NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: INR 441

COURSE TITLE: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC STUDIES

INR441   CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC STUDIES

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Introduction

INR 441: Contemporary Strategic Studies is a one-semester course in the Fourth year of B.A. (Hons) Degree in French and International Relations. It is a three Unit Credit Course designed to explore the nature of Contemporary Strategic Studies as well as the issues relating to global security. The course begins with a discussion of the nature of contemporary strategy as well as the relationship between strategy, policy and military aim before proceeding further into different issues relating to global security and the unfolding challenges in the contemporary era'.

INR 441 is designed to facilitate understanding of the nature and conduct of modern warfare, contemporary strategic concepts such as containment, brinkmanship, massive retaliation, flexible and gradual response, mutual assured destruction, overwhelming force, deterrence, etc, The course further explores the revolution in weapons technology, the military industrial complex as well as the impacts of the revolution in military technology on the conduct of the 21st Century warfare. Issues relating to the causes, evolution and the global war against terrorism were also explored in the course. The course further reviews the global war against terrorism and offered various perspectives on how terrorism could be curtailed in international politics.

The study units are structured into Modules. Each module comprises of 5 units. A Unit Guide comprises of instructional material and also provides a brief description of the instructional material.

Courses Objectives

The main objective of INR 441 is to facilitate the understanding of the nature of the contemporary security challenges facing the international system and appraise the responses of the international community to these challenges. The objectives of each unit are specified at the beginning of each unit and are to be used as reference points and to evaluate the level of progress in the study. At the end of each unit, the objectives are also useful to check whether the progress is consistent with the stated objectives of the unit. The entire units are sufficient to completely achieve overall objective of the course.

The Course Material

In all of the courses, you will find the major components thus:

(1) Course Guide
(2) Study Units
(3) Textbooks
(4) Assignments

 Study Units

There are 20 study units in this course: They are:

Module 1 : Contemporary Strategy

Unit 1   The Nature of Contemporary Strategy
Unit 2   Strategy, Military Aim and National Interest
Unit 3   Contemporary Strategic Concepts.
Unit 4   Military Power
Unit 5   Strategic Configuration in the Post Cold War Order

Module 2 : Modern Warfare

Unit 1   What is War?
Unit 2   Causes of War
Unit 3   Types of War
Unit 4   The Laws of War
Unit 5   War as Policy Instrument in Contemporary Strategy

Module3: Modern Developments in Weapons Technology and Strategy

Unit 1   Modern Developments in Weapons Technology
Unit 2   Impacts of Weapon Technology on the 21st Century Warfare
Unit 3   The Nature of Nuclear Weapons and their Effects
Unit 4   Global Efforts to Control Weapons of Mass Destruction
Unit 5   The Military Industrial Complex

Module 4 Terrorism and Global Security

Unit 1   What is Terrorism
Unit 2   The Evolution of Terrorism
Unit 3   Terrorism and Global Security
Unit 4   Terrorist Networks Organizations
Unit 5   Contemporary Global War against Terrorism

From the above, we can see that the course starts with the basic introduction to the nature of contemporary strategy and progresses subsequently into comprehensive analysis of the various security challenges confronting humanity in the 21st Century. Among the challenges are proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uncertainties of a multi-polar world and global terrorism. The instructions given in each unit contains objectives,

course contents and reading materials. In addition, there are also self-assessment exercise and Tutor-Marked Assignments. All these are intended to assist you in achieving the objectives of each unit.

Textbooks and References

Beaufre, A. (1965) *An Introduction to Strategy* . London: Faber

Chaliand, Gerard (2007) *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Clausewitz, Von, (1908) *'On War'* (translated by Graham, J.J.) reprinted London: Routledge, 1966

Crenshaw, Martha (2007) "Terrorism and Global Security," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, edited by Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

Diaz-Paniagua (2008) *Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-Terrorism Treaties* 1997-2005

Goldstein, D. (2007). *Week 3: Religion and Modern Terrorism*. Retrieved March 27, 2007, from Boston University, Vista Web site: *http://vista.bu.edu/webct/*

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Morgenthau, H.J. (1956) *Politics among Nations*. New York : Alfred A Knopf

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December 9, 1994, UN Doc. A/Res/60/49

White, J.R. (2006). *Terrorism and Homeland Security (5th ed).* Belmont, CA:
Thompson Wadsworth

Verba Sidney (1969) "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in
Models of the International System" In James Rosenau (ed.),
International Politics and Foreign Policy: New York, Free Press

Welch, David (1992) 'The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics
Paradigm: Retrospect and Prospect' *International Security* 17 (2): 112-146

Tutor-Marked Assignments/ Self Assessment Exericises

There are 20 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs) in this course. You need to submit at least four assignments of which the highest three marks will be recorded. Each recorded assignment counts 10 percent towards your total course grade. Three recorded assignments will thus count for 30 percent. Whem you complete your assignments, send them including your form to your tutor for formal assessment on or before the deadline.

Self Assessment Exercises are provided in each unit. The exercises should help you to evaluate your understanding of the materials so far. They are not to be submitted. However, answers are provided or directions given as to where to find answers within the units.

Final Examination and Grading

There will be a final examination at the end of the course. The examination carries a total mark of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will reflect the contents of what you have learnt and the self-testing and tutor-marked assignments. You therefore need to revise your course materials before the examination.

Course Overview

There are 20 units in this course. You are to spend one week on each unit. One of the advantages of Open and Distance Learning (ODL) is that you can read and work through

the designed course materials at your own pace, and at your own convenience. The course material replaces the lecturer that stands before you physically in the classroom.

All the units have similar features. Each unit has seven items beginning with the introduction and ending with reference/suggestions for further readings.

Course Marking Scheme

The table below shows the breakdown of how the students course assessment is done

Assignment	Marks
Assignment : There are 20 assignment	Four assessments, best three marks out of four count @ 10% each = 30% Course Marks
Final Examination	70% of overall Course Marks
Total	100% of Course Marks

Summary

INR 441 is designed to facilitate understanding of the nature and conduct of modern warfare, contemporary strategic concepts such as containment, brinkmanship, massive retaliation, flexible and gradual response, mutual assured destruction, overwhelming force, deterrence, etc, The course further explores the revolution in weapons technology, the military industrial complex as well as the impacts of the revolution in military technology on the conduct of the 21st Century warfare. Issues relating to the causes, evolution and the global war against terrorism were also explored in the course. The course further reviews the global war against terrorism and offered various perspectives on how terrorism could be curtailed in international politics. All the basic course materials needed to successfully complete the course are provided. Upon completion, you will be able to:

- Explain the complexities and changing trends of strategy, especially contemporary strategy in the 21st Century. Central to the discussion is an in-depth understanding of the contemporary strategic concepts, the interactions between strategy, national interest and military aim, military power and contemporary strategy and the nature of strategic configuration in the post cold war order.
- Discuss the nature, causes, and the legal framework guiding the conduct of war and the utility of War as policy instrument in the contemporary politics.
- Describe the revolution in military technology and its impact on weapons development, the challenges of technology for strategy and how the revolution in technology is changing the character of the 21st century warfare.

- Examine the broad issues of terrorism and its attendant impacts on global security in the contemporary world order
- Provide a justification for the contemporary global war against terrorism

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MODULE 1: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

This module provides a general overview of the nature of contemporary strategy. The intention here is to expose you to the complexities and changing trends of strategy, especially contemporary strategy in the 21st Century. Central to the discussion in this module is an in-depth discussion of the contemporary strategic concepts, the interactions between strategy, national interest and military aim, military power and contemporary strategy and the nature of strategic configuration in the post cold war order.

This module, which is made up of five units, provides the background for understanding subsequent discussions regarding contemporary strategy in the 21st Century as well as the attendant challenges for global peace and international relations.

Unit 1   The Nature of Contemporary Strategy
Unit 2   Strategy, Military Aim and National Interest
Unit 3   Contemporary Strategic Concepts.
Unit 4   Military Power
Unit 5   Strategic Configuration in the Post Cold War Order

UNIT 1   THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

This is the first among the five units that constitute the module. As an introduction, the unit examines the nature of contemporary strategic studies further explores the relationship between contemporary strategy and theories of international relations as well as the relationship between strategy and war . Discussions in this unit take a broad over-view of conceptual clarifications of the nature of contemporary strategy regardless of the context, in which such strategy is taking place. Discussions explored in this unit form the foundation upon which specific issues of the contemporary strategy are built. It is expected that at the end of this unit, you would be grounded in issues pertaining to the nature of contemporary strategy as well as the relationship between strategy and other security related concepts.

2.0.   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i)   Define the concept of 'strategy' either in your own words or by adapting various definitions drawn from various authors.
(ii) Explain the relationship between contemporary strategy and theories of international relations.
(iii) Explain the relationship between strategy and war

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Nature of Contemporary Strategy?

Different perspectives abound about the meaning of 'strategy'. From the ordinary usage on daily basis, strategy to many people could imply a 'blue-print' or 'plan' while others

could view it as 'tactics' or 'devices' to use in other to accomplish a pre-determined objectives or goals. There seems to be a sense in all the contexts in which 'strategy' is being used. It is about a means to secure a pre-determined ends.

Fundamentally, strategy concerns itself with the way military power is used by policy makers to accomplish national interests. Von Moltke quoted by Liddell Hart (1966:165) described strategy as the 'practical adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object in view'. Liddell Hart (1966:335) also described strategy as the 'art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy'. There seems to be an overbearing influence of military might in the definition of strategy and this popular impression is also cemented by the widely acclaimed Clausewitz's definition of strategy as the 'employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war' (Von Clausewitz, 1908:165).

However, contemporary strategy is much about peace than war. While war may sometimes be inevitable in the process of making peace, it should be emphasized that waging war is only one of the ways in which military power can be used to implement political goals. It is for this reason that contemporary strategy is much deeper than the narrow focus on the study of wars and military campaigns.

Contemporary strategy therefore emphasizes both the wartime and peaceful application of military power. Given the context of the revolution in military technology in which war modern war is becoming unwinnable in the face of thermonuclear weapons, the general concern of modern strategy is to avoid wars, if possible. In contemporary strategy, absolute military definitions are clearly outdated as they failed to acknowledge the efforts of international community to promote peace. It should also be recognized that these efforts have largely responsible for the absence of a global war since the end of the Second World War in 1945.

It should also be emphasized that contemporary application of military power is never done in isolation of other instruments of statecraft like diplomacy, sanctions, propaganda, etc. Given the interactions between the political, economic and psychological instruments of power, the application of military power must be defined in conjunction with other instruments. Contemporary strategy must therefore incorporate political components and context in which strategic planning is taking place.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

To what extent is it justifiable to assert that contemporary strategy is as much about peace as war?

3.2 Contemporary Strategy and Theories of International Relations

Like many other concepts in international relations, 'contemporary strategy' is underpinned by theoretical assumptions, of which some have been subject of controversy. Scholars and practitioners tend to disagree on the framework of analysis on contemporary strategic thinking. This controversy arises primarily from the different theoretical frameworks from which the subject matter is approached. The study of contemporary strategy is thus fraught with a number of difficulties. Thus, whatever theoretical framework adopted would influence the interpretation of the analyst. For example, the analysis could be done using realist or liberalist, rational model, peace and security frameworks.

From the realist perspective, the dominant issue in statecraft bothers on security concerns. Realists tend to be conservative about the issue of security as they tend to be skeptical about the prospect of peace in an anarchical international system in which states are not subjected to any higher authority and also where the pursuit of self interests overrides collective interests. Realism is thus a clear recognition of the limits of morality and reason in politics and the 'acceptance of the fact that political realities are power realities and that power must be countered with power and self interest is the primary datum in the action of all groups and nations' (Herzog, 1963:88).

The realists are quick to emphasis the limitations of international laws and multilateral organizations in resolving conflicts in anarchical environments. They are also pessimistic about human nature's prospect for working in harmony with peaceful interests. The realists thus shared the Hobesian notion of human nature, which is seen as inherently destructive, selfish, competitive, aggressive and stubborn. Conflict is regarded as an inescapable condition of international life and the realists are not much given to moralizing about international politics.

Most of the realists' ideas have shaped strategic studies following the turbulent period in international relations in the prelude to the Second World War and during the Cold War era. The American strategists that influenced the earlier development of contemporary strategic thinking were greatly influenced by concepts such as deterrence, armaments and disarmaments, flexible responses, overwhelming response, mutually assured destruction, brinkmanship and détente.

In contrast to the realists, the idealists were very optimistic about the prospect for peace and security in the contemporary international system. They emphasized a collective approach to resolving the question of peace through international institutions and

international laws. They also advocated disarmament and arms control as means of securing international peace. The global wave of democratization that swept throughout the developing world in the immediate post cold war order resonated well with the idealist's argument of the 'democratic peace'. The democratic peace thesis advocates the spread of democracy into non-democratic areas to extend the zone of peace in the turbulent international system. The increasing global collaborations in the post cold war order particularly within the UN system all pointed to the resurgence of liberalism in the contemporary strategic thinking. The increasing cooperation between the USA and Russia in reducing strategic arms stockpile is also a reflection of liberalism.

As stated in the introduction, the concern for peace and security is the dominant thought in strategic thinking. Almost without exception, all the major strategic analysts share the view that peace and security are desirable goals that must be collectively pursue for the survival of humanity on the planet earth. Although, the methodology and framework to achieve peace may be different, there is a unity of concern for this elusive goal among strategists. The concern for peace and security is also an indication that strategy is also underpinned by normative concerns and values.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How appropriate are the fundamental concerns of Realism and Liberalism to the Contemporary Strategic thinking?

3.3 Strategy and War

Strategy as defined before is the application of military means to achieve policy objectives. In using military means to accomplish policy objectives, war sometime seems inevitable. While it is also acknowledged that military means could be used to achieve policy goal without necessarily firing a shot, war is the most popular military instrument used for achieving policy goal in the contemporary world. Intrinsically, strategy is a military activity in which high-ranking officers plan the overall conduct of wars. Strategy is thus fundamentally concerned about war and the conduct of military campaigns. War is thus serving an instrumental purpose in achieving political objectives. It should be noted that apart from war, other means of using military power are deterrence, threats, brinkmanship, and disarmament. However, in the evolution of strategic thinking war has largely been instrumental in the evolvement of strategic doctrine. For example, military campaigns have led to the development of different strategies which have underpinned strategic study. In the pre-Napoleonic era, limited wars were fought over limited objectives. The conduct of war in that era was predominantly the general's affairs with limited inputs from civilian populace. As the era was also noted for primitive

technology, the weapons of wars were limited to bows, arrows, stones, clubs, among others, with low casualties recorded. The Napoleonic era was influence by the industrial revolution and products of technology were adapted for use at the battle fields. The era also marked a shift from wars being the general's affairs to national strategy, in which the entire population was mobilized for fighting. It was also an era in which ideology played prominent role in mobilizing the population for fighting

The first and second world wars were further extension of the Napoleonic era in which national strategy was executed at the highest level of policy making of the government. It was also an era where Air Strategy was developed, which changed the landscape of war dramatically. The era of the World Wars also witnessed the development of weapons of mass destruction and the realization of the unwinnable nature of modern warfare. From this perspective, it could be seen that war has largely been instrumental in the evolution of strategic thinking right from the pre-Napoleonic era to the contemporary era. Strategic concepts such as limited war, blitzkrieg, close-arm formation, aerial battles, first strikes, pre-emptive strikes, ambushes, guerrilla tactics, and overwhelming force, among others have been developed from different wars fought at different eras.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the view that the war has been a defining moment for the development of strategic thinking,

4.0   CONCLUSION

The evolution of strategic thinking has seen a qualitative improvement from the pre-Napoleonic era through the World Wars to the contemporary era. In the development of strategic thinking, war has been very influential. It is however important to emphasise that despite the preponderance of military power in the definition of contemporary strategy, the focus of strategic in the present era is on security and peaceful application of military power towards the attainment of policy objectives.

5.0   SUMMARY

Discussions in this unit have focused primarily on the fundamentals of contemporary strategy. We have provided conceptual definitions of strategy from different perspectives. The unit has also explored the different theoretical perspectives that have shaped the development of contemporary strategy and the analytical framework. It should be obvious to you by this time that strategy deals with the ways military power is used for

the accomplishment of political objectives. War as a component of military power is an instrument of policy while other components are deterrence, armament and disarmament, brinkmanship, show of power, threats, etc. The revolution in military technology in the contemporary era has largely made wars to be unwinnable, thereby motivating different stakeholders in the global community to deepen their efforts to achieve peace without recourse to war. Also, the forces of globalisation have deepened interdependent among states thereby reducing the probability of armed conflicts.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

With relevant examples, discuss how contemporary strategy is different from the strategy of the pre-World War period.

7.0 REFERENCES/ FURTHER READINGS

Beaufre, A. (1965) *An Introduction to Strategy* . London: Faber

Clausewitz, Von, (1908) *'On War'* (translated by Graham, J.J.) reprinted London: Routledge, 1966

Hart, Liddel (1967) *Strategy: The Indirect Approach, London* : Faber, 6th Edition

Herzog, A. (1963) *The War-Peace Establishment*. New York and London: Harper and Row

Morgenthau, H.J. (1956) *Politics among Nations*. New York : Alfred A Knopf

Thompson, K.W. (1960) *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

UNIT 2: STRATEGY, MILITARY AIM AND NATIONAL INTEREST

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

The previous unit has discussed the nature and evolution of the contemporary strategy and the theoretical frameworks that underpinned the subject matter. The unit further elaborated on the concern for peace in contemporary strategic thinking as contrasted with absolute emphasis on war in the old strategy. This unit further examines the relationship between the national interest and strategy as well as the relationship between military aim, national interest and strategy. It should be noted that strategic decisions are not taken in isolation of the overriding policy objectives that are derivable from the national interest. Without policy guidelines to steer the course of strategic thinking, it would definitely become an aimless adventure. This unit intends to examine the interconnectedness between national interest, policy, strategy and military aim.

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Explain the interconnectedness between national interest and strategy
(ii) Recognize the preponderance of policy goals over strategy
(iii) Identify instances where strategy could be used to pursue policy goals

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The National Interest and Strategy

National interest is the sum total objective that a state seeks to promote at any time. Every state, no matter how powerful or weak, has a variety of goals/objectives that it seeks to pursue and the interests define the relationship of such a state with other entities in the international system. The national interests could be divided into three categories namely: (a) vital/core interests; (b) secondary/variable interest; (c) general or complimentary interest (Ojo and Sesay, 2010). The core interest is permanent and conservative. It is not negotiable as the very survival of statehood rests on the core interest of a state. Examples of core interest are the protection of territorial integrity of state; protection of lives and properties of citizens; protection of national institutions and monuments; security within the territory of a state, among others. In the contemporary international politics, core interest may also expand to include the security and protection of allied state/ states within an alliance system from threat or attacks from other states. Article 5 of NATO clearly states that in the case of an attack on a member state of NATO, all other members of the alliance are oblige to come to the aid of the member state under attack.

Strategy as defined earlier is the application of military power to accomplish policy objectives. From this perspective therefore, strategy is deployed for policy objectives, which are largely derived from the national interest of a state. Strategists must therefore be well acquainted with the political problems, which provide the context for strategic thinking. Strategy is subordinate to policy goals and must be guided by the national interest of a state. Thus, strategy is fundamentally concerned about 'means' rather than the 'ends'. The direction of strategy is provided by the policy objectives derivable from the core interest of state. If war as defined by Clausewitz is a 'continuation of political discourse by other means', then it must be guided by the national interest of a state. Nations do not wage war just for adventure sake but in pursuance of political objectives, that are drawn from the national interest of a state. Thus, strategy should be guided by policy goals as defined by the national interest.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Justify the use of military power to pursue the national interest of a state

3.2 Military Aim and Political Objectives

It is important in discussing the relationship between military aim and strategy to be clear about the distinction between the political and the military objectives. The two are different but not separate. The military objective is the means while the political objective is the end to be attained. Settling political objectives are the responsibility of the policy makers and strategists are only interested in how given military resources can be usefully applied for the achievement of policy goals. Strategists are not concerned with policy planning, which is the responsibility of the policy makers; but their job is to harness military power to be used in the pursuit of the national interest. The mandate of the strategists does not extend to determining the content and direction of the national interest. From this analysis therefore, strategy is subordinate to policy and must be directed at all times by the political objectives. Clausewitz's definition of war as a continuation of political discourse by other means readily finds relevance and meaning in this context.

Gaining victory on the battle front is not itself equivalent to gaining the objective of the policy. There is a natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national interest and substitute it with the military aim. In consequence, whenever war has broken out, policy has too often been governed by the military aim and this has been regarded as an end in itself, rather than merely as a means to an end. By losing sight of the proper relationship between the national interest and the military aim, that is, between policy and strategy, the military aim became distorted and over- elaborated.

The military aim according to Clausewitz (1908) is to disarm the enemy. According to Clausewitz:

"If our enemy is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation that is more oppressive to him and the worst condition in which an opponent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If therefore the enemy is to be reduced to submission, he must either be disarmed or be place in such a position that he is threatened with it. From this, it follows that the complete disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare"

If war is a continuation of policy by other means, the political objective as the original motivator of the war should be the standard for determining the aim of the strategy. Settling political goals is the proper business of politicians and strategists are only interested in how military resources are mobilized to attain political objectives. Thus, the subordination of strategy to politics should be a standard practice in warfare and the

determination of policy goals should be the responsibility of politicians. This is to prevent warfare from turning into a pointless violence. Strategists should concentrate on identifying and evaluating the various choices available to states in their use of military power for ends clearly defined by political authority. While politicians must exercise ultimate control over the use of violence, the decisions they arrive at should be moderated by the advice received from strategists. Politicians should involve the strategists who are best qualified to know the implications of pursuing particular policies and are well able to advise the practicability and consequences of certain policies.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Strategy as a means to an end is employed for the attainment of policy goals which are derived from the national interest of the state. The national interest provides the context for strategic thinking. Since policy goals are decided by the politicians in a democracy, they should retain the overall direction of strategy. However, there is risk in completely excluding the strategists from policy discussions, since ultimately; they will carry out the policy decisions taken by the politicians. Thus, there should be continuous dialogue between policy and strategy to achieve the policy goals.

5.0   SUMMARY

Discussion in this unit has largely focused on the relationship between strategy and national interest. It has been pointed out that the national interest provides the policy context in which strategic thinking is taking place. We have also emphasized that as the overall determinant of military aims, policy is superior and strategy is subordinated to policy goals. Therefore policy makers who determine policy goals for strategy should take control of warfare. Military aims should not be seen as ends in itself but rather as a means to accomplish the ends- which is the attainment of policy objectives. We have also emphasized that though strategy is subordinate to policy, strategists who are given the task of mobilizing military resources to achieve policy objectives should not be completely excluded from policy decision making processes.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

If war is a continuation of policy by other means, examine the relationship between policy, strategy and military aims.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Beaufre, A. (1965) *An Introduction to Strategy* . London: Faber

Clausewitz, Von, (1908) *'On War'* (translated by Graham, J.J.) reprinted London: Routledge, 1966

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UNIT 3: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

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3.0   Main Content
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        3.2   Deterrence
        3.3. Overwhelming Force (Powell's Doctrine)
        3.4. Brinkmanship
        3.5. Mutually Assured Destruction
        3.6. Limited War
        3.7. Guerrilla Warfare
        3.8. Massive Retaliation
        3.9.   Preemptive Strike
        3.10. Disarmament and Arms Control

4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Readings

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

The previous units have examined the fundamental issues relating to the nature, evolution, and the theoretical frameworks that underpinned contemporary strategy. We have also examined the relationship between strategy, national interest and the military aim. This unit further examines the basic concept underlying contemporary strategy. As stated earlier, most of the concepts were developed during warfare that has occurred in the post World Wars and the Cold War era.

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Identify the basic concepts that underpinned contemporary strategy
(ii) Explain the interconnectedness between war and basic strategic concepts
(iii) Evaluate the relevance of some of these concepts in the 21st Century

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Containment

Containment refers to the foreign policy strategy of the United States in the early years of the Cold war in which it attempted to stop the *'domino effect'* of states moving politically towards Soviet Union based communism, rather than European-American based capitalism. The concept sprang up from the idea that isolation will lead to stagnation and the policy was first laid out in George Kennan's famous long telegram and was made public in 1947 in his anonymous Foreign Affairs Article '*The Sources of Soviet Conduct'* better known as the *'X Article'*.

Kennan argued that the primary goal of the United States should be to prevent the spread of communism to non-Communist nations; that is, to 'contain' communism within its borders. The Truman Doctrine aimed at this goal and containment was one its key principles and this led to American support for regimes around the world to block the spread of communism. The motivation of containment was the *domino theory*, which held that allowing one regional state to fall to communism would threaten the entire region, similar to a series of dominoes toppling.

Containment further became the overriding objective of US National Security Policy with the NSC approval by President Truman in November, 1948. This document maintained that the Soviet Union was motivated by its ideology to expand its influence throughout the world, and claimed that this expansion of interest was inimical to American security interests. All subsequent American presidents after Truman, both Republican and Democrat, subscribed to the doctrine of Containment as being the focal point of American cold war strategy.

3.2. Deterrence

 The development of weapon of mass destruction coupled with an ever-increasing ability to deliver them quickly and efficiently has ensured that defeating an enemy on the field of battle is no longer a prerequisite for inflicting enormous casualties on his civilian population, disrupting the administrative apparatus of his state, or destroying his industrial wealth. War prevention has, by and large, superseded victory during hostilities as the main objective of the major powers.

Deterrence can be seen as a particular type of social or political relationship in which one party tries to influence the behaviour of another in desired direction. Deterrence involves a particular distinctive type of influence that rests directly and openly upon threats of

sanctions or deprivations. It is basically an attempt by State A to prevent State B from undertaking a course of action which A regards as undesirable by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon B in the event that the action is taken. From this illustration, it is obvious that deterrence is an attempt by State A to influence the intentions and consequently, the actual behaviour, of State B in a particular direction – that of inaction.

There are two forms of deterrence: deterrence by punishment or deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked. Aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer such damage as a result of an aggressive action. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a form of this strategy, which characterized the relations between the defunct Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war. Deterrence by denial is a strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defense and intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralizing or mitigating attacks. Aggressors are thus deterred from attacking, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likely success.

3.3. Overwhelming Force (Powell's Doctrine)

The doctrine simply asserts that when a nation is engaged in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve overwhelming force against the enemy. This may oppose the principle of proportionality. For decades, the US had followed a policy of proportionality: restraint because of fear of escalation but Colin Powell popularized the doctrine of overwhelming force during the Gulf War. According to Powell, 'if you respond proportionately, you allow your opponent to set the limits and level of fighting, you grant him the initiative'. Essentially, the strategy expresses that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target. Then the force to be used should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy. There must also be a strong support for the campaign by the general public; and there should be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged. Before using overwhelming force, certain principles are laid out for consideration:

    (i)   Is a vital national security threatened?
    (ii)   Do we have a clear attainable objective?
    (iii)   Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
    (iv)   Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
    (v)   Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
    (vi)   Is there reasonable expectation that the public and Congress will support the operation ?
    (vii)   Do we have genuine broad international support?

3.4. Brinkmanship

Brinkmanship was developed during the cold war confrontations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It was a practice of pushing a dangerous situation to the brink of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. Brinkmanship occurred in international politics, foreign policy and in military strategy. It involved a threat of using nuclear weapons. This maneuver of pushing a situation to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions. This was observed during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when the world was close to a nuclear confrontation between the US and Soviet Union. Brinkmanship is ostensibly the escalation of threats to achieve one's policy objectives. Eventually, the threats involved might become so huge as to be unmanageable at which points both sides are likely to back down and make concessions. This was the case during the cold war as the escalation of threats of nuclear war was mutually suicidal. The dangers of brinkmanship as a political or diplomatic tool can be understood as a slippery slope, which could become unmanageable resulting into a total disaster. In order for brinkmanship to be effective, the threats used are continuously escalated. However, a threat is not worth anything unless it is credible; at some point. The aggressive party may have to back up their claim to prove their commitment to action. The further the escalation of threats, the greater the chance of the situation sliding out of control into total disaster if the opponent refuses to back down.

3.5. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)

This is a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of Nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of strong weapons is essentially to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the use of the very same weapons. The strategy assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason y the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants' total and assured destruction. It is now assumed generally that nuclear fallout resulting from a large scale nuclear war would bring about worldwide devastation. The primary application of this strategy started during the Cold war in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the two power blocs while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. The doctrine was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second –strike capability.

Proponents of MAD as part of the US and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive (as a functioning state) a full scale nuclear exchange. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial amount in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. This provoked arms race that saw the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems such as nuclear missile silos, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear bombers.

3.6. Limited War

Limited war is a war whose objective is smaller in scope than total defeat of enemy. Since the objective is limited, the means for propagating the war is also limited. Limited war reflects the idea that nations who are enemies today would be better off if they could make peace and trade with one another. This is harder when unlimited war creates massive civilian casualties and destroys the productive infrastructure of a nation. A state fighting a limited war would engage its enemy only within certain defined territory, or may not persuade any other state to take part in the conflict as an ally, or will not seek to use certain weapons at its disposal or destroy a certain type of military infrastructure, such as radar installations.

Limited war strategies were advanced as a response to two quite different pressures. First, it was developed because if deterrence failed, men wanted an alternative to total annihilation and second, it was developed because many believed that the ability to wage limited war enhanced deterrence. Most limited war theorizing has, therefore, to be considered from two distinct perspectives; that of those who are interested in waging wars in a controlled environment and that of those who wish to avoid war altogether.

However, the sift of emphasis away from deterrence towards limited have been criticized from three perspectives. The first argument claimed that ideas of limited war undermined the strategy of deterrence, which had prevented the outbreak of a full blown war between the two superpowers during the cold war (Garnet, 1975:115-116). The second argument against limited war was that ideas about limited war brought war back into the realms of political practicability as argued by Clausewitz (1908). While Clausewitz largely made a reputation for himself by arguing that 'war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means', the nuclear age seemed to have disapproved this if war meant total destruction. Thus if limited war doctrine is accepted and war could be controlled without inevitably leading to destruction, then Clausewitz has been

inevitably rehabilitated (Garnet, 1975:115-116). The final argument against limited war claimed that the strategy of limited war implies a level of rationality on the part of the policy makers, which is quite unrealistic as a degree of control over battlefield may be technically impossible and unrealistic (Garnet, 1975:115-116). It is therefore a risky assumption that policy makers could conduct war as rationally as possible.

3.7. Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is a method of combat in which small groups of combatants attempt to use mobile and surprise tactics (ambushes, raids, surprise attacks, etc) to defeat a foe, often a larger, less mobile army. Typically, the smaller guerrilla army will either use its defensive status to draw its opponent into terrain which is better suited to the former or take advantage of its greater mobility by conducting strategic surprise attacks. Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage and espionage, undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign or local regime, as demonstrated by the Vietnam conflicts. Guerrilla warfare may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrilla fighters may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. Guerrilla tactics are useful in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerrillas. In many cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a large and much better equipped enemy for a long time as demonstrated in Vietnam and Afghanistan during the cold war.

3.8. Massive Retaliation

Massive retaliation, also known as massive response is a military doctrine and nuclear strategy in which a state commits itself to retaliate in much greater force in the event of an attack. Upon an attack by an aggressor, a state would massively retaliate by using a force disproportionate to the size of the attack. The aim of massive retaliation is to deter an adversary from initially attacking. For such a strategy to work, it must be in the public knowledge of all possible aggressors. The adversary must also believe that the state announcing the policy has the ability to maintain second strike capability in the event of an attack. It must also believe that the defending state is willing to go through with the deterrent threat, which would likely involve the use of nuclear weapons on a massive scale. Massive retaliation works on the same principles as MAD, with the important

caveat that even a minor conventional attack on a nuclear scale could result in an all-out nuclear retaliation.

3.9. Preemptive Strike

A preemptive strike is a military strategy designed to prevent, or reduce the impact of an anticipated attack from the enemy. It can also be used to describe any offensive action that is taken to prevent, or reduce the impact of, an anticipated offensive action by another party. These actions can either be physical or non-physical. Substantial opposition against pre-emptive strikes comes from pacifists, countries that have previously been invaded or occupied and countries caught in the cross-fire of the Cold War, many of whom see US-assertion of a 'pre-emptive strike' not as a defensive measure, but an offensive one. Considering preemptive strikes sweeps most diplomatic options off the table. Verifiable intelligence tends to loom large in threat assessment used to justify a first strike. The possibility that a bogus intelligence will be introduced into the formation stream by supporters of the first strike also creates a problem. The rush to war necessitated by supposed immanent attack can be followed by subsequent disclosure and validation that the pretexts were false, or falsified.

3.10. Disarmament and Arms Control

Disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be unilateral or multilateral, general or local, comprehensive or partial; controlled or uncontrolled. Arms control on the other hand is restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use.

Disarmament and arms control are sometimes used synonymously. However, although, they are closely related, there is value in preserving a distinction between them, based on the difference between reduction and restraint. Whereas disarmament always refers to a reduction, under arms control, the increase is consciously restrained.

Arms control is an umbrella term for restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of weapons, especially, weapons of mass destruction. Arms control is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy, which seeks to impose such limitations upon consenting participants through international treaties and agreements, although it may also comprise efforts by a nation or group of nations to enforce limitations upon a non-consenting country.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to further weapons control agreements. The SALT 1 talks

led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement in 1972. The SALT 2 talks started in 1972 leading to agreement in 1979. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the US and Soviet Union in 1987 and ratified in 1988 leading to an agreement to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was signed banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons so also was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1966 banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.

Enforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time. Most agreements rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Usually, when a nation no longer desire to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to simply end their participation in the treaty.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How relevant are the basic contemporary strategic terms in the 21st Century?

4.0   CONCLUSION

Basic contemporary strategic terms were developed during the World War era and the Cold War period. It is thus right to declare that wars have largely been the defining issue in the evolution and development of basic contemporary strategic terms. It is also important to stress that the contemporary period is witnessing peaceful collaborations among states on economic issues rather than the military preoccupation that largely characterized the Cold War period.

5.0   SUMMARY

Discussion in this unit has focused on the examination of the basic contemporary strategic terms and how they evolved and the circumstances under which they could be successfully applied to actualize policy goals. It has been pointed out that the two world wars and the cold war period have provided the context for the evolution and the development of some of the basic strategic concepts. The contemporary era that is witnessing accelerated globalization in economic and political terms has rendered some of these terms irrelevant in international politics.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the relevance and applicability of deterrence in the contemporary era

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UNIT 4: MILITARY POWER

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

The previous unit examined the basic contemporary concepts, their development and the contexts in which they could be utilized and the conditions for their success. This unit further examines the nature of military power and the various arguments for and against the utility of military power in the contemporary era. The concept of military power has undergone different transformations from the pre-Napoleonic era when limited wars were fought under the overall control of the generals to the contemporary era that peace strategy predominately occupies the attention of policy makers.

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Define and discuss the meaning of military power
(ii) Provide a convincing argument to support military power
 (iii) Discuss the major arguments against military power in the contemporary era.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   What is Military Power?

At its simplest definition, military power refers to the capacity to kill, maim, intimidate, subdue and destroy. Although, occasionally, this power may be possessed by individuals and groups within the state as the feudal barons possessed it during the middle ages and as possessed by some non-state actors like the terrorist groups, military power essentially tends to be monopolized by states and used primarily by governments to protect their countries from external aggression and internal subversion.

Military power therefore is the legally sanctioned instrument of violence which governments use in their relations with each other, and when necessary, in an internal security role. Underlying this definition is the assumption that military power is a purposive functioning thing - one of the many instruments in the orchestra of power which states use at an appropriate moment in the pursuit of their respective national interests.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Apart from military power, identify other instruments of state policy in the contemporary period.

3.2. Arguments for Military Power

Military power is regarded as a necessity for state survival, which every state must possess. Military power is one of the many techniques of statecraft, taking its place alongside diplomacy, economic sanctions, and propaganda, among others.

Military power may also be used for defense purpose and foreign policy. In many newly independent states, the armed forces are a powerful instrument of national unity and may be consciously used for that purpose. In many African countries, the discipline and unity which is implied by military training has been used by central government to erode tribal and racial differences, which might disrupt the stability of newly independent states.

Military power is also regarded as part of the essential paraphernalia of statehood without which recognition by the international community would either be denied or incomplete. Military power is a symbol of national prestige, which no self-respecting state can do without. Armed forces join the flag, the national anthem, currency and other symbols as the outward sign of independence and nationhood. In a world of independent sovereign states, which by definition acknowledges no authority higher than themselves and which are in constant and unceasing competition for scarce resources, military power has been an indispensable instrument of the national interest.

In addition, acquisition of military power represents an attempt by statesmen to control as far as possible the dangerous and unpredictable international environment in which they live. Military power is thus an intrinsic part of the fragile international order associated with the international system. It is not easy to see how international relations could be conducted and international order maintained in the total absence of military power.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why is military power intimately associated with state survival?

3.3. Arguments against Military Power

Democratically elected governments always feel uneasy about military power for two reasons. First, the acquisition is very expensive and may be opposed by electorate and secondly, military power has inherent threat to democratic values.

It has also been argued that the most militarily powerful states are not always the most politically successful. Military preponderance cannot always be translated into political victory automatically and this is buttressed by the uselessness of weapons of mass destruction for all practical purpose. The extension of the argument is that in an ideological quarrel, military power is inappropriate because ideas cannot be defeated by force of arms. For example, the ideological struggle between the West and East ended not by military power but because of internal contradictions within communism itself.

Also, in the contemporary era, military power is not the most dominant instrument of modern statecraft. Today, the goals of state are much more intangible like for example, improving trade relations, securing markets, gaining political friends, and in pursuit of these objectives, military power is at best irrelevant.

The destructiveness of modern weapons has also made military power not the first option in contemporary conflicts

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the relevance of military power in contemporary international politics

4.0   CONCLUSION

Although the changing nature of contemporary politics has altered the ways military power could be deployed, military power is still very relevant as an important tool for statecraft. The survival of a state is very much depends on the maintenance of security and peace within its borders and this could best be achieved with military power. Military power despite its destructive potential could still be used without necessarily resorting to war. In negotiation, military power could provide a backup for negotiation from a position of strength.

5.0 SUMMARY

The unit has tried to explain the nature of military power as well as various arguments in support of military power and against military power. It has been recognized that military power is essential symbol of statehood, which is associated with sovereignty, independence, and nationhood. In spite of the opposition of pacifist to the acquisition of military power, states will continue to make their armaments relevant, to confront the uncertainties of the international system

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Critically exam the peaceful ways that military power could be utilized to confront the challenges of the 21st Century.

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UNIT 5: STRATEGIC CONFIGURATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ORDER

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
      3.1   Strategic Configuration in the Cold War Order
      3.2   Strategic Configuration in the post-Cold War Order
      3.3.   The Challenges of a multipolar post-Cold War Order

4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Readings

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

We have examined the nature of military power and the various arguments in support and against the utility of military power in the contemporary era. The unit concluded by examining the circumstances in which military power is still relevant in the contemporary era. This unit will examine the strategic configuration of the post cold war order and the new challenges that arose as a result of the dynamics of the demise of communism and the end of bipolarity

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i)   Describe the strategic configuration of the post cold war order
(ii)   Compare the configuration of the post cold war with that of the cold war order
(iii) Identify the various challenges of the post cold war order.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Strategic Configuration of the Cold War Order

The Cold War was a period of ideological confrontation between the capitalism and communism. It was a period of intense struggles for global domination between the two opposing ideologies. Although the two super powers avoided direct armed confrontation

throughout the period, there were proxy wars fought through their allies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. During the cold war, there were two major ideological camps represented by the Capitalist West led by the United States of America and the Communist East, led by the defunct Soviet Union.

Throughout the cold war, the strategic configuration was bipolar as there were only two super powers and two dominant ideologies confronting each other. The period also witnessed the formulation of two military/ideological alliances in form of NATO and WARSAW Pact. The cold war period was marked by global tension, intense competitions, conflicts, armed race and proxy wars throughout the world. It was a period in which the threat of a nuclear war escalated to the highest level since the end of the Second World War. The Cold War started in 1945 and dominated international politics until 1989/1990, when it was officially declared ended. It was a period in which the activities and functions of the United Nations were frustrated largely due to uncooperative attitude of the two opposing super powers

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Identify and discuss the distinctive characteristics of the Cold War Order.

3.2. Strategic Configuration of the Post Cold War Order

The end of the cold war liberated both the US and the Soviet Union from the ideological rivalry that had extracted enormous resources and reduced their economic strength relative to other ascending great powers such as China, Germany, and Japan (Lebow and Stein, 1994). The end of the East-West rivalry left the world facing unfamiliar circumstances. No longer was there a 'clear and present danger to delineate the purpose of power and this basic shift invalidated the framework for much of the thought and action about international affairs in East and West since World War 11 (Oberdorfer, 1991).

While the distribution of power in the Cold War system was bipolar, the post – Cold War era initially indicated a different structure. The collapse of Soviet Union and the dismantling of the WARSAW Pact produced a new unipolar structure. In the early 1991, when it victoriously fought the Gulf War, the US basking in the euphoria of victory pronounced a 'new world order'. However, subsequent events in the post cold war order are pointing in the direction of multipolarity. The long term trajectories of history is however, pointing in the direction of a world in which China and perhaps, other great powers, will rapidly rise to challenge U.S financial and military clout in international

politics. Even, if the U.S. military strength remains unchallenged in the short run, China, Japan and other emerging states are growing in economic power relative to the US and this suggests that the pecking order of the world's countries is likely to look very different by the year 2020.

The U.S. Secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger declared in 1989 that 'we are now moving into a world in which power and influence are diffused among a multiplicity of states – a multipolar world'. A multipolar sytem of relatively equal powers, similar to the classical European balance of power system may indeed best describe the emerging distribution of powers in the post cold war order. Such a multipolar system is likely to consist of the United States, European Union, China, Japan, India, Germany and Russia.

The rise of China is definitely one of the great dramas of the 21st Century. China's extra ordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia and future decades will see greater increases in Chinese power and influence. The drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's most populous country emerges not from within but outside the established post – World War 11 international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendancy of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order (Ikenberry, 2008).

Chine is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power. The size of its economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s and, by some estimates, will double again over the next decade. It has become one of the world's major manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the global supply of iron,steel, and coal. It has accumulated massive foreign reserves, worth more than $1 trillion at the end of 2006. China's military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, and its economic diplomacy has extended its reach not just in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Indeed, whereas, the Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is emerging as both a military and an economic rival – heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power (Ikenberry, 2008).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Describe the strategic configuration of the post-Cold War Order

3.3. The Challenges of a Multipolar post-Cold War Order

The end of the cold war has altered the strategic configuration of the international system in diverse and profound ways. It held out the promise of international peace but, at the same time, raised the specter of new kinds of global instability. As President George Bush lamented in November, 1991, "the collapse of communism has thrown open a Pandora's Box of ancient ethnic hatreds, resentment, even revenge". The peaceful end of the Cold War did not translate automatically to global peace nor promised a peaceful future, but on the contrary, the insights of long-circle and realist theories predict pessimistically that prevailing trends in the diffusion of economic power will lead to renewed competition, conflict, and perhaps, even warfare among the great powers, and that the range of new problems and potential threats will multiply. Samuel Huntington also predicts a 'clash of civilization' as opposed to the optimistic 'end of history' thesis of Francis Fukuyama. In his thesis, Huntington (1996) predicts that conflicts will recur endlessly, with a civilisation confrontation replacing the ideological one unlike Fukuyama, who envisaged the unification of international society in accordance with the Western ideological values of liberalism (Fukuyama, 1992).

If a truly multipolar world develops, it is difficult to foresee how each great power's relationship with the others will evolve. Realignments – sometimes rapid are to be expected. With the probable expansion of the number of great powers to as many as five, realist theorists predict that rivalry will likely intensify as each jockeys for privilege, position and power.

A global order consisting of five or more independent and approximately equal centers of power will create an enlarged global chessboard of multiple bilateral geostrategic relationships. Such a congested landscape will be fraught with potential for conflict and confusion about the identity of friends and foes. As previously argued, when power has been relatively evenly distributed in the past, each player has been assertive, independent, and competitive; diplomacy has displayed a non-ideological chess-like character; and conflict has been intense as each contender has feared the power if its rivals.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the potentialities for conflicts in a multipolar global order.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War international order is gradually taking the shape of a multi-polar world with the emergence of regional powers and centres of influence around the world. The rise of China and the growing influence of the emerging powers like Brazil, India, South Korea, Germany and Russia without doubt would influence the shape of international politics. In addition, rather than heralding the end of history as predicted by Fukuyama, a subtle ideological conflict is also emerging with the rise of global terrorism in confrontation with the dominant western values.

5.0   SUMMARY

We have examined the profound changes occasioned by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a 'new world order' in which power and influence are relatively distributed among centers of power across the world. The rise of China and other emerging powers is increasing challenging the dominant influence of the U.S. in the post Cold War order. We have also examined how stability and control are difficult to maintain in a multipolar world in which potentials for conflicts are multiplied. While the strategic configuration of the current era is pointing in the direction of a multipolar world, we must also state that it is an 'emerging' order that has not taken a permanent shape but still evolving.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Critically examine the strategic configuration of the post Cold War and its implications for global peace

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MODULE 2:   MODERN WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

Module 1 provides a general overview of the nature of contemporary strategy, the complexities and changing trends of strategy, especially contemporary strategy in the 21st Century, the interactions between strategy, national interest and military aim, military power and contemporary strategy and the nature of strategic configuration in the post cold war order

This module, which is made up of five units, focuses on War. The Module examines the nature, causes, and the legal framework guiding the conduct of War. Finally, the Module examines the utility of War as policy instrument in the contemporary politics.

Unit 1   What is War?
Unit 2   Causes of War
Unit 3   Types of War
Unit 4   The Laws of War
Unit 5   War as Policy Instrument in Contemporary Strategy

UNIT 1:   WHAT IS WAR?

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

This is the first among the five units that constitute the module. As an introduction, the unit examines the meaning of War and the changing context of armed conflicts in the 21st Century. Discussions in this unit take a broad over-view of conceptual clarifications of War, regardless of the context, in which armed conflict is taking place. Discussions in this unit provide the background for subsequent exploration of other substantive issues relating to the question of War.

2.0.   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Define the concept of 'War' either in your own words or by adapting various
     definitions drawn from various authors.
(ii) Explain the changing context of armed conflicts in the 21st Century

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Nature of War

Philosophically, examining the nature of war begins with very general questions: What is war? How can it be defined? What causes war? Is it ever right to wage war? What is the relationship between politics and war?

Different perspectives abound about the meaning of 'War'. From the ordinary usage on daily basis, War to many people could simply imply a 'confrontation' or 'struggles'. War

is a state of widespread conflicts between states, organizations, or relatively large groups of people, which is characterized by the use of lethal violence between combatants or upon civilians. War is contrasted with peace, which is usually defined as the absence of war. A common perception of war is a series of military campaigns between at least two opposing sides involving a dispute over sovereignty, territory, resources, religion or a host of other issues. For General Von Clausewitz (1908), 'War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will; thus, it is continuation of politics by other means'. Sun Tzu also described the art of war as 'of vital importance to state and a matter of life and death, a road to either safety or to ruin; hence it is a subject of inquiry which on no account can be neglected'.

The notion that wars only involve states as Clausewitz defines it implies a strong political theory that assumes politics can only involve states and that war is in some manner or form a reflection of political activity. However, war as defined by Webster's Dictionary is a state of open and declared hostile armed conflict between states or nations, or a period of such conflict. This definition captures a particularly political-rationalistic account of war and warfare. The Oxford Dictionary expands the definition of war to include "any active hostility or struggle between living beings; a conflict between opposing forces or principles. This definition avoids the narrowness of a political-rationalist conception by admitting the possibility of metaphorical, non-violent clashes between systems of thought, such as of religious doctrine or of trading companies.

The political issue of defining war poses a philosophical problem, but once that is acknowledged, a definition that captures the clash of arms, the state of mutual tension and threat of violence between groups, the authorized declaration by a sovereign body, among others, can be drawn upon to distinguish wars from riots and rebellions, collective violence from personal violence, metaphorical clashes of values from actual or threatened clashes of arms.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Identify the distinguish characteristics of War as opposed to collective violence

3.2. The Changing Context of War in the 21ˢᵗ Century

The realists are quick to emphasis the limitations of international laws and multilateral organizations in resolving conflicts in anarchical environments. They are also pessimistic about human nature's prospect for working in harmony with peaceful interests. The realists thus shared the Hobesian notion of human nature, which is seen as inherently

destructive, selfish, competitive, aggressive and stubborn. Conflict is regarded as an inescapable condition of international life and the realists are not much given to moralizing about international politics.

Armed conflicts have changed over the course of human history in response to innovations in military technology and their dispersion throughout the world. In the 21st Century, increasingly destructive modern weaponry has transformed contemporary warfare in major ways:

Although, the duration of interstate wars steadily increased between 1816 and World War 11, wars have been shorter since 1945. Presumably, the capacity to inflict massive destruction has brought many armed conflicts between countries to a sooner end. The average number of countries involved in major wars has fallen sharply since World War 11. Armed conflicts have become increasingly concentrated geographically and now usually involve the less developed countries. Large-scale armed conflicts involving many participants have become less frequent, reversing the historic pattern that characterized the 19th Century. The goals of many states have changed since previous centuries about waging wars, perhaps, as a consequence of the destructiveness of wars, their financial costs and security danger. Also a war for territorial acquisition is no longer the norm in the contemporary era.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the changing contexts of armed conflicts in the post World War order

4.0   CONCLUSION

In the development of strategic thinking, war has been very influential. There are different school of thoughts in the definition of war. These schools are from political-rationalist and metaphorical perspectives. However, essential characteristics of war from a strategic viewpoint are armed confrontations between opposing groups, widespread violence and tension, declaration by authorized authority, among others.

It is however important to emphasise that despite the preponderance of war in the 19th Century, the character of armed conflicts has been transformed greatly in the present era and the focus of strategic is on security and peaceful application of military power towards the attainment of policy objectives.

5.0   SUMMARY

Discussions in this unit have focused primarily on the nature of war from different philosophical perspectives. The changing context of armed conflict since the end of the Second World War in which the forces of globalisation and technological revolution have reduced the incidence of armed conflicts among states were also examined.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Examine how the forces of globalisation and revolution in military technology have changed the context of armed conflicts in the 21st Century.

7.0   REFERENCES/ FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 2: CAUSES OF WAR

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

The previous unit has discussed the nature of war from different theoretical/philosophical perspectives, the evolution of war as instrument of policy and the changing context of armed conflict in the 21st Century. The unit continues with the discussion of war by examining the causes of armed confrontations among states from three different levels of analysis. .

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Explain the causes of war from the individual/human level of analysis
(ii) Identify the causes of war from the national level of analysis
(iii) Interlink the relationship between armed conflicts and prevailing global system

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Individual/Human Level of Analysis

The repeated outbreak of war has led some psychologist, such as Sigmund Freud (1968), to conclude that that aggression is an instinctive part of human nature that stems from humans' genetic programming and psychological make-up. Also, ethnologists such as Lorenz (1963) similarly argued that human kind is one of the few species practicing intra-specific aggression, in comparison with most other species, which practice inter-specific

aggression. The realists also affirmed that the drive for power is innate and cannot be eliminated. They therefore accept the conclusion suggested by Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection: that is, life entails a struggle for survival of the fittest, and natural selection eliminates the traits that interfere with successful completion.

Although, the nature-nurture controversy regarding the biological bases of aggression has not been resolved, most social scientists now strongly disagree with this realist premise and conclude that war is a learned trait, part of mankind 's cultural heritage rather than its biological nature. Ted Robert Gurr (1970) expresses the thesis supported by behavioural research that 'aggression is a propensity acquired early in life as a result of socialization, and therefore is a learned rather than biologically determined behaviour.

The argument that national character also predisposes a nation to war as argued by some psychologists, have also been questioned by behavioural scientists. National character can express itself in various ways and can also change. Sweden and Switzerland have managed conflict without recourse to war since 1809 and 1815, respectively, whereas former, they were aggressive. This suggests that violence is not an inborn characteristic of particular peoples that predestines periodic outbreaks of aggression.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How relevant is the psychological assertion that aggression is innate and genetically programmed to provoke violence and war?

3.2 The State/National Level of Analysis

Conventional wisdom holds that variations in states' governments, sizes, ideologies, geographical locations, population dynamics, ethnic homogeneity, wealth, economic performance, military capabilities and level of educational attainment influence whether they will engage in war. Implicit in the state level of analysis is the assumption that differences in the types or classes of states will determine whether they will engage in war. Some of the possible causes of war at the state's level are duration of independence in which new states are seen to be more prone to conflicts as they typically pass through a period of internal political upheavals. Also, poverty, militarization, economic system, type of governments, and nationalism is also some of the internal factors that could provoke armed conflicts.

3.3. The Systemic Level of Analysis

Classical realism emphasizes that the roots of armed conflict rest with human nature. In contrast, neo-realism sees war springing from changes at the global level of analysis, that is, as a product of the decentralized character of the international system that requires sovereign states to rely on self-help for their security. The nature of the international system at any point would also affect the ways states act within the system. For example. In the Cold War period, international system then was competitive and conflictual and this provoked numerous conflicts among states

4.0   CONCLUSION

We have seen that a singular explanation is insufficient to provide explanations to the question of war and its causes. The social-psychological, national pressures and systemic setting for decision making may 'exert an influence independent of the actions and beliefs of individual policymakers. The decisions for war are better explained then, not by individual leader's aggressiveness or by aggressive national character, but by the many political pressures that influence government leaders who 'ultimately decide the great questions of war and peace.

5.0   SUMMARY

Discussion in this unit has largely focused on the causes of war from three perspectives. The individual/human level of analysis which blamed human's genetical makeup and the national character were explored. Similarly, the systemic level was also explored. From the three level of analyses, it is clear that war is a combination of different factors within the individual, state and systemic level of analysis.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

The decisions for war are better explained then, not by individual leader's aggressiveness or by aggressive national character, but by the many political pressures that influence government leaders who 'ultimately decide the great questions of war and peace. **Discuss**

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UNIT 3 : TYPES OF WAR

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

This unit continues with the discussion of war by examining the two main types of war in the international system. We should also clarify that wars could occur between two or more independent states; there could also be civil wars within the state and also war between state and extremist groups like war against terrorism.   Generally, wars are classified into two categories – limited war and total war.

Throughout military history, America has engaged in both limited and unlimited warfare. The Cold War saw the United States pursuing limited objectives rather than the complete destruction of an adversary. The threat of great power conflict and nuclear annihilation frequently had a restraining effect on local conflicts. In the post-Cold War period, the United States returned to unlimited warfare in regional interventions. Military operations and diplomatic pressure are used to overthrow target regimes. But political and strategic failures, fiscal constraints, and the growing military power of other states are prompting a return to limited war. Successful prosecution of limited wars, however, is contingent on a sound understanding of their strategic and operational characteristics.

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Identify the categories of war
(ii) Explain the circumstances under which different wars could occur
(iii) List the conditions for the successful prosecution of each category of war

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1. Limited War

Limited war does not climax in the political annihilation of an opponent. It seeks lesser objectives, such as territory or a shift in political behavior. It is true that limited war still involves enemies and enmity, and certainly it also has become much less genteel since the age of 18th century maneuver. Furthermore, limited war should not be mistaken as an alternative form of warfare. War has truly one nature, and its character in any given conflict is predominately determined by its political object.

Limited war also is not distinguished by limited *means*. The means employed to gain the object only loosely correlate with war aims. Decisive operations have enabled limited aims and economy of force operations are often utilized for wars with expansive objectives. The Gulf War was a limited conflict contingent on the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, yet it required a powerful combined-arms ground campaign and a massive air war. In contrast, the United States did not take on the hard work of ground combat in Afghanistan in 2001 or slug it out with Muammar Gaddafi's forces in Libya in 2011. Yet despite the limited character of the means Washington was willing to devote to those conflicts, their objects were the overthrow of adversary regimes.

Policy and strategy in limited war must be genuinely *limited*. Disaster frequently awaits those who wage unlimited war with limited resources. While some military forces have undoubtedly achieved favorable operational outcomes under quantitative disadvantages, the margin of superiority needed to make the impossible possible is often exceptional. The Anglo-American joint operation to overthrow the Iranian government in 1953 was a masterpiece of political subversion, but also would not have been possible if it were not for fortuitous local dynamics and a good helping of luck.

Similarly, the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 rested mostly on Afghan military land power supported by Western standoff firepower. Policymakers should consider what is possible to achieve through the use of force before committing land, sea, or air forces. Objectives should be as specific as possible—phrases such as "teaching a lesson" or "defending the international system" should be banished from the political-military lexicon. A truly limited objective can also be abandoned or altered in response to new strategic circumstances, and a war is certainly not limited if it entraps one or both combatants into a new commitment. When the United States committed itself to containing Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the Gulf War, it was in fact committing itself to his overthrow. The total character of the sanctions and American policymakers' casting

of his regime as fundamentally illegitimate helped commit the US to a set of circumstances in which US pressure could only be relieved with Hussein's overthrow.

The success of limited war also depends very much on the nature of the adversary. A "real enemy" that considers war to be politics by other means is capable of settling for less than political annihilation. However, an absolute enemy that sees politics as *war by other means* will only cease to be a major security threat after it is no longer a strategically cohesive force. What distinguishes a run-of-the mill tyrant from a Hitler is the totalizing character of the latter's strategic ambitions. There also are important differences between a local group of partisans animated by local concerns and an international revolutionary organization that fights for abstract goals. The local fighter ceases to be a military concern after disengagement from a distinct area of operations. The international revolutionary considers the globe his battlefield. Embarking on limited war when the adversary seeks to wage a total war is a classic strategic mistake that should be avoided at all costs.

3.2. Total War

Total war is a war in which a belligerent engages in the complete mobilization of fully available resources and population. In the mid-19th century, "total war" was identified by scholars as a separate class of warfare. In a total war, there is less differentiation between combatants and civilians than in other conflicts, and sometimes no such differentiation at all, as nearly every human resource, civilians and soldiers alike, can be considered to be part of the belligerent effort.

Total war played a major part in conflicts from the French Revolutionary Wars to World War II, but has been replaced in the modern era by cheaper, quicker and more effective policies including guerrilla warfare and the adoption of weapons of mass destruction

Warfare with unlimited goals ends in the destruction of an adversary as a political entity. Destruction need not be total in material character, as regimes have been overthrown without substantial bloodshed. But unlimited war, if prosecuted to its natural extremes, ends with the fall of a given political order and the creation of a new reality. While all war is to some extent characterized by ill intent, unlimited war always involves the escalation of an adversary to an absolute enemy. Such a total enemy is portrayed as dangerous, illegitimate, and criminal. The only remedy for such a foe is political annihilation. Political destruction of an adversary can completely remove a threat. Rome's destruction of Carthage removed an important challenger to its dominance, and

the destruction of the Third Reich put a lethal close to nearly century-long threat of a militarily powerful German state. But the end of one absolute enemy sometimes also creates new security threats or leaves the ground open for otherwise unwelcome shifts in the strategic balance. The destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime removed Iran's greatest enemy and created an opportunity to direct Tehran's military planning and covert subversion elsewhere.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

To what extent would you agree with the view that the categorisation of war depends on the means of propagation and the objectives at stake in the conflict.

4.0. CONCLUSION

Limited means rather than ends often characterize what many policymakers view as "limited war." Such categorical confusion only ensures that operations are waged without the resources necessarily to achieve success and larger entrapment in more expansive commitments than policymakers might have necessarily bargained on. Truly "limited" war can only be possible with limited aims and a sound understanding of the dynamics of war under political constraint. The subordination of strategy to policy goals would therefore be effective in defining the character of armed conflicts into a total or limited wars.

5.0. SUMMARY

All armed confrontations could be categorised according to the means and ends being pursued into limited and total conflicts. The unit has identified the circumstances under which limited and total wars could be prosecuted in the present era. We have also categorised some of the wars fought in our contemporary era into both total and limited wars. It has also been noted that total war is now the exception, rather than the rule because of the destructive capability of weapons of mass destruction.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Identify the risks associated with waging limited and unlimited wars.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 4: THE LAWS OF WAR

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

This Unit will examine the legal provisions regulating the conduct of warfare. Discussions in this unit is structured around three themes – legal provision for the establishment of National Armed Forces; International Conventions regulating the conduct of warfare; and the principles of the Just War Theory. It is important to state that though warfare indicates violence and ruthlessness to subdue an opponent, there are limits to excesses either on the battlefield or aftermath the war and these provisions are recognised internationally with provisions of sanctions to defaulters.   The outbreak of war does not in any way grants permission to trample on the basic human rights of opponents neither does it confer approval to use inappropriate weapons for the conduct of war. These issues are fully examined in this Unit.

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Identify the legal provisions for the operation of the Nigeria armed forces
(ii) Recognise the major International Treaties for the regulation of warfare
(iii) Evaluate the relevance of the Just War Theory to the contemporary warfare

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1. Legal Provision for the Nigeria Armed Forces

The legal provisions for the establishment and operational control of the Nigeria Armed Forces were set forth under Chapter VI, Part 111, Paragraph 217 of the Amended

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011. The functions listed for the armed forces are listed in paragraph 217 (2) as follows:

(i) Defending Nigeria from external aggressions;

(ii) Maintaining Nigeria's territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;

(iii) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president

Section 218 (1) also vested the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces on the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation. The powers to appoint the service chiefs for the federation were also vested on the President by Section 218 (2). The armed forces, established by the Act of the National Assembly, have all its operational control and regulatory powers subject to the Act of the National Assembly. All the operational, regulatory and legal control of the Nigeria armed forces is established under Section 217 to 220 of Section VI of the Amended Constitution of 2011.

3.2. International Conventions on the Conduct of War

3.2.1 - 1925 Geneval Protocol

The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, usually called the Geneval Protocol is a treaty prohibiting the first use of chemical and biological weapons. It was signed at Geneval on June 17, 1925 and entered into force on February 8, 1928. The Protocol prohibits the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons, but has nothing to say about production, storage or transfer. A number of countries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneval Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying to other parties and that these obligations would cease to apply if the prohibited weapons were used against them.

3.2.2. The 1949 Geneval Conventions and their Additional Protocols

The Geneval Conventions and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilian, medics, aid workers, etc) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick, and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war). The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent or put an end to all breaches. Those responsible for breaches must be sought, tried, or extradited, whatever nationality

they may hold. The First Geneval Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war. It also provides for medical and religious personnel, medical units and medical transports. The Second Geneval Convention protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war. This Convention closely follows the provisions of the first Geneval Convention in structure and content. The Third Geneval Convention applies to prisoners of war. This Convention replaces the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. It contains 143 articles. The categories of persons entitled to prisoners of war status were broadened in accordance with Conventions 1 and 11. The Convention establishes the principle that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The Fourth Geneval Convention affords protection to civilians, including in occupied territory. The Convention adopted in 1949 deals with the status and treatment of protected persons, distinguishing between the situation of foreigners on the territory of one of the parties to the conflict and that of civilians in occupied territory. The Convention spells out the obligations of the Occupying Power vis-a-vis the civilian population and contains detailed provisions on humanitarian relief for population in occupied territory.

3.3. The Just War Theory

The Just War Theory is probably the most influential perspectives on the ethics of war and peace. The Just War tradition has enjoyed a long and distinguished pedigree, developed in the middle ages and largely influenced by philosophers like St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Vattel and Vitoria. While in its origin, many credited St Augustine with the founding of the theory, however, the theory is a synthesis of classical Greco-Roman, as well as Christian values. Many of the rules of the Just War Theory have since been codified into contemporary international laws governing armed conflicts, such as The United Nations Charter and the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The tradition has thus been influential, dominating both moral and legal discourse surrounding war. The Just War Theory attempts to define conditions and situations in which the killing of others becomes a moral obligation. The main concerns of Just War theory are the protection of innocents, the creation of rules which can minimize deaths and the waging of wars within defined rules. A Just War therefore is not merely defined by purely utilitarian criteria, but also by their means, principles and virtues.

The Just War Theory can be meaningfully divided into three parts. These parts are (1) Jus Ad Bellum, which concerns the justice of resorting to war in the first place; (2) Jus in Bello, which concerns the justice of conduct within war, after it has begun; and (3) Jus

Post Bellum, which concerns the justice of peace agreements and the termination phase of war.

The rules of Jus Ad Bellum are addressed first and foremost to heads of state. Since political leaders are the ones who inaugurate wars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be held accountable to Jus ad Bellum principles. If they fail in that responsibility, then they commit war crimes. Just War Theory contends that for any resort to war to be justified, a political community, or state must fulfil each and every one of the following six requirements.

Just Cause - Force may be used only to correct a grave public evil (e.g, a massive violation of the basic rights of whole populations) or in defence

 Comparative Justice -- While there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to override the presumption against the use of force , the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other

Legitimate Authority - Only duly constituted public authority may use deadly force or wage war

 Right Intention - Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose. Correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention while material gain is not

 Probability of Success - Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success

Proportionality --   The overall destruction expected from the use of force must be outweighed by the good to be achieved

Last Resort ---   Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted

Jus in Bello refers to justice in war, to right conduct in the midst of battle. Responsibility for state adherence to Jus in Bello principles falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of a particular state. They are to be held responsible for any breach of the principles which follow bellow:

Obey all international laws on weapons prohibition – chemical and biological weapons, in particular, are forbidden by many treaties.

Just War should be governed by the principle of discrimination. The acts of war should be directed towards the inflictors of the wrong, and not towards civilians caught in

circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military target and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against ordinary civilians.

Just War conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. The force used must be proportional to the wrong endured, and to the possible good that may come. The more disproportional the number of collateral civilian deaths, the more suspect will be the sincerity of a belligerent nation's claim to justness of a war it initiated.

Just War conduct should be governed by the principle of minimum force; torture of combatants or non-combatants is forbidden and prisoners of war must be treated with respect.

Jus Post Bellum refers to justice during the third and final stage of war: that of war termination. It seeks to regulate the ending of wars, and to ease the transition from war back to peace. The principles of Jus Post Bellum are set below:

Proportionality and Publicity – the peace settlement should be measured and reasonable as well as publicly proclaimed

Rights Vindication - the peace settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty

Discrimination -- Distinction needs to be made between leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated territory one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post war measures

Compensation – financial restitutions may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination

Rehabilitation -- the post-war environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How a 'just war' should should be conducted according to the principles of *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jut in Bello'*

4.0. CONCLUSION

The laws of war make provisions to guide decision-makers on the appropriateness of their conduct during the resort to war, conduct during the war and the termination phase of the conflict. Its over-all aim is to try and ensure that wars are begun only for a very narrow set of truly defensible reasons, that when wars break out, they are fought in a responsibly controlled and targeted manner, and that the parties to the dispute bring their war to an end in a speedy and responsible fashion that respects the requirements of justice.

5.0.   SUMMARY

We have examined the legal provisions guiding the conduct of armed conflicts in the contemporary international system. The provisions for the establishment and regulation of the armed forces are established by the Act of the National Assembly while there are many international laws that regulate the conduct of war. We have examined the various provisions of the Geneval Convention and Geneval Protocols

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Provide justification for the global war against terrorism as a just war

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 5: WAR AS POLICY INSTRUMENT IN CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

In the previous units, we have examined the relationship between strategy, policy and military aim and it was established that policy takes precedence over strategy and we also established that without the overriding policy framework, strategy becomes an aimless adventure. The discussion under military power also established the utilitarian purpose of military power as policy instrument to attain policy goals. This unit will establish three specific case studies where military power (war) was used to pursue policy goals

2.0. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Provide relevant examples of the deployment of military power to pursue policy goals
(ii) Identify the underline circumstances where military power could be utilized to pursue policy goals.
 (iii) Evaluate the consequences of military   power on the foreign policy goals that were pursued.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1. ECOMOG Operations in West Africa

The Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was a West African multilateral armed force established by ECOWAS. ECOMOG was a formal arrangement for separate armies to work together. Its backbone was Nigerian armed forces and financial resources, with sub- battalion strengths units contributed by other

ECOWAS members- Ghana, Guinea, Sierra-Leone, The Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and others.

Anglophone ECOWAS members established ECOMOG in 1990 to intervene in the civil war in Liberia (1989-1996). The arguments used to establish ECOMOG had more solid grounds in politics than in law. The Defence Protocol's guidelines were not followed, and ECOMOG was justified largely on humanitarian grounds. Within Africa, ECOMOG represented the first credible attempt at a regional security initiative since the defunct OAU tried to establish an 'Inter-African Force' to intervene in Chad in 1981.

ECOMOG successfully restored an atmosphere that permitted the reinstatement of a functional state structure in Liberia. It also engaged in the process of re-establishing the authority of the democratic order and ending a nine-year savage civil war in the Republic of Sierra-Leone, Liberia again and Guinea Bissau.

3.2. American's Operations in Iraq

The Persian Gulf War codenamed 'Operation Desert Storm' (January 17, 1991 - 28 February, 1991) commonly referred to simply as the Gulf War, was a war waged by a UN-authorized coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States, against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq troops was met with international condemnation, and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. United States President Bush deployed American forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the coalition and the initial operation to expel Iraq from Kuwait started with an aerial bombardment on 17 January, 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 23 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraq territory. The coalition ceased their advance and declared a ceasefire 100 hours after the ground campaign started.

The Second Iraq War or Operation Iraqi Freedom involved a combined troops from the U.S., the UK, Australia, Poland and others who invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of Saddam Husein . According to President George Bush of the US and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the coalition mission 'was to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism and to free the Iraqi people. The invasion met with little resistance and Baghdad was occupied and the government of Hussein collapsed.

3.3. The U.S. Invasion of Panama

The United States invasion of Panama codenamed 'Operation Just Cause' was the invasion of Panama by the U.S. in December, 1989 during the administration of US President George Bush (snr). During the invasion, the de facto Panamanian leader, general and dictator, Manuel Noriega was deposed and the Panamanian Defense Force dissolved. The U.S official justification for the invasion was articulated on the morning of December 20, 1989 a few hours after the start of the operation.   The reasons for the invasion were listed as 'to safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens in Panama; defend democracy and human rights in Panama; combating drug trafficking and protecting the integrity of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. Although Noriega remained at large for several days, he was hunted massively and with few options left for him, he took refuge inside the Vatican diplomatic mission in Panama City. But, in the face of U.S. psychological pressure on him though the 'rock and roll music', he surrendered and was taken to the U.S to face trial.
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SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Using the ECOMOG operation as a case study, evaluate the use of military power (war) as an instrument of foreign policy

4.0. CONCLUSION

The three case studies examined in this Unit have shown the potency of military power as an instrument of foreign policy. It was clear from the case studies that without the deployment of military power, other policy instruments would have proved ineffective in achieving the policy goals at stake in those contexts.

5.0.   SUMMARY

The case studies examined were used to illustrate Clausewitz's definition of war as a 'continuation of political discourse by other means'. No other means could have been successful without the deployment of military power in Liberia, Sierra-Leone and in Iraq to salvage an impending humanitarian disaster. We have also shown that the deployment of military power were the last resort after every other peaceful means of conflict resolution had been explored without success.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Under what conditions military power could be used successfully as instrument of state power?

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MODULE 3: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

Technology is recognized as an important but elusive factor in modern warfare. In single battles and campaigns, the technological prowess of opposing forces has been a crucial determinant of victory or defeat, while in the longer term; technology has been seen by military historians to fit cyclical patterns of offensive and defensive ascendancy. Of all the components of state power, military capability is usually thought to be the most important. Realists regard it as the central elements in states' power potential. By shaping the tactics and strategy best suited to the exercise of military force, technology has profoundly affected international politics: by setting limits on armed forces capabilities to seize or defend territory and to undertake other operations, it has moulded political intentions and expectations.

This module, which is made up of five units, focuses on the revolution in military technology and its impact on weapons development, the challenges of technology for strategy and how the revolution in technology is changing the character of the 21st century warfare.

Unit 1   Modern Developments in Weapons Technology
Unit 2   Impacts of Weapon Technology on the 21st Century Warfare
Unit 3   The Nature of Nuclear Weapons and their Effects
Unit 4   Global Efforts to Control Weapons of Mass Destruction
Unit 5   The Military Industrial Complex

UNIT 1: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

For modern industrialised states in the twenty first century, military technology has played an even more vital role in the use and organisation of armed forces; as in other spheres, constant and rapid exploitation and substitution of new technologies have yielded order-of magnitude improvements in capabilities. The most striking development in the post cold war era has been the development and refinement of fission and fusion weapons, whose firepower has shaken traditional assumptions about warfare and placed a new emphasis on the mechanisms of deterrence. Beneath the nuclear threshold, however, developments in conventional weapons have been almost equally dramatic.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Explain the interconnection between technology and new developments in military technology
(ii) Identify the components of the revolution in military technology
(iii) Identify new developments in weapons technology

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Nature of Revolution in Military Technology

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Military-technical Revolution (MTR) are the concepts used to describe the impact of technology on the military revolution. Technological breakthroughs have transformed the character of the battlefield of the

twenty-first century. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Military-technical Revolution (MTR) refer to the goal of seeking to increase military capabilities and effectiveness by seizing the opportunities created by microprocessors, instantaneous global communications, and precision-guided munitions technologies to confront and contain the armed conflicts of the 21ˢᵗ Century. A revolution in military affairs (RMA) consists in fundamental and qualitative changes in the methods of warfare generated by scientific –technical progress. These fundamental changes have a tremendous impact on how armed forces are structured, trained and employed.

3.2 Modern Development in Weapons Technology

Advances in weapons technology have been rapid and extraordinary with the development of new weapons like dirty bombs, clean bombs, and bombs that burrowed into the earth seeking underground command posts; bombs that went off undersea, seeking submarine; bombs that went off high over earth, to fry the brains of electrical devices with a huge shower of electromagnetic pulses, etc. The results of this tiredness invention were weapons powerful enough to threaten human life on the planet (Powers, 1994:123).

Weapons technology is evolving rapidly and the diversity of this change is impressive. In 1975, the U.S. alone funded over thirty new conventional weapon families and in the area of anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) alone, more than eighteen new systems were developed by NATO members. These developments not only promise greater firepower, mobility and protection, they could also introduce more control and flexibility into combat operations. The most significant developments are taking place in the areas of precision guidance; remote guidance and control; munitions improvements; target identification and acquisition; command, control and communications; and electronic warfare.

Other technological improvements have broadened the spectrum of available weapons. The U.S and Russia for example have equipped their ballistic missiles with 'multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which enables a single missile to launch multiple warheads toward different targets simultaneously and accurately.

New technologies also alter the character of weapons. Laser weapons, nuclear armed tactical air-to surface missiles (TASMs), Stealth air-launched cruise missiles (ACMs) and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that can project force in and wage war from outer space, have become part of the military landscape.

In addition, a large number of innovative new weapons technologies are being developed. These are the so called 'wonder weapons' such as the 'non-lethal' weapons like electron magnetic heat, sonic wavelength, magnetic radiation, electronic sneak attacks, energy pulses, among others.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine the impact of revolution in military technology on weapons development.

4.0. CONCLUSION

The revolution in military technology obviously has changed the character of weapons technology of the 21st Century. Apart from the refinement and upgrading of the existing weapons into a more deadly system, technological revolution has also led to the development of new weapons to confront the challenges of the 21st century. Some of the weapons developed are tactical weapons, intelligence and surveillance equipments, and non-lethal weapons.

5.0 SUMMARY

Technology is transforming the way we live our lives in ordinary day and its influence is quiet pervasive. Similarly, the revolution in military technology has greatly altered and transformed weapons development, classification and utility to an unprecedented level. This has many implications for strategic thinking of the 21st Century.

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UNIT 2: IMPACTS OF WEAPON TECHNOLOGY ON THE 21ST CENTURY WARFARE

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous Unit has examined the nature of the revolution in military technology and its impacts on weapons technology. We have seen that revolution in military technology has led to the invention of the new weapons while at the same time; the previous weapons' capacity has been upgraded. In this Unit, we will examine the impact of weapons technology on strategic doctrine of the 21st Century as well as the impacts of the technological revolution on the battlefield of the 21st Century.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Discuss the impact of the revolution in weapons technology on strategic doctrine
(ii) Analyze the impact of the technological revolution on the battle field of the
      21st Century

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Weapon Technology and Strategic Doctrine in the 21st Century

Strategic doctrine is built on weapons calculation and defense intellectuals have to devise new strategies to accommodate innovations and developments in weapons. In strategic warfare, the technology is complex but the implications of new technological developments are more readily apparent because of the salience of the equipment and missile-exchange concept. In conventional warfare, the technology is often simple but

the diversity and interaction of the many systems required to accomplish specific tasks often masks the implications of new technological developments. In strategic warfare, a new technology like multiple warheads can dramatically alter calculations and indeed the whole milieu. In conventional warfare, a better tank or aircraft may give a temporary advantage, altering accustomed exchange ratios of enemy to friendly losses, but the opponent soon learns to cope with the technical change.

Even, if new weapon technologies become periodically available for exploitation, an important caveat must be recognized: the innovative technology will need to be properly applied by military institutions which in many instances are composed of elements committed by tradition and instinct to preserving their expertise in familiar, experience-proven areas. Without institutional adaptiveness, potential technological superiority can be meaningless. The technologically inferior opponent may be more innovative in practice because of readiness to accept doctrinal innovations and institutional changes.

If military planning is not made with intellectual vigour so as to challenge existing dogmas and to produce innovations, operational strategies and weapons will be less than optimal. For instance, in Vietnam, the U.S. selected a military approach based upon mobility and firepower, yet these expensive measures, were not central to a strategy for counter-insurgency- which must protect the people from the insurgent infrastructure and separate the insurgent from his source of sustenance.

To make new weapons relevant and sustainable, there must be the dynamic destruction of replacing the old strategic doctrine with new ones that are relevant to the technological innovations. The process requires that the military art be learnt, it also needs an understanding of how and why doctrines become obsolescent. As with society, it is ideas that drive the military: its tactics, deployment, operating codes, organization, and even, its research, development and procurement choices.

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can only occur through strategy. In as much as strategy encompasses the theory, practice, and conduct of war on the whole, it is the level from which all other changes proceed. New technology may exist, but their military application is not apparent except through strategy. It is the symbiosis of these two elements that generates an (RMA). If strategic doctrine does not change, even with weapons development, then no RMA occurs – only the results of scientific-technical progress or a military-technical revolution (MTR).

The appearance of new weapons does not automatically generate new methods of warfare- a specific theory of their deployment is required. And here, military doctrine or

military theory can either drive the RMA or retard it. For example, a defensive, passive military doctrine doomed the Iraqi army to defeat despite its impressive combat potential. A state can thus accumulate mountains of weapons and still suffer bankruptcy in future war. Military doctrine must be a derivative of military-technical progress; if it is developed subjectively, it is neither filled with content nor backed up technically and potentially.

3.2.   Impact of Weapon Technology on the 21st Century Warfare

Precision Guidance

Developments in weapons technology not only promise greater firepower, mobility and protection, they could also introduce more control and flexibility into combat operations. The most significant developments are taking place in the areas of precision guidance; remote guidance and control; munitions improvements; target identification and acquisition; command, control and communications; and electronic warfare.

The most striking of the impact of weapons technology on the 21st Century warfare is the increased accuracy obtainable from new and refined guidance techniques. The term 'Precision Guided Munitions' (PGM) is now used to describe a growing class of bombs, missiles and artillery projectiles with single-shot kill probabilities from ten to a hundred times greater than unguided munitions. PGM have been nicknamed 'smart bombs' to distinguish them from their less intelligent unguided predecessors. The increased in accuracy of PGM is made possible by numerous guidance technologies that can reduce the circular error probable (CEP) of delivery vehicles to 20 metres or less.   The operational definition of PGM identifies these weapons in terms of their probability of hitting desired targets (50 % or more). While these descriptions have drawbacks, they do convey the essential element of precision guidance - that incorporating sensoring technologies into a wide range of munitions promises almost 'one shot, one kill'.

Improved Munitions

Though overshadowed by increased accuracy and improvements in remote guidance, continued refinements in conventional munitions offer enhanced destruction capability combined with reduction of unwanted blast effects. One important development has been to give conventional munitions greater reliability by certifying production techniques for warheads, propellants and fusing systems. Increased delivery accuracy, the profusion of types of munitions for point and area target and higher reliability has brought about a marked improvement in weapon-tailoring capabilities (the ability to match a specific target with the most efficient munitions to destroy it). For point targets like command

posts, bridge piers and individual tanks, kinetic-energy or explosive penetrators and armour piercing munitions can be selected according to the desired effect. Hard structure weapons with accelerated terminal velocity projectiles to penetrate several feet of concrete, can be used against hardened bunkers. 'Earth penetrator weapons' which burrow several feet under hard surfaces are effective against roads and air strips.

Target Identification and Acquisition

Detector, location and targeting are essential to highly accurate systems and target acquisition functions are integral to many PGM systems. Anti-radiation missiles seek out emitting targets; infra-red guided systems locate targets giving off heat; and with simpler systems, like infantry anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) and portable surface –to –air missiles (SAM) , the operator acquires and tracks targets visually. Direct observation can also be used for longer-range guided systems, like stand-off missiles or cannon-launched projectiles by equipping forward observers with man-portable laser designators. Long range RPV could provide acquisition both for battle field targets and for those far beyond enemy lines. Long range and high endurance RPV could be used to detect incoming missiles and aircraft, as a target designator for tactical missiles, or to provide beacon positioning data.

American Airborne Early Warning Control System (AWACS) aircraft will carry long-range surveillance radars to provide 200-mile over-the-horizon coverage, including the detection of low-flying enemy aircraft. At shorter ranges, moving target indication (MTI) radar can detect ground forces massing for attack and imaging radars can locate ground targets.

Command, Control and Communications

Several related improvements in information collection and transmission promise commanders a more comprehensive view of the theatre of operations, while advances in miniaturization will enable small units to receive and transmit urgent information. On the theatre level, the effort is being made to enable commanders to make strike decisions on the basis of real time intelligence. This has been facilitated by computer technology that allows rapid synthesis of reconnaissance information. For the ground forces, computerized battlefield command and control systems are being designed to give field commanders rapid access to information on enemy movements, aircraft and artillery availability, weather conditions and logistics support. At the global level, a major effort is being made in the U.S. to upgrade the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems. This includes modernization of computers, deployment of an advanced

Airborne Command Post, improvements to communications and greater interoperability between the communications of the separate services.

Electronic Warfare

Efforts to control the electromagnetic spectrum for military purposes have been one of the defining features of the military technological revolution of the 21st Century. The widespread use of electronic warfare in the 1973 Middle East conflicts has spurred numerous developments, particularly in the United Sates and the defunct Soviet Union. All new SAM can now vary their radar frequency, which makes point jamming more difficult, and the so-called 'frequency agility' of new radar-controlled SAM systems has led to the development of computer-directed jamming systems with greatly improved reaction times. Because both jamming and jamming counter-measures require considerable power, electronically-steerable directional antennae are being used to reduce the power waste associated with crude barrage jamming.

Technology and the 21st Century Warfare:

The most important impact of the new weapon is the greater killing power available to small independent units: the new technologies make fixed bases and large and costly systems like tanks, strike aircraft and surface warships more vulnerable to detection and targeting by the new generation of weapons like ATGW, SAM and anti-shipping missiles, while enabling small units to make use of benefits inherent in defense, such as concealment. With the new technologies, a target that betrays its location is said to have a high probability of being destroyed, so that a greater premium is said to be attached to 'hiding, blending, with the background and remaining motionless. This premium obviously is of greater benefits to a defender who can play a more passive role than an attacker.

Particularly deadly have been the technological refinements that enable states to deliver weapons as far away as 9,000 miles within one hundred feet of their targets in less than thirty –minutes. Other technological improvements have broadened the spectrum of available weapons. The US and Russia for example, equipped their ballistic missiles with *multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs),* enable a single missile to launch multiple warheads toward different targets simultaneously and accurately.

Despite all the efforts to control missile capabilities, other kinds of technological improvements have led to steady increases in the speed, accuracy, range and effectiveness of these weapons. New technologies can also alter the character of these

weapons. Laser weapons, Nuclear Armed Tactical air- to surface missile (TASMs), Stealth air-launched Cruise Missiles (ACMs), and anti-satellite weapons that can project force in and wage war from outside space have become a part of military landscape. In addition, a large number of innovative new weapons technologies are in use and under development – wonder weapons, such as the so called non-lethal weapons made possible by the revolution in military technology.

Technological advances are also likely to make orthodox ways of classifying weapons systems as well as prior equations for measuring power ratios obsolete. The much greater precision, range, and destructiveness of weapons could extend war across a much wider geographical area, make war much more rapid and intense, and require entirely new modes of operation. Application of new technologies to both offensive and defensive systems will pose complicated problems for designing forces and assessing enemy capabilities (*US Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, 1988:8)*

As both Nuclear and conventional weapons technologies advance, there is danger that the firebreak is being crossed from both directions- by a new generation of 'near nuclear conventional weapons' capable of 'levels of violence approximating those of a limited nuclear conflict' and by a new generation of near-conventional' strategic weapons able to inflict damage not much greater than that of the most powerful conventional weapons (Klare, 1985).

 The precision and power of today's conventional weapons have expanded exponentially at precisely the moment when the revolution in military technology is leading to the 'end of infantry' because, in the computer age, "the sky has eyes, bullets have brains and victory will belong to the country whose military has the better data network (Ross, 1997). Examples are electromagnetic –pulse bomb (EMP), which can be hand-delivered in a suitcase and can fry the enemy's computer and communication systems within an entire city; computer viruses of electronics-eating microbates that can eliminate a country's telephone system; and logic bombs that can confuse and redirect traffic on the target country's air and rail's system. Also available are information warfare or infowar tactics that deploy information age techniques to disrupt the enemy's economy and military preparedness, perhaps, without firing a shot'.

Biological and chemical weapons also pose a special and growing threat to the global landscape. Despite the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, the U.S., United Kingdom, and Japan are known to have developed several types of biological weapons. The proliferation of ballistic missiles among regional rivals in the Middle East, Asia and

elsewhere particularly raises the danger of their use because they enable chemical weapons to be readily delivered at great distances. The possibility that these weapons might be acquired and used by terrorists poses still another kind of threat for global peace.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Examine how the revolution in military technology has transformed the strategic landscape of the 21st Century warfare

4.0 CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the widespread availability of modern arms has made it easier for potential belligerents to choose the military rather than the diplomatic option when seeking to resolve local disputes. The revolution in military technology has influenced military power especially weapon technology in the areas of strategic doctrine, weapons procurement and availability, speed, range, transportation, surveillance and monitory, precision guided, command control and communication, and electronic warfare. In all these developments, it is the technologically advanced countries that are at the forefront while the developing states are lagging behind. The danger of readily availability of chemical and biological weapons have made it easy target of poor countries to leverage their backwardness with the developed countries.

5.0   SUMMARY

Technology has greatly transformed the battle field of the 21st Century, altering strategic calculations, weapons procurement and classifications, operational, communication and command control, and doctrine. The refinement of old weapons technology as well as the developments of new weapons have greatly influenced the 21st Century warfare. The areas where technological revolution appears to have greater influence are in information communication, weapons development and strategic calculations.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Would the revolution in military technology make the 21st Century Warfare less destructive and more humane?

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UNIT 3: THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR EFFECTS

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous Unit has examined the nature of the revolution in military technology and its impacts on weapons technology. We have seen that revolution in military technology has led to the invention of the new weapons while at the same time; the previous weapons' capacity has been upgraded. In this Unit, we will specifically focus on the impact of the revolution in military technology on Nuclear weapons and the potential dangers of nuclear weapons for international security. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence. Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 22,000 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
(i) Describe the nature and characters of nuclear weapons
(ii) Discuss the issues relating to proliferation of nuclear weapons and the attendant dangers

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Nature of Nuclear Weapons   and their Effects

The 21st century saw revolutionary breakthroughs in many fields of science and technology. Besides the many discoveries and inventions in the fields of electronics and

telecommunications, few of the leaps forward had more direct impact on people's lives and society at large than the advances in nuclear science.

A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. The first fission ("atomic") bomb test released the same amount of energy as approximately 20,000 tons of TNT. The first thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb test released the same amount of energy as approximately 10,000,000 tons of TNT. A modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than 2,400 pounds (1,100 kg) can produce an explosive force comparable to the detonation of more than 1.2 million tons (1.1 million tons) of TNT. Thus, even a small nuclear device no larger than traditional bombs can devastate an entire city by blast, fire and radiation. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control have been a major focus of international relations policy since their debut (Rhodes, 1986).

Nuclear warfare (sometimes atomic warfare or thermonuclear warfare), is a military conflict or political strategy in which nuclear weaponry is used to inflict damage on an opponent. Compared to conventional warfare, nuclear warfare can be vastly more destructive in range and extent of damage, and in a much shorter time scale. A major nuclear exchange could have severe long-term effects, primarily from radiation release, but also from the production of high levels of atmospheric pollution leading to a "nuclear winter" that could last for decades, centuries, or even millennia after the initial attack. A large nuclear war is considered to bear existential risk for civilization on Earth. Importantly however, despite modern civilization being at risk, assuming weapons stockpiles at the previous cold war heights, analysts and physicists have found that billions of humans would nevertheless survive a global thermonuclear war

Only two nuclear weapons have been used in the course of warfare, both by the United States near the end of World War II. On 6 August 1945, a uranium gun-type fission bomb code-named "Little Boy" was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on 9 August, a plutonium implosion-type fission bomb code-named "Fat Man" was exploded over Nagasaki, Japan. These two bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people—mostly civilians—from acute injuries sustained from the explosions. The role of the bombings in Japan's surrender, and their ethical status, remain the subject of scholarly and popular debate.

Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated on over two thousand occasions for testing purposes and demonstrations. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weapons—and that acknowledge possessing such weapons—are (chronologically by date of first test) the United States, the Soviet Union (succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In addition, Israel is also widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, though it does not acknowledge having them. One state, South Africa, fabricated nuclear weapons in the past, but as its apartheid regime was coming to an end it disassembled its arsenal, acceded to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accepted full-scope international safeguards (Waltz, 1995).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the nature of Nuclear Warfare and its potential effects on human survival on the planet

3.2. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Potential Dangers

After the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, many people called for a ban on nuclear weapons in order to avoid a nuclear arms race and the risk of future catastrophes like the ones in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both the United States and the Soviet Union declared that they were in favor of putting the atomic bomb under foolproof international control. In spite of these declarations, the big powers were never ready to give up their own nuclear weapons programs. By the end of 1946 it was clear to everybody that the effort to prevent a nuclear arms race had failed. Indeed, the Soviet Union had already launched a full-speed secret nuclear weapons program in an attempt to catch up with the United States. Thanks in part to espionage; the Soviet scientists were able to build a blueprint of the American fission bomb that was used against Nagasaki and to conduct a successful testing of it on August 29, 1949.

By 1954, both the United States and the Soviet Union had successfully tested their first generation of H-bombs. The tests proved that fusion bombs could easily be made to produce explosions more than 1,000 times as powerful as the fission bombs used in the Second World War. The most powerful explosion ever took place at Novaya Zemlya on October 30, 1961, when the Soviet Union tested a "monster bomb" with a yield equivalent to 50 megatons of TNT. This explosion alone released more destructive power than all bombs and explosives used in the Second World War added together, including the three nuclear explosions of July and August 1945.

By 1961, two more countries had developed and successfully tested nuclear weapons. United Kingdom had started its program during the Second World War in close co-operation with the United States, and the first British bomb was tested on October 3, 1952. On February 13, 1960, France followed suit. The French program received very little technological and scientific support from other countries. Four and a half years later, on October 16, 1964, China became the fifth nuclear power after having received only reluctant assistance from the Soviet Union.

There are eight states that have successfully detonated nuclear weapons. Five are considered to be "nuclear-weapon states" (NWS) under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are: the United States, Russia (successor state to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China. Nations that are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons are sometimes referred to as the *nuclear club*.

Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, three states that were not parties to the Treaty have conducted nuclear tests, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. North Korea had been a party to the NPT but withdrew in 2003. Israel is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons, though it has refused to confirm or deny this, and is not known definitively to have conducted a nuclear test

Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war. A sudden rush of nuclear proliferation among nations may be triggered by small nuclear wars that are won by a country with more effective nuclear forces than its adversary, or by success of nuclear terrorists in forcing adherence to their demands. Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations could spread at an awesome rate in such circumstances, since "latent proliferation" is far along in at least several dozen nations, and is increasing rapidly as more nuclear power plants and supporting facilities are built in more countries.

As long as nations possessing nuclear weapons continue to behave as though they feel more secure with than without them, more nonnuclear states can be expected to join "the nuclear club." The danger of proliferation to the Indian subcontinent illustrates the psychology behind the phenomenon and how proliferation spreads like an epidemic. In

1945, near the end of World War II, the United States exploded its first nuclear weapon. In the tense East-West relations of the postwar period, the Soviet Union detonated its first weapon in 1949. As relations between the Soviet Union and China chilled in the 1960s, China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. In its turn, India, which had fought a border war with China in 1962, then conducted a nuclear test in 1974. Although India's nuclear test was claimed to be for peaceful purposes, and it has repeatedly denied having any nuclear weapons, India announced in 1998 a successful testing of nuclear weapons. Response, India's traditional enemy, Pakistan, has pushed its own nuclear programme and also announced to the world in 1998 a successful testing of atomic bomb.

Organizations with access to skilled technicians (internal or hired) could disassemble the stolen weapon and build a new one detonated in a different way. And smart terrorists would focus on weapons that are not protected. Terrorist organizations could also construct a nuclear weapon from scratch. As with nations, the main technical barrier is the acquisition of the required plutonium or highly enriched uranium. This material could be obtained by theft, by "donation" from a nation sympathetic to the terrorists, or by purchasing it on a black market (Mark, Taylor, Maraman and Wechsler, 1987).

The Middle East is another area with high danger of proliferation. There have been strong indications that, in spite of official denials, Israel has been producing nuclear weapons since the late 1960s. Convincing public revelations by a former employee of the Israeli nuclear establishment in the fall of 1986 leave little doubt that Israel has a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons, credibly more than a hundred. This creates an atmosphere in which the Arab nations can easily justify their own attempts at developing nuclear weapons. In fact, the 1981 Israeli air raid on the Iraqi research reactor at Osirak (Tammuz) was motivated by fear it would be used as a source of materials for nuclear weapons (Avner, 1988).

Proliferation is also encouraged by the fact that nearly fifty nations — including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, and Vietnam — have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US and the USSR were required by Article VI of the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Yet since the treaty went into effect in 1970, the American strategic nuclear arsenal has grown from 4,000 warheads to 12,000 and the Soviet arsenal has increased from 2,000 to 10,000 (Goodchild, 1980).

Terrorist organizations could also construct a nuclear weapon from scratch. As with nations, the main technical barrier is the acquisition of the required plutonium or highly enriched uranium. This material could be obtained by theft, by "donation" from a nation sympathetic to the terrorists, or by purchasing it on a black market. The problem of theft brings out an important difference in protecting against national versus terrorist diversion of nuclear materials. In the case of national diversion, only detection is required. But in the case of terrorist diversion, strong physical security is also needed since terrorists or criminals might obtain material through a physical attack. While the details of the physical security mechanisms to counteract such threats are classified, what has been publicly revealed tends not to inspire confidence. . An extensive and detailed expression of this concern and possible ways for alleviating it has recently been published by the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. The most straightforward way for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons would be to steal complete weapons from military facilities or transport vehicles. The terrorist's job is complicated somewhat because many weapons are protected by Permissive Action Links (PALs). PALs are like combination locks which prevent the weapon from being detonated until the correct secret access code ("combination") has been entered. Some PALs go further and are designed to make the nuclear weapon inoperable after any unsuccessful attempt to bypass the PAL (Gervasi, 1985:85-88)

It is highly doubtful that the physical security afforded to plutonium and highly enriched uranium would be effective against thefts involving the sophistication displayed in many modern thefts of money or other materials less valuable than a nuclear weapon; the value of stolen nuclear materials would be measured in millions of dollars and a complete weapon would be worth many times more.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Identify the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear powers in the contemporary world.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. In summary, much more serious international attention than is now evident needs to be

given to the consequences of nuclear proliferation among nations, terrorists, or criminals. Continuing to neglect this menace is a recipe for disaster. Nuclear proliferation is greatly enhancing the likelihood of nuclear war. It dramatically increases the number of scenarios for small-scale nuclear wars or nuclear terrorism, which could escalate to nuclear war between the superpowers. Deterrence, the cornerstone of national security in present strategies, fails against nuclear terrorism simply because there are no well-defined targets against which to retaliate.

5.0   SUMMARY

Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the potential dangers of nuclear proliferation to international security?

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UNIT 4: GLOBAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
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1.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous unit has examined the nature of nuclear weapons and their impacts on contemporary warfare, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the attendant dangers of nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands. Nuclear proliferation is the spread of weapon capabilities from a few to many states in a chain reaction, so that an increasing number of states gain the ability to launch an attack on other states with devastating weapons (e,g nuclear weapons). Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the *Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, the governments of which fear that more countries with nuclear weapons may increase the possibility of nuclear warfare (up to and including the so-called "counter-value" targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of states.

This unit will examine the nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) and some of the obstacles to the success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the prospects of achieving an effective nuclear disarmament in harmony with global peace.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i) Discuss the nature and dynamics of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR)
(ii) Identify the challenges and obstacles to a successful nuclear disarmament in the contemporary world.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR)

Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust), and at times even outright sabotage—such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima.

Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material (Buffet, 1998).

Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country (Beatrice Heusser, 2000).

Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of countries with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968,

governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.

Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations.

From its foundation by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.

At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the *Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty* or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States. Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.

Additional Protocol

In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

- The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.

- IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
- States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
- Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgment on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one ([Iraq](#)) is implementing its protocol provisionally. The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan. Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol is Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards, Brazil, also opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing, but has not ruled out signing (Saeed, 2012)

3.2. Obstacles to the Success of Non-Proliferation Regime

Despite the apparent success of the NPT, the obstacles to increased proliferation are fragile, as shown by the nuclear development programmes of India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. The incentives to join the nuclear club are strong for several reasons.

First, the materials needed to make nuclear weapons are widely available. This is partly due to the widespread use of nuclear technology for generating electricity. Today, hundreds of nuclear power and research reactors are in operation in dozens of countries throughout the world, In addition, to preading nuclear know-how, states could choose to reprocess the uranium and plutonium that power plants produce as waste for clandestine nuclear weapons production.

Secondly, the scientific expertise necessary for weapons development has spread with the globalization of advanced scientific training. It has been estimated that in the near future, it will be possible to duplicate almost all past technology in all but the most forlorn of Third World backwaters, and much of the present state-of the-art will be both intellectually and practically accessible' (Clancy and Seitz, 1991-92)

Thirdly, export controls designed to stop technology transfer for military purposes are weak. A large and growing number of states can now export material, equipment, technology, and services needed to develop nuclear weapons (Potter, 1992). In addition, the leaks in nuclear export controls make a 'mockery of the long-revered nuclear non-proliferation regime' (Leventhal 1992). Conversion of peacetime nuclear energy programmes to military purposes can occur either overtly or, as in the case of India and Pakistan covertly. The safeguards built into the non-proliferation regime are simply inadequate to detect and prevent secret nuclear weapons development programmes. The ease with which Pakistan made a successful end run around the technology-export controls of the United States and Western European governments illustrates the problem of control. In 1979, Pakistan quietly bought all the basic parts- allegedly with funds supplied by the Libyan government – necessary for uranium –enrichment plant. Similarly, UN inspectors discovered after the Persian Gulf War that Iraq was much closer to building an atomic weapon than previously suspected, despite UN restrictions against this and Iraq's continued pledge to adhere to the rules of the non-proliferation regime. The Iraqi experience illustrates the obstacles to preventing the illegal proliferation of weapons, as does the record elsewhere. No less than eight countries have constructed secret nuclear production plants, underscoring the difficulties of managing effective inspections and monitoring nuclear developments (Albright 1993).

Fourthly, other states have strong incentives to develop nuclear weapons, especially, the non-nuclear states, who want the same command of their own fate and the same diplomatic influence that the nuclear powers seem to enjoy.

There has been much debate in the academic study of International Security as to the advisability of proliferation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles De Gaulle, argued in books like *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the *force de frappe*, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability.

Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison continue to argue along the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes proliferation in

any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation, and those such as Waltz, who advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North Korea's.

Total proliferation

Waltz and Sagan argue that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of MAD logic – the only occasion when enmity between two Great Powers did not result in military conflict. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz and Sagan (2003: 24). Waltz and Sagan believe that there should be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances.

Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described by Scott Sagan (1993). This concept can be described as a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he states, "Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security" (Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we can see how this has taken place. When the United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and Great Britain perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Identify some of the major obstacles to achieving a successful implementation of the non-proliferation treaty

4.0 CONCLUSION

The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely. The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

There are many arguments both for and against abolition, disarmament, and arms control. Everyone has his or her own idea about how best to tackle the intensely serious problem of nuclear weapons. Some will work for their abolition, which is the declared ultimate goal of most world leaders. The difficulties of achieving this are very great, however, and careless or overeager efforts to achieve this goal might actually be harmful. While nuclear weapons are a great danger, they exist because the nations that own them think they provide some protection against serious threats to their security, some of which are also nuclear.

Most statesmen, therefore, believe that the day for abolishing nuclear weapons is far off and, meanwhile, nations must find safe ways to live with them. In effect, this is an arms control outlook that can be pursued both by trying to have cautious strategies and controllable weapons, safe from accidents, and by agreements about arms control. Under such an arrangement, governments would undertake to reduce the number of weapons and abolish dangerous ones and keep each other informed and reassured about situations

that might otherwise cause countries to take hostile action. While no single action will guarantee success, everyone seems to realize that failure would be catastrophic for everyone--everywhere--on this earth

5.0   SUMMARY

Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon. The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Examine the complexities of maintaining a nuclear regime that is consistent with global peace and security

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 5: THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous unit examined the nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) and some of the obstacles to the success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the prospects of achieving an effective nuclear disarmament in harmony with global peace in the contemporary world.

War for profit is not exclusive to modern times for it drove the best and worst of old Europe for many years - perhaps best exemplified by the naval arms race between France, Spain and Britain. The driving force behind these initiatives was generally in out-doing a potential foe and, therefore, establishing a large standing military force to counter the moves of a potential enemy. The modern interpretation of this as it relates to the Military-Industrial Complex is slightly altered in that the established military force is now utilized to further global interests - the enemy is no longer another nation per se but any organization not in line with presented ideals.

At any rate, the theory of a mutually beneficial relationship existing between war planners and industry is not unfounded for there is much money to be made in the design and development process of military goods which precede lucrative production commitments. As such, a defense contractor can be the recipient of multiple contracts during the life of a single product leading many of the top firms to constantly outdo competitors in attempting to maintain their own respective bottom lines in the boardroom.

The phrase Military-Industrial Complex was first used in an American report at the turn of the 20th Century and later immortalized by outgoing United States President Dwight

D. Eisenhower in his January 17, 1961 farewell address to the nation. In his speech, Eisenhower cited the Military-Industrial Complex as a grave warning to the American people based on his experiences of a wartime economy and political environment during and after World War 2 - the warning being to not let the military-industrial establishment dictate America's actions at home or abroad for such unchecked power would begin to usurp the inherent freedoms inherent in the very fabric of our nation. The original usage appeared as Military-Industrial Congressional Complex but this was later revised to exclude the reference to congress.

This Unit will specifically examine the influence of Military-Industrial Complex on global arms sale and proliferation of weapons; the strategic impacts of arms sale on global security and how the Military-Industrial Complex are influencing foreign policies of states.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

(i)   Describe the nature of military-industrial complex
(ii) Explain the impacts of the military-industrial complex on global arms sale
(iii) Identify the impacts of the military-industrial complex on foreign policy

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Military Industrial Complex and Arms Sale

Military-Industrial complex is a network of individuals and institutions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies. The military-industrial complex in a country typically attempts to marshal political support for continued or increased military spending by the national government.

Whilst the term originated in the 1960s and has been applied since, the concept of co-ordination between government, the military, and the arms industry largely finds its roots since the private sector began providing weaponry to government-run forces. The relationship between government and the defence industry can include political contracts placed for weapons, general bureaucratic oversight and organized lobbying on the part of the defence companies for the maintenance of their interests.

For centuries, many governments owned and operated their own arms manufacturing companies - such as naval yards and arsenals. Governments also legislated to maintain state monopolies. As limited liability companies attracted capital to develop technology,

governments saw the need to develop relationships with companies who could supply weaponry. By the late 19th century the new complexity of modern warfare required large subsets of industry to be devoted to the research and development of rapidly maturing technologies. Rifled, automatic firearms, artillery and gunboats, and later, mechanized armour, aircraft and missiles required specialized knowledge and technology to build. For this reason, governments increasingly began to integrate private firms into the war effort by contracting out weapons production to them. It was this relationship that marked the creation of the military–industrial complex.

The term military-industrial complex was first used by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Farewell Address on January 17, 1961. Eisenhower warned that the United States must "guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence…by the military-industrial complex," which included members of Congress from districts dependent on military industries, the Department of Defense (along with the military services), and privately owned military contractors *(Encyclopedia Britannica Online)*.

A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower had been concerned about the growing size and cost of the American defense establishment since he became president in 1953. In his last presidential address to the American people, he expressed those concerns in terms that frankly shocked some of his listeners.

Eisenhower began by describing the changing nature of the American defense establishment since World War II. No longer could the U.S. afford the "emergency improvisation" that characterized its preparations for war against Germany and Japan. Instead, the United States was "compelled to create a permanent armaments industry" and a huge military force. He admitted that the Cold War made clear the "imperative need for this development," but he was gravely concerned about "the acquisition of unwarranted influence...by the military-industrial complex." In particular, he asked the American people to guard against the "danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite." (Eisenhower, 1960)

Eisenhower's blunt language stunned some of his supporters. They believed that the man who led the country to victory in Europe in World War II and guided the nation through some of the darkest moments of the Cold War was too negative toward the military-industrial complex that was the backbone of America's defense. For most listeners, however, it seemed clear that Eisenhower was merely stating the obvious. World War II and the ensuing Cold War resulted in the development of a large and powerful defense establishment. Necessary though that development might be, Eisenhower warned, this

new military-industrial complex could weaken or destroy the very institutions and principles it was designed to protect.

The international trade in arms, spurred by developing countries' energetic search for armaments commensurate with those of the industrial countries and their production of them for use at home and export abroad has fuelled the dispersion of military capability throughout the globe.

For the United States over such a length of time: the Cold War with the Soviet Union, involving an arms race throughout most of the period; the Korean War (1950–1953), and the Vietnam War (1964–1975). As the period ended (that is, as the Cold War at last appeared to have come to a close), a fourth situation assured continuation of military-industrial production—the deployment of forces and combat operations in the Persian Gulf region.

Military orders for goods and services went from $27.5 billion in 1964 to about $42.3 billion in 1969. The total defense budget for fiscal year 1969 was $79.788 billion, which amounted to 42.9 percent of the total federal budget, and between 9 and 10 percent of the gross national product (about the same percent as throughout the preceding decade). Defense funds went to every state, to 363 of the 435 congressional districts and to over 5,000 communities. Workers in defense industries and in defense-related production in mining, agriculture, construction, and services comprised over 10 percent of the total labor force. The Defense Department itself employed as many civilians as the populations of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine combined. (*Encyclopedia of the New American Nation)*

Despite the lowering of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union—and between Eastern Europe and western Europe—in 1989 and 1990, the Pentagon in 1990 still was planning to put $100 billion into the improvement of the nuclear arsenal over the next ten years. This was in addition to the continuation of the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") research program. By 1987 the funding for SDI research and development had reached about $6 billion a year. The Department of Defense in 1990 estimated that the annual outlay would rise to about $12.5 billion in 1997. In September 2000 President Bill Clinton announced that he would not proceed with an order to build the missile defense system. Incoming President George W. Bush announced that he would continue the program. The total cost was estimated at $60 billion. (*Encyclopedia of the New American Nation)*

After dropping sharply from an all-time high of $81.5 billion in 1984 (in 1997 prices) to a low of $42.2 billion in 1994, international trade in arms took a sharp upturn. By 1997 it had risen by 26 percent from that low point, and by 23 percent just over the previous year, to $54.6 billion. Three regions—the Middle East, East Asia, and western Europe—accounted for 80 percent of that trade in 1997, but arms sales to South American countries were rising at a rate of 20 percent a year from 1992 to 1997 (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1999: 390-393).

During the 1995–1997 period, Saudi Arabia was the leading arms importer, with a total of $31.3 billion. Others in the top ten arms importers were Taiwan, $12.5 billion; Japan, $6.8 billion; Egypt, $5.3 billion; Kuwait, $5 billion; Turkey, $4.9 billion; United Kingdom, $4.5 billion; South Korea, $4.2 billion; United States, $3.8 billion; United Arab Emirates, $3.8 billion. The United States was the main supplier of arms for eight of those countries (all except the Arab emirates, where France was the chief supplier) (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1999: 390-393).

The American share of world arms exports grew from 29 percent in 1987 to 58 percent in 1997. During that period, the Russian share of world arms exports declined from 37 percent to 4 percent; the British increased from 8 percent to 12, and the French from 4 percent to 11. In dollar amounts, world arms exports in 1995– 1997 totaled $142 billion. The total for the United States during that period was $77.8 billion; for the United Kingdom, $18 billion; for France, $12 billion, and for Russia, $9.2 billion. In 1997 arms exports represented 4.6 percent of the total exports of the United States, 2.3 percent of the exports of the United Kingdom, 2 percent of the exports of France, and 2.6 percent of the exports of Russia (*Encyclopedia of the New American Nation*)

While arms trade totals of North Korea were not high when compared with totals of other nations, it should be noted that in 1988, 32.3 percent of North Korea's total imports were in armaments, and 29.2 percent of its total exports were in armaments. By 1997 those figures had declined to 2.1 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively. The People's Republic of China's arms exports amounted to $1.1 billion in 1997, 0.6 percent of its total exports, and its arms imports were $142.2 million, 0.4 percent of its total (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1999: 390-393).

A further complication on the international scene is the growth of domestic arms industries into international conglomerates and multinational corporations. When a great

military aircraft manufacturer leaps national boundaries and takes in companies or builds plants in many countries, where does its loyalty lie? What control does its home country have over it? If a foreign branch builds planes or tanks or guns for a country that has become an adversary, how can the company be accused of trading with the enemy?

Since the end of the Cold War, the developing countries' total purchase of arms totaling $206.5 billion between 1989 and 1996 accounted for nearly three-fourths of the $284.8 billion of arms delivered worldwide (Grimmett 1997). The global South's countries have been the leading market for the traffic in arms. Today, in the face of fierce competition among an expanding number of suppliers, the world's most advanced weapons are being transferred to developing countries. Weapons being transferred include tanks and self-propelled cannons, supersonic combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, warships, submarines, anti-shipping missiles and other technologically advanced weapons (Grimmett, 1997:32-33).

The Middle East has been the focus of intense strife and chronic national security problems and in the wake of the Gulf War, and enduring conflicts and rivals between Israel and Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Syria, these states' high level of activity in the global arms market has continued. Middle Eastern countries accounted for 11% of world wide arms imports in 1967. Between 1993 and 1996, the Middles East purchase has increased to 64%.

According to SIPRI, total world spending on military expenses in 2009 was $1.531 trillion US dollars. 46.5% of this total, roughly $712 billion US dollars, was spent by the United States. The privatization of the production and invention of military technology also leads to a complicated relationship with significant research and development of many technologies. (Sherry, 1995).

The Military budget of the United States for the 2009 fiscal year was $515.4 billion. Adding emergency discretionary spending and supplemental spending brings the sum to $651.2 billion (Ibid). This does not include many military-related items that are outside of the Defense Department budget. Overall the United States government is spending about $1 trillion annually on defense-related purposes

3.2. The Strategic Consequences of Arms Sale

To what extent do the pressures of manufacturers worried about profits, communities worried about unemployment, and members of Congress and presidents worried about

local or general business depression—and ultimately about votes in key states—influence the choice of weapon systems, and thus affect the military considerations in national strategy? Do we build a new bomber or a new missile or a new aircraft carrier because our strategy requires it, or because some group demands it, and then develop a strategy to include it? There always is the prospect that elements of a powerful military-industrial complex will influence national policy and strategy in the interest of favouring certain weapon systems not simply on the basis of military advantage, but for the benefit of the companies making them, or for the armed service using them, or for the locale where they and subsidiary instruments are made. In the fifty years after the conclusion of World War II, three forces led to the maintenance of a military establishment of unprecedented proportions: for the United States over such a length of time: the Cold War with the Soviet Union, involving an arms race throughout most of the period; the Korean War (1950–1953), and the Vietnam War (1964–1975). As the period ended (that is, as the Cold War at last appeared to have come to a close), a fourth situation assured continuation of military-industrial production—the deployment of forces and combat operations in the Persian Gulf region (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1999: 390-393).

An increasingly significant arm of the military-industrial complex was the research community—the universities and private think tanks that lived on defense contracts. About half of all the scientific research being carried on in the United States in fiscal year 1969 was related to the military. Some 195 educational institutions received defense contracts of $10,000 or more during the year. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, and Johns Hopkins were among the nation's top 100 defense contractors (*Encyclopedia of the New American Nation*)

During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union thought they could maintain peace by spreading arms to politically pivotal recipients. Between 1983 and 1997, the U.S. provided arms to fifty-nine less developed countries while the USSR supplied forty-two (Klare 1990). However, contrary to working out deterrence, many of the recipients engaged in wars with their neighbours or experienced internal rebellions. Undoubtedly, the import of huge arsenals of weapons from abroad aided wars and rebellions in developing countries. The U.S. arms exporting programmes undermines the U.S avowed principle of policy priority of promoting democracy as most of the importers of the arms are non-democratic countries.

3.3.   Military Industrial Complex and Foreign Policy

The greatest direct impact of the military-industrial complex on foreign policy, and the greatest direct impact of foreign policy on the military-industrial complex, has been in the transfer of arms among nations, programs of military assistance, cooperative production programs, arms sales abroad, and the rise of multinational corporations in arms and related industries.

One of the most serious charges leveled against the military-industrial complex is that it campaigns actively and effectively against arms control and disarmament, and exerts a controlling influence on the shaping of foreign policy. Those who traffic in military procurement have a vested interest in an unstable international environment. According to proponents of this view, the profits and power of the complex would decline catastrophically if real progress were made in limiting strategic nuclear weaponry and conventional weapon systems. For this reason, it is claimed; advocates of huge arms expenditures use all available means of shaping public attitudes and governmental behavior to perpetuate an illusion of great international danger emanating particularly from the communist bloc of nations. Modern "merchants of death" are said to pursue their own interests in complete disregard of humanitarian considerations.

As a part of military assistance to other countries, the United States at first emphasized cooperative production programs with certain of those countries. Undoubtedly, the cooperative production programs contributed significantly to European defense. But Europeans saw the whole effort as too much of a one-way street. The United States showed little inclination to accept European designs for cooperative production either in the United States or in other European countries, even when European designs were favored by those countries. According to one view expressed at the time, this situation was the natural result of American technological superiority and American salesmanship. Another suggested that it was due at least in part to pressure by the U.S. government, which had been lobbied by its own defense industries.

3.4.   Driving Forces for the Military-Industrial Complex

Recognizing that the military-industrial complex does exist as a powerful, if informal, structure in American military and economic affairs, the following questions arise:

How did it get that way? What are its consequences? What can be done about it? The forces that have driven the development of the military-industrial complex include the following:

The national arms policy during the first half of the nineteenth century. The early decision to rely on production both in government facilities and by private firms for providing armaments set the stage. The policy of long-term contracts with private arms manufacturers planted the seeds for a permanent arms industry in peacetime.

Industrial expansion during the Civil War. The first industrial mobilization that approached total war created undreamed-of opportunities for profit and showed what might be done in arms production.

Industrial mobilization during World War I. This carried the opportunities a step higher, but the effects were only temporary, because no large-scale defense industry persisted after the war, when the drives for disarmament and isolation amid cries against profiteering by "merchants of death" discouraged such activities.

World War II Expansion. This was several notches higher than the mobilization for World War I and was when many firms got their start in military production, and then continued after the war under conditions far different from the post–World War I period.

Government-sponsored research and development on a large scale. This major development during World War II had important consequences in the years that followed. This has been one of the keys to the growth of the military-industrial complex.

Nuclear weapons. This was another legacy of World War II that overshadowed defense policies in the postwar world.

The Cold War. The perceived threat of the Soviet Union to security in Europe, and the perception of communism as a worldwide threat led to an armaments race in both nuclear and conventional forces that gave a certain permanence to defense industries. Broad programs of foreign military assistance became a part of this, and added to demand for military production.

Korea. The communist attack against South Korea called up further military-industrial efforts and gave credibility to the fears of the Cold War.

Vietnam. This conflict maintained the demand for military equipment at a high level over a long period of time.

The Gulf War. Just when there were growing demands for cuts in military expenditures to help reduce the national deficit, the crisis in the Persian Gulf served to renew requirements for production. The policy of maintaining a "guns and butter" economy in the buildup for Korea, for Vietnam, for the Gulf War, and for the Cold War in general meant that if the unsettling impact of continuous conversion and reconversion on domestic industries was to be avoided, some measure of a military industry on a more or less permanent basis would have to be maintained.

The economic impact of defense industries on local economies, and the supposed stimulus of defense spending on the national economy. This brings pressure from local industrial leaders and from local labor unions and workers in general who are employed in defense plants, from local chambers of commerce and businesses that stand to benefit from providing consumer goods and services to defense workers and their families, and from members of Congress and other political leaders anxious to stimulate employment in their districts (*Encyclopedia of the New American Nation)*

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Critically examine the impacts of the Military-Industrial Complex on Strategy and Foreign Policy in contemporary world

4.0 CONCLUSION

Granted that the national security of the United States requires a substantial military industry, a question remains: How can the unfortunate consequences of a powerful military-industrial complex—the kind of conglomerate of special economic and military interests against which Eisenhower warned—are alleviated? One measure might be that favored by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations, that is, nationalization of the armaments industry. That all factories for the production of direct weapons of war shall be nationalized and their production shall be subject to the inspection of the officers of the council; and the council shall be furnished periodically with returns of imports and exports of munitions of war into or from the territories of war into or from the territories of its members, and as far as possible into or from other countries.

Government ownership and operation would eliminate the need for any profit at all and reduce the pressures on the government for big defense spending for the benefit of a company. Of course, it would not eliminate this kind of pressure altogether. As we have

seen, locales and political leaders apply pressure for defense orders in their areas whether the facility concerned is government or private, and subsidiary industries that benefit from defense production still would urge those expenditures that would benefit them indirectly.

Wartime still might require the conversion of civilian plants to military production. But that is a different matter. A thriving automobile factory has no real stake in converting to tanks or aircraft, and it would be reconverted to the civilian production when the immediate need had been met. Another approach might be to prohibit the export of armaments. This usually brings the rejoinder, "Well, if we did not sell arms to other countries, someone else would." The answer to that is, "So be it; at least we would not be putting advanced weaponry into the hands of potential enemies." (*Encyclopedia of the New American Nation)*

A further step toward reducing undue influences of the military-industrial complex might be a more complete separation of government-sponsored research and development from those who have an immediate stake in the production of the items concerned.

5.0   SUMMARY

Of all the political ideas that gained popular currency in the 1960s, the military-industrial complex is the concept perhaps most gravely deformed by public mastication. The debate of 1968 and 1969 over the influence of the military establishment in the United States proved, with few exceptions, consistently unsatisfying. After all was said, the concept of the military-industrial complex remained muddled and its attendant questions of international and domestic political influence were still unanswered.

Political leaders reflected the confusion of the man in the street, of business leaders, industrial workers, farmers, college students, and activists for conflicting causes. All were caught up in a dilemma—that armaments cause wars, and that arm industries create prosperity. At the same time, nearly everyone agreed that some military forces were needed for national security, and these in turn depended upon some kind of military industry.

The inability of arms suppliers to control the uses to which their military hardware will be put is thus troubling. The United States armed both sides in several conflicts in the Global South since World War 11 as the defunct Soviet Union. The widespread quest for armaments has created a potentially explosive global environment. The description is especially apt when we consider not only trends in defense expenditures and the arms trade but also in destructiveness of modern weapons.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Examine the influence of the Military-Industrial Complex on the global proliferation of arms and its attendants consequences for global peace.

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MODULE 4:   TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism in whatever dimension defiles both moral and legal justification thus, poses threat and insecurities to human existence in regards to which defenseless nations live in perpetual fears and anxiety. This no doubt undermines the instrumentally of global security and the basic philosophical fundamentalism behind it. Perhaps if not properly sanctioned is capable of eroding the objective foundations of foreign policy of any nation and should be combated in a myriad of ways.

Issues of terrorism and global security have become significant points of contention in shaping foreign policy of nations across the globe. Recent literatures have revealed that such issues as, social, economic, political and technological factors that revolve around the hub of global security matters have been seriously undermined by cancerous acts of terrorism. This is because terrorism in which ever form poses an alarming kind of violence and threat in the contemporary world, which constitutes great hindrance to free flow relationship that exist amongst nations.

This Module will examine the broad issues of terrorism and its attendant impacts on global security in the contemporary world order.   The Module is organized into five units which examine the concept of terrorism, its evolution and networks as well as the contemporary global war against terrorism.

Unit 1   What is Terrorism
Unit 2   The Evolution of Terrorism
Unit 3   Terrorism and Global Security
Unit 4   Terrorist Networks Organizations
Unit 5   Contemporary Global War against Terrorism

UNIT 1: WHAT IS TERRORISM?

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is one of the major factors affecting global security during the twenty first century. Terrorism is a strategic tool used by fundamental groups to achieve their goals. Terrorism is not limited to regional or territorial conflicts but often relates to cultural and religious differences described by some as the "clash between civilizations". After the attacks on New York and Washington in September 11, 2001, terrorism was recognized as a major international security problem. It has remained on the international agenda because the problem has not been solved. The trend in terrorism that produced the 9/11 catastrophe did not abate but continued. Other issues associated with terrorism also remain troubling, particularly those connected to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, conditions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and the future of Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani relations.

The immediate impact of the attacks was dramatic. For the United States, 9/11 led to the declaration of a "global war on terrorism," military intervention in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban regime and destroy Al Qaeda's base, and in 2003 a preemptive war in Iraq. At home, the government undertook fundamental organizational reforms, including establishing a Department of Homeland Security and reorganizing the nation's intelligence bureaucracy into a National Counterterrorist Center. At the international level, terrorism also became a top priority. The United Nations, NATO, and the EU moved immediately to develop counterterrorism policies based on international cooperation. In 2001, for example, NATO invoked its collective defense provision for the first time.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
(i)   Describe the nature of Terrorism
(ii) Provide a conceptual definition of Terrorism from different perspectives
(iii) Identify the causes of Terrorism

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Nature of Terrorism

Terrorism is a contested concept. Its use is often subjective and pejorative, meant to convey condemnation of an adversary. It is not easy to use the term and to be understood objectively. Accordingly, it has been difficult to reach agreement on a definition at the international level. Since it was first discussed in 1973, despite the passage of twelve anti-terrorism conventions, the United Nations has yet to decide on an official definition. As the 2004 Secretary-General's High-level Panel Report explained, disagreement has centered first on whether the term applies only to non-states. Should states also be considered "terrorist" when their armed forces or security services attack civilians, whether deliberately or not?

A second problem concerns moral justifications for violence. Should the use of violence by a resistance movement confronting foreign occupation be categorized as terrorism? Does the end excuse if not justify the means? The panel concluded that terrorism is never acceptable, no matter how legitimate or popular the cause it is meant to serve. Terrorism is "any action . . . that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counter-terrorism, and Counterinsurgency nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act' (Crenshaw, 2007).

The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as *"the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."* Within this definition, there are three key elements—violence, fear, and intimidation—and each element produces terror in its victims. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as *"the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives"*. The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism to be *"premeditated politically-motivated*

violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience".

Terrorism in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence or equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.

Outside the United States Government, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations produced the following definition of terrorism in 1992; *"An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets."* Less specific and considerably less verbose, the British Government definition of terrorism from 1974 is *"...the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear."*

The definition of terrorism has proved controversial. Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions of terrorism in their national legislation. Moreover, the international community has been slow to formulate a universally agreed, legally binding definition of this crime. These difficulties arise from the fact that the term "terrorism" is politically and emotionally charged (Hoffman 1998) In this regard, Angus Martyn, briefing the Australian Parliament, stated that "the international community has never succeeded in developing an accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United Nations attempts to define the term floundered mainly due to differences of opinion between various members about the use of violence in the context of conflicts over national liberation and self-determination (Diaz, 2008) These divergences have made it impossible for the United Nations to conclude a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that incorporates a single, all-encompassing, legally binding, criminal law. The international community has adopted a series of sectoral conventions that define and criminalize various types of terrorist activities. Since 1994, the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly condemned terrorist acts using the following political description of terrorism:

"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance

unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them" (UN,1994).

For the purposes of this guide, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism used by the U.S. State Department, contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d). That statute contains the following definitions: "*The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience*

Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draws the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public's or government's reaction to the act. For example, in 1972 at the Munich Olympics, the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were the immediate victims. But the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching the televised event.

Terrorism has been described, correctly, as a tactic of the weak. It's adopted by groups of dissenters who lack the resources to attack the state and its forces. Clearly a rebel force that had the capacity to attack and defeat the government's forces would do so to achieve their goals as quickly as possible. Such opportunities rarely, if ever, exist in strong states. The alternative is to wage a war of attrition, gradually wearing down the state's and public's resolve. Terrorists seek to instill a climate of fear that erodes the public psyche, and to impose escalating economic costs, draining the state's financial resources and the collective will. Many of these objectives could be pursued without resorting to terrorism

3.2. The Causes of Terrorism

Karl von Clausewitz described "war as politics by other means." One might describe terrorism in the same way, or as "war by other means." There are two types of terrorism: rational and irrational. Rational terrorism has a political goal and a purpose. Irrational terror might be described as mindless violence that serves some dark psychological imbalance and is as difficult to understand as the motives of serial killers. As such this is

the realm of psychologists and psychiatrists, not political scientists, politicians, statesmen, and security specialists. This briefing deals only with "rational terrorism."

Rational terrorism is an outgrowth of public dissatisfaction and political dissent and a form of revolt against the established order, or regime. Few, if any, dissident movements willingly adopt terror as a conscious tactic, namely because such tactics provoke public revulsion and condemnation. Dissident movements will usually begin as reform movements that fail to achieve their demands and proceed through stages of escalating fear, frustration, anger and hardening attitudes. Violent political conflict can be categorized in terms of the motivation and aspirations of the combatants.

Political – In some cases the dissidents have what may best be described as political motivations. It's said that war is diplomacy by other means; violent political conflict could be described as politics by other means. The motivation may be to affect a political reform, or overthrow a regime perceived as illegitimate or lacking public trust and support. Terrorism may be used as to demonstrate the weakness and vulnerability of the regime, to reveal its inability to provide security, to provoke government repression to help recruit followers, and ultimately to force leaders from power. This motivation has been most common in Latin America, Africa and other developing regions and would be typical where there is an oppressed majority population that is denied political influence.

Cultural – This motivation is most common in situations where an ethnic or religious group fears extermination, or loss of their common identity, language or culture. It may also be combined with political motives, where the rulers discriminate against the ethnic group in terms of jobs, economic opportunity or access to the political process. In the case of oppressed minorities, opposed by a strong, entrenched regime, terrorism may be seen as the only available option. This is especially true where demands for political reform are ignored, where there are few, if any, external allies, and where the regime resorts to collective punishment for what are seen as reasonable and justified demands.

Psychological – A surprising number of pro-government analysts favour this explanation, which asserts that some terrorists are unbalanced, violent individuals suffering some form of psychosis. Others may be egomaniacs driven to achieve recognition through violence, and who attract a following of other dysfunctional individuals. This characterization may be accurate in cases where terrorist appear to have no logical goal, or motivation, or a purpose that makes little sense to normal people. This can include cases where the goal is the psychological benefit achieved by vengeance (Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City bombing). Psychologically motivated terrorism is simply a criminal act, like serial

killing, and doesn't qualify for analysis as political violence. Cultural motivations can be further classified into three broad, but non-exclusive categories.

Separatism – (let's separate). This happens in a situation where the ruling group is seen to be unfair and unjust in its government administration; dissident groups fight to form a separate state. Example would include the aspirations of Tamils in Sri Lanka, or Basques in Spain to establish a separate state for their people.

Cohesion – (aka Irredentism – let's get back together). The objective is to re-unite an ethno-political group that has been divided and separated by an arbitrary state border. An example is the conflict in Northern Ireland where Irish Republicans (typically Catholics) aspire to unify the 6 northern counties with the Republic of Ireland.

Nationalism – (let's organize ourselves). The aspiration of a national group (people related by ethnicity, religion, language or culture) to create a formal state for their nation. An example is the aspiration to establish Kurdistan as a homeland for the Kurdish people. This entails elements of both separatism and irredentism of Kurds living in Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

To what extent would you justify the definition of terrorism as a 'strategy of the weak against the strong to achieve politically motivated goals'?

4.0. CONCLUSION

It's doubtful that terrorism is any sane person's first choice. Most disgruntled people would start with a petition stating their grievances and setting forth their demands for reform. If denied, they might organize to demonstrate, or protest and might engage in civil disobedience – all designed to attract public attention and broaden their support. If denied again, they might attempt legal action, if such avenues are open to them. And if they fail, what then? And what if the denial involves being attacked and beaten by authorities, or being arrested and imprisoned? The reactions of the state government can directly influence the course of future events. Terrorism doesn't just happen. Terrorism is an advanced stage of a failed political process that begins with inequities and injustice, and moves from frustrated attempts at reform that breed fear and anger, to political confrontation that erupts in violence, which can be exploited to rationalize the use of any form of violence against any target. It seems that solutions to terrorism could be found at any stage of the evolving, or deteriorating political process. This suggests that we must start by understanding the historical context for today's conflicts.

5.0   SUMMARY

In fact, the question, "what causes terrorism?" is not quite the right question to be asking, because we will never be able to answer it. We cannot say that the presence of one factor provokes terrorism in the same way that we can say with scientific certainty that certain toxins cause diseases. If you listen closely to the explanations that are usually given as answers to the question, "What is terrorism?" you will find that they actually answer the question: "What are the conditions in which terrorism is most likely to take place?" Sometimes these conditions have to do with the people who become terrorists (they are described as having certain psychological traits, like 'narcissistic rage') and some conditions have to do with the circumstances they live in (a poor society; a formerly colonized society, for example). Although many people today believe that that religious fanaticism "causes" terrorism, it isn't true. It may be true that religious fanaticism creates *conditions* that are favorable for terrorism. But we know that religious zealotry does not 'cause' terrorism because there are many religious fanatics who do not choose terrorism or any form of violence. So there must also be other conditions that in combination provoke some people to see terrorism as an effective way of creating change in their world.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Examine the complexities involved in arriving at a universally acceptable definition of Terrorism

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 2: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous Unit discussed the nature of terrorism and the complexities involved in arriving at a universally acceptable definition. The Unit further examined various definitions of terrorism from different perspectives as well as the underlying socio-political issues that motivated recourse to terrorist activities. This Unit takes the discussion further by examining the evolution of terrorism from the past to the contemporary period.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
(i)   Provide an historical evolution of Terrorism
(ii) Identify the distinct characteristics of the contemporary Terrorism
(iii) Describe the nature of contemporary Terrorism

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Evolution of Terrorism
The history of terrorism is as old as humans' willingness to use violence to affect politics. The Sicarii were a first century Jewish group who murdered enemies and collaborators in their campaign to oust their Roman rulers from Judea. The Hashhashin, whose name gave us the English word "assassins," were a secretive Islamic sect active in Iran and Syria from the 11th to the 13th century. Zealots and assassins were not, however, really terrorists in the modern sense. Terrorism is best thought of as a modern phenomenon. Its characteristics flow from the international system of nation-states, and its success

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depends on the existence of a mass media to create an aura of terror among many people. (Chaliand, 2007)

The word Terrorism comes from the Reign of Terror instigated by Maxmilien Robespierre in 1793, following the French revolution. Robespierre, one of twelve heads of the new state, had enemies of the revolution killed, and installed a dictatorship to stabilize the country. Robespierre's sentiment laid the foundations for modern terrorists, who believe violence will usher in a better system. For example, the 19th century Narodnaya Volya hoped to end Tsarist rule in Russia. But the characterization of terrorism as a state action faded, while the idea of terrorism as an attack against an existing political order became more prominent (Chaliand, 2007)

After the Civil War, on December 24, 1865, six Confederate veterans created the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The KKK used violence, lynching, murder and acts of intimidation such as cross burning to oppress in particular African Americans, and created a sensation with its masked forays' dramatic nature. The group's politics are generally perceived as white supremacy, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Catholicism, and nativism. A KKK founder boasted that it was a nationwide organization of 550,000 men and that it could muster 40,000 Klansmen within five days' notice, but as a secret or "invisible" group with no membership rosters, it was difficult to judge the Klan's actual size. The KKK has at times been politically powerful, and at various times controlled the governments of Tennessee, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, in addition to several legislatures in the South

The rise of guerrilla tactics by non-state actors in the last half of the twentieth century was due to several factors. These included the flowering of ethnic nationalism (e.g. Irish, Basque, Zionist), anti-colonial sentiments in the vast British, French and other empires, and new ideologies such as communism. Terrorist groups with a nationalist agenda have formed in every part of the world. For example, the Irish Republican Army grew from the quest by Irish Catholics to form an independent republic, rather than being part of Great Britain. Similarly, the Kurds, a distinct ethnic and linguistic group in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, have sought national autonomy since the beginning of the 20th Century. The Kurdistan Workers Party(PKK), formed in the 1970s, uses terrorist tactics to announce its goal of a Kurdish state. The Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil are members of the ethnic Tamil minority. They use suicide bombing and other lethal tactics to wage a battle for independence against the Sinhalese majority government (Hoffman, 2007).

International terrorism became a prominent issue in the late 1960s, when hijacking became a favored tactic. In 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

hijacked an an El Al Flight. Twenty years later, the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, shocked the world. The era also gave us our contemporary sense of terrorism as highly theatrical, symbolic acts of violence by organized groups with specific political grievances (Crenshaw 2007).

The bloody events at the 1972 Munich Olympics were politically motivated. Black September,a Palestinian group, kidnapped and killed Israeli athletes preparing to compete.Black September's political goal was negotiating the release of Palestinian prisoners. They used spectacular tactics to bring international attention to their national cause.Munich radically changed the United States' handling of terrorism: "The terms *counterterrorism* and *international terrorism* formally entered the Washington political lexicon.

Terrorists also took advantage of the black market in Soviet-produced light weaponry, such as AK-47 assault rifles created in the wake of the Soviet Union's 1989 collapse. Most terrorist groups justified violence with a deep belief in the necessity and justice of their cause.

3.2. Contemporary Terrorism

Religiously motivated terrorism is considered the most alarming terrorist threat today. Groups that justify their violence on Islamic grounds- Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah— come to mind first. But Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and other religions have given rise to their own forms of militant extremism.

The role of technology is in the forefront of contemporary terrorism. This notion is ostensible due to multifarious technological advances and innovations. Possibilities for widespread destruction and continuous propaganda open up to terrorists who choose to avail themselves of such technology.

One of such technological advances is the Internet. The Internet is widely used to spread propaganda and even garner new recruits for terrorist organizations through web sites and blogs. Many times, computers and computer networks are compromised via the means of cyber terrorism to destroy and/or obtain information (White, 2006). Another good reason to use cyber terrorism techniques is to obtain the necessary funding to support terrorist campaigns. This can be done by hacking, scamming, phishing and other methods which will successfully penetrate its intended target (i.e. bank web sites and other financial institutions). This would not be easily achieved fifteen or twenty years ago, but now it is, and it poses a definite threat.

Another technological disadvantage to the humanity was the introduction of the weapons of mass destruction in the mid twentieth century. This innovation creates a high level threat to the world due to the inclination to cause massive destruction and life loss (White, 2006).

Further developments in technology have allowed for a torrent of communication. Cell phones, email, satellite com links, television, Internet, and other channels of communication have allowed for terrorist organizations to plan and execute in a much more organized and rapid manner. The use of cellular and satellite communications plays a vital role in the everyday life of a terrorist organization. Intelligence is gathered and the "message of intent" is spread with a click of a mouse. Suspicious meetings are arranged on Intranets with superb security features that can block even the most avid hackers. Terrorists train in how to use technology, and use it in order to stay ahead of the agents who try to eliminate them. Hence, terrorism may thrive within the present world and its technological marvels. Massive effort needs to be initiated to counter this force as the propensity for a future attack is high as the technology behind them will get better and more ground-breaking with time.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Trace the Evolution of Terrorism from the time of French Revolution to the Contemporary Era

4.0. CONCLUSION

The history of terrorism is a history of well-known and historically significant individuals, entities, and incidents associated, whether rightly or wrongly, with terrorism. Scholars agree that terrorism is a disputed term, and very few of those labeled Terrorists describe themselves as such. It is common for opponents in a violent conflict to describe the other side as terrorists. Those called terrorists can often be referred to as militants, paramilitaries, guerrillas, resistance movements or freedom fighters. However, they are united in the range of tactics they commonly employ which involves non-systemic covert or semi-covert warfare, driven by an ideological basis often political religious or socially based. They often seek to use propaganda of the deed to cause a psychological impact alongside the actions themselves to drive the aspired change. A significant issue that has emerged from the discussion of the evolution of Terrorism is that the character of terrorism has changed over the years from being used as instrument of state policy to a potent weapon by dissident groups opposing the state policies.

5.0   SUMMARY

Terrorism has been used as a tactic for centuries but has become more pervasive since the 1960s. After World War I and II, colonial powers redrew the maps in many parts of the world and gradually reduced their colonies. This led to a rise in nationalist movements seeking self-determination, or seeking to replace rulers that had been imposed by the colonists. Many of the resulting conflicts have involved revolutionary warfare strategy and guerrilla tactics.

However, traditional guerrilla warfare is often inappropriate in urbanized countries. For instance, rebels cannot gain and hold control over land when opposed by superior forces and cannot employ overt hit-and-run attacks effectively, without large losses. What emerged was a new doctrine of urban guerrilla warfare, which has evolved to include terrorist tactics.

Until recently, terrorism has been most closely associated with ethnic and minority group struggles for independence and self-determination. The primary area of conflict could usually be defined, as could the adversaries and their various aspirations. During the 1990s a new form of international terrorism emerged that appears less rational, less focused, more international and more deadly – Islamist Terrorism.

In fact, many of the causes and motivations remain strikingly similar to what could be called traditional modern terrorism. What is different is the religious ideological foundation, the broad definition of adversaries, the evolution in terrorist tactics and the desire and potential for devastating levels of destruction. Islamist extremists appear willing to ignore taboos against killing innocents and able to rationalize their actions by distorting Islamic teachings. The potential to use chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons of mass destruction has created a new level of terror that demands effective solutions.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Examine the differences in the characters of 'old terrorism' and the contemporary terrorism

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 3: TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
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3.1   Terrorism and Global Security
3.2.   Socio-Economic Impacts of Terrorism
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1.0. INTRODUCTION

The previous Unit discussed the nature of terrorism and the complexities involved in arriving at a universally acceptable definition. The Unit further examined various definitions of terrorism from different perspectives as well as the underlying socio-political issues that motivated recourse to terrorist activities. This Unit takes the discussion further by examining the evolution of terrorism from the past to the contemporary period.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
(i)   Discuss the linkages between Terrorism and global security
(ii) Identify the socio-economic impacts of global Terrorism

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Terrorism and Global Security

The act of terrorism transcend national boundaries in terms of the means of which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetuation operate or seek asylum. Terrorism is a war about identity-politics, the exclusive claim to power on the basis of identity, be it ethnic, religious, or linguistic. And this kind of conflict cannot be channeled into peaceful directions. And because the world has entered a new era of interdependence, it has not learnt how to adjust it's institutions and it's traditions of government to the new conditions. And the world is so closely, knitted together now that it is no longer possible for a nation to run amok on one frontier while her neighbour on another is hardly aware. Every war

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threatens to become a world war. Terrorism is threatening the viability of a nation-state, there by bringing about economic crisis, instability e.t.c.

Terrorism is not just America's fight alone, because the victims of the September 11th attack were from around the world. Terrorism has become frequent because terrorist are becoming more eager and desperate to change the world values and replace it with theirs, which they believe is best. Terrorism is a threat to tourism, energy-sector, civil-aviation, maritime, transportation and civil transportation. The problem of terrorism has refused to go away' instead, it has kept people in perpetual fear, robbing people of freedom and security. The nature of terrorists groups are similar whether conventional terrorists or information warrior. Conventional terrorist traditionally have operated as members of larger terrorists organizations.

The international community has often demonstrated a willingness to tolerate political violence against civilians perpetrated by states – state terrorism. Repressive states have been responsible for far greater terrorism than any so-called terrorist organization, yet they are allowed to continue their participation in the world's political and economic community. Only in the most enduring and grievous cases does the international community sanction, or exclude a repressive state. In addition, countries and arms merchants sell arms, provide military training and economic support to repressive, even terrorist regimes, seemingly oblivious to the fact that state repression breeds international terrorism and that terrorists will target those who lend support to their adversaries. It's little wonder that terrorism has emerged as a major threat to world security and peace.

Another problem that has drawn terrorism into the domain of international politics is the difficult question of how to deal with political organizations that use or have used terrorism but are democratically elected to positions of power. The contemporary examples we have before us in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are Hamas and Hezbollah. How should the international community deal with an armed state within a state or an armed party that leads a government? Iranian support for Hezbollah and its recalcitrance before the world community's effort to restrain its nuclear ambitions underscore the seriousness of this problem. (It is interesting that the war in Iraq began with the presumption that its purpose was to remove Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in the interest of curbing nuclear proliferation; we have now returned to the same threat with Iran, which has profited by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to fill a power vacuum in the Middle East (Crenshaw, 2007).

More convincing is the proposition that permeability of borders, mobility of persons, and instantaneous worldwide communication via the internet and the news media provide important resources for terrorist conspiracies. Underground organizations can take advantage of all the developments that make the world a smaller place. It is easy to travel, communicate, and transfer money. Islamist-oriented groups that call for a return to the past, paradoxically, are quite adept in using the tools of the modernity they ostensibly reject. They establish websites to promote the cause, talk via cell phones, watch satellite television, and jet around the globe; their main targets are public transportation systems, the facilities that are emblematic of modernity. Just as businesses, NGO's, and universities find it easier to integrate their activities and reach consumers and clients on a transnational scale, so do too the users of terrorism. It would be surprising if it were otherwise.

The war on terror has so far had results that have been massively costly in human terms and deeply counter-productive for the United States. This leads on to the issue of whether such failure will result in fundamental changes in what might broadly be called the western security paradigm, a paradigm centred on maintaining control and successfully suppressing that jungle full of poisonous snakes. If the experience of the war on terror suggests that "the jungle" cannot be controlled by the largely traditional application of military force, then an opportunity may exist for a radical re-appraisal of the current western understanding of global security (Rogers, 2009).

3.2. Socio-Economic Impacts Terrorism

Apart from the fear of insecurity terrorism brings about, it also reflects in economic decline, unemployment, inability to pay salaries of workers, debt burden; it brings about poverty and a general sense of frustration amongst the victims. Terrorism involves acts dangerous to human-life. They are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, so that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. The acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.

The economic impact of terrorism can be calculated from a variety of perspectives. There are direct costs to property and immediate effects on productivity, as well as longer term indirect costs of responding to terrorism. These costs can be calculated quite minutely; for example, calculations have been made about how much money would be lost in productivity if we all had to stand in line at the airport for an extra hour every time we flew.

Economists and others have tried to calculate the economic impact of terrorism for years in areas beset by attacks, such as Spain's Basque region and Israel. In the last several years, most analyses of terrorism's economic costs begin with an interpretation of the costs of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The response to the attacks, however, has been costly indeed. [Defense](#) and homeland security spending are by far the largest cost of the attack. The direct cost of the September 11 attack has been estimated at somewhat over $20 billion. Paul Krugman cites a property loss estimate by the Comptroller of the City of New York of $21.8 billion, which he has said is about 0.2 % of the GDP for a year (Krugman, 2004).

Similarly, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) estimated that the attack cost the private sector $14 billion and the federal government $0.7 billion, while clean-up was estimated at $11 billion. According to R. Barry Johnston and Oana M. Nedelscu in the IMF Working Paper, "The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets," these numbers are equal to about 1/4 of 1 percent of the US annual GDP--approximately the same result arrived at by Krugman (Zalman, 2003).

Defense and security spending increased by a massive amount in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The US alone now spends about US $500 billion annually--20 percent of the US federal budget--on departments directly engaged in combating or preventing terrorism, most notably Defense and Homeland Security. The Defense budget increased by one-third, or over $100 billion, from 2001 to 2003 in response to the heightened sense of the threat of terrorism – an increase equivalent to 0.7 per cent of US GDP. Expenditures on defense and security are essential for any nation, but of course they also come with an opportunity cost; those resources are not available for other purposes, from spending on health and education to reductions in taxes. A higher risk of terrorism, and the need to combat it, simply raises that opportunity cost (Krugman, 2004).

Economists also assess terrorism's impact on global supply chains. (A supply chain is the sequence of steps that suppliers of goods take to get products from one area to another.) These steps can become extremely costly in terms of time and money when extra layers of security at ports and land borders are added to the process. According to the OECD, higher transportation costs could have an especially negative effect on emerging economies that have benefited from a decrease in costs in the last decade, and thus on countries' ability to combat poverty (Zalman, 2003).

It does not seem entirely farfetched to imagine that in some instances, barriers meant to safeguard populations from terrorism would actually amplify the risk: poor countries that might have to slow exports because of the cost of security measures are at a greater risk, because of the effects of poverty, of political destabilization and radicalization among their populations.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

From a cost-benefit analysis, provide a convincing justification for the global war against terrorism

4.0. CONCLUSION

For governments, terrorism is a threat to sovereignty, reputation, and credibility as well as the safety of their citizens. National leaders must be sensitive to the challenge to the prestige of the state itself as well as to the security of their territories and populations. In democracies, leaders must respond to public opinion. They cannot afford to appear complacent or neglectful.

Today's terrorism also appears more threatening than in the past because of its global diffusion that makes it seem omnipresent, the willingness and ability of its users to cause large numbers of civilian casualties, and the tenacity and resilience of the jihadist movement that inspires it. Our awareness of all these factors is also more acute than ever because of the modern communications era. Although past terrorism had a transnational dimension (especially the anarchist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), the contemporary threat has a broader and more sustained territorial reach in terms of the geographical diversity of the location of attacks, the sites where plots are laid and resources gathered, and the nationalities of the individuals involved.

5.0 SUMMARY

Contemporary terrorism has widened their scope of activities to become global with far-reaching security and economic implications. The scope, security and economic impacts of terrorism were the focus of this Unit.

Terrorism has a negative impact on global security, which affects every nation because they are all connected. Terrorism has been in practice throughout history and throughout the world. It is affecting global security in the 21st century because it is becoming more rampant. Terrorism affects the foreign policy of many nations. A huge amount of lives have been destroyed, and properties worth billions also destroyed. People live in perpetual fear of insecurity, because they do not know the next turn of events, or where it

would take place. As a result of modern and sophisticated technology, the world has been reduced to a global village, hence the impact of terrorism on global security. It affects the whole world. Terrorism could threaten the peace and security of a nation. International terrorism continues to pose difficult challenges to state and human security in the international system.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Examine the socio-political implications of the contemporary global war against terrorism

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 4: TERRORIST NETWORK ORGANISATIONS

CONTENTS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

What has been emerging in the business world is now becoming apparent in the organizational structures of the newer and more active terrorist groups, which appear to be adopting decentralized, flexible network structures. The rise of networked arrangements in terrorist organizations is part of a wider move away from formally organized, state-sponsored groups to privately financed, loose networks of individuals and subgroups that may have strategic guidance but that, nonetheless, enjoy tactical independence. For example, in the Greater Middle East, terrorist organizations have diverse origins, ideologies, and organizational structures but can be categorized roughly into traditional and new-generation groups. Traditional groups date to the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the majority were (and some still are) formally or informally linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Typically, they are also relatively bureaucratic and maintain a nationalist or Marxist agenda. These groups have utilized autonomous cells as part of their organizational structure, but the operation of such cells is guided by a hierarchy through clear reporting relationships and virtually little horizontal coordination. In contrast, the newer and less hierarchical groups (such as Hamas; the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Hizbollah; Algeria's Armed Islamic Group; the Egyptian Islamic Group; and Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, al-Qaeda) have become the most active organizations . In these loosely organized groups with religious or ideological motives, operatives are part of a network that relies less on bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values and horizontal coordination mechanisms to accomplish
its goals

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
(i)   Identify some major Terrorist Network Organisations
(ii) Identify some types of Terrorist Attacks

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Terrorist Network Organisations

Throughout history, cases in which individuals unaffiliated with any group have carried out major terrorists acts are rare. It does not mean that, terrorist members have never acted alone while on a mission (i.e. suicide bomber). Although, one or two people may carry out a violent tactic or operation, a larger base of people and support exists elsewhere for them. Each terrorist whether a group or individual relies on the organization of which individual is a member. Terrorists' organizational structure is similar to that of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The hierarchy of terrorist organizations demands that an extensive leadership and support structure exist if it is to survive or succeed in its goals. The organization is composed chiefly of the hard-core leadership, active cadre, active support and passive support. The leaders in a terrorist organization play important roles.

The organization's complexity depends upon the skills of the insurgent leaders in identifying, integrating and coordinating the different tasks and rules essential to combat operations, training, communications, transportation, information and supervision. The leaders are the heart of the terrorist organization. The leaders profile emphasizes their ability to plan better than other members. The leaders usually come from higher economic classes, and are usually dedicated group of professionals, with background in medicine, law or philosophy. Terrorist's members as a whole do have a general profile. These characteristics include age, gender, marital status, socio-economic background and rural versus urban origins, depending on the type of terrorism the gender of the actors also varies. The terrorists group operates like international business organizations.

Terrorists network utilize the existing global economic, transportation and communication systems to organize and manage far-flung subsidiaries and to move funds, men and material from one location to another. Cell-phones and E-mail keep network in constant, while couriers provide cash advances, air plane tickets and passwords to facilitate operations. Terrorists operations are not restricted to territories or ideologies, or to a particular region. They are instead explicitly global in orientation. Terrorists operations flourish more in weak or failed states. The breakdown of authority,

law and order gives them the ability to conduct their operations without significant interference. Weak and failed states hold a lot of attractions for terrorists. Failed states flourish their smuggling and trafficking in order to raise funds.

The new and more active generation of Middle Eastern groups has operated both inside and outside the region. For instance, in Israel and the occupied territories, Hamas and to a lesser extent the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have demonstrated their strength over the last five years with a series of suicide bombings that have killed more than 100 people. In Egypt, the Islamic Group (also known as al-Gama'a al- Islamiya) carried out a 1997 attack at Luxor, killing 58 tourists and four Egyptians. Another string of terrorist attacks and foiled attempts) has focused attention on a loosely organized group of "Arab Afghans"—radical Islamic fighters from several North African and Middle Eastern countries who have forged ties while resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. One of the leaders and founders of the Arab Afghan movement is Osama bin Laden, a Saudi entrepreneur based in Afghanistan.

The organizational structure of a group determines its strengths and weaknesses. A general knowledge of the prevalent models of terrorist organizations leads to a better understanding of their capabilities. Knowledge of the different labels and systems of classification that have been applied to groups and individuals aid us in discarding useless or irrelevant terms, and in understanding the purposes and usefulness of different terminologies. In recent times, the popular image of a terrorist group operating according to a specific political agenda and motivated by ideology or the desire for ethnic or national liberation dominated our understanding of terrorism. While still true of some terrorist organizations, this image is no longer universally valid. Also, a generational change in leadership of established groups is in many cases ushering in a more a destructive and relentless type of organization.

Terrorist groups can be at various stages of development in terms of capabilities and sophistication. Newer groups with fewer resources will usually be less capable, and operate in permissive areas or under the tutelage of more proficient organizations to develop proficiency. Also, groups professing or associated with ethnic or nationalist agendas and limiting their operations to one country or a localized region tend to require fewer capabilities. Groups can coalesce from smaller organizations, or splinter off from larger ones. The smallest elements of terrorist organizations are the cells that serve as building blocks for the terrorist organization. One of the primary reasons for a cellular or compartmentalized structure is security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other cells.

Terrorists may organize cells based on family or employment relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct action and intelligence. The terrorist group may also form multifunctional cells. The terrorist group uses the cells to control its members. Cell members remain in close contact with each other to provide emotional support and to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures. A terrorist group may form only one cell or may form many cells that operate locally or internationally. The number of cells and their composition depend on the size of the terrorist group. A terrorist group operating within one country frequently has fewer cells and specialized teams than does an international terrorist group that may operate in several countries.

There are many different categories of terrorism and terrorist groups that are currently in use. These categories serve to differentiate terrorist organizations according to specific criteria, which are usually related to the field or specialty of whoever is selecting the categories. Also, some categories are simply labels appended arbitrarily or redundantly, often by the media. For example, every terrorist organization is by definition "radical", as terror tactics are not the norm for the mainstream of any group.

Separatist. Separatist groups are those with the goal of separation from existing entities through independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or domination. The ideologies separatists subscribe to include social justice or equity, anti-imperialism, as well as the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. Examples of these are : Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (or ETA (Basque for "Basque Homeland and Freedom", is an armed Basque nationalist separatist organization; The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was an Irish nationalist movement founded in December 1969 when several militants including Seán Mac Stíofáin broke off from the Official IRA and formed a new organization. Led by Mac Stíofáin in the early 1970s and by a group around Gerry Adams since the late 1970s, the Provisional IRA sought to create an all-island Irish state; The Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) was a Marxist nationalist group that sought to create an independent, socialist Quebec. Georges Schoeters founded the group in 1963 and was inspired by Che Guevara and Algeria's FLN

Ethnocentric. Groups of this persuasion see race as the defining characteristic of a society, and therefore a basis of cohesion. There is usually the attitude that a particular group is superior because of their inherent racial characteristics.

Nationalistic/Liberation. The loyalty and devotion to a nation, and the national consciousness derived from placing one nation's culture and interests above those of

other nations or groups. This can find expression in the creation of a new nation, or in splitting away part of an existing state to join with another that shares the perceived "national" identity. Founded in 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was the military wing of the African National Congress; it waged a guerrilla campaign against the South African apartheid regime and was responsible for many bombings

Revolutionary. Dedicated to the overthrow of an established order and replacing it with a new political or social structure. Although often associated with communist political ideologies, this is not always the case, and other political movements can advocate revolutionary methods to achieve their goals.

Political. Political ideologies are concerned with the structure and organization of the forms of government and communities. While observers outside terrorist organizations may stress differences in political ideology, the activities of groups that are diametrically opposed on the political spectrum are similar to each other in practice.

Religious. Religiously inspired terrorism is on the rise, with a forty-three percent increase of total international terror groups espousing religious motivation between 1980 and 1995. While Islamic terrorists and organizations have been the most active, and the greatest recent threat to the United States, all of the major world religions have extremists that have taken up violence to further their perceived religious goals. Religiously motivated terrorists see their objectives as holy writ, and therefore infallible and non-negotiable. Hezbollah ("Party of God") is an Islamist movement and political party founded in Lebanon shortly after that country's 1982 civil war. Inspired by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, the group originally sought an Islamic revolution in Lebanon and has long fought for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. A number of terrorist organisations in the Middle East are influenced by religious convictions. Examples of such movements are the Hamas; Al-Qaeda; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Muslim brotherhood, the Fatah Movement; Palestian Islamic Jihad, Abu Sayyaf. The Taliban is well known for beastly governing the Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and its deadly guerrilla war against the NATO including the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This terrorist group was founded by Pashtun tribes with the significant support from some Islamic countries

Domestic. These terrorists are "home-grown" and operate within and against their home country. They are frequently tied to extreme social or political factions within a particular society, and focus their efforts specifically on their nation's socio-political arena.

International or Transnational. Often describing the support and operational reach of a group, these terms are often loosely defined, and can be applied to widely different capabilities. *International groups* typically operate in multiple countries, but retain a geographic focus for their activities. Hezbollah has cells worldwide, and has conducted operations in multiple countries, but is primarily concerned with events in Lebanon and Israel. *Transnational groups* operate internationally, but are not tied to a particular country, or even region. Al Qaeda is transnational; being made up of many nationalities, having been based out of multiple countries simultaneously, and conducting operations throughout the world. Their objectives affect dozens of countries with differing political systems, religions, ethnic compositions, and national interests

3.2 Types of Terrorist Attacks

Bombings

Bombings are the most common type of terrorist act. Typically, improvised explosive devices are inexpensive and easy to make. Modern devices are smaller and are harder to detect. They contain very destructive capabilities; for example, on August 7, 1998, two American embassies in Africa were bombed. The bombings claimed the lives of over 200 people, including 12 innocent American citizens, and injured over 5,000 civilians. Terrorists can also use materials that are readily available to the average consumer to construct a bomb.

Kidnappings/Hostage-Takings

Terrorists use kidnapping and hostage-taking to establish a bargaining position and to elicit publicity. Kidnapping is one of the most difficult acts for a terrorist group to accomplish, but, if a kidnapping is successful, it can gain terrorists money, release of jailed comrades, and publicity for an extended period. Hostage-taking involves the seizure of a facility or location and the taking of hostages. Unlike a kidnapping, hostage-taking provokes a confrontation with authorities. It forces authorities to either make dramatic decisions or to comply with the terrorist's demands. It is overt and designed to attract and hold media attention. The terrorists' intended target is the audience affected by the hostage's confinement, not the hostage. On September 1, 2004, in what became known as the Beslan school hostage crisis, thirty-two Chechnyan separatists took 1,300 children and adults hostage at Beslan's School 1 and the attempted rescue recorded many casualties.

Attacks/Assassinations

Armed attacks include raids and ambushes. Assassinations are the killing of a selected victim, usually by bombings or small arms. Drive-by shootings is a common technique employed by unsophisticated or loosely organized terrorist groups. Historically, terrorists have assassinated specific individuals for psychological effect.

Arsons

Incendiary devices are cheap and easy to hide. Arson and fire bombings are easily conducted by terrorist groups that may not be as well-organized, equipped, or trained as a major terrorist organization. An arson or firebombing against a utility, hotel, government building, or industrial center portrays an image that the ruling government is incapable of maintaining order, thereby trying to discredit and undermine the government in power. .

Hijackings

Hijacking is the seizure by force of a surface vehicle, its passengers, and/or its cargo. Skyjacking is the taking of an aircraft, which creates a mobile, hostage barricade situation. It provides terrorists with hostages from many nations and draws heavy media attention. Skyjacking also provides mobility for the terrorists to relocate the aircraft to a country that supports their cause and provides them with a human shield, making retaliation difficult. This was the mode employed in September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, when three flights were hijacked and later used to bomb some selected targets within the U.S., causing the highest human casualties ever recorded.

In addition to the acts of violence discussed above, there are also numerous other types of violence that can exist under the framework of terrorism. Terrorist groups conduct maimings against their own people as a form of punishment for security violations, defections, or informing. Terrorist organizations also conduct robberies and extortion when they need to finance their acts and they don't have sponsorship from sympathetic nations. Cyber-terrorism is a new form of terrorism that is only going to increase in profile as we rely on computer networks to relay information and provide connectivity to today's modern and fast-paced world. Cyber-terrorism allows terrorists to conduct their operations with little or no risk to themselves. It also provides terrorists an opportunity to disrupt or destroy networks and computers. The result is interruption of key government or business-related activities. This type of terrorism isn't as high profile as other types of terrorist attacks, but its impact could be very destructive and destabilizing.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Identify some major contemporary terrorist groups and their mode of operations

4.0. CONCLUSION

Terrorism has been practiced by a broad array of political organizations to further their objectives. It has been practiced by right-wing and left-wing political parties, nationalistic groups, religious groups, revolutionaries, and ruling governments. An abiding characteristic is the indiscriminate use of violence against noncombatants for the purpose of gaining publicity for a group, cause, or individual. The symbolism of terrorism can leverage human fear to help achieve these goals.

Historically, terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons have been rare. Due the extremely high number of casualties that NBC weapons produce, they are also referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD. The increased development of WMD also increases the potential for terrorist groups to gain access to WMD. It is believed that in the future terrorists will have greater access to WMD because unstable nations or states may fail to safeguard their stockpiles of WMD from accidental losses, illicit sales, or outright theft or seizure. Determined terrorist groups can also gain access to WMD through covert independent research efforts or by hiring technically skilled professionals to construct the WMD.

5.0 SUMMARY

The Unit has provided some categories and examples of contemporary terror organizations and the mode of their operations, like kidnapping, arson, bombing, armed attacks and cyber-terrorism. The possibility of determined terror groups using weapons of mass destruction raises the stake higher for the contemporary war against terrorism. However, the underlying provocative factors driving people into extremism should be the fundamental starting point for addressing the scourge of terror groups.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Categorise contemporary terror organisations into five distinct groups and provide relevant examples of each category.

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UNIT 5: CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

CONTENTS

1.0.   INTRODUCTION

The War on Terror (also known as the Global War on Terrorism) is a term commonly applied to the international military campaign which started as a result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. This resulted in an international military campaign to eliminate al-Qaeda and other militant organizations. The United Kingdom and many other NATO and non-NATO nations participated in the conflict. The phrase 'War on Terror' was first used by US President George W. Bush on 20 September 2001. The Bush administration and the Western media have since used the term to signify a global military, political, lawful, and conceptual struggle—targeting both organizations designated as terrorist and regimes accused of supporting them. It was typically used with a particular focus on militant Islamists and al-Qaeda.

The events of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new era of US pre-emptive military action aimed at securing the safety of US interests at home and abroad. The new rhetoric of the US government insured America's right to self-defense, and the World's obligation to the defense of freedom. The Global War on Terror is one main component of this new strategy. However, as the War has evolved, it has become increasingly apparent that this new doctrine does not represent a shift in US foreign policy with regard to the Middle East. In fact, the US government has sustained static normative policy in the region since the end of World War II. Though the rhetoric has changed, American strategic goals, and the means used to achieve them, have not. From a U.S. led coalition war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the contemporary war against terrorism has expanded to become a global war with far-reaching political and economic consequences. This Unit examines the dynamics of the global war against terrorism and also evaluate the progress made so far and the prospects of winning the war.

2. OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
(i)   Describe the nature of the global war against terrorism
(ii) Evaluate the progress made so far in the war
(iii) Analyze the prospects of wining the war against terrorism

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Global War against Terrorism

The War on Terror was not initiated as a policy of self defense, but rather as a vehicle by which to achieve specific political goals of the United States government. Though implemented as a reaction to the hijacking of four American commercial airliners, and the subsequent attacks on United States soil in September of 2001, the politics behind the "new" foreign policy agenda of the US government had been in place for decades. With regard to the Middle East, the United States strategic goals are comprised of three fundamental components: the security of the lone regional nuclear power; Israel, control over the flow of Persian Gulf oil, and maintenance of regional stability to ensure the integrity of investment opportunities.

Declaring a war on terrorism gives the United States government considerable strategic latitude. Riding international support and domestic fear, the Bush administration was able to rally support for a military response not just against the organization blamed for the attacks of 9/11, but any organization which it claims espouses terrorism and all governments which apparently harbor such activity. The declaration of war was a declaration of revenge against all those who the United States chooses to label as terrorists. In order to clarify where the lines would be drawn, President Bush introduced the layout of the organization of the post 9/11 world to the international community in a speech to Congress nine days after the attacks: "Either you're with us, or you're with the terrorists". This loaded statement by the American President is significant not simply for its disclosure of unprecedented levels of exclusionary exceptional, but for the way in which the administration effectively redefined terrorism and the legitimacy of the American government. President Bush defined terrorism as the antithesis of American values. Such a definition relegates terrorism to a conditional standing insofar as only acts which the United States government labels as existing in opposition to American interests will be deemed as terror, and therefore necessitate a response (White, 2006).

On October 7, 2001, the U.S. and British militaries began air and missile strikes against Afghanistan, giving the new foreign-policy narrative its first expression as a conventional war. Within several years the field of military and support operations had widened to include the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and North and Trans-Saharan Africa, in addition to Iraq. Although Bush presented military action as only one thrust of the new war, which also entailed diplomacy, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts, the war would nonetheless be most deeply associated with the military for both of the administration's terms. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld helped support the tendency to conflate the symbolic war with actual warfare. The terms of victory were the numbers of al-Qaeda members or other terrorist suspects killed. The 2006 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, produced during Rumsfeld's tenure at the Defense Department, took the global war on terror as its central theme, characterizing the enemy as "dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam, subjugate the Muslim world under a radical theocratic tyranny while seeking to perpetuate conflict with the United States and its allies and partners" (US Department of Defence, 2006).

After the fall of the Taliban regime many members of the Taliban resistance fled to the Northern border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan where the Pakistani army had previously little control. With the logistics and air support of the United States, the Pakistani Army captured or killed numerous al-Qaeda operatives such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, wanted for his involvement in the USS Cole bombing, the Bojinka plot, and the killing of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl.

The Iraq war was a major test to the Bush administration's unilateral approach to the War on Terror. Though the UN resolution that the US gained support through immediately after the attacks did not establish any legitimacy for military action, the American Congress had authorized military deployment against any nation or organization that had planned the September 11th attacks to prevent further atrocities. In order to procure Congressional approval for an invasion of Iraq, President Bush cited that "members of *al Qa'ida*, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, are known to be in Iraq", adding also that "Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Here again the US selective respect for international law is revealed, as ongoing violation of UN resolutions by Israel for similar activities continued to be supported by the US regime. Publicly, the original call for war against Saddam Hussein was the Iraqi regime's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, namely chemical and biological weapons. US intelligence reports suggested Iraq still maintained stockpiles of these weapons which were used against the Kurds and against Iran in the 1980s when the

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US supplied military aid to Iraq. However, these claims were either proved to be false, or could not be verified (Chomsky, 2003).

Baghdad, Iraq's capital city, fell in April 2003 and Saddam Hussein's government quickly dissolved. On 1 May 2003, Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. However, an insurgency arose against the U.S.-led coalition and the newly developing Iraqi military and post-Saddam government. The insurgency, which included al-Qaeda affiliated groups, led to far more coalition casualties than the invasion. Other elements of the insurgency were led by fugitive members of President Hussein's Ba'ath regime, which included Iraqi nationalists and pan-Arabists. Many insurgency leaders are Islamists and claim to be fighting a religious war to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate of centuries past. Iraq's former president, Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. forces in December 2003 and was executed in 2006.

In 2004, the insurgent forces grew stronger. The US conducted attacks on insurgent strongholds in cities like Najaf and Fallujah. In January 2007, President Bush presented a new strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom based upon counter-insurgency theories and tactics developed by General David Petraeus. The Iraq War troop surge of 2007 was part of this "new way forward" and, along with US backing of Sunni groups it had previously sought to defeat, has been credited with a widely recognized dramatic decrease in violence by up to 80% (Gompert, 2008).

In October 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established in Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier. It contains approximately 2,000 personnel including US military and special operations forces (SOF) and coalition force members, Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150). Task Force 150 consists of ships from a shifting group of nations, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Pakistan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The primary goal of the coalition forces is to monitor, inspect, board and stop suspected shipments from entering the Horn of Africa region and affecting the US' Operation Iraqi Freedom. Included in the operation is the training of selected armed forces units of the countries of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics. Humanitarian efforts conducted by CJTF-HOA include rebuilding of schools and medical clinics and providing medical services to those countries whose forces are being trained (Kilcullen, 2005).

The war against terrorism has subsequently widened in scope to become a global operation with successful terrorists' strikes across Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

The U.S. has enlisted global coalition through NATO and governments of the world to support the onslaught against terrorism. Funding, training and intelligence sharing have been provided in the global coalition against terrorism. Many governments of the world have been pressurized to make legislation domestically to support the global war against terrorism while incentives have also been provided to encourage compliance with the U.S. mandate.

3.2.   Wining the War against Terrorism

The U.S. led global war against terrorism without any doubt has recorded significant success with the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the collapse of Qadaffi in Libya and the reversal of fortunes for Al-shabab in Somalia. Successful drone strikes have also decimated the leadership of Al-Qaeda, thereby greatly weakening its coordinating structures and leadership. The high point of the success was the killing of Osama Bin Laden himself in Pakistan. These recorded successes have greatly reduced the capability of terrorists to organize coordinated attacks, especially in the western world.

However, despite the recorded successes, the war against on Terrorism goes on because it does not address the primary causes. If we define winning as stopping terrorism for all time, the present US strategy focuses on eliminating the present generation of terrorists. Under that strategy, nations are invited to work with the US on controlling terrorists in their own countries. If those nations cooperate, they do so by repressing the out group in their countries whose most angry or discontented members are the terrorists. Angered and frustrated by further repression, those out groups grow the next generation of terrorists. As a result, the War on Terrorism is self-feeding, and it may be difficult to be won (Rogers, 2009).

The same rules apply to War on Terrorism as to all other wars. No real progress can be made until the fighting stops. Only then can we focus on the problems of repression, social, political and economic injustice, human rights abuses, and reactions to main-stream neglect that are the global breeding grounds for terrorism. Those problems exist in at least a third of all nations. If we do not recognize this situation soon and move with other nations and the United Nations system to deal with it, we are all doomed to perpetual conflict. Our best chances lie with dedicating many more aid resources to solving those problems and as quickly as possible shifting the fight against terrorism back to law, diplomacy and the justice system.

While the War on Terror was successful initially in creating a justification for the US means of achieving its political goals the long term effects may prove to be detrimental. One major goal of the US in the Middle East has been severely threatened as a result of the war, and this is the region's political stability. The destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime helped strengthen the Islamic state of Iran, and brought about the subsequent eruption of sectarian violence in Iraq aided by US support for various Sunni militias. Also, the unconditional support for Israeli self-defense by the US government has led to unprecedented military strikes against the increasingly repressed and therefore belligerent HAMAS political leadership in Gaza. Through the trespasses of the United States government against domestic and international law, and their direct support for nations that do the same, the tactics of the War on Terror are slowly being revealed as the continuation of 60 years of US international law violations in the Middle East. Executing their foreign policy toward unchanged goals by means of economic and political coercion, support for repressive regimes, abandonment of UN resolutions and human rights, the American government has shown no moral improvement or shift in action to denote the undertaking of a war in which an inherent and absolute "evil" is opposed by a high-valued and moral "good". By defining a moral undertaking as the relative value of its goal, and dismissing the means by which this goal is achieved, the United States government successfully used the War on Terror as a justification for the exercise of hegemonic control in the Middle East (Bobbit, 2008).

The Arab Spring has brought freedom to much of the Middle East and North Africa. This is good news for America. Ultimately, democracy shapes healthy societies. Where governments are responsive to the aspirations of their citizens, despair is gradually replaced by hope. And terrorist atrocities are not acts born of satisfied minds. This being said, it's also true that the Arab Spring has empowered political Islamists. So America has a choice to make either to engage with new political realities or retreat into isolation.

Clearly, the U.S. can do far more to persuade Muslims that he is a friend to their interests, rather than an enemy to their aspirations. To do so, U.S should adopt an expansive but honest public relations campaign, pointing out the obvious, sickening hypocrisies of her adversaries. The central truth of the war on terror should be conveyed that Islam is not America's greatest enemy; it is the extremists who usurp the Muslim faith in order to wage war against their fellow believers. From Pakistan to Iraq, Muslims are subjected to a daily epidemic of destruction. In Syria, the charlatan emancipators, Hezbollah, are joined with the Iranian theocrats in a brutal campaign of murder against civilians demanding democracy. In Lebanon, Hezbollah uses murder as a political weapon. In

Afghanistan, the Taliban hang children and shoot teachers. These terrorists are neither agents of liberation nor servants of Islam.

Another crucial initiative is that for terror suspects detained abroad, U.S. should adopt a legal framework that can bring these detainees to speedy military trial at Guantanamo Bay. The current judicial framework for capturing, detaining, and prosecuting terrorists is excessively confused and far too slow. Fortunately, the Obama administration is showing new interest in solving this troubling problem. And whether in Algeria, Mali, Somalia, Yemen or elsewhere, U.S. should ensure that extremist groups fail to find sanctuary in weak states. America has highly competent intelligence officers and military personnel who deserve the latitude to work legally but creatively. The continuing threat of Islamist terrorism is not something imagined by conservative propaganda and should be confronted head-on.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

How can a successful war against terrorism be prosecuted?

4.0.   CONCLUSION

Successful counter-terrorism is difficult to measure. Unlike a conventional military campaign, there is no enemy capital to capture, army or industrial base to destroy. Even a terrorist organization that is divided and demoralized still has the capability to lash out and kill many innocents. In their open statements to Congress, FBI Director Robert Mueller III, CIA Director George Tenet, and other senior officials have emphasized the number of arrests and disruptions as a way of indicating success. Director Mueller testified that "We have charged over 200 suspected terrorists with crimes," while Director Tenet noted that, "more than one third of the top al Qaeda leadership identified before the war has been captured or killed." President Bush himself reportedly keeps a "scorecard" that notes which al Qaeda and Taliban leaders are dead or in custody.

Such a body count approach is appealing because it provides a concrete measure of success and failure. However, a body count can be misleading because the size of the terrorist cadre is often unknown, and many of those killed or captured are low-level recruits who can easily be replaced. More important, such an approach generally fails to measure accurately the status of the adversary's morale, recruitment, fundraising, organization, ability to conduct sophisticated attacks, and other vital components. If al Qaeda can still recruit new members, maintain the support for its cadres, fund its operations, sustain its organizational structure, and mount sophisticated operations, the

loss of even a Khalid Shaikh Mohammed may have little impact on its overall strength. The war on terrorism is far from over. Al Qaeda and the ideology it promulgates remain strong, and the Middle East in particular will remain fertile ground for anti-American radicalism for the foreseeable future. As a result, for years and perhaps decades to come, Americans must be ready to live with the risk of large-scale terrorist violence.

5.0   SUMMARY

In the short-term, the war against terrorism appears to be going well, but the long-term outlook is far more troubling. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups continue to draw numerous recruits throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world more broadly. The September 11 attacks built on al Qaeda's past successes, making it clearly the leading anti-American movement in the world. Ironically, U.S. efforts to fight terrorism have resulted in the fostering rather than diminution of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Washington's embrace of sordid governments such as the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, its silence regarding Russian brutality in Chechnya, and other distasteful, albeit perhaps necessary, concessions needed to ensure vital cooperation against al Qaeda are paradoxically bolstering al Qaeda's claims that the United States supports the oppression of Muslims and props up brutal governments.

There are few easy choices in the war on terrorism, and no silver bullets. Several measures, however, will help the United States better posture itself against terrorist groups for the long-term as well as for the coming months. Most obviously, homeland defense must become a true priority. So far, the United States has not fully embraced the range of measures necessary to secure itself more completely. In addition, we must avoid a false sense of complacency. Declarations of victory, even after impressive counterterrorism successes, will only make Americans surprised rather than resolved during the many trials to come.

Public diplomacy in the Middle East also deserves more than lip service. This requires heavy investment in measures that will help woo the next generation of leaders and improve America's image among the many Muslims and Arabs currently suspicious of the United States. To return to the analogy of a global insurgency, to actually defeat al Qaeda will mean winning the hearts and minds of the people in the Islamic world to eliminate al Qaeda's recruitment and financing base, and make it impossible for its operatives to move and operate in the greater Middle East. This is a much bigger campaign than the war on terrorism has so far embraced, and will require tools—economic, political, and cultural—that the United States has so far only defined but has yet to wield effectively. No strategy guarantees complete security. The United States and

its allies must accept the inevitability of a large, global movement bent on murder as a form of political expression. Ultimate victory, when it comes, will take decades rather than years.

6.0   TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Critically examine the prospects of wining the global war against terrorism

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