrafts. By the end of August the jets were in the air, piloted by Egyptians - rocketing and introducing a new political element into the war. The refusal of the Americans and Britain to supply the arms which Nigeria requested, and the USSR's assessment of the likely outcome of the war at the end of July when the Nigerian Mission went to Moscow, turned the USSR fully towards Nigeria.

The Soviet supported the unity of Nigeria with the conviction that the alternative would benefit the West, fearing that a divided Nigeria would be less able to resist the efforts of collective colonialism and individual plunder, which they accused the West of perpetrating in Africa. Thus, the eventual unification of Nigeria was in the interest of the country, as it was in the plan of the Soviet Union and her allies, to undermine what was regarded as Western intrigues of divide and rule, as well as to improve their relations with the country. Similarly, the industrialization of Nigeria and training of some of her manpower would be helpful to the country as well as expected to meet the long term interest of the Soviet

Union aimed at reducing Nigeria's dependence on the West and at the same time assisting in the rapid growth and development of industrial and urban proletariat whose revolutionary activities could weaken capitalism from within, leading to the eventual emergence of socialism. Simultaneously with the strengthened support for the unity of Nigeria, the Soviets initiated several contacts aimed at improving relations between Moscow and Lagos. These contacts he said was similar to those between the Soviet Union and the Balewa regime during the closing years of the Nigeria's first republic, took varying forms ranging from cultural to economic, all helping to improve the political and diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries. For instance, a three-man Soviet delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization visited Nigeria between December 10 and 23 1968. The delegation which paid courtesy calls on a number of government officials expressed its support for the unity of Nigeria and the continued friendship between Nigeria and the Soviet Union. About the same time a group of Soviet journalists visited the country to see the war situation for them and to meet with their Nigerian counterparts. Several more of such visits and contacts were also made during the 1969. In January of that year, a delegation of the Soviet Association of Friendship with the People of Africa was in the Nigerian capital to take part in the work of the national conference of Nigerian-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Society. In February, a Nigerian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce was opened in Lagos to enhance the development of trade and commercial relations between Nigeria and the Soviet Union; and in the following month, a Soviet squadron commanded by Captain V. Platanov visited Lagos and its crew were received by Nigeria's Head of State, General Gowon. The squadron consisting of missile ships; Boiky and Nelovny, submarine and tanker came on a demonstration of continuing Soviet military support for the unity of Nigeria. In the north, Bobunov announced the willingness of the Soviet government to contribute to the rapid development of the country in all spheres, including the field of education. A similar expression of Soviet willingness to assist in development of Nigeria was made by the Soviet ambassador to Nigeria Alexander Romanov, in a speech in Lagos to mark the 99th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin openly celebrated by the various pro-socialist groups in the country (Orobator 1997).

Shortly before, a Soviet Trade Union delegation headed by the secretary of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, P. T. Pmenov, visited Nigeria at the invitation of the Nigeria Trade Union Congress, the pro-Soviet and most radical trade union organization in the country. In May, the Nigerian radio was speaking of the possibility of Nigeria seeking Soviet assistance in the construction of the first Iron and Steel Complex in the country and during the same month, there were reports that four Soviet geologists led by Professor V. Grigoryev arrived Kaduna for a

ten-day visit to parts of the region. In June, it became certain that an agreement on the construction of the Iron and Steel Complex was reached as indicated by the Nigerian Commissioner for Finance, Chief Obafemi Owolowo, in his address to the Ilorin Chamber of Commerce. By July there were talks of exchange of cultural programmes between the Soviet Film and Telecommunication Organization and their Nigerian counterpart. During August, similar contacts were made in various ways. Early in the month, it was announced that a direct air link between Moscow and Lagos was to be inaugurated in November and that as the Lagos airport got bigger, the Soviet authorities would be prepared to put more powerful planes on service to Nigeria. And on October 31, the Soviet News Agency, TASS, announced that the Soviet Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, Nikolai Bykov, was on his way to Lagos on the first flight of the new weekly air service between Soviet Union and Nigeria. Moreover, the Soviet Minister was reported to have expressed his country's willingness to train Nigerians as civil aviation pilots. In November, a three-man delegation of technical experts from Soviet Union was in Nigeria on tour of the various technical institutions at the invitation of the Nigeria government (Orobator 1997).

The above had been a catalogue of varying contacts with Nigeria and Nigerians initiated by Soviet authorities. Especially between 1968 and 1969. Within the same period, Nigeria also made similar contacts in appreciation of the Soviet initiatives and assistance. For instance, during August-September, 1969, a six-man delegation of Nigerian church leaders led by the Anglican Bishop of Lagos, the Right Reverend S. I. Kale, was in Moscow in a return visit of the Soviet Orthodox Church delegation which had visited Nigeria the year before. A similar visits was made to the Soviet Union by Nigerian Moslems during the same period. A seven-man delegation for top Nigerian Moslems led by the Emir of Kano visited various parts of the Soviet Union including the Russian, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijzan Republics. The delegation was also in Leningrad and Moscow where they had discussion with leaders of Soviet Moslems, and Y. Ivanov, the deputy Chairman of the Union of Friendship Societies. In the same month, the Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Lawrence Fabunmi, visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Apart from these goodwill visits, Nigeria expresses gratitude for favourable Soviet understanding of the crisis as exemplified by the statement made by Nigeria's Head of State, General Gowon expressed delight at the abundance of goodwill and understanding between the two nations in 1967, the relationship between them had matured considerably to the advantage of both sides. Similarly, the Nigerian ambassador to the Soviet Union, G. Kurubo, in an interview in Moscow, also expressed Nigeria's appreciation of Soviet support and understanding; adding that even in international problems, the aims and

desires of the two countries coincided in many ways. They were both in support of African liberation and the settlement of Middle East crisis on the recommendation of the Security Council Resolution 242 of November, 1967 (ibid. 1997).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss Russia-Nigeria relations during the Civil War period?

3.2 Russia-Nigeria Relations after the Civil War

Russia has always held a special place in the hearts of most Nigerians as the country that supported Nigeria during its bitter civil war between 1967 and 1970 (Alao, 2011). By the time the war ended in January 1970, Nigeria had become a lot wish in the game of international politics where there are no permanent friends or enemies but only permanent interests. Having been deserted by its traditional friends and allies in the West, It was forced to reassess its situation and change its hitherto pro-Western stance in favour of a more flexible and diversified external relations that cut across the various ideological cleavages. Relationship with the Soviet Union became more *cordial and friendly*, with General Gowon paying a high-profile state visit Moscow to personally express the country's gratitude for timely Soviet assistance at the critical period. The early 1970s witnessed influx of soviet diplomats and nationals doing business in the country. Cheap Soviet- made automobiles such as Lada, Moskvitch and Volga became common on Nigerian roads while other consumer items from behind the iron curtain also flooded the country's market. All the earlier restrictions placed on the movement and activities of Soviet personnel had been removed. The Soviets were awarded the contract for the construction of Nigeria's multi-million dollar Iron and Steel Industry at Ajaokuta in Kogi State. This was in addition to a range of bilateral commercial, cultural and educational agreements that blossomed in the early and mid – 1970s (Fawole, 2003).

The Soviet Union (and later Russia) continued to feature prominently in Nigeria's diplomacy. This relationship progressed further following the return of civilian rule to Nigeria in May 1999 according to Alao (2011) as discussed below:

Diplomatic Relations: In March 2001, President Obasanjo visited Russia and both countries signed a Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Partnership, and a Programme on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Nigeria in 2010, the first such visit from a Kremlin leader to Africa's most populous nation, boosted their relationship significantly. Both

countries signed a deal to co-operate in developing nuclear energy, especially for the purpose of electricity. Another major project of interest to the Russians was the Trans-Saharan Gas pipeline, a project aimed at sending Nigerian gas to Europe, and supported by the EU as a way to diversify its energy resources. This is of considerable interest to Gazprom because of its belief that it is far behind its foreign competitors in Africa, especially when compared with companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Exxon Mobil. By 2010 both Nigeria and Russia had also started exploring discussions on space technology, nuclear energy and partnerships in other technical fields. The countries have signed a nuclear agreement between the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the Russian State Atomic Corporation to explore and develop gas and hydrocarbon-related projects in Nigeria.

Trade Relations: The relationship continued to progress and in 2008 the two countries signed a series of MOUs. One of these was to regulate the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Another envisaged the participation of the Russian-based Gazprom, the world's largest energy corporation, in the exploration and development of oil wells and gas reserves in Nigeria. By 2009 trade figures between both countries reached the \$1.5 billion mark and both countries began talking about further developing their relationship. Nigeria's former Foreign Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, met to discuss various areas of collaboration. Specifically, Russia was interested in projects related to the development of Nigeria's infrastructure; the ferrous and nonferrous metals industry; electric power generation, including nuclear energy; and the extraction of hydrocarbon and other raw minerals. For its part, Nigeria was interested in all spectrums of bilateral economic co-operation, including the electricity sector. In 2010 trade between the two countries reached \$300 million. Despite the relative insignificance of this amount, Nigeria has become Russia's second-largest trade partner in sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa. Russia exports metals, fertilisers and oil consumables to Nigeria, while Nigeria exports agricultural products to Russia. However, Russia appears to be growing increasingly discontent with playing second fiddle to other countries like China and India. The Russian Ambassador to Nigeria, Alexandra Polyakov, has attributed the low trade volume to the absence of a legal framework to support the 2009 Investment Promotion Agreement between the two countries.

Cultural Relations: Socio-cultural contact between Nigeria and Russia dates back to the former Soviet Union. Many Nigerians travelled to the former Soviet Union, where they imparted aspects of African culture. Many also married Soviet citizens; some of whom came from other parts of the Soviet Union but the majority was from present-day Russia. Many of these marriages still exist, thus reinforcing contact between Nigeria

and Russia. Presently both Russia's embassy in Nigeria and Nigeria's embassy in Moscow have cultural attachés whose main responsibility is to foster cultural links. Although now significantly limited, Russia still offers scholarships to young Nigerian students to study in the country.

Military Relations: Nigeria's military forces use warships, helicopter gunships, troop transports and unmanned drone intelligence planes sold to Nigeria by Russian companies. Russian instructors provide specialised training to Nigerian navy and air force sailors and pilots in how to operate the ships and helicopters. Russia was also involved in the September 2003 launch of a military satellite targeted at boosting surveillance of Nigeria's military and crude oil facilities. The satellite, NigeriaSat-1, was built by Nigeria's National Space Agency and Russia's Rowbrow Export in Plesetsk at the cost of \$13 million. It is a low-earth orbit micro satellite designed to monitor disasters. NigeriaSat-1 has three spectral bands, namely green: 0.52–0.62 μm , red: 0.63–0.69 μm , and near-infrared: 0.76–0.9 μm . The close and extensive links between Nigeria and Russia have had little impact on Nigerian politics. This is largely because most of the relations were conducted at government levels, with few activities percolating to the local population. Indeed, unlike the cases of China and India, few Nigerians know much about the activities and even the presence of Brazilians and Russians in Nigeria. Most Nigerians only associate Brazil with football, and this is limited to the activities of individual Brazilian players; and associate even less with Russia. There is a negligible number of Russian companies in Nigeria that may have employed Nigerians, from which their treatment of Nigerian staff could be measured. There are also few Russian goods to rival Nigerian commodities. Consequently, Nigerians have no grounds for complaints about the activities of Russia in the country.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you identify and explain four areas of Russia-Nigeria relations after the Civil War?

3.3 The Prospects of Russia-Nigeria Relations

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation, an ideological friend and ally of many African countries during the Cold War period, started to disengage from Africa and other developing countries, and to develop closer relations with the Western countries. As Russia's economic strength started to reinvigorate in the late 1990s, the Russian foreign policy objective of reestablishing its geopolitical stature led to a renewal of its relations with Africa. This was driven not only by political ambitions but also by economic and commercial motivations. The African continent, enriched by vast natural

resources and with burgeoning consumer markets, has become a very attractive destination for Russian investment. The post-2000 Russian economic stability, which resulted in strong economic growth (yearly average GDP growth rate of 6.9 percent), increasing demand for Russian exports (mostly oil and other natural resources) and higher foreign exchange reserves (world's third largest reserve). This presented an opportunity for the Russian government and business elites to expand their influence beyond Russian and CIS borders and to enhance their political and commercial ties with African countries and other emerging markets.

The importance of Russia as a trading partner to African countries is quite minimal when compared to other developed countries and emerging markets such as the European Union, the United States, China, India, and Brazil. Bilateral trade between Russia and Africa reached its peak of US\$ 7.3 billion in 2008. Although this is close to a tenfold increase from the very low trade volume of US\$ 740 million in 1994, it is not significant enough to guarantee Russian companies a bargaining edge when engaging with African countries. To improve its political and commercial ties with Africa and facilitate market access to its firms, the Russian government embraced a new foreign policy toward Africa, undertook high official visits to some African countries, and advocated for conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, and debt relief for Africa. Since 2000, Russia's trade with Africa started to rise but with imports of African products increasing at a slower pace than Russian exports to the Africa continent. Imports from Africa rose overall from US\$ 350 million in 2000 to US\$ 1.6 billion in 2009 while exports grew from US\$ 947 million to US\$ 4 billion over the same period. Both exports and imports grew steadily from 2000 to 2008, after which they slightly decreased because of the impacts of the world financial and economic crisis. Russia has maintained a trade surplus with Africa, which stood at US\$ 597 million in 2000, rising to US\$ 3.3 billion in 2008 and falling to US\$ 2.3 billion in 2009. Russian imports from Africa are also concentrated in a few countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa, jointly these account for about 80 percent of Africa's exports to Russia. The exports from Africa are slightly more diverse and include ores, uranium, iron, and other concentrates of base metal, fruits and nuts, cocoa, tobacco, and inorganic chemical elements. Although the import of African products increased at a Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 19 percent between 2000 and 2009, Africa still accounts for only 1 percent of Russia's world trade.

This marginalized position of Africa vis-à-vis trade with Russia may reflect the country's long withdrawal from the continent following the end of the Cold War. It is unlikely to reverse because of Russia's

growing interest to modernize its trade network by expanding its trade of machinery and equipment, and other technologies. At the current stage of its development and given the limited dynamics of its export base, Africa may not be in a position to meet Russia's trade interests.

Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Russia's renewed interests in Africa has been fueled by the crucial need to access foreign energy reserves as Russia runs the risk of exhausting its oil reserves should the current scale of national exploitation remain constant. Africa's rich untapped oil and natural gas reserves provide an opportunity for Russia's outbound exploration drive and strategic goal of remaining the world's largest exporter of oil (second to Saudi Arabia) and natural gas, and maintaining Europe's dependence on its export of natural gas.

In 2009 oil, fuel and gas accounted for 67.4 percent of total exports from Russia, and more than three-fourths of its oil and gas exports went to Europe. Oil and gas account for 30 percent of Russia's GDP, and constitute more than 40 percent of government revenues. While the recent high oil prices are projected to keep the current account in surplus (peaking at US\$ 103.7 billion in 2008), falling Russian oil reserves may slow down the strong economic growth experienced over the past ten years (6.9 percent increase on average per year). Growing Interest of Russian Investors Africa's vast natural reserves make the continent an increasingly attractive investment destination for Russia's energy and other natural resource industries. On account of its strong economic growth, large external assets (US\$ 480 billion in foreign exchange reserves), increasing outward direct investment stock (from US\$ 3 billion in 1995 to US\$ 249 billion in 2009), and politico-strategic ambitions, Russia represents a major potential investor in African countries. At the same time, Russia's outward investment is dominated by large resource-based corporations that seek to gain greater access to the African market of fuel, energy and metallurgy, and expand Russian investment flows to Africa, which peaked at US\$ 20 billion in 2008. The table below illustrates some of the major Russian investment operations in African countries.

As mentioned above, oil, gas and other natural resources sectors have been the major contributors to the Russian economic boom and increasingly, they dominate Russian outward investment. Therefore, it is not surprising to see large Russian multinationals such as Lukoil, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, Alrosa, Rusal and Severstal invest in oil, gas, diamond, aluminum, iron ore and other metal products in many African countries including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa. The motivation behind Russian business expansion in Africa is also driven by the depletion of the resources base in Russia (see table below).

The absence of new discoveries and technological advancement, which are weakening Russia's domestic energy, together with the lack of easy access to the remaining underground mineral deposits in Russia, are some of the factors leading Russia's considerable natural resources.

While Africa's share of global energy production is about 12 percent and increasing, its share of global commercial energy consumption is only 3 percent, which represents a significant supply for Russia's growing oil demand. The high costs of accessing Russia's reserves of diamonds, uranium, gold, copper, nickel and other metals and their reduced economic viability given the volatility of these products' world prices, have encouraged Russian firms to turn to Africa as an alternative source of supply, as the costs of exploration and production are much lower there. In fact, Africa's underexploited mineral reserves, which account for about 30 percent of global resources, will be strategic complementarities to Russia's depleting natural resource base, including zinc, diamond, gold, uranium, oil, copper, nickel, manganese, bauxite, and coal. Moreover countries such as Algeria, Angola, Botswana, DRC, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia, which dominate the African mining industry, will potentially attract an increasing number of Russian business elites.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How would you discuss the prospects of Russia-Nigeria relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit we have been able to discuss the Russia-Nigeria relations during the Civil War in Nigeria; identify and explain Russia-Nigeria relations after the Civil War as well as discuss the prospects of Russia-Nigeria relations.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, the role of Russia during the Civil War in Nigeria; Russia-Nigeria relations after the Civil War as well as the prospects of Russia-Nigeria relations have been discussed.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss the Russia-Nigeria relations during the Civil War period
2. Identify and explain four aspects of Russia-Nigeria relations after the Civil War.
3. Discuss the prospects of Russia-Nigeria relations.

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